

MONITOR

DEVELOPMENT POLICY

THE ROLE OF NON-TRADITIONAL DONORS IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

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Pragmatic Giants

On the Development Policy of the Gulf States: Motives, Priorities and the Potential for Cooperation¹

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- › In respect of their development policy, the Gulf states were long described as ‘newcomers’ or ‘quiet giants’. However, such characterisations no longer reflect the reality of Gulf Arab development policy.
- › The Gulf states’ development policy still correlates with their own specific motives, logic and objectives, though, which often distinguish it from the policy of traditional Western donors.
- › Despite improved, but still incomplete data on funding and activities, the Gulf states can be described as giants in development assistance. They are active, in particular, in education and training, the advancement of women, children and young people, health, electricity, drinking water and wastewater, while also granting micro-credits and providing budget support, for example.
- › An intertwining of various motives and objectives can be discerned in the development policy pursued by the Gulf states. Development policy is linked, in particular, to security and economic policy.
- › Given their self-imposed pressure to reform in preparation for a post-oil era and in view of the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, it remains to be seen whether the Gulf states can sustain their high level of development assistance.
- › The Gulf states can already be considered partners in the realm of development policies of the DAC member states (including Germany). Cooperation in partnership is possible despite varying motives and approaches. In view of the prospect of declining financial resources and increasing global challenges, such cooperation should be expanded.

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Quiet giants?

The Gulf states have frequently been described as ‘quiet giants’ in development assistance². A characterisation of this kind makes it clear that hitherto the Gulf states have been comparatively reserved about their role as providers of development aid, although they are very active. In a discussion with the analyst and author Peter Salisbury, an unnamed development policy player said in 2017: ‘In the Middle East, Africa, and in Islamic countries in Asia, the Gulfies have been there as long as they have had oil money. [...] The more recent phenomenon has been that they have been entering the same space [as the OECD countries], and they are often not as experienced or sophisticated in that space, so they are seen as these newcomers.’³

Since the 1970s these ‘newcomers’ from the Gulf – especially Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – have had at their disposal a large number of bilateral and multilateral organisations dedicated to development assistance, and a global comparison shows that they spend very large sums in this field. There are still major gaps in the data on development aid from the Gulf states, however.⁴ An OECD report published in 2020 nonetheless provides some interesting clues to the financial resources expended by the Gulf donors.⁵ It shows that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were among the world’s major bilateral donors in 2017 (ranked 7th and 8th respectively). The OECD also classifies Qatar and Kuwait as ‘significant’ donors (in 20th and 22nd place respectively). Regarding the target of spending 0.7 per cent of gross national income on development aid (Official Development Assistance ratio or ODA ratio), the UAE have spent over 1 per cent since 2013 and had the highest ODA ratio worldwide in 2017.⁶ Kuwait ranks ninth in the relevant OECD survey, Qatar eleventh and Saudi Arabia twentieth. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Saudi Arabia was the fourth largest provider of humanitarian aid in 2018 and the ninth largest in 2020, while the UAE was the third largest provider of humanitarian aid in relation to its gross national income in 2016. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the UAE became the world’s largest

donor of humanitarian aid in 2013, having made 5.89 billion US dollars available.⁷ Thus it would appear justifiable to describe them as ‘giants’. However, they no longer go ‘quietly’ about their business. They are active, in particular, in education and training, the support and advancement of women, children and young people, health, electricity, drinking water and wastewater; they grant micro-loans, for example, and provide budget support.

