EDUARDA HAMANN (ORG.)

REVISITING BORDERS BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND MILITARY:

Security and Development in Peace Operations and Post-conflict Situations

VIVA RIO

These and other critical remarks are to be found in the present publication:

While the original purpose of CIMIC was military protection through outreach to the civilian population, the concept has evolved within the UN into an instrument of dialogue and coordination.
LUIZ CARLOS DA COSTA Principal Deputy SRSG MINUSTAH

On occasions, [the principle of "neutrality"] does not apply because it is quite clear that all forces – both civilian and military – must be mobilized in the most effective way to help the poor without taking sides.
LT GEN SANTOS CRUZ Former Force Commander MINUSTAH

The close dialogue with all armed actors (national armed forces, multinational forces with or without a UN mandate, armed insurgencies, and other armed groups) allows the ICRC not only to access the victims but also to remind the parties to the conflict of their obligations under international humanitarian law (…).
FELIPE DONOSO International Committee of the Red Cross

Should [Brazil] choose to contribute more frequently and deploy larger numbers of policemen and policewomen [to international missions], it could benefit from studying previous police missions.
MICHIEL DE WEGER Netherlands Defence Academy

Inevitably, governmental organisations (including the military) and NGOs do not always agree on how to proceed in a post-conflict situation. NGOs complain that governments do not listen or consult, have hidden agendas, (…). Governments sometimes find NGOs to be over-optimistic in their expectations of what their ministries and military can achieve.
GRAHAM ZEBEDEE Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

SUPPORT

British Embassy Brasília

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

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CIVILIANS AND MILITARY:

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DADOS INTERNACIONAIS PARA CATALOGAÇÃO NA PUBLICAÇÃO (CIP)

R454

Revisiting Borders between Civilians and Military : Security and Development in Peace Operations and post-conflicts situations / Eduarda Hamann (org.). – Rio de Janeiro : Fundação Konrad Adenauer, 2009.

175 p. : il. ; 23 cm.

Trabalhos apresentados em Encontro Internacional, realizado pelo Viva Rio, em 2009.

ISBN 978-85-7504-142-01

1. Relações entre Civis e militares. 2. Paz-Cooperação internacional. 3. Mediação internacional. I. Hamann, Eduarda. II. Fundação Konrad Adenauer.

CDD- 322.5

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Rio de Janeiro
November 2009

Revisiting Borders Between Civilians and Military:
Security and Development in Peace Operations and Post-Conflicts Situations
November 2009

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Cover
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Feb. 2007.
CIMIC activity developed by the Brazilian Battalion, MINUSTAH

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Printed in Brazil

ISBN: 978-85-7504-142-0

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to all of those who helped us in the completion of this magnified challenge. Both the workshop and the present publication were only possible because of the remarkable human efforts and the indispensable material support of several people and institutions.

The event itself was funded by *Viva Rio*, the *British Embassy in Brasilia* and the *Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, and we also had the special support of UNIC-Rio (*United Nations Information Centre for Brazil*). This publication, on its turn, was funded by *Viva Rio* and the *Fundação Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*.

My deepest appreciation goes to the speakers – especially to those who had to travel to Rio de Janeiro from different cities or even from different countries. They are experts who deliberately decided to dedicate time and energy to the first event on peacekeeping operations organized by Viva Rio. Through their oral and written words, they made an inestimable contribution to the success of the meeting and to the relevance of this publication.

Special gratitude is extended to the participants who attended the workshop – they made evident that there is an increasing demand, by the Brazilian society, to learn more and more about peacekeeping operations. Many others will be able to drink from the same sources, included in this publication.

Other acknowledgements go to the interpreters, to the reviser and to the publishers.

Finally, I am deeply indebted to Viva Rio and to those who embraced the project in the beginning, in the middle or in the end of the process – Rubem

César Fernandes, Jana Tabak, Vinícius Ribeiro, Luciano Francelli, Adriana Pereira, Vera Pinheiro, Edson Leocadio, Graciela Bittencourt, Monica Cavalcanti, Mariana Reade, Walter Mesquita, Cibele Dias, Mayra Jucá, and many others who also made the event possible.

Rio de Janeiro, November 4th, 2009.

Eduarda Hamann (org.)

DEPUTY COORDINATOR
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FOREWORD

"Revisiting Borders between Civilians and Military: Security and Development in Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Situations" was the title of an international meeting hosted by VIVA RIO in 2009. Participants from various countries presented their arguments and shared their experiences on the opportunities and the limitations for cooperation, in post-conflict and peace operations, between military and civilians (including police officers, civil society and government development agencies).

It was the first event of the kind in Brazil, if one considers the dimension of the theme, the variation of the panels, the nationality of the speakers and the institutional affiliation of the participants. Such a combined effort definitely requires a publication that would both register the voices and grant further access to the ideas shared by prominent representatives from the military, police and civilian parts of the complex equation that now rules contemporary peacekeeping.

By organizing this international event and by presenting the peacekeeping community with this publication, VIVA RIO's "Peace Operations project" offers a timid but decisive contribution to provoke, produce and disseminate critical knowledge on peacekeeping operations.

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INTRODUCTION

Multidimensional Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Situations: The 'Civil-Police-Military Predicament'

Eduarda Hamann and Rubem César Fernandes

The historical record shows most armed conflicts to be intra-state in nature – certainly since the end of the Second World War (Peter Wallensteen *et al*, 2002[1]). Nevertheless, it was only after the end of the Cold War that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) acknowledged the challenge this type of armed conflict posed to international peace and security. Such recognition – long-overdue – resulted in a range of impacts in the types of solutions that the UNSC would subsequently propose, among the most critical of which peace-keeping/building operations must surely be counted.

Despite being a tool not included in the original UN Charter, peacekeeping operations have always had a strong political component. But a lot has

1. Gleditsch, Wallensteen *et alli*, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset", in *Journal of Peace Research* (2002), Vol. 39, (No. 5) p. 624.

changed since the first mission back in 1948 – or 1956 if one prefers to count only missions where troops are deployed. The political essence continues to this day – now allied with a strong contingent aspect. In its 60 years of existence, the UNSC has authorized 63 peacekeeping missions; more than half were related to *intra-state* conflicts; such conflicts now necessarily include non-military actors in what was hitherto an arena almost exclusively military.

In the 1960s, the UN deployed the first few police officers on the ground. Civilian deployment followed shortly thereafter. Today, the military too has joined their ranks to become a key component in the makeup of UN personnel in peacekeeping missions. Side by side with the 80,500 troops and 2,200 military observers, the number of police officers and civilians grow every year: today, the ranks of UN personnel in peacekeeping missions number approximately 12,000 police officers and 18,000 civilians (including international and local personnel)[2]. This coexistence demonstrates the inherently multidimensional aspect of most contemporary peacekeeping operations, which highlights the need the range of actors on the ground to work together. There is now a clear acknowledgement that international security problems are complex and that their causes and consequences have multiple layers: this being the case, responses that are complex and multiple-layered are required for any chance of a stable/sustainable solution.

On a more solid footing, it is worth noting that post-conflict strategies and operations (not just those under the UN flag) are now forced to tackle a predicament that has long been relegated to the back burner: How to foster effective cooperation between military, police and civilians? To what extent is it possible to develop multidimensional operations? What are the main challenges? How does one interact with and effectively include *local actors* such as government representatives and community leaders? –not only are the latter the final beneficiaries, but also, those who might afford a greater degree of legitimacy / (indispensable) sustainability to international actions?

These and other questions were raised during the events organized in 2009 by the Brazilian civil-society organization *VIVA RIO,* under the title,

2. DPKO, Background Notes, as of August 31, 2009. Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>

"Revisiting Borders Between Civilians and Military: Security and Development in Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Situations". Participants comprised a select group of experts, researchers and practitioners representing several *governments* (Brazil, Canada, Great Britain, United States and The Netherlands), *intergovernmental institutions* (United Nations, European Union and OECD), *universities* (Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, University of Brasilia and Universidade Candido Mendes), *training centers* (Peacekeeping Training Center of the Brazilian Army — Centro Sergio Vieira de Mello, Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre and the United States Institute of Peace) and notable non-governmental actors (Viva Rio, International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins sans Frontières, Small Arms Survey, Partners in Health, and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung).

Several discussions touched upon both the challenges and opportunities for concerted action by disparate players at the highest political echelons of the international arena; others identified specific elements of coordination by actors from a single sub-region, Latin America. Some speakers shared concrete examples of cooperation between civilians and military in the field, while others talked about their experience in international policing. Speakers also revealed that places as disparate as Haiti and Afghanistan have a multidimensional perspective in common when attempting to address different security and development needs.

Beyond being just a record of what was said, this publication seeks to extend and democratize access to this type of knowledge to all those interested in such themes. Let it stand as our contribution to the understanding of this much-needed debate.

PART I

Top-down: Reflections from the high political level

"Revisiting Borders between Civilians and Military: Security and Development in Post-Conflict Situations and in United Nations Peace Operations"

Luiz Carlos da Costa

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, MINUSTAH.

This presentation focuses on the CIMIC experiences of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and discusses the shared goals of the civilian world and the Military. The challenge is to maximize the contribution of Peacekeeping operations during the transition of post-conflict countries towards lasting peace and stability. As such, it is important to recognize that military operations are not "stand-alone" and are part of the continuum from peacemaking to peacebuilding and long-term development. The crucial issue here is how can the military component of a UN Mission effectively support the transition process while the respective countries attain sufficient stability and fundamental civil structures/functions (e.g., justice, police, and social services) to put reconstruction and development processes steadfastly back on track?

Fifteen years have passed since the first guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief were published in May 1994. Over the years, discussion of military participation in relief assistance and other

"humanitarian" activities has generated a lot of emotional debate among military and civilian actors. Within the UN itself, discussions on CIMIC have figured high on the agenda due to their critical importance for UN peace operations.

Over these recent years, the concept of multi-dimensional "Integrated Missions" has included a number of issues traditionally referred to under the rubric "CIMIC". While the original purpose of CIMIC was military protection through outreach to the civilian population, the concept has evolved within the UN into an instrument of dialogue and coordination. Guidelines and policy directives aim at delimiting military assistance in humanitarian operations, in consonance with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and humanity.

Mr. da Costa will address the different definitions and approaches of CIMIC operations, with a special emphasis on the DPKO policy. This includes the more traditional CIMIC activities as well responses to emergencies by the Military, who have filled a vacuum in the country's emergency response capacity through invaluable emergency, and relief assistance in one of the most natural-disaster-prone countries in the hemisphere. Lastly, Mr. da Costa will talk about the more complex and programmatic approaches and examples of MINUSTAH military support to infrastructures and institutions:

1. "Hearts-and-Minds" activities: These operations are linked to the traditional military operations of winning the goodwill of the population and to creating an environment that allows the Mission to accomplish its mandate. This concept is the closest to the traditional NATO doctrine.

2. Emergency/ disaster relief. These operations seek to
   a) provide relief and rescue assistance to the population in case of disaster;
   b) facilitate access by humanitarian organisations; and
   c) provide security in affected areas.

Military engagement in natural disasters is relatively straight forward, and the military can be quickly called upon by both governments and the humanitarian community as a provider of last resort, especially in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, in which neither government nor civilian

humanitarian organizations have the capacity for a quick and efficient response.

However, emergency relief assistance provided in complex emergencies, i.e. emergencies with a political dimension, remains somewhat controversial because of the dichotomy between military approaches and the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity. Peacekeeping Missions are acutely aware of this dilemma and strive to engage in consultations with national governments and humanitarian partners before engaging in any such activities. With regards to this challenge, it is worthwhile mentioning that MINUSTAH is a "Stabilization Mission" and Haiti a special case in the Peacekeeping context. The setting is very different from post-conflict zones in which peacekeeping operations face different warring factions.

3. Civic/programmatic activities: These activities aim at contributing to the functioning, or improvement in the vital functions, of civil society, governance, basic services etc.