Table 1: TOP 5 donors worldwide by ODA ratio (2017)

No.	Donor	ODA ratio (percentage share of GNI)
1	United Arab Emirates	1.03%
2	Sweden	1.01%
3	Luxembourg	1.00%
4	Norway	0.99%
5	Denmark	0.72%
	ODA target	0.7%
	DAC average	0.31%

Source: OECD Development Finance Data

Policy interdependence in development assistance – zakat, security, stability and economic prosperity


The image of today's Gulf monarchies is one of glittering high-rise facades, air-conditioned shopping malls, global airlines, a Mars mission and rentier systems in which citizens are provided with basic necessities for a good quality of life. Hence it comes as no surprise that large amounts of money can also be spent on development assistance. However, it is easy to forget that, in the minds and experience of the players involved and of Gulf citizens at large, their countries were still ‘underdeveloped’ as late as the 1970s. In a 1979 special issue on *Arab Aid* published by Saudi Aramco World, the magazine of the Saudi Aramco oil company, a representative of the Abu Dhabi Fund was quoted as saying: ‘You have to have been here 10 years ago to know how we feel. [...] We did not have any streets, any schools, any kind of infrastructure at all. People walked around barefoot. Life was very poor. All this is still very fresh in our minds, so we feel it is our duty to help other people now that we are in a position to do so.’⁸ This personal awareness of the past combined with a (partly) religiously motivated emphasis on charity, compassion and generosity – Muslims are obliged by the custom of zakat to donate 2.5 per cent of their personal wealth – has spawned a tradition of assistance in the Gulf: ‘A desire to help the less fortunate and be generous with wealth is [...] embedded in the cultural consciousness of the region. Shared religious and cultural affinity may partially explain the observation that Gulf aid tends to be concentrated in the immediate region, with a demonstrable preference of Arab and Muslim countries.’⁹

The Gulf states differ as regards the recipients of their development aid wherever political motives come into play. Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other, have pursued different strategies in Egypt, while Saudi Arabia has a more pronounced interest in Yemen, this being reflected in the fact that it receives the bulk of Saudi funding. Overall, however, the Gulf states generally prefer to concentrate their aid on Arab and Muslim states. This has been

a defining aspect for Gulf donors from the very start. They have been providing aid to the Palestinian territories since the 1960s, for example. Aid flowed to Lebanon to stabilise the country during the civil war from 1975 to 1990, while in the 1970s and early 1980s Saudi Arabia, in particular, sought to make other monarchies resilient to the concept of Arab nationalism and the influence of the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was the largest per capita donor in the world, directing its aid to regional allies (mainly Jordan, Morocco, North Yemen, Iraq and Syria). Finally, mention should also be made of the Gulf states' aid to Iraq after the "Iranian revolution" of 1979, the intention being to consolidate Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian influence.¹⁰ It is against this backdrop that Saudi Arabia began exporting Wahhabism, a very conservative form of Islam. For many years, dissemination of this interpretation of Islam constituted a motivation for development policy, expressed in the form of development aid, religious education at home and abroad, and financial support for religious schools and mosques. However, the situation changed with the attacks of 11 September 2001 (15 of the 19 attackers were Saudi citizens), the subsequent criticism of the kingdom's religious policy and, finally, Saudi Arabia's fresh stance adopted under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The influence of the clergy and the religious police was severely curtailed and new, stricter rules governing religious organisations, their activities and financial flows were enacted. This is in line with Mohammed bin Salman's policy of a 'return to moderate Islam'¹¹.

The persisting regional focus reveals a second motive underlying the Gulf states' development cooperation: stabilisation of neighbouring countries and consolidation of their own systems of government. For example, financial support in accordance with the rentier model¹² was initially expanded in their own countries after the "Arab Spring", but large amounts of financial aid also went to Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and Oman, for instance – and later also to Egypt.¹³ This was intended to stabilise other monarchies and neighbouring countries, including Egypt, secure the status quo, sponsor states considered as security partners and stem Iran's regional expansion. These interests also prompted Saudi Arabia to pursue a policy of military intervention in Yemen, while simultaneously spending large amounts on humanitarian aid.¹⁴ Development, stabilisation and security policies are thus intertwined. This policy interdependence is reflected in the data published by the OECD, according to which the Gulf donors spent 68 per cent of their financial aid between 2013 and 2017 on development schemes in the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt, Yemen and Morocco received 60.3 per cent of this aid.