Mr. da Costa's presentation includes practical examples on how MINUSTAH achieves the strategic goal of CIMIC, i.e., winning the "hearts-and-minds" of the local population, and also shows how the Mission has gone beyond this paradigm and engaged in programmatic activities that expand the envelope and enhance assistance and reconstruction efforts. While MINUSTAH does not have a development mandate per se, it is widely recognized that lasting stability in Haiti will also require improvements in the daily lot of the people. MINUSTAH therefore supports the foundations for socioeconomic development to take root, including through CIMIC activities. Furthermore, as during the hurricane season 2008, in line with its mandate and in order to ensure that a humanitarian emergency does not translate into a political or security crisis, MINUSTAH stands ready to deploy its assets for humanitarian relief efforts, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.

CIMIC is no longer only a means to facilitate the Mission mandate of stabilisation: on a tactical/operational level, CIMIC activities also aim at improving the living conditions of the local population. In this context, military outreach activities complement the efforts of local government and organisations, and achieve a multiplier effect for the benefit of the population.

Some of these activities are to ensure that projects are actually executed, projects such as road repairs, which might not otherwise be realized due to lack of financial or technical resources. Other activities are more complex and require a programmatic approach entailing the collaboration of a range of civilian stakeholders of central and regional authorities, UN-agencies, NGOs, the local population, and even the private sector.

Lastly, the presentation will look at future perspectives and raise a number of ideas for further discussions.

Cooperation Between Civilians and the Military – UN Level

Lt Gen Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz

COMMANDER OF THE SECOND ARMY DIVISION / BRAZILIAN ARMY – SÃO PAULO / BRAZIL. FORMER FORCE COMMANDER IN MINUSTAH (JAN 10, 2007 – APRIL 8, 2009)

1. Introduction

The objective of the contents in this document is not to suggest or analyze actions according to "doctrine" or theoretical models presented in papers easily accessible on the Internet.

The intention is to describe certain field experiences in order to provide some answers to the questions posed by the seminar's organizers:

1) What is the nature of the interaction between UN purposes/principles and the security/development dichotomy at the strategic level of MINUSTAH?
2) How deep is the integration between blue helmets and civilians as peace partners within the mission?
3) What are the main highlights?

Comments are made in hopes of making a contribution and responses to questions are based on personal experience in Haiti. Although the conclusions drawn from the Haiti experience cannot apply to all other contexts/places/times, it is believed that the military-civilian interaction in MINUSTAH can serve as a reference in similar situations.

2. Development

Field cooperation/interaction between civilians and military depends on those involved in the process, especially senior leaders. A positive outlook and the ability to adapt are both crucial to an understanding of what drives people, to mutual collaboration, and to working cooperatively, unfettered by restrictions.

There are many ways to improve cooperation and it is certainly possible to overcome the limitations and do just that. MINUSTAH has provided many examples of cooperation between the Military Force and different civilian sectors, both inside and outside mission limits. Such examples include joint work with Corrections, Justice, Child Protection, United Nations Police, Haitian National Police, Haitian civilian administration, UNICEF, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, embassies, UNDP, and NGOs.

The first step to productive cooperation is to have a correct understanding of the mission itself. Beyond that, it is important to maintain good will and not to cling to pre-conceived interests/models/concepts which might have been perfectly appropriate in some theoretical way, but which are neither relevant nor useful in the Haitian case.

A mission is established to focus on the people, to deliver something for the people – not governments, institutions or authorities. The latter elements receive attention because they are often assumed to be the best way to deliver services and benefits to the people. With the focus on the people, especially those in need, those in charge at all levels will be inspired to develop a positive and cooperative attitude to make the partnership work.

The simple desire to serve others fosters good will. Sometimes personality traits or conflicting interests are behind behavior that is counterproductive to cooperation between the different civilian sectors and military. It is all too easy to find ways to block cooperation if good will is not abundant. Included

in the regulations, principles, studies, theoretical essays, etc., are many techniques to remain isolated from other sectors. Further, many institutions seem to harbor narrow-minded individuals who only understand the existence of two teams (possibly more) – the military and the "humanitarians". Currently, this mindset is responsible for many of the misunderstandings and misinterpretations that eventually result in difficulties with interactions and the consequent lack of benefits for the people. It is quite clear that much more can and should be done for the people, without any advance requirement for technical analysis.

The motivations involved in the march to provide services for the people is another issue. Some such motivations are understandable: they are part of human nature – like vanity and personality, competition for prestige, job survival, the fight for funding, etc. Though many restrictions act as a barrier to the various agendas, it is important to gain an understanding of them by undertaking the necessary due diligence.

A peacekeeping mission is essentially a mission where the military component is among the most important. However, it is not sufficient, in and of itself, to achieve all the objectives established by the mandate – objectives which must be strived for. All components are equally important; the military uniform, for example, is highly symbolic to the people. For many, especially the poor anxious to receive something from UN, the visibility of men in uniform is the face of the mission. And people in extreme need for help neither understand nor have any interest in nuances of tasks, legislation or philosophy. Their needs and expectations are real and urgent: it does not matter where benefits come from.

The structure of the military is solid, available, flexible, and able to perform many different tasks. Such structure, both complex and powerful, gives the units the flexibility to work on many different fronts. Inside the structure of military units there are sectors responsible for civil-military coordination, communications groups for dealing with leaders and communities, professionals who handle public administration and accounting (financial resources and projects), and technical personnel (military engineers, truck drivers, doctors, etc). But this structure is not constantly involved with combat or patrols: because the period the units stay in the field is short (about 6 months) and the troops are capable of working at a rigorous pace. Normally, all military units are equipped to assist the populations in their own countries during

emergencies as well as a variety of other different situations. In additional, the way the military live in the mission, with all personnel and equipment and concentrated inside the base (including ambulances, trucks, drivers, doctors, chain of command, kitchen, cooks, mechanics, electricians, etc.) provides the forces with the ability to respond quickly and flexibly. The chain of command is clear and project management comes at a relatively low cost.

Deep specialization for the general support for the people is not needed. Specialization is necessary only in certain technical activities, such as health care or engineering. All that is needed for general assistance is the structure for planning, a few experienced people, adequate resources and good will.

There are myriad examples of military work in humanitarian aid (emergencies or otherwise), either executed alone or jointly with civilian institutions and NGOs. Moreover, it should be noted that many volunteers also enter institutions, whether motivated by the enchantment of working to help people or for personal reasons. All motivations are valid and welcome; learning is fast and the work is productive when real humanitarian interest is in evidence.

Another very important point is the necessary flexibility for some in the field to understand what are and when to apply principles such as neutrality and impartiality. These principles, like others, change over time and from place to place, thus a lack of mental flexibility can hamper effective cooperation.

In conflict areas or during wars, and for safety's sake, it is sometimes important to have a visible "neutrality". On occasions, as in the recent case of Haiti, this principle does not apply because it is quite clear that all forces – both civilian and military – must be mobilized in the most effective way to help the poor without taking sides.

With MINUSTAH, we seem to have the poor on one side and those with the moral and legal obligation to help on the other. But, in reality, there are no sides, just work that needs doing together. However, in this environment, incongruous as it may seem, it became known that some organizations had forbidden their staff from having any contact with the military, even socially.

Another example. During the flood of 2007, in front of a school being used as a shelter for about fifteen hundred people, a civilian friend announced that transportation was needed to bring 300 hygiene kits from the airport.

There were about 10 military trucks parked close by. Transport to bring the hygiene kits was offered and accepted. But moments later, a phone call relayed a message saying that the organization did not transport material in military vehicles. So the people never got the kits. This behavior might be understandable in a country with two parties at war, if transportation by means of trucks from a peacekeeping force should represent a risk to the NGO. In Haiti, however, the attitude reflects narrow-mindedness and a complete lack of versatility.

In emergencies such as natural disasters, the military structure is that best prepared to act quickly to provide first aid. It stands to reason. It is the military way of life: bases have both the personnel and the necessary physical resources. The civilian structure needs more time to mobilize resources and implement their plans. This is perfectly understandable. The gap between the impact of the disaster and the mobilization of civil defense is quite naturally bridged by the military. It was suggested to the civil defense to include the military in its plans to cover the first two days; however, the offer was not accepted. Despite the rebuff, the military did in fact manage to cover all natural disaster situations in a timely manner after the impact.

Much more could be done in terms of military-civilian cooperation. In MINUSTAH, there were many examples of how cooperation was both possible and effective, thus demonstrating that the concept should be reassessed by all actors. Again, the hardest part is for those involved to put aside their own agendas.

The following lists just some of the many positives examples that illustrate civil-military cooperation in the field:

- Summer camp for 800 children, funded by Norwegian Government.
- Renovation of infirmary inside Fort Liberty prison, funded by Norwegian Government.
- Purchase of generator for a fishing colony in Port-au-Prince, funded by Norwegian Government.
- Renovation of community water tank in Druillard (Cite Soleil), funded by Norwegian Government.
- Cleaning of canals, in partnership with NGO (Viva Rio), and similar projects in partnership with the Haitian Government.

- Training of "emergency brigades" in certain communities, in partnership with NGO (Viva Rio).
- Storage of material and organization of distribution (blankets, mattresses, stoves, etc) by NGO in Cite Soleil.
- Intensification of patrols to protect construction materials (bought by NGO) and workers from gang-related extortion/threats.
- Rescue and transport of 8,000 people during the 2007 floods in Porto-au-Prince; organization and administration of shelters.
- Distribution of 35,000 meals during the floods in Port-au-Prince in 2007, including material from military units.
- Medical assistance for 18,000 people in 2007 and 16,000 more in 2008, including 10 births inside military camps.
- School cleaning campaigns in 2007 and 2008, just before the start of school in September.
- Bridge construction in Saint Raphael (South of Cap–Haïtien), in partnership with the French and Haitian Governments and World Bank.
- Participation in a project to rebuild a street in Martissant (Project Lane 23), in partnership with World Bank.
- Road construction (access road to Port-au-Prince dump), funded by Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
- Renovation of house facades in Cite Soleil, in order to repair bullet holes in front walls, funding by Norwegian Government.
- Renovation of schools with financial resources from MINUSTAH (Quick Impact Projects).
- Transport of furniture bought by MINUSTAH (Justice Section) for Haitian tribunals in various locations.
- Renovation of public square in Fort Liberty.
- Asphalting of streets in Port-au-Prince, with resources from MINUSTAH.
- Asphalting of School of Magistrates in Port-au-Prince, with resources from MINUSTAH.
- Construction of library for youth detention center, in coordination with Corrections / MINUSTAH.
- Medical support for women's prison in Pétionville, in coordination with Corrections / MINUSTAH.

- Construction of prison toilets and showers in Mirebalais, with funds from MINUSTAH (Quick Impact Projects) in coordination with Corrections / MINUSTAH.
- Plaza cleanup campaign in various locations.
- Cleaning prisons, in coordination with Corrections / MINUSTAH.
- Christmas campaign, with distribution of 15 thousand toys for children and basic food bags for families.
- Eastern campaign, with distribution of basic food bags for families and 25,000 chocolates for children.
- Permanent support (including materials, water and limited health care) for over 50 orphanages.
- Food distribution support (several hundred tons) donated by Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, in coordination with the respective embassies.
- Bridge construction, as requested by NGO Partners in Health, with a bridge from MINUSTAH property and financial support from a private company (contacted by the NGO itself). Ongoing.
- Well, dug by military engineers with financial support from NGO. Other, similar works in cooperation with Corrections Sector / MINUSTAH.

3. Summary

The list above is just a hint of the military-civil cooperation for the Haitian people. Much more was and continues to be done in Haiti. The possibilities for future joint actions are virtually unlimited.

If the military and civilians from international institutions, donors, local government and NGO could work together in a more coherent way, the effectiveness of the aid would multiply manifold, and on a scale that could significantly reduce human suffering in poor areas.

At this point, the questions posed by the seminar organizers can be answered.

1) What is the interaction like between UN purposes/principles and the security/development dichotomy at the strategic level of MINUSTAH?

MINUSTAH is completely behind the objectives established in the mandate and the principles of all UN missions: to promote stability, foster respect for human rights, respect Haitian sovereignty and protect civilians.

There is no security/development dichotomy. Security is fundamental for creating the conditions for development. MINUSTAH is a mission for stabilization and, as such, has been successful. Development per se is not the main task of MINUSTAH and must depend on international financial institutions, especially the Haitian Government.

2) How deep is the integration between blue helmets and civilians as peace partners within the mission?

The integration was excellent during 2007, 2008 and the beginning of 2009: Almost all senior leaders had the right mindset, not just senior leaders inside the mission, but those outside as well. Almost all UN managers and NGOs had a very positive approach.