Figure 1: Regional distribution of ODA funds of the Gulf states (2013-17)



Source: Author's own diagram based on OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate 2020: How Arab countries and institutions finance development.

Table 2: Top 10 recipient states of ODA funds from Gulf Arab donors (2013-17)

No.	Recipient country	Share
1	Egypt	34%
2	Yemen	11%
3	Morocco	8.7%
4	Jordan	6.6%
5	Serbia	3.6%
6	Sudan	2.5%
7	Iraq	1.8%
8	Pakistan	1,8%
9	Mauretania	1.7%
10	Tunisia	1.6%

Source: OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate 2020: How Arab countries and institutions finance development.

However, funding earmarked for the MENA region fell by 11.2 per cent between 2013 and 2017, while funding for Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 46.6 per cent over the same period.¹⁵ Here, the main recipients are the countries in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and West Africa. A look at the focus of this aid reveals three additional aims driving the Gulf states' development policy: food security, economic prosperity and geopolitical co-determination.

Although the Gulf states (Qatar in particular) have made great efforts in recent years to build up food infrastructures in their own countries, they are still heavily dependent on imports.¹⁶ Therefore, they support and invest in the agricultural economies of other countries (especially in Africa)¹⁷ and in the transport, infrastructure and logistics sectors¹⁸ in an effort to secure their own food supply – a necessity that was highlighted once again by the temporary disruption of supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The regional priorities described above in conjunction with the areas of investment also throw light on the geopolitical interests the Gulf states pursue in competition with each other and with other states. A new 'Great Game' is being played in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey along with Russia, China and the USA are expanding their presence. The key issues for the Gulf states are food security, access to Africa and securing the sea routes and their western borders.

Another strategy pursued by the Gulf states is to export elements of their reform models in an effort to generate economic benefits for themselves from their activities in the recipient countries and to support their economic diversification strategies. For example, the UAE have invested directly in real estate and industry in Egypt. This is in line with their own economic and development model, which focuses primarily on infrastructure and real estate projects. Thus, development partnerships are concluded in order to open up markets, secure follow-up orders, strengthen the states' own business locations and establish (economic) networks between donor and recipient countries. This leads to an interweaving of development and economic policy.¹⁹

Decisions on the volume, type and recipient country of development aid are made by the royal houses and so this aid becomes highly personalised, as it is linked to the ruling families. With this in mind, a search for prestige and nation branding are likely to be among the motives for development aid. The Gulf states publicise their aid efforts much more openly than in the past, be it through cross-media communication, holding development policy forums or major conferences. This also demonstrates their willingness to assume greater responsibility at the international level, to function as reliable partners and play a role in international politics.²⁰

Pragmatic donors

This role is played, amongst others, by bilateral and multilateral organisations which have joined forces in the Coordination Group of Arab National and Regional Development Institutions²¹, founded in 1975, as well as through other organisations in the individual Gulf states.²² The financing instruments employed are loans, grants, budget support, debt relief and (religiously motivated) donations. In addition, there are in-kind deliveries in the form of oil and gas or financially subsidised oil and gas as well as investments in construction and real estate. Contributions to international organisations are relatively modest by comparison. However, the Gulf states contribute to specific programmes whenever they are deemed important (e.g. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East and humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees). Development assistance from the Gulf remains bilateral.²³

This bilateral development aid can be described as highly pragmatic in that it is tailored to the recipient countries. The Gulf states tend to respond more to requests than to implement pre-formulated aid packages or strategies they have devised themselves. Moreover, they rely on experts,

advisors and government representatives in the recipient countries concerned.²⁴ Conditionality, in the sense that financial aid is tied to reforms in the areas of finance, the economy or governance, is not only indiscernible but is rejected. The development assistance actors in the Gulf states are sceptical to the point of refusing to provide development aid within the framework of international institutions or multilaterally if political strings are attached. Non-interference and state sovereignty have always predominated in the arguments they have advanced. Aid, said the former chairman of the Arab Fund in 2003 with regard to the Coordination Group, must not be tied to any political or economic conditions.²⁵

Giants under pressure

Whether the Gulf states can maintain their relatively robust development policy commitment remains to be seen. In the past, aid spending by the giants from the Gulf has usually reflected the development of oil revenues or the economic situation and political priorities. In the 1970s, for example, oil revenues grew at a rate which allowed OPEC countries to spend an average of 12.48 per cent of gross national product on development aid. In the 1980s and 1990s, Gulf donors were more cautious as financial proceeds from oil revenues declined and political priorities in the Gulf shifted towards their own security following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. During the oil boom from 2003 to 2008 the Gulf states amassed financial reserves of up to 514 billion dollars, but development aid increased only moderately and tended to remain at the level of the late 1980s. This can be explained in part by the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Financial contributions by the Gulf states to countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan were subjected to a very critical review, as were the activities of Islamic charities. State budgets generated large surpluses, above all in the oil price boom phase from 2010 to 2014, and funds for development aid increased accordingly.²⁶

This short history of the development aid provided by the Gulf states shows that it can be highly volatile, depending on the economic situation and current political priorities. A number of developments suggest that the Gulf states might scale back their aid activities somewhat in the future. The price of oil has been low since 2014. This has led to a decline in government revenues and pressure on budgets is growing.²⁷ Moreover, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic marked the beginning of a multiple crisis for the Gulf states: oil revenues continued to decline, international goods transport slowed, tourism and air traffic collapsed. These are precisely the sectors on which the Gulf states are pinning their hopes as they prepare for a post-oil era. In response to the pandemic, public sector salaries have been increased, key interest rates lowered, loan repayments postponed and private sector support programmes launched. Budget deficits have risen while financial reserves have shrunk. GDP in all the Gulf states is expected to drop. This, in turn, will increase the pressure the Gulf states faced even before the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence the economic outlook is uncertain at the very least. Since the Gulf states have traditionally been rentier states, it is reasonable to assume that they will scale back external development assistance if internal financial aid requires a boost. This assumption is supported by the observation that, to counteract the COVID-19 pandemic, the Gulf states have provided emergency material and financial aid to a whole series of states (in particular Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Jordan, Yemen) while at the same time switching some of their development policy funding to the domestic market.²⁸ More recent preliminary data available from the OECD for 2020 for Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia show that there was, indeed, a decline in ODA funding in these countries in the year of the pandemic.²⁹

There are both economic and political reasons for the current volatility. For example, political and financial support for the Palestinian territories has been part of the *raison d'état* for all Gulf states for decades. Cracks seem to be appearing here, however. The core of the 2002 Arab peace initia-

tive – the prospect of normalising relations with Israel, provided a peace agreement with Israel acceptable to the Palestinians was reached first – is no longer valid for the UAE and Bahrain. Both are now normalising their relations with Israel, thereby demonstrating that the Palestinian cause is no longer a priority, whereas cooperation with Israel is. Criticism of the performance of the Palestinian Authority can be heard in all the Gulf states and it cannot be ruled out that development aid will in future either be used as a means of pressure to bring about reforms or will be further reduced.³⁰