3) What are the highlights?

All actors, starting with senior leaders, must focus on the people. When such is the case, the resulting good will can surpass the original mandate.

Military and civilians must understand and believe they complement each other.

These attitudes contributed to the can-do stance apparent at MINUSTAH.

Civilian-Military Cooperation in Haiti – Challenges, Responses and Perspectives

Carlos Sérgio S. Duarte

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, BRAZILIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Over the past decade, there has been a growing perception within the United Nations system of the need for complex and integrated responses to the challenges posed by conflict and post-conflict situations. The Brahimi Report is an early and widely known conceptual expression of this perception, which has more recent and concrete manifestations, such as increasingly multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations and the recent creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005.

Although this approach is relatively recent in UN operations, countries of the developing world have recognized for many years – often as a result of their own experience – the close interdependence between security, strong State institutions, and socioeconomic development. That development is a necessary component for peace is not a recent discovery. The issue is, rather, why it has taken the international community so long to incorporate this dimension into its efforts to support conflict-stricken countries.

The key concept here is "integration". Security, development, and institutional consolidation must be dealt with not only simultaneously, but also in an integrated manner. Peacebuilding efforts in these three fields must

be designed to strengthen each other. In this context, the importance of civil-military cooperation becomes obvious. It is more than a specific tool: rather, it is a type of relationship vital to peacebuilding efforts, to be practiced by the international community and fostered in the host country. Men in uniform cannot be identified solely with the tasks of repression – they must be seen as partners in peace.

Much progress has been made in this area over the last few years. One of the best examples is the work carried out by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH. The mission, established in 2004, is the latest chapter in a long and often troubled history of the UN's involvement with the Caribbean nation, which actually began in 1948, with the arrival in Haiti of the UN's first ever technical assistance mission[1]. In the 1990s, no less than four UN missions came and went without leaving in place the conditions for sustainable peace: UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, and MIPONUH.

It is therefore no surprise that the discussions in the Security Council that led to the establishment of MINUSTAH in 2004 were permeated by a sense that previous approaches had failed and that the international community's engagement with Haiti would have to take on a different form. In this context, Brazil and other developing countries successfully argued for a more comprehensive mandate for MINUSTAH – one that would allow it not only to keep the peace and maintain security in a traditional sense, but also to help Haiti in addressing the root causes of the conflict.

One of the elements of this approach is civil-military cooperation, which is embodied by the mission at various levels. For example, the military component of MINUSTAH has been directly involved in activities that allow for development and social benefits, such as paving roads and securing access to water, work that has been done by the military engineers who are part of the mission.

Brazil has been a staunch defender of such work and other "Quick Impact Projects" (QIPs) for their role in peacekeeping. Despite having, at times, to face significant opposition in forums such as the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly, we have, with the support of

1. Sunil Amrith & Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations", in Journal of World History, vol. 19, no. 3, Sept/2008, pp. 251-274.

other countries (especially in Latin America), managed to secure the funds necessary for MINUSTAH to continue to implement QIPs.

Both QIPs and the civil benefits derived from work done by military engineers are important inasmuch as they give the local population a stake in stability and in peacebuilding efforts. They remain, however, small-scale and cannot substitute for the social and economic development that is required to lift Haiti out of its cycle of violence and instability. Bringing development to Haiti requires significant investments and a wide-ranging program of technical cooperation from the country's partners, investment capable of creating jobs and building capacity.

In any case, initiatives aimed at promoting development in Haiti are benefiting from close coordination with MINUSTAH. This has been the case for Governmental bodies such as the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and non-governmental organizations such as Viva Rio.

Civil-military cooperation is clearly here to stay. Nevertheless, much still has to be done in order to strengthen this notion within the United Nations system. Recently, there have been some positive indications to that effect. This year's report by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations[2] – the C-34 – recognizes the challenges facing peacekeeping and the need to tackle them in a holistic manner. The Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict[3] – issued in June – lays a sound emphasis on the principle of national ownership and on the multidimensional nature of all peacebuilding processes. Although it does not deal directly with civil-military cooperation, it suggests reforms that will make this kind of cooperation easier, by improving dialogue between stakeholders and giving decision makers in New York a clearer view of what is happening on the ground.

On a similar note, the recommendations put forward by the DPKO and the DFS in the context of the "New Horizon" project are also important contributions to the debate on peacekeeping operations[4]. Although many

2. 'Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group - 2009 substantive session' – document A/63/19, available at http://unbisnet.un.org/
3. 'Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict' – document A/63/881, available at http://unbisnet.un.org/
4. 'A New Partnership Agenda: Charting the New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping' – available at http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.shtml

of the suggestions largely reiterate past recommendations, the document recognizes the importance of economic and social development for the establishment of a sustainable peace, as developing countries have long advocated.

These acknowledgements are, at least in part, due to the success of approaches such as those taken by MINUSTAH, which may inspire future operations in countries confronting similar challenges.

It is also relevant to mention, in this context, the Secretary-General's report on implementing the responsibility to protect[5]. In discussing what he calls the second "pillar" of the responsibility to protect – the responsibility of the international community to help States fulfill their obligations – the report brings home the point that peacebuilding must not be seen simply as a remedial measure, but that its preventive dimension must also be emphasized. If the deeper causes of conflict are addressed before they become critical, much suffering can be avoided.

Despite MINUSTAH's success, ensuring that the UN has the financial and political resources required to continue promoting civil-military cooperation – both in Haiti and elsewhere – remains, however, an uphill struggle. The issue of funding is critical. This year, under overwhelming pressure from the developed countries, the General Assembly's Administrative and Budgetary Committee – the Fifth Committee – made drastic cuts in the UN peacekeeping budget. The appropriations for peacekeeping operations were almost half a billion dollars less than requested by the Secretary-General. In the name of "efficiency" and "belt-tightening", the budget allocated to the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur, UNAMID, was almost US$ 200 million less than requested – a cut of about 11%. The Secretariat was casually told to "do more with less", while the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC, had 5% of its requested budget cut. Fortunately, MINUSTAH suffered one of the smallest budget cuts in relative terms.

There is, however, a principle at stake here. Efficiency must be pursued and wasteful spending must be curbed. But it is not realistic to deploy peacekeeping missions to complex conflict situations and expect them to succeed without the necessary funds. Arbitrarily presuming that 3%, 5%,

5. 'Implementing the responsibility to protect - Report of the Secretary-General' – document A/63/677, available at http://unbisnet.un.org/

or 10% of a mission's budget is wasteful or composed of unnecessary extras is both disingenuous and wrong. Pressing for wide-ranging peacekeeping mandates in the Security Council, while demanding budget cuts across the board in the Fifth Committee is contradictory, to say the least. States must be willing to pay the price for peace to be sustainable.

Yet – is it so expensive? The G-20 countries spent roughly US$ 692 billion in stimulus in 2009 alone. The total budget requested by the Secretary General for 15 peacekeeping operations was less than US$ 8.5 billion. Maintaining international peace and security is significantly cheaper than maintaining international financial stability.

Money is not the only issue, however. It is the Security Council that designs and approves the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Brazil has made the reform of the Council a front-line issue of its foreign policy because it is essential for multilateralism to retain its relevance in the contemporary world. For the Council to have the representativeness and legitimacy it requires in order to adequately deal with all current challenges to international peace and security, developing countries must play a greater, more decisive role in its deliberations and decisions. This will result in more effectiveness. It is worth recalling that at the time of the genocide in Rwanda, only three countries – two of them developing countries – argued that the United Nations should intervene[6]. Reforming the Council is essential to assure that peacekeeping operations have mandates that are appropriate and effective. There is no doubt that developing countries often have a direct experience of the pathways and pitfalls of peacebuilding, and that they can make a substantive addition to the Council's consideration of conflict and postconflict situations.

Political will is required to reform the Security Council and to give peacekeepers the funds they need to do their jobs. Political will is required to give the Peacebuilding Commission a larger role in the UN system and to conduct its constitutional review, beginning in 2010, in a way that will make it more representative and effective. Political will is required for the Security Council to listen to and consult more with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, and the troop-contributing countries.

6. Spain, Brazil, and Nigeria.

Maintaining international peace and security has always been a central challenge for the global community, and peacekeeping is one of the major instruments devised by the Security Council for effectively meeting that challenge. In the contemporary world, peacekeeping is taking on new forms with civil-military cooperation taking on a more prominent role. It must be an ambitious joint undertaking, where North and South, civil and military, governmental and non-governmental partners come together to fulfill the promise of peace. Brazil is committed to making the United Nations a place where this can happen and to making MINUSTAH an example of how civilian and military personnel can work together for sustainable and lasting peace.

Thank you very much.

PART II

Bottom-up:
Motivations and constraints from the grassroots level

Mission and history of Partners In Health

Louise Ivers

PARTNERS IN HEALTH

Partners In Health (PIH) is dedicated to providing a preferential option for the poor in health care. By establishing long-term relationships with sister organizations based in settings of poverty, PIH strives to achieve two overarching goals: to bring the benefits of modern medical science to those most in need and to serve as an antidote to despair. PIH draws on the resources of the world's leading medical and academic institutions and on the lived experience of the world's poorest and sickest communities. PIH is dedicated to providing the highest level of clinical care possible while alleviating the social and economic burdens of poverty that create obstacles to health.

In 1983, Dr Paul Farmer and Ophelia Dahl worked with several Haitian leaders in the village of Cange, a squatter settlement in Haiti's impoverished Central Plateau, to establish a community-based health project. In 1987, Dr. Farmer and others founded Partners In Health in Massachusetts to support activities in Cange; at the same time they created Zanmi Lasante (Haitian Creole for Partners In Health) as our sister organization in Haiti. Today, Zanmi Lasante (ZL) is the largest health care provider in Central Haiti, serving a catchment area of 1.2 million across the Central Plateau and the Lower Artibonite. The clinic in Cange is a 104-bed full-service medical complex that includes infectious disease treatment, pediatric care, a women's health

services, emergency obstetrical care, pharmacy and laboratory services, and community development programs. Beyond Cange, ZL provides medical care through nine public hospitals and health centers in Central Haiti and the Lower Artibonite, where we have renovated dilapidated clinics, trained staff, and provided essential supplies, medicines, and equipment. In 2008, ZL recorded 2.6 million patient encounters through clinic visits, mobile clinics, and vaccination campaigns.

PIH tackles the twin epidemics of disease and poverty. Our primary constituency is the world's poor, who lack access to adequate health care and who, because of their poverty, bear a disproportionate burden of disease and ill health. PIH works primarily in rural areas, focusing on populations that are most in need of improved health care and are neglected by global health initiatives that tend to target urban areas. Second, PIH provides a full range of medical care rather than creating vertical, disease-specific programs and seeks wherever possible to decentralize health care from the hospital to the local health center, and from the health center to the community, so that rural, hard-to-reach populations have better access to services. A key element of our community-level care is the recruitment, training, and paid support of community health workers, who monitor patients on HIV and TB treatment and engage in active case finding and prevention in their communities. Third, rather than creating private, parallel service delivery systems that drain resources away from the public sector, PIH works directly with Ministries of Health (MOH) to strengthen the public health system through infrastructure improvements at public facilities, the provision of supplies and equipment, staff recruitment and training, and improved clinical and pharmacy management.

Community-based perspectives: MINUSTAH mandate and function

Our work places us with the people we serve in the Central and lower Artibonite departments of the country. These predominantly peaceful, highly rural parts of the country have always been faced more vehemently with the struggle of day to day survival in the face of severe poverty and serious food insecurity than they are with concerns about the largely urban

issues of kidnappings, gang violence and common crime. Violence in Haiti in recent years has tended to be highly geographically localized – a Médecins sans Frontières survey between January 2006 and July 2007 showed that nearly one in four deaths in one Port-au-Prince slum was related to violence, but on a generalized scale, even during the most serious periods of more generalized 'insecurity', Haitian adults have always been, as a whole, more likely to die of preventable and treatable infectious diseases, of malnutrition, in childbirth, or of diarrheal disease than they have of violence.