Potential for cooperation

Since the 1970s, there have been various forms of cooperation between the Gulf states and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). According to the OECD, three dimensions of cooperation have so far presented themselves. Firstly, the DAC encourages the Gulf states to communicate the level of their commitment to the OECD in the form of data and statistics so that it can keep track of development activities worldwide. The DAC also urges them to improve the accuracy, timeliness and transparency of their data. Secondly, support is given to regular political exchange and cooperation between DAC and Gulf donors (through the Arab-DAC Dialogue on Development and Arab-DAC Task Forces on topics such as education, energy and water). Thirdly, since the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are DAC participants, they can attend all DAC meetings and play their part in DAC Communities of Practice; they are thus able to exchange views on such matters as statistics and their evaluation, the environment, conflict and fragile states, and gender equality. The DAC and the Coordination Group of Arab National and Regional Development Institutions meet regularly for the Arab-DAC Dialogue on Development, the latest gathering being held in February 2021. 'All in all', according to the OECD, 'the collaboration provided a better understanding of Arab development co-operation activities to DAC members and globally. [...] By engaging in policy dialogue with the DAC and its members, Arab countries and institutions benefit from the sharing of knowledge, experiences and good practices on a range of development co-operation themes.'³¹ Since 2014, organisations from the Gulf states have also been involved in triangular cooperation³² as a facet of development cooperation. They are committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as to taking greater responsibility internationally, participating in the international dialogue on development policy and creating greater transparency by publishing data on development aid. These are all areas in which the Gulf states have made great strides in the direction of OECD countries.

Nevertheless, the Gulf states' approach remains crystal clear: bilateral relations with the recipients of development assistance continue to predominate. The states do not query the "no-strings-attached" approach; they endeavour to secure the autonomy of their own development policy and give priority to stability, security and the success of their own reform policies rather than to development policy.

At the same time, the overriding priorities of the Gulf states' development policies described above, in combination with declining financial resources, could prompt them to seek enhanced regional and international coordination and to tap the potential for synergies. Another consequence of dwindling financial resources for external development activities could be a review of the sectors that are to be given priority status: less large-scale investment in transport, infrastructure and logistics and more development assistance to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises, founders and start-ups, education, vocational training, capacity building for young people and especially women, as well as gender equality. These areas are also at the heart of Gulf states' own reform plans and are likely to dovetail with the aim of broadening their own diversification in the light of the experience they have gathered and the economic networks they have established

and mitigating the risks that could arise for regional stability as a result of unemployment and social discontent. Furthermore, these are areas in which their interests are likely to mirror those of German development policy, for example.

Energy and the environment are other potential fields for cooperation in development policy between the DAC and the Gulf states. In recent years, the latter have built up capacities to prepare for a post-oil era. They have boosted research into alternative energies and energy efficiency, for instance, and are promoting corresponding programmes and initiatives at home and abroad. In these fields, triangular cooperation – for example, between a German development organisation and a Gulf organisation – could serve as an appropriate instrument. DAC development policy could then also benefit from the know-how the Gulf states have built up in their priority sectors as well as from the trust placed in them as Arab donors in the Arab and Muslim region.

Not only are there common interests in the aforementioned areas, joint projects are already under way. Germany has pioneered cooperation with the Gulf states in development policy, for example through the German development agency's (GIZ) programme 'Cooperation with Donors from the Arab States of the Gulf (CAD)', partnership agreements and co-financing.³³ This shows that, despite all the differences in motives and approaches, cooperation rooted in partnership is feasible. Given the prospect of dwindling financial resources coupled with increasing global challenges, cooperation of this kind is imperative.