Through the lens of our position as a community-based organization in rural, peaceful Haiti, with dangers far greater than violence, the perspectives of our neighbors, patients and workers towards the mandate of United Nations Stabilization Force in Haiti, may be quite different from those who live and work in Port-au-Prince, New York or Geneva. Three MINUSTAH military bases have existed in the geographic areas where we work since 2004 – Hinche, Mirebalais and Belladères and the following discussion is based on lived experiences in these areas. In 2006, Partners In Health, New York University School of Law and the Robert F Kennedy Memorial Foundation testified regarding ongoing violations against the Haitian people in terms of their socioeconomic rights (primarily to health, water and food) during the MINUSTAH presence and highlighted the international human rights obligations of Organization of American States (OAS) Member States to effect improvement in human rights[1].

NGO collaboration with MINUSTAH in the field

PIH/ZL has no strict doctrine regarding collaboration or interaction with military on professional or social levels in the field, although written policy does prohibit weapons inside our vehicles or institutional buildings and clinics. In general, our aim is to forge partnerships with other groups, recognizing the complex set of experiences and skills that in collaboration will provide sustained improvement in conditions for the people in the areas we work. Beyond medical care, PIH defines health in the broadest terms

1. Legal brief submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. RFK, NYU, PIH/ZL. February 2006.

and thus implements education, housing, food and agriculture, clean water, social assistance, and job creation initiatives in the catchment areas of our clinical sites. In this sense, we have used a common sense approach regarding military collaborations – avoiding active collaborations during military dictatorships, but actively working with Ministries of Justice in prisons in Haiti and other countries – for example, to improve health and living conditions of prisoners. Since 2004, by virtue of their presence in Haiti, we have had both planned and unplanned interactions with MINUSTAH in the Central Plateau department.

Concrete experience of MINUSTAH from the field

Our experiences with MINUSTAH from the field have been mixed, with some positive and other negative interactions. The general impression of MINUSTAH in our communities is dependent upon the viewpoint that is taken – institutional or individual level.

- Individual perspectives in the community

At an individual level, our communities view MINUSTAH through the lens of their own peaceful, direly poor existence. From outside the walls of the barracks that few have the opportunity to enter, through open gates they can get a glimpse of rows of white vehicles although they themselves have no motorized transportation; students gather to study under the floodlights of the compound walls, themselves with no electricity at home; they wonder at heavily armed soldiers protecting visitors in a place where oxen and carts plough fields and where 'bandits' and kidnappers have never set foot. They know that the tourist hotels are full of MINUSTAH staff on leave or in meetings, but a day-pass to those beaches costs the equivalent of one month's income for most peasant farmers. They call the military 'TOURISTAH' – 'moun ki vinn na vakans' - people who are here on vacation[2].

The day-to-day realities of an official MINUSTAH mandate are less important from the individual's perspective. The visible image of MINUSTAH

2. http://www.ijdh.org/articles/article_recent_news_3-7-06b.htm

is one of the heavily armed, resource intense activities that seem to have little apparent relevance to the everyday needs of Haitians in the area. The inequity of a 601.58 million US dollar budget for stabilization in a place with such urgent humanitarian needs is flagrant when one considers that the barefoot peasant farmer knows the soldiers inside the compound eat ice cream for dessert even though he has the means to eat only one meal per day[3].

In post-hurricane affected Gonaïves, on September 6, 2008, the same day that UN and other sources reported that 'access to Gonaïves remains virtually impossible' and 'the risk of violent demonstrations is high….restricting movements in Gonaïves since it is impossible to move without a military escort from MINUSTAH, and the peacekeeping mission has the capacity to provide only 3 escorts at the time', a PIH four wheel drive vehicle traveled the road to the flooded city to transport supplies to the emergency medical services replacing Gonaïves general hospital. The trip was repeated the next day, uneventfully. The claim of 'insecurity' and 'inaccessibility' during this period of humanitarian assistance appeared to those in the community as more an excuse for a first delayed and then inadequate national and international response to the disaster than as a genuine barrier to relief.

- *Institutional perspectives*

At an institutional level, Zanmi Lasante's interactions with MINUSTAH have overall been positive, resulting primarily though, from individuals' personal contacts, and not because of any formal transparent process for initiating collaboration. In Hinche, the ZL Ministry of Health hospital was the recipient of a 2000-gallon water tank; medical staff from the clinic frequently see civilian staff from the UN base as outpatients in the clinic and have arranged for a series of lectures on health for civilian staff at the base. In December 2005, ZL Chief Operations Officer was en route from Port-au-Prince to Cerca-la-Source with 5000 lbs of medical equipment – an X-ray machine – for the hospital. Although the journey is only 87 kilometers, it took eight hours because of the desperate conditions of the road. The PIH truck was unable to make the final stretch of the journey because of heavy rains. The

3. Data from Zanmi Lasante surveys shows a very high level of food insecurity in the areas discussed. On average families eat meal per day.

COO had received information for a personal contact in the MINUSTAH base in Hinche and called on the contact for assistance with the last portion of the transportation. This was gratefully received and the machine arrived to Cerca-la-Source and was installed that same night.

In Belladères, the ZL team reports similar informal collaboration with the MINUSTAH military personnel – activities that take place based on one individual's personal interest or motivation rather than at a central level. As examples, the medical director of the hospital reports that some soldiers come to the hospital to use its Internet facilities; individual military personnel have volunteered to come on mobile health clinics that our team frequently performs in the surrounding mountains; on one occasion military personnel accompanied a sick patient to the hospital for care. During one particular demonstration in the town, an injured party was brought to the hospital for care – tensions rose high between the medical and military staff when armed MINUSTAH soldiers entered the hospital unannounced, acted in a threatening manner to those in the waiting room for the clinic and arrested the injured individual without discussion with hospital administration. This situation was later resolved with discussion and setting of expectations between the medical and MINUSTAH personnel. Despite these mainly positive interactions, there has never been formal interaction between military leaders at the base and the hospital management to attempt to deepen the degree of support and collaboration possible.

In contrast to Belladères and Hinche, Mirebalais military base is a few miles away on a difficult road from the nearest ZL medical center – a 20-bed hospital serving an isolated population of 64,000 people. Interactions have been more negative than in the other towns mentioned. Promises from MINUSTAH to repair latrines in a primary school and to participate in a reforestation project went unfulfilled, contributing to a loss of confidence by the local community. During a particularly difficult period of heavy rain, the same Zanmi Lasante COO, who had successfully requested help in Hinche, approached the Mirebalais base for assistance in transporting staff and patients across a flooded river and was told simply that there was 'no money to help'. This single interaction (during a particularly stressful period for our staff and patients) was particularly damaging to the institutions' perspective of MINUSTAH.

The largest and most recent collaboration between ZL and MINUSTAH, the design and construction of a bridge, was also the result of personal

contacts. This resulted in the contribution of a bridge and technical expertise from MINUSTAH for a project that involves the government of Haiti, private business, local peasant farmers and Partners In Health. The project is currently underway and, when complete, will make a significant impact on the lives of people in the region of Boucan-Carré – currently isolated on a daily basis by severe flooding of a river across the only road into the area.

Summary

Civil society perspectives on the success or failure of MINUSTAH's presence in Haiti, particularly in the context of the financial cost of the mission, depend upon the lens through which one views the situation. For the rural poor of the Central Plateau and Lower Artibonite departments of Haiti, where PIH works, the presence of a heavily armed and resource-intense peace-keeping force appears somewhat irrelevant and inappropriate in terms of the greatest challenges for survival of the population there, i.e., poverty and lack of infrastructure, not violence. Institutionally, some negative, but also some positive collaborations have emerged from interactions with MINUSTAH forces. However, much greater effect could be realized if the interest, good will and motivation of individual military personnel to help the people of Haiti were institutionalized and systematic, thus allowing an open, transparent, organized way in which to access available expertise and resources.

Recommendations

1) Broader mandate in Haiti

The UN mandate in Haiti should take into consideration the contribution of poverty, food insecurity and lack of infrastructure to the country's fragility as a whole and the protection of social and economic rights should be essential components of the mission. The international community has clear and specific obligations in this regard - Organization of American States (OAS) member states that contribute to leadership of the mission do so under the OAS Charter, for example. The geographic context of conflict should also

be taken into consideration, recognizing that even during the immediate/ emergency phase; the real needs of certain vulnerable populations are totally unrelated to violence or conflict.

2) Improving process and access

The procedures for accessing assistance, for collaborating on development issues and the chain of command of military institutions is not familiar to many civil society groups and may be particularly unclear for national organizations that are more used to long-term development activities than for international organizations frequently involved in emergency assistance (the latter perhaps having more experience interacting with UN bodies). Effort should be made by MINUSTAH and similar missions to provide access to civil society via transparent procedures that do not rely on personal contacts and connections.

3) Budget to complement technical expertise

The MINUSTAH budget should include more substantial flexibility to contribute to development projects, allowing the technical expertise of a highly trained military force to be put to more concrete use during the times of stability and peace. Although technical expertise is available to those who understand how to access it, extremely limited funding is available for actual implementation of basic infrastructural projects. By contributing to local development needs, MINUSTAH bases would greatly abate the community tensions regarding the disparities in equity between the inside and outside of the base – this is particularly important in places where the local population is living on the catastrophic poverty margin. The MINUSTAH budget for 2008 is on par with the total national budget for Haiti.

4) Visibility of the mission

The rural poor have a poor image of MINUSTAH. Efforts should be made to improve the image of the mission both by committing to the recommendations above and by improving institutional sensitivity to the effects that glaring inequity in resources within and outside the walls of the UN bases have on local communities.

CMR: The ICRC Perspective

Felipe Donoso

ICRC – RIO DE JANEIRO

Liaising and dialoguing with the military prior to, during and after an armed conflict is crucial to the ICRC mandate and mission. The close dialogue with all armed actors (national armed forces, multinational forces with or without a UN mandate, armed insurgencies, and other armed groups) allows the ICRC not only to access the victims but also to remind the parties to the conflict of their obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), such as providing humanitarian aid in an impartial manner.

Since the end of Cold War, the military has been increasingly involved in humanitarian aid activities. The 1990s saw the beginnings of a tighter integration of political and military efforts in multinational efforts towards conflict management/resolution and a new trend in which multinational military forces assume humanitarian roles and mandates. These trends sometimes weaken the perception and reality of impartial, independent and neutral humanitarian action in the eyes of belligerents and beneficiaries alike. Humanitarian agencies are able to be neutral and independent only with difficulty when they deploy, for example, the logistical assets of peacekeeping forces that, on occasions, become belligerents in the conflicts they are meant to attenuate.

Advocating for an independent and neutral humanitarian approach includes a claim for maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian

actions, on the one hand, and political-military action, on the other. Not because the ICRC shies away from the military: on the contrary, the ICRC has an active dialogue with them; but because the ICRC wants to avoid the blurring of lines produced by the characterization of military "hearts and minds" campaigns or reconstruction efforts as humanitarian. This said, humanitarian actors should not fall into the trap of thinking that they, and they alone, can help the population in the long run. Humanitarian action is not, and should not be used as, a substitute for sustainable political action.

The involvement of the military in relief operations is sometimes welcome. When needs arise on a large scale and insecurity prevails in areas where vulnerable communities require immediate assistance, it may be that only the armed forces have the capacity to do the task at hand while others prepare to step in.

In 2001, the ICRC adopted Guidelines for Civil-Military Relations (CMR), based on the experiences of the previous decade. While a relationship with armed forces is natural for an organization that works in contexts of armed conflict, there was a particular need to address both the complexity of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations and the growing trend towards integrating the efforts of political, military and humanitarian actors. The ICRC Guidelines address the risks and threats posed by multinational military missions engaging in humanitarian activities or deployed under a humanitarian mandate, while potentially becoming an active participant in hostilities.

For the ICRC, the Fundamental Principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality – to mention only the principles most relevant in this context – cannot be abandoned and reinstated at will. Building trust and acceptance by all parties to a conflict takes a long time and demands much patience. Moreover, the trust so constructed always remains fragile: misperceptions, misunderstandings and confusion with other actors can rapidly destroy this capital of trust and jeopardize humanitarian action long periods.

The ICRC, which enjoys a special status under IHL and has a specific mode of humanitarian action – independent and non-partisan action, recognizes and appreciates other modes of action, but believes that there is, in the wide "landscape" of humanitarian action, a need for such an independent way of working. Vis-à-vis other humanitarian actors, the ICRC does see its own action as complementary. Although there are times when one mode of

action is more effective than another, the ICRC believes that preserving the comparative advantage conferred by its neutral and independent approach and its proximity to the victims in the field is in the best interests of the victims of armed conflict.

In a pluralistic world and in the complexity of conflict situations in particular, there cannot be one and only one approach to humanitarian action. Nobody has a monopoly on humanitarian concerns and goals. A sustained and constructive dialogue should be maintained on all fronts, bearing in mind that States, UN organizations, NGOs and the ICRC are not the only interested parties. Non-state actors and, above all, the civilian population affected by warfare, must also have a say.

Humanitarians and the Military: Reality Beyond Manuals and Guidelines

Simone Rocha

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR – MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES

The past decades have witnessed a greater involvement of the military, be it in the form of national or multinational forces or internationally mandated troops, in the field of humanitarian aid. Since the aftermath of the Cold War, states have become acutely aware of the advantages of borrowing both humanitarian terminology and modes of action. For a number of years, humanitarianism seemed to have become a sort of a joker in the pack in international relations, filling in for the lack of international political solutions to protracted crises or for the lack of timely reaction to occurrences of mass murder such as genocide or ethnic cleansing. As could be expected, humanitarianism was not the answer for international political failures, and humanitarian interventions of the '90s proved to have served interests other than those of the populations to whom they were meant to guarantee protection or assistance. They may have been a success for some states in terms of diplomacy and propaganda but were little more than lip service to the victims in Mogadiscio, Kibeho or Srebrenica. These shameful examples highlighted the need to separate political and military motivations from humanitarian responses to crises.

Despite the failures of military humanitarianism in the first half of the '90s, the following years witnessed continued intrusion by military forces into aid delivery[1], making it even more urgent to clearly distinguish between the military and humanitarians in terms of their roles and scope of action. In each situation, humanitarian agencies, both UN and non-UN, maintained a dialogue with troops on the ground that proved to be indispensable and unavoidable, and quite soon both sides realized the need to codify and institutionalize this debate. In the mid '90s, UN documents such as the Oslo Guidelines and the IASC[2] Principles for Military-Civilian Relations were clear signs of a nascent institutionalization of relations between humanitarian workers and soldiers in the field.[3] A number of guidelines, discussion papers and codes of conduct—both generic and context-related—followed suit, depicting the concepts and principles to be observed by military and humanitarian organizations.[4] These documents highlight the importance of respecting the distinction between the two sets of actors, emphasize the primary role of humanitarian organizations in dealing with the humanitarian consequences of natural disasters and complex emergencies, and urge the humanitarian community to work in a principled and independent manner.

Despite this important effort from IASC and OCHA, empirical observation of events shows that neither states nor the UN have ceased to include humanitarian aid in their broader political and military agendas. On the contrary, two new elements currently undermine progress made on the separation of roles between military and humanitarians in the field: 1) the

1. Some examples are actions by ECOMOG and British forces in Sierra Leone, by UN-led forces in Liberia, and by NATO troops in Kosovo.
2. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was created in 1992 within the UN system to enhance the coordination of UN humanitarian responses. It is composed of the following members: FAO; OCHA; UNICEF; UNDP; UNHCR; UNFPA; WFP; WHO. It also includes the following standing invitees: InterAction; ICRC; ICVA; IFRC; IOM; SCHR; OHCHR; Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs and the World Bank.
3. IASC Principles on Military-Civilian Relations, January 1995; Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Civil and Military Defense Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations (Task Force Report), September 2005.
4. Examples of such documents are: Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies – An IASC Reference Paper, June 2004; Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies, OCHA, 2008; Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief – "Oslo Guidelines". Rev. 1.1, Nov. 2007.

military doctrines followed by some Western powers in complex emergencies, and 2) the UN's integrated approach to peacekeeping/enforcement missions, which envisions a unified coordination between military, political and humanitarian branches, and so incorporates humanitarian response into a broader security agenda.

The concepts of coherence and integration are only now being fully incorporated and translated into integrated UN missions in the field, and the degree of implementation has varied greatly, making it difficult to draw definite conclusions about the consequences for the independence of humanitarian aid or the protection and assistance afforded to populations at risk. Nonetheless, the studies that do exist, including a study by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), point to a dangerous assimilation of humanitarian provisions into broader agendas of peacekeeping, reconstruction, and nation- or state-building.[5] Conceived to be applied to UN missions, coherence does affect the rest of the humanitarian community, since the bulk of NGOs rely on the UN for security clearances, logistics or funding, and donor states have largely bought into the UN idea of coherence. This can be seen, for instance, in the frequent use of pooled funding and the UN Central Emergency Response Funds (CERF). When funding is channeled via the UN, and not bilaterally between a diverse field of donors and different NGOs with independent approaches, the services offered are reduced in number and diversity. There is undoubtedly a risk that the integration of agendas may result in military or political goals taking precedence over humanitarian needs on a more recurrent basis than we have seen so far.

5. Derderian K., Stobbaerts E., Sigh A., Rocha S., Melody D., U N Humanitarian Reforms: a View from the Field, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 39, June 2007. Donini A., Fast L., Hansen G., Harris S., Minear L., Mowjee T. and Wilder A., Humanitarian Agenda 2015: The State of Humanitarian Enterprise, Final Report, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, March 2008. Joanna Macrae and Nicolas Leader, Shifting Sands: The Search for 'Coherence' Between Political and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies, HPG Report 8, August 2000, http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport8.pdf. Nicolas de Torrenté, 'Humanitarianism Sacrificed: Integration's False Promise', Ethics & International Affairs, 18(2), 2004, http://www.cceia.org. Nicolas de Torrenté, 'Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War', Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17, Spring 2004, http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss17/torrente.shtml. Greg Hansen, 'Taking Sides or Saving Lives: Existential Choices for the Humanitarian Enterprise in Iraq', June 2007, http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/HA2015IraqCountryStudy.pdf. Fabien Dubuet (MSF), United Nations: Deceptive Humanitarian Reforms? December 2006, http://www.msf.org.

On the point of Western military doctrines, it seems that lessons learnt in the '90s by the decision-makers responsible for waging the wars against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathist regime in Iraq has not guided them during the first half of this decade. In both of those cases, humanitarian aid was considered to be a tool for winning support within domestic constituencies, international public opinion and, first and foremost, the local populations where interventions were being carried out. The concept of ´force protection,´ according to which Quick Impact Projects or other sorts of ´rapid deployment´ of assistance may precede, complement or hide a military and/or intelligence-gathering mission in a given territory, was added to the traditional ´hearts and minds´ strategy. As implementers of the bulk of humanitarian aid, NGOs were seen as ´force multipliers,´ and much pressure was brought to bear on NGOs to accept being embedded into the Coalition of the Willing, with the goal being to control where, how and with whom NGOs would work.[6] In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the humanitarian community witnessed an unprecedented disregard for the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, which led to a clear deterioration in local perception of humanitarians, worsening of security conditions, and an increase in the number of attacks against humanitarian workers.[7]

From food drops wrapped in the same colors as explosive fragments of cluster bombs to the dropping of leaflets making the transmission of intelligence information a condition of the continuity of aid, the international intervention in Afghanistan represents a clear case of misuse of the humanitarian endeavor by international forces and the governments

6. See Natsios A., 'Remarks at the InterAction Forum, Closing Plenary Session', 21 May 2003, www.interaction.org/forum2003/panels.html; Powell C., 'Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the National Foreign Policy Conference For Leaders of Non-Governmental Organizations', 26 October 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01102606.htm; De Torrente N., Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 17. www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss17/torrente.pdf

7. In Afghanistan, the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) has been documenting the cases of violence against humanitarian workers. In 2009, so far 11 NGO workers have died in over 68 security incidents involving aid agencies. 'Increased Attacks on Afghanistan Aid Workers Could Provoke Humanitarian Crises,' PoliticalAffairs.net: http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/7149/1/344. For a very recent account on the Afghan case, see: Donini, Antonio, 'Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat,' Feistein International Center, 2009. http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Afghanistan+--+Humanitarianism+under+Threat

they represent.[8] And on the ground, the CIMIC doctrine applied both by US Army and NATO troops in Afghanistan does not seem to reflect the respect for the specificity of the assistance enterprise portrayed in the aforementioned UN documents.[9] Besides ignoring long-term effects on the perception of humanitarian organizations working within the same context, sustainability and appropriateness of aid — two core guiding principles in aid delivery —were also neglected at every turn.

The argument is not against states' providing assistance or the fact that they may choose to do so through military forces. One can argue that it is the duty of occupying forces to provide for the needs of the population in the occupied territory. The problem is not the provision of aid *per se*, but its random, *ad hoc*, partial and unsustainable nature when driven by interests other than the needs of the population, and in sharp contrast to both the guiding principles of humanitarianism specified by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the professional standards developed and applied by experienced humanitarian agencies.

In fact, humanitarians do not pretend to hold a monopoly over assistance provision. The military, in addition to its role in armed conflict, can provide valuable and welcome support in the delivery of humanitarian aid. In situations such as the aftermath of natural disasters, military forces´ logistics may contribute enormously to providing aid in a timely manner, rescuing victims, evacuating the ill, de-mining, reconstructing heavy infrastructure, etc., and NGOs often make use of their assets. Far more complicated, though, are situations in which international troops play an active role in hostilities,

8. In April 2004, the coalition dropped leaflets in Afghan areas that border Pakistan linking aid to intelligence information. In the leaflet, which had a picture of an Afghan girl carrying a bag of wheat, one reads : "Pass on any information related to the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Gulbaddin to the coalition forces in order to have the continuation of the provision of aid".

9. NATO´s CIMIC doctrine states that the following: *The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him to fulfil his mission. The long-term purpose is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations.* For the full doctrine see: http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf. The USA´s army doctrine states that the following: *Civil-Military Operations encompass the activities that joint force commanders take to establish and maintain positive relations between their forces, the civil authorities, and the general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed in order to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve US objectives.*

or are a part of a UN-mandated military mission that uses or threatens to use force to maintain or enforce peace. In these scenarios, the involvement of military in the delivery of aid, concurrent with one-time or permanent engagement in hostilities, blurs the line foreseen in IHL between combatants and non-combatants, between the military and impartial providers of humanitarian assistance, endangering acceptance of the latter by warring parties and local populations. In most of these situations, neutral and impartial action will always be vital to the provision of aid, since the parties involved in conflicts are required by IHL to grant access to populations in need of assistance to agencies that abide by these principles. Maintaining a neutral stance has been fundamental for Médecins Sans Frontières and has allowed it to obtain access to needy populations in dozens of armed conflicts over the past three decades.

Over the course of its history MSF has, on the one hand, made use of military assets — mostly in situations of natural disasters, but exceptionally in conflict settings as well — while, on the other hand, it has denounced the consequences of military humanitarianism for beneficiaries. In its daily work in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and other war-torn countries, its interaction with the military has been constant, frank and pragmatic. Experience has taught us that no two situations are alike, and that the needs of the populations should determine, on a case-by-case basis, the degree of proximity or collaboration between our teams and intervening troops. Experience has also taught us that whenever political and military interests are mixed with humanitarian objectives in conflict or post-conflict settings, the former prevail over the latter, often compromising both protection of and assistance to the populations in question. In these contexts, separating humanitarian aid from politics and military strategies to the greatest degree possible is the first step towards collaboration between the military and humanitarians in the field, whatever shape or dimension it may take. A primary understanding of the differences in roles, tactics and objectives is of utmost importance if any sort of productive interaction is to take place between these two groups. As a matter of fact, we should be far beyond that stage by now. Yet it seems that the better one becomes at producing guidelines and manuals to frame the relationship between military and humanitarians, the further one gets from the reality of such relations, as the environments in which they take place become increasingly politicized.

Preparing for Integrated Peace Operations – Planning and Training

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As peacekeeping has evolved, particularly during the past two decades, a growing number of peacekeeping centers have been considering the need for improving their training focused on multidimensional missions.

The increasing complexity of the mandates (including military, UN police, political affairs, law, human rights, humanitarian activities, reconstruction, public information and gender) have engendered more in-depth peacekeeping training programs.

Whilst a mandate issued by the Security Council with DPKO (**Department of Peacekeeping Operations**) assessment can authorize a multidimensional mission, by itself, it cannot ensure integration in a peacekeeping mission. From the strategic to the tactical level, it is necessary to have integrated planning, training and, perhaps the most crucial of all, a shift in paradigm.