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- ¹ This article was first published in KAS-Auslandsinformationen 2/2021.
- ² The term ‘development assistance’ is used in this analysis, since the element of partnership between donor and recipient, which is inherent in the German understanding of ‘development cooperation’, is less prominent in the Gulf. Moreover, Gulf State development assistance does not fit neatly into simple and readily definable development policy categories. The auxiliary and financial instruments deployed are too diverse, as are the underlying motives and intentions. E.g. Young, Karen 2020: Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment, American Enterprise Institute, August 2020, in: <https://bit.ly/3dUB34U>, here p.3: “Distinctions between what kind of financial flows exist, where they originate, and if they are private or government funds are often muddled, difficult to distinguish, or unreported altogether.” [14 April 2021].
- ³ Quoted from Salisbury, Peter 2018: Aiding and Abetting? The GCC States, Foreign Assistance, and Shifting Approaches to Stability, September 2018, p. 6, in: <https://bit.ly/3dh000v> [14 April 2021]. See also Al-Ubaydli, Omar / Meshref, Ahmed 2017: What the West doesn’t understand about UAE foreign aid, Al Arabiya, 9 October 2017, in: <https://bit.ly/3mNHjpS> [14 April 2021].
- ⁴ Data have only been issued for a comparatively short time. The UAE first published development assistance reports in 2013 and Qatar in 2014 and they also provide information on their websites, while Kuwait publishes primarily data and activities concerning the Kuwait Fund for Development. Saudi Arabia regularly publishes data; e.g. via the Saudi Aid Platform website, which has been up and running since 2018. However, private donations do not generally appear in any public statistics.
- ⁵ The following data compiled by the OECD cover the Gulf states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, the regional donor institutions Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Islamic Development Bank, OPEC Fund for International Development, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Gulf Programme for Development, Arab Monetary Fund as well as data for Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the methodological difficulties of data collection and the data themselves see: OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate 2020: How Arab countries and institutions finance development, in: <https://bit.ly/32gZoN7> [14 April 2021].
- ⁶ However, the latest OECD figures indicate that the UAE’s ODA ratio fell below the 0.7 per cent mark in 2019 and 2020. OECD 2021: United Arab Emirates, in: Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/153f7558-en> [29 June 2021].
- ⁷ AlMezaini, Khaled 2021: Humanitarian Foreign Aid of Gulf states: Background and Orientations, Policy Report 20 / January 2021, in: <https://bit.ly/3tjPaaH> [14 April 2021].
- ⁸ Quoted from Saudi Aramco World 1979: Arab Aid. An introduction, November/December 1979, in: <https://bit.ly/3wTCEkm> [14 April 2021].
- ⁹ Momani, Bessma / Ennis, Crystal A. 2012: Between caution and controversy: lessons from the Gulf Arab states as (re-)emerging donors, in: Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25:4, pp. 605-627, here: p. 613.
- ¹⁰ Ghattas, Kim 2020: Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East, New York.