Since the MINUSTAH startup, DPKO has generated much paperwork to attempt to stimulate integration in the field. Despite some unpredictable setbacks in the Secretariat structure, the message of integration remains the strongest idea sent to Member States and to the field mission. Over the course of UN reform, some important advances suggest a more comprehensive approach in the field would be in order.

As a direct consequence of this change, the training provided by CI Op Paz (Training Centre for Peacekeeping Operations of the Brazilian Army) as well as another training Centre has included more and more civilian participants. The responsibility of keeping training programs updated has generated a great deal of work for the peacekeeping center, a subscriber to UN doctrine. Such changes are affecting its structure and are opening up steadily expanding numbers of places for law enforcement, civilians and women.

Just one year before the approval of MINUSTAH mandate, in 2003 DPKO issued an important document entitled "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations". The material is recommended to any future candidate preparing for a multidimensional mission and provides the reader with at least some inkling of whom he/she might meet in the field. While the military structure follows relatively few universal principles, the civilian actors in a multidimensional mission present a much wider variety. A thorough understanding of the concept of an integrated mission, the role and the structures of its actors, the process of training and planning is highly beneficial. With sufficient mutual understanding, the various actors will be in a better position to identify and emphasize potential areas of cooperation.

The handbook has influenced MINUSTAH since the first Concept of Operation. Further, at the time of the first DPKO technical visit to Haiti, the handbook was already available to all DPKO staff members and was also sent to all Permanent Missions in New York.

Inspired by the new demands from the field and the proposal made by Member States in the annual report of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), DPKO has created some specific mechanisms to bridge the gap between the military, police and civilian actors.

MINUSTAH has implemented and benefited from several of these mechanisms, including the creation of Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) and Joint Operations Centre (JOC).

Encompassed by the mandate of the JMAC/JOC is the idea that a multidimensional mission must be able to identify, prevent and/or respond to threats or emerging threats. The assumption of the policy is that senior

mission leaders are informed of and understand developments on the ground, their likely consequences and the possible impacts of possible decision vis-à-vis mandate implementation/UN personnel and facilities security.

The DPKO policy that created JMAC and JOC was issued on 2006, at a time when MINUSTAH was still in need of practical mechanisms for a better integration. The policy had a positive effect on MINUSTAH, improving its coordination capacity. Within a short period of time, MINUSTAH became a point of reference for the implementation of what was then a new concept. However, the deployment of new structures that upset entrenched paradigms always causes reactions and the implementation of JOC and JMAC in MINUSTAH was no exception.

One practical problem reported during the implementation of JMAC in MINUSTAH was the difficulty in finding an adequate profile to fit the job description of JMAC post. Beside the need of a good training, regarding intelligence related issues, the language skills are also relevant. So, in order to provide adequate human resources on board, it is necessary a particular effort on recruiting and training the personnel. Despite the difficulty faced in the implementation phase, there is no doubt that MINUSTAH has presented a great improvement on information gathering and analyzes capacity. Similar reactions were observed when discussing the JOC structure. Actually, MINUSTAH has adapted the idea of a Joint Operation Center and created other integrated structures.

The positive aspects of achieving synergy in a mission area are broader than this and benefit not only the Head of Mission, but also all participants in the peace process. Working in an integrated manner the partners can provide the host country with better peace dividends, assimilating the integrated/cooperative government model and solving critical problems. This is, perhaps, one of the greatest legacies that United Nations can provide for the local people in a post conflict area and peacekeepers returning to their home countries.

Policing in conflict zones: military or policing tasks? Initiatives and challenges

Major Joseli Cândido

PMERJ

Domestic disorder is generally the essence of conflicts in nation states and results in the decay of public institutions, especially those related to preserving law and order and resolving internal disputes.

The aim of modern multi-dimensional Peace keeping Operations is to provide the means for the host country to reestablish order and local public institutions, thereby providing a safe and secure environment for all people and maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies in accordance with international standards with respect for human rights.

The Development of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

The end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties brought to the forefront the UN practice of PKO, involving civilians, police, and military in its attempt to separate armed domestic rivals while simultaneously restoring law and order.

The Deployment Gap

The original mission of a PKO military contingent is to impose basic and rigorously applied order. An intervening military force tries to limit loss of life and destruction of property. Because local law enforcement agencies may have become oppressive or stopped operating altogether, international policing assistance must be mobilized to restore this function.

Although military forces have a capacity to deploy rapidly in unit strength, police organizations do not. Mobilizing a UNPOL contingent is time consuming because most domestic police forces do not have international mobility or any experience in operating beyond national borders. At the start of an intervention, the military is often the only source of order.

The local public security force commonly lacks the capacity or motivation to put a stop to civil disorder. Consequently and in all likelihood, the international military contingent will be faced with a need to perform certain police functions, at least until UNPOL personnel arrive and are able to operate effectively.

The Enforcement Gap

Once sufficient UNPOL members are deployed, monitoring of the local police force can begin (assuming the latter still exists). Public security, with respect to crimes by individuals and small-scale disturbances, will usually be provided by some hybrid of the local police force and UNPOL. The military component provides area security.

For society to begin to restore normal activity there must be a state of law and order. This comprises public security, and includes police, judges, and jailers. This phase of the operation should also serve as a period of reconstitution for the entire public security apparatus. A common problem is confusion about which legal code applies and who is authorized to enforce it. Whereas the deployment phase was about timing, the enforcement phase is about function.

International police observers are incapable of dealing with serious lawlessness and violent domestic disorder, especially of the sort that tends to appear during postconflict situations. Such situations created a demand

for special police units trained for riot control situations and other special situations. The units were designated as FPU (Formed Police Units) with a total manpower of about 125 policemen belonging to one member state. The units are generally armed and have arrest authority added to their mandate.

Soldier and law enforcement officer are different jobs and require different types of training. Whereas police officers are trained to be flexible on an individual level and adjust their attitudes to the prevailing situation on the streets (including escalating and de-escalating the use of force as needed), military training tends to be less flexible. Different national traditions might play a role, too. Reports from the different military contingents employed in a peacekeeping role in Haiti, for example, suggest that Brazilian soldiers are better able to adapt their behavior to the situation compared with other troops.

It would be wrong to expect an international military operation to take over police work for an extended period. A police organization can function successfully only in the context of long-term stability. While military forces might carry out policing duties in an unstable environment for a short time, to achieve lasting stability and security a local police structure must be either recreated or reformed.

By monitoring the local structures and training/assisting the "new" police forces, international police officers can help to establish the local population's trust in these institutions and overcome initial difficulties. The Police play a fundamental role in the transition from war to peace, gradually bringing "normal life" back to the local population. Therefore, there must be a standardized selection, training, and supervision of these international police officers in order to achieve effective policing during peace operations.

While international military forces cannot stay forever, advisers may continue after military withdrawal from the operation, keeping in mind the basic need to:

- Establish a stable, secure, well-coordinated environment, employing both military and civilian police personnel;
- Establish regularly operating judicial/penal systems and police forces.

Postconflict peace building is the best guarantee to the international community that the investments of a peacekeeping operation will not be

wasted by the resurgence of states of violence. Such work, although requiring investments of time and coordination, offers the best hope of turning fragile agreements into lasting peace.

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Challenges in Policing and the Advantages of *Policia Militar*

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Introduction

Over the past decade, the Brazilian military has contributed to international or United Nations (UN) military peacekeeping missions. However welcome these contributions may have been, they have taken place on a comparatively limited scale. Brazil's contribution to international police efforts has been even smaller. Should the country choose to contribute more frequently and deploy larger numbers of policemen and policewomen, it could benefit from studying previous police missions. International literature on UN and other policing activities is widely available, but must be gathered, analysed and incorporated in the system of preparation for peacekeeping. The UN and other "foreign" organisations can certainly provide valuable information materials, courses and advice, but for the most part Brazil would have to prepare its own police units.

The aim of this contribution is to provide an overview of and some insight into—from a European perspective—the challenges that international police missions pose. It can also be used as a starting point to find more literature. In addition, this contribution suggests using the *Policia Militar* of the 27

Brazilian states and federal districts for international police peacekeeping. The contribution ends with short answers to the five questions that the organisers of this conference formulated for the members of this panel.

Police in peacekeeping

A review of the literature reveals some of the challenges in peacekeeping operations.[1] In some cases, the international police and military hardly coordinated their efforts. Doctrinal, logistical, planning, and cultural differences between contributing police forces also created problems. In many operations, the chain of command was not clear before or during the operation. Finding enough qualified officers and having them available in time proved to be too difficult on numerous occasions. A lack of flexibility in national regulations limited the cooperation between police officers from different countries that were taking part in the mission. The literature also makes it clear that policing other peoples is far more difficult than providing security in one's own country. During the operations too much time was spent on internal organization tasks such as meetings, administration, and coordination. Finally, international efforts did not always put local authorities in charge of police matters, which left them unprepared to fully take over once the foreign police left.

Of course Brazil does not negotiate mandates for UN or international missions on its own, but it could at least educate its diplomats on the peculiarities and demands of policing operations and instruct them to specifically address these wherever they can. Policing other peoples is always difficult. However, Brazil's police forces have domestic experience with remote regions, rough terrain, drug organisations and lawless areas in larger cities (*favelas*), which might make them more suitable for peacekeeping than police from countries with less troubled domestic security, including most countries in Northern and Western Europe. Moreover, culturally, in climate and in urban infrastructure, many, if not most, peacekeeping areas do resemble Brazil.

A review of the challenges in four international policing operations—Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan—indicates other, more

1. De Weger (2007), pp. 14-15.

complex problems.[2] Some of the international forces deployed seriously lacked police capacity. In some cases there was no advance planning and no exit strategy for the police operation, no operational plans had been developed, or the operation was not evaluated at all. International forces demonstrated poor human rights standards, had no internal disciplinary procedures, and were not being policed themselves. A lack of equipment, limited logistical support and limited training resources reduced their effectiveness. The international police had no standards for training local police forces and lacked expertise in training, selecting, vetting and interviewing local police recruits. The slow development of policies, procedures and management structures for local forces and slowness in equipping them are also mentioned in the literature. In some of these four operations, too few local police officers were trained. Another problem mentioned is a limited knowledge of the country upon arrival. In these operations, the vast array of external and internal stakeholders was poorly coordinated. Lack of coordination and an overlap with other actors in the operation also caused problems. In some operations there was too much emphasis on developing specialised local police forces and too little effort made in the field of common policing capacity. Poor performance in high-profile cases of politically motivated violence also limited the effectiveness of some of these missions. The rotation frequency of the international police was too high, which limited the quality of their performance. In some operations an absence of structural reforms in the ministries of the host nations limited the effectiveness of the international operations. To avoid the long list of problems in earlier international policing operations, some created local police forces that required unsustainable levels of effort by the host governments.

Police reform

Research supervised by the author into the experiences of officers of the Dutch gendarmerie force (*Royal marechaussee*) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and Afghanistan provides insight into the challenges of international police

2. De Weger (2008), pp. 181-185.

reform operations.[3] The research revealed challenges in selecting personnel who were experienced in the specific tasks they would perform abroad, lack of preparation for these tasks (e.g., history, culture and self-protection training), and time-pressure during preparation for deployment. In Afghanistan, the security situation was too threatening to train and mentor the Afghan police outside of Dutch army barracks. In Iraq, the *Marechaussees* were periodically given the task of "spying" on local police to identify threats to Dutch troops in the area. In all cases, policing in the areas of deployment differed greatly from the Netherlands: there was a lack of computers, archives, and dossiers, in addition to illiteracy and a lack of initiative among local police officers. In Iraq and Afghanistan, practice policing was often limited to manning checkpoints. During these practice sessions, police officers refused to wear uniforms and work outside their tribal areas for reasons of safety.

In all three of the above cases, the local population held the police in very low esteem due to its historical role, which included corruption and extortion. International police were treated indifferently or opportunistically and deferentially by local police, who were trying to receive as much free equipment as possible and thus agreed to participate in any kind of training. Donors provided some equipment that local police were unable to use, administer, or maintain. Contributions from various countries were often lacking or poorly related to local needs. Communication with trainees proved to be an enormous challenge, causing interpreters to be of utmost value, even to the point where international police became dependent on them while doubting their impartiality in local issues. *Marechaussees* had a hard time trying to change local police culture that was based on corruption, use of violence and authority. Training illiterate and inexperienced officers proved to be very difficult. Whether advice was taken was highly dependent on personal relations with local officers. Local police forces developed different structures and tactics as each contributing police force applied its own national standards. Finally, after ending their period of service, Dutch gendarmerie officers often had just days to share their knowledge and experiences with their successors.

3. Sollie (2009), pp. 86-109.

Iraq and Afghanistan

This section will highlight some additional challenges, using the much-studied cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. What both have in common is that police matters have for too long not been taken seriously enough, while mismatches have existed between security threats and the precise kinds of police and military specialists used to counter them. Generally speaking, the more available resources are concordant with threats, the higher the chances of success.

In Iraq, security conditions seem to be finally improving, but police affairs got off to a very bad start. The US-led coalition had virtually no serious plans for what to do after military victory. In the space of a year, crime and public order spiralled out of control, partially due to the dissolving of Iraqi police and other security forces. Neither the Iraqi government nor the coalition had sufficient special security forces to counter the general lawlessness that occurred. Due to a lack of robust and regular police, they had to rely on infantry and extremely overstretched and inexperienced MPs. This resulted in many cases of using disproportional violence. Only when an insurgency and civil war erupted, leading to the US surge and a change of policy in working with local militia, did the relation between threats and available resources improve, allowing the violence to be quelled.

As to Afghanistan, the newly formed police force does not fit the legal tradition of the country, and international efforts to build it have been highly inconsistent. The police are corrupt and still do not observe human rights standards. Although modest progress has been made in building up the Afghan police, plans for an even larger force might be hard to achieve, because it is highly doubtful that the Afghan government and population could financially sustain such a force.[4] The current Afghan police force is generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgence. It suffers three times as many casualties as the Afghan military and is highly militarised in nature because most of its training has come from foreign military forces.[5]

4. Hovens (2009).
5. Perito (2009), p. 1.

Advantages of *Policia Militar*

Before pointing out the advantages that gendarmerie forces offer for policing in troubled countries, we must first explain what is meant by this label. The Policia Militar force of Brazil is one of a large group of similar security forces in the world. The first gendarmerie were introduced by the early-1800s French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte in countries he conquered (such as the Netherlands, Spain and northern Italy) and copied by states that admired Napoleon's military organisation (such as Turkey and tsarist Russia) or introduced by European countries in their colonies around the world (including Portugal in Brazil). Gendarmerie, *policia militar* or constabulary forces, as they tend to be called in Anglo-Saxon literature, combine military and police elements. At present, 65 countries seem to have some form of gendarmerie force;[6] this amounts to about a third of all countries. Its is mainly Anglo-Saxon-oriented countries, like the United States or the United Kingdom and its former colonies, that do not have *policia militar*. Several authors have suggested that the US create a constabulary force for peacekeeping.[7]

A review of the literature reveals why gendarmerie are suitable for peacekeeping and what their advantages are over regular, local or civilian police.[8] Gendarmerie forces have a light infantry aspect and are thus able to carry out policing in all circumstances, while a civilian police force is used to working only in conditions of peace. Being military organisations, gendarmerie are rapidly deployable and able to sustain themselves logistically. Gendarmerie can be placed under military command and work in a military environment. As military personnel, gendarmes can be deployed abroad and in dangerous surroundings. They are also allowed by law to operate under civilian control. Gendarmerie forces share many approaches with the military: planning, command and control methods; rotation of forces; and training and exercises on levels that civilian police forces cannot reach. Because they perform mainly rural tasks domestically, possess robust military equipment, and train with the military, they can operate in demanding geographical

6. De Weger (2009), pp. 75–83.
7. I.e. Perito (2004), Kelly e.a. (2009).
8. De Weger (2009), pp. 26-27 and 36-37.

areas. Gendarmerie forces should, of course, also be preferred for tasks in which only they have domestic experience.

On the other hand, gendarmerie forces have advantages over the regular military. They have specialised equipment for dealing with lower levels of violence. Gendarmerie forces are far more experienced in securing internal security and enforcing the law in a civilian context. They are better at not alienating the public. Gendarmerie forces are less expensive. In some cases, it is more politically acceptable to local conflicting parties or to surrounding countries to deploy gendarmerie rather than regular military forces. A very important factor is that deploying gendarmerie avoids giving the impression of applying a double standard: Countries that would never use soldiers for crowd control domestically do not have to resort to such an approach abroad. Moreover, due to their historical task of pacifying remote parts of their own countries, at least in Europe, gendarmerie forces understand far better than the operation-campaign-and-war-oriented regular military that improving local security takes time, discretion and patience.

To contribute to international peacekeeping under the flag of Brazil and to achieve the country's foreign policy goals, the 27 states' *Policia Militar* forces should be able to work as one, limiting the differences that undoubtedly exist between them. They face more or less the same problems that their European cousins needed to address in creating the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). By developing common standards, doctrines and procedures, certifying and designating units, being able to deploy within a month, and having an integrated chain of command, the EGF reflects lessons learned from earlier international operations.[9] Brazil's National Force of Public Safety (*Força Nacional de Segurança Pública*), which is controlled by the central government and meant to assist in serious disturbances of public order that exceed the capacity of individual states to handle, probably faced the same challenges during its creation as a single unified force. It would be interesting to compare the two. Moreover, the National Force of Public Safety could be used for international police operations as well. Taking this one step further, if Brazil were to become more involved in police peacekeeping by using its *Policia Militar*, it might do so in conjunction with the other South American gendarmerie forces, such as the *Gendarmería Nacional Argentina*

9. De Weger (2009), pp. 27-29.

and *Carabineros de Chile*.[10] These could deploy sizeable forces that would be all the more effective if they could operate as one.

Answers to panel questions

We will now try to answer the questions that the organisers of this conference put to our panel. This contribution has so far focused on questions two, four and five. Many challenges have been highlighted, and it has been suggested that most can be overcome if the Brazilian government and security forces were to educate, train, equip, organise and lead its own deployable police contingents, for which the Policia Militar forces seem to be the best candidates.

Now we will address the other questions. First, in most police peacekeeping, the international police force has extensive contact with the international military. Both are responsible for providing security, each for its own specific security issues, which requires extensive contact to determine who should do precisely what, as well as where, when and how to operate together. For obvious reasons, the international police force should also have extensive contact with civilian actors who are providing medical services, humanitarian aid, development aid, economic assistance, etc.—probably to a greater extent than they do when working in their own country. The police should provide security, but communicating, coordinating and cooperating will deliver better results for all. Interactions thus take place both at management level and "in the field."

Second, the suggestion that community policing can be useful for police peacekeeping is either a truism or misguiding, depending on the political and security context the operation takes place in. Community policing in its usual sense is impossible if security conditions are too harsh for the police to operate in, in cases were there is widespread distrust of the international police forces, when the population is not used to a police presence, or if foreign police officers do not know enough about the local situation or

10. The *Policía Nacional de Colombia* and the Venezuelan National Guard (*Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación*) can also be considered gendarmerie forces. The first might be too involved in domestic troubles to become involved in peacekeeping. The latter might, for some countries, be politically unacceptable.

cannot effectively communicate with locals. In all other cases, it is of course desirable to "work for and with the public." No one who wishes the best for the local population would say otherwise.

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Planning and Training in an Era of Multidimensional Complex Peace Operations

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Introduction

There is consensus that the environment in which complex peace operations are conducted is substantively different post-Cold War and post-9-11. Conflicts have shifted from inter-State to intra-State, and the conduct of conflicts and the framing of peace have been altered as a consequence. With approximately 115,000 deployed personnel, diverse mandates, and a budget of approximately $7.8 billion, peace operations are increasingly challenging. The need for increased numbers of police and civilians to meet the multiple peace operations tasks cannot be overstated. Military capabilities are stretched, and the requirement for personnel, logistic and administration systems to support the missions spread across the globe often find it difficult to meet the demand.

Three overarching issues complicate the landscape of international peace and security and as a result, of complex peace operations. First, rapid socio-economic changes evidenced by Wall Street and the High Street are impacting on how wealth is made and exchanged, as well as affecting how national budgets are allocated for defence, diplomacy and development. Second, the

shift in demographics or the youth bulge commands attention as roughly 40% of the world's population is below the age of 15, an important factor in assessing the costs to a State of education, employment and health care, as well as in recruitment of child soldiers, and human trafficking issues. Finally, global climate change is impacting resources such as food, water and energy and their allocation. Scholars and practitioners have argued that water will be the next source of conflict – even more so than oil. The distribution of resources, be they human, food, water or oil will continue to impact on international peace and security.

Fundamentally, the concept of collective security has become broader, deeper and more complicated as the international environment deals with the fact that the majority of the threats to global collective security are beyond the control of any single authority. Effective partnerships, transparency, accountability and consensus now have to traverse non-traditional lines if they are to be effective in this complicated environment which is also impacted by information technology, the Internet and the rapid transmission of 24-hour news cycles, photos, blogs, and twitters.

Brahimi and Capstone Principles and Guidelines

Two documents are particularly relevant as institutions prepare their civilian, military and police personnel for deployment into complex peace operations; specifically, the Brahimi Report (2000) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (2008). The anticipated New Horizons non-paper will also be an important analytical document in re-thinking how to build effective partnerships to manage the international demand, management and expectations for peace operations planning, training and implementation.

Before reviewing briefly the Brahimi Report, one must acknowledge the Agenda for Peace (1992), which began to address the complexity of global transition. The authors noted trends of deepened cooperation among regional and continental associations of States; it also noted the contradictory nature of change by identifying the "…fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty….and the threat to the cohesion of States from "…brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife". The Agenda for Peace also

identified how poverty, disease, debt burdens, and other social conditions contributed to being a source and consequence of conflict which would require the highest priority and attention by the United Nations.

In the section on peacekeeping (Agenda for Peace, para 50-52), there was clarity that as the demand increased for peacekeeping, there were also new problems: logistics, equipment, personnel, and financing needed the Member States' attention and resources. Without having trained personnel readily available to deploy to a UN mission, and without the equipment to carry out the terms and conditions of the mandate, and without the logistical support to get the trained personnel, and their equipment into the mission area, the probability existed for a mission to be unsuccessful.

Attention also focused on the fact that peacekeeping required a host of civilian actors, ranging from civilian police officers to humanitarian aid and development specialists who would play a role as central as the military. Finding these civilian personnel, trained and released from their civilian jobs proved difficult, as did the issue of roles and responsibilities; the issues surrounding humanitarian space and civil-military relationships became part of the debate and dialogue. A further point was that the training for complex peace operations would require a more integrated approach that would acclimatize the civilian, military and police actors to working with each other.

The Brahimi Report was issued in 2000 and built on the Agenda for Peace. Echoes of the past were evident in the report; the need for a Secretary-General to have "…clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States" could not be emphasized enough. The failures of peacekeeping operations were credited to the "…inability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular is to succeed" as well as to the reality that "…force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built" (Brahimi Report, viii).

The Brahimi Report re-emphasized the need for preventive action and peacebuilding, which was integrated with peacekeeping's need for a robust doctrine and realistic mandates. Planning with one eye on history and another eye clearly focused on what a specific mandate required in terms of trained personnel, robust rules of engagement so that the UN peacekeeping force could be a credible deterrent against spoilers was critical if there was to be a successful peacekeeping mission.

Mission guidance, mission leadership, rapid deployment standards, on-call expertise to conduct complex peace operations were all noted as critical for UN missions in a challenging international environment.

The Capstone Principles and Guidelines (2008) was designed as an internal UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) guide for all UN personnel serving in the field and at UN Headquarters and can be seen as a response to the Brahimi Report's note about the need for doctrine. Its purpose is to "…provide a handrail to assist planners and practitioners" as they navigate complex peace operations. Its value to peacekeeping training institutions is the identification of the myriad tasks and responsibilities which have to be factored into preparing personnel from the multiple disciplines who have a significant role in the implementation of complex mandates. It also outlined additional success factors which support the basic principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force expected in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership were seen as critical components in the support of achieving sustainable peace and are now included in the listing of foundational principles.