- ¹¹ Mohammed bin Salman, quoted from Chulov, Martin 2017: I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince, *The Guardian*, 24 October 2017, in: <https://bit.ly/3xzeZ80> [14 April 2021].
- ¹² The state rentier model entails an indebtedness of the citizens to the state, as they are in a relationship of dependence on it. Drawing primarily on oil revenues, the state provides a wide range of support services and in return enjoys autonomy from the population.
- ¹³ Isaac, Sally Khalifa 2014: Explaining the Patterns of the Gulf Monarchies' Assistance after the Arab Uprisings, in: *Mediterranean Politics*, 19:3, pp. 413-430.
- ¹⁴ Saudi Arabia is working very hard to end the war; negotiations with the Houthis are proceeding through unofficial communication channels, Saudi-Iranian talks are addressing the issue, the kingdom presented a peace plan in March 2021 and the Houthis were promised (economic) aid, provided they accepted a ceasefire.
- ¹⁵ OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate 2020.
- ¹⁶ Efron, Shira / Fromm, Charles / Gelfeld, Bill / Nataraj, Shanthi / Sova, Chase 2018: Food Security in the Gulf Cooperation Council, December 2018 in: <https://bit.ly/2RvkV2l> [14 April 2021].
- ¹⁷ Todman, Will 2018: The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC states foreign policy laboratory, CSIS Briefs, November 2018, in: <https://bit.ly/32d9Kxl> [14 April 2021].
- ¹⁸ OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate 2020.
- ¹⁹ Young, Karen E. 2017: A New Politics of GCC Economic Statecraft: The Case of UAE Aid and Financial Intervention in Egypt, in: *Journal of Arabian Studies* 7: 1, pp. 113-136.; On the involvement of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE in Egypt after the Arab Spring see also Watanabe, Lisa 2017: Gulf states' engagement in North Africa: the role of foreign aid, in: Almezaini, Khalid S. / Rickli, Jean-Marc (eds.): *The small Gulf states: foreign and security policies before and after the Arab Spring*, New York, pp. 168-181, here: pp. 173-178 as well as Sons, Sebastian / Wiese, Inken 2015: *The Engagement of Arab Gulf states in Egypt and Tunisia since 2011: Rationale and Impact*, DGA-Panalyse No. 9 / October 2015, in: <https://bit.ly/37zhsEF> [9 April 2021].
- ²⁰ Villanger, Espen 2007: Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives, CMI-Report, pp. 17-22, in: <https://bit.ly/2Q2jCaP> [14 April 2021]; Almezaini, Khalid p. 2012: *The UAE and Foreign Policy. Foreign aid, identities and interests*, New York, pp. 101-115.
- ²¹ See Saudi Fund for Development: Coordination Group, in: <https://bit.ly/3mMweyJ> [14 April 2021] and Arab Development Portal: What is the Coordination Group of Arab, National and Regional Development Institutions? In: <https://bit.ly/3dey4Fo> [14 April 2021].
- ²² Mention should be made here, in particular, of the Saudi Arabian organisations King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre; the Emirate organisations Dubai Cares, Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, Mohammed bin Rashid Global Initiatives and Emirates Red Crescent; the Qatari organisations Education Above All, Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent Society and Silatech; and the Kuwaiti organisations International Islamic Charitable Organisation, Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences and Kuwait Red Crescent Society.
- ²³ Tok, Evren 2015: Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda: Towards a Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation, United Nations University Center for Policy Research, November 2015, in: <https://bit.ly/3g8PuVS> [9 April 2021]; Young, Karen E. 2017, pp. 113-136.
- ²⁴ Rouis, Mustapha 2010: Arab development assistance: four decades of cooperation, in: World Bank. *MENA Knowledge and Learning August 2010*, in: <https://bit.ly/3e6v79n> [14 April 2021].

- ²⁵ Al-Hamad, Abdlatif Y. 2003: The Coordination Group of Arab National and Regional Development Institutions: A framework for efficient aid delivery, in: The OPEC Fund for International Development (ed.): Arab Aid: Past, Present and Future, pp. 9-14, here: pp. 13-14.
- ²⁶ Young, Karen 2020, pp. 8-10.
- ²⁷ International Monetary Fund 2020: The Future of Oil and Fiscal Sustainability in the GCC Region, 6 February 2020 in: <https://bit.ly/2RBL79> [14 April 2021].
- ²⁸ Blumberg, Fabian / Bernhard, Philipp 2020: Die COVID-19-Pandemie. Maßnahmen und Folgen in den Golf-Staaten, Iran und Jemen, Policy Report 5 / April 2020, 13 April 2020 in: <https://bit.ly/32eRROI> [14 April 2021]; Soubrier, Emma 2020: Gulf Humanitarian Diplomacy in the Time of Coronavirus, The Arab Gulf states Institute in Washington, 1 May 2020, in: <https://bit.ly/3ac9gfn> [14 April 2021]; Dunne, Michelle 2020: As Gulf Donors Shift Priorities, Arab States Search for Aid, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 June 2020 in: <https://bit.ly/3dZaFXP> [14 April 2021].
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- ³⁰ Melhem, Ahmad 2020: Saudis, Arab states drastically reduce aid to Palestinians, Al-Monitor, 23 October 2020, in: <https://bit.ly/3e4phF9> [14 April 2021].
- ³¹ OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate 2020.
- ³² Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2021: Dreiecksoperationen. Neue Wege der Zusammenarbeit gehen, in: <https://bit.ly/3wUFICd8> [14 April 2021].
- ³³ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 2021: Zusammenarbeit mit Gebern aus den arabischen Golfländern (CAD), in: <https://bit.ly/3uQdwce> [14 April 2021].

Imprint

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
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