We know that contemporary, complex peace operations have a multiplicity of actors, roles, responsibilities, and authorities. We also know that there is no such thing as a "one size fits all" model for complex peace operations. Issues such as the protection of civilians, humanitarian space, ethics, cultural awareness/sensitivity/communication, spaces for development and security, as well as security sector/system reforms compel all stakeholders to find new methods for training and analysis of complex, multidimensional peace operations. We know that there is a need for balancing flexibility and coherence. And we know that we have to extract what works and that we have to tailor our response to any given situation.

Training for multidimensional complex peace operations

The United Nations Integrated Training Service (UN ITS) has developed a series of guidelines and standards for generic, as well as discipline specific peacekeeping training. Member States, of course, retain the responsibility for national training of their police and military contributions to UN peace

operations; however, these pre-deployment standards are an attempt to bring coherence to the training provided by Member States to their personnel scheduled for deployment into UN peace operations.

The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) is also committed to supporting the UN ITS training modules. At the 2008 meeting, there was substantive discussion about the benefits of coherence and standardization among deployed personnel (military and police) whose training for peace operations was based in these modules. Attention was given to how the IAPTC could be an additional supportive mechanism for Member States in the development and implementation of their respective training programmes.

One of the most important outcomes of having guidelines and standards from UN ITS is that it does provide a means whereby deployed personnel will have a better common understanding of their tasks in mission.

The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) also provides a framework for guiding the planning processes required to meet the mandates. While it is still being refined, the IMPP is useful as a training tool for helping the senior leadership team in a mission headquarters appreciate the myriad challenges of meeting their specific tasks and objectives. At the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), we have found benefit in training civilians, military and police in the same classrooms, using the IMPP in the United Nations Integrated Mission Staff Officers Course, as well as in the Planning for Integrated Missions, the Senior Managers Course, and Advanced Planning for Integrated Missions. The impact of these courses is that participants who are deployed have a clearer understanding of the interface among the police, civilians, military, and local populations and understand the need for working together despite the tensions that exist among their respective disciplines.

It is not news that the role of police and justice sectors is increasingly important in missions as the mandates focus on post-conflict peacebuilding. The inclination is to think of a linear hand-off from the military to the police to the civilians, but with the Security System/Sector Reform focus and the need for supporting the development of an environment where the population have confidence in their police and justice institutions, the nexus among military, police, justice, humanitarians and other civilian actors requires integrated training.

Several challenges emerge:

1. the provision of training to civilians, who generally do not have either the budget or the institutional frameworks that support pre-deployment, in mission, or continuous training; many civilian organizations do not have the numbers of personnel to support a training rotation as they "one deep";
2. the relationship among civilian and military personnel remains somewhat tense, although significant advances have been made in understanding the integrated approach which is necessary if the vulnerable populations are to have their needs met;
3. police are highly valued in their home countries, and allowing them to be deployed into an international environment results in fewer police "walking the beat" on their own community streets; from a political perspective, this is difficult for a Chief of Police to manage, despite the value that is accrued when a police officer serves in an international mission.

The PPC has been a vocal and strong advocate for multi-disciplinary training since its inception. Offering training for civilians, police and military in the same classroom provides opportunities for these distinct disciplines to practice decision-making together when the cost of an error is not measured in human life. The mutual respect engendered for the variety of roles, responsibilities and authorities is obvious, and the de-bunking of myths is useful. While no panacea for the civil-military space issues, training together using a scenario based curriculum built in accordance with UN ITS standards does provide a space for practicing planning and managing consequences. The evaluation feedback from course participants deployed to missions indicates that the integrated training resulted in their ability to be more effective in their mission.

The complexity of current UN peace operations missions and the probability of continuing high levels of demand for peacekeepers do require a re-thinking in how training is conducted. If the expectation for rapid deployment of trained personnel (and equipment) who can meet the demands of the mandate continues at the current pace, this suggests that training institutions will be increasingly under pressure to offer integrated

courses, framed in UN ITS modules, in order to provide personnel who can effectively and efficiently perform their tasks for the benefit of those who suffer the impact of conflict.

Afghanistan's Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform

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Introduction

From a standing start in 2002, Afghanistan's National Police (ANP) forces have grown to 68,000 with target end strength of 86,000 personnel. The ANP includes several distinct entities operating under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior. These police forces include the Afghan Uniform Police, which is responsible for general police duties, and four specialized police organizations: the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the Counter Terrorism Police. While this growth in size and responsibilities is impressive, the ANP has failed to fulfill its mandate to uphold the rule of law, protect Afghan citizens, and meet the country's security needs, including controlling the borders and narcotics production and defeating the Taliban-led insurgency. Speaking in Brussels at a German Marshall Fund Conference on March 21, 2009, U.S. Special Envoy Ambassador Richard Holbrooke characterized the ANP as "inadequate," "riddled with corruption," and the "weak link in the security chain." Holbrooke said that fixing the police

would be a key part of the Obama Administration's plan for stabilizing Afghanistan.[1]

The US Police Assistance Program

Under the international division of labor agreed to at the beginning of the Afghanistan operation, the Germans developed an initial plan for training the Afghan police based upon the European model of creating a police academy that would provide a university-level education for officers and a shorter academic program for non-commissioned officers.[2] The Germans committed $70 million toward renovating the police academy in Kabul, provided eleven police instructors, refurbished Kabul police stations and donated fifty police vehicles. The first team of German police advisors arrived in Kabul on March 16, 2002, and the German Coordination Office was opened on March 18. The Coordination Office supervised the reconstruction of the police academy, which formally reopened on August 22, 2002 with 1,500 officer cadets enrolled in a five-year program.[3] The Academy also offered a three-month recruit course for 500 noncommissioned officers.[4] According to Interior Minister Mohammed Qanooni, the Interim Authority's goal was to create a police force of 70,000 officers.[5] The German approach would have taken decades to train a police force of that size, assuming that it was even capable of doing so.

1. Neuger, James. 2009. "Corrupt Afghan Police Targeted in U.S. Policy, Holbrooke Says," *Bloomberg News,* 21 March 2009. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=auJx_dJa9TGg
2. Amnesty International. 2003. "Afghanistan: Police Reconstruction Essential for the Protection of Human Rights." 12 March 2003. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA11/003/2003
3. Government of Germany, Closed Session Briefing, *National Defense University*, 16 September 2002. Attended by author.
4. Interview with Official, US Department of State, 14 April 2002.
5. Struck, Doug. 2002. "National Police Force Sought in Afghanistan." *Washington Post*, Washington, DC. 5 February 2002. Available at: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/105187240.html?dids=105187240:105187240&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Feb+5%2C+2002&author=Doug+Struck&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.08&desc=National+Police+Force+Sought+in+Afghanistan%3B+Recruits+Would+Hail+From+All+Provinces

The United States did not challenge the German approach to police training as inappropriate for Afghanistan. Instead, in 2003, the United States took the more diplomatic tack of creating a separate program to provide "in-service training" to those who were currently serving in police roles. The U.S. State Department established a police-training center in Kabul to provide in-service training for Afghan police currently serving in the capital. The Kabul site served as a prototype for seven regional training centers that were constructed around the country. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) led the U.S. police assistance program, but training center construction, instructor recruitment, and project management was contracted to DynCorp International, which had played a similar role in the Balkans.

At the initial facility in Kabul, three American and six international instructors – plus Afghan staff – handled training. Trainees were selected by the Afghan Interior Ministry and were not vetted by U.S. program administrators.[6] The program offered three core courses based upon a curriculum that was used at the Police Service School in Kosovo. The courses included an eight-week course in basic police skills for literate, noncommissioned officers and patrolmen, a five-week course for illiterate patrolmen, and a fifteen-day Transition Integration Program for policemen with extensive experience. The training centers also offered a two- to four-week course in instructor development. The U.S. program greatly accelerated the number of Afghan police that received some training, and the total number reached 71,147 by July 2007.[7]

The quality of the training received by the majority of the graduates of the U.S. program was open to question. In Afghanistan, contract instructors faced a formidable challenge. Trainees had little or no classroom experience. They sat on hard benches for hours a day in prefabricated classrooms that baked in the summer and froze in the winter, listening to instructors who spoke in English and to poorly trained Afghan translators unfamiliar with

6. Sedra, Mark. 2008. "Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan," in *Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat,* Geoffery Hayes and Mark Sedra, ed. Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, p. 201-02

7. Sedra, Mark. 2008. "Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan," in *Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat*, Geoffery Hayes and Mark Sedra, ed. Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo. p. 201-02

police terminology. Few of the American instructors were professional police trainers, and there was little or no use of adult-learning techniques. Because more than 70 percent of the Afghan trainees were illiterate, most of those trained received only the fifteen-day program. The inability of recruits to read and write inhibited their ability to absorb information and learn basic police skills, such as taking statements from witnesses, writing incident reports, and maintaining records.[8]

The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

In 2005 the U.S. government transferred responsibility for the U.S. police assistance program from the Department of State to the Department of Defense, following the lead of the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. Implementation was assigned to the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which also had responsibility for training the Afghan National Army (ANA). Within CSTC-A, responsibility for training was assigned to the Task Force Police Directorate, while responsibility for reforming the Interior Ministry went to the Police Reform Directorate. While CSTC-A had overall responsibility, State/INL retained contract management authority for police training, mentoring, and Interior Ministry reform. State/INL also continued to provide civilian police trainers and advisors through its contract with DynCorp International.[9]

Transferring responsibility to the Defense Department infused manpower and financial resources but did little to improve the effectiveness of the US police assistance program. In December 2006, a joint report by the inspectors general of the State and Defense Departments found that U.S.-trained Afghan police were incapable of conducting routine law enforcement and that American program managers could not account for the number of ANP officers on duty or for the whereabouts of vehicles, equipment, and weapons

8. Murray, Tonita. 2007. "Police-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Reform." *International Peacekeeping*, 14:1. Available at: www.princeton.edu/~lisd/publications/ch1_building_state_and_security_in_ afghaistan.pdf
9. Wilder, Andrew. 2007. "Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police." *Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit*. July 2007. Available at: www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid =523

provided to the Afghan government. The report noted that the official Afghan figure of 70,000 trained police officers was inflated and that only about 30,000 were actually on duty and able to carry out police functions. The report faulted the failure to establish a field-training program that could mentor graduates from the regional field training centers and keep track of equipment. Despite the $1.1 billion which the United States had spent on police assistance in Afghanistan to that date, the report noted that the program was understaffed, poorly supervised, and ineffective.[10]

Focused District Development Program

In November 2007, CSTC-A sought to correct for deficiencies in the U.S. police training program by launching a new training initiative called Focused District Development (FDD), which aimed at enhancing ANP capabilities by training all uniformed police in a single district at one time as a unit. While the district police were in training, a highly skilled Afghan National Civil Order Police unit replaced them, providing a model of effective police performance for local citizens. The program was designed to counter the ineffectiveness of the previous approach under which newly trained police returned to their previous duty stations to serve under untrained and corrupt superiors. Under the FDD program, an advance team of U.S. military and civilian police advisors conducted a pre-training assessment in the district, noting the level of police performance, the relationship between the police and the population, economic and transportation infrastructure, and the threat level from criminals and insurgents. The entire district force was brought to a regional training center, where it received basic training for all untrained recruits, advanced training for police with previous experience and management and leadership training for officers. The unit was then re-deployed to its district under the supervision of a U.S. police mentoring team. [11]

10. Inspectors General, US Department of State and US Department of Defense, "Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness," *Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-07-07, Department of Defense Report No. IE-2007-001,* November 2006. Available at: http://www.dodig.osd.mil/inspections/Index.htm
11. US Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2009. "Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military

The training program included seven weeks of instruction in military tactics, weapons use, survival strategies, and counter-insurgency operations and one week of training in basic police skills. While in training, the police received new uniforms and weapons, vetted leadership and increased salaries. The instructors who delivered the training returned with the police unit to its district and remained there until the completion of the program. The embedded mentoring team included two civilian police advisors, four military support personnel, and a six-member military security force. The mentoring team was able to work with individual officers, establish personal relationships, and provide role models that supported the training. The team provided the Afghan police with continuing on-the-job training and assessed the unit's progress toward independently conducting police operations. Units were evaluated on a variety of competencies, including equipment accountability, formal training, crime handling procedures, and use of force. Initially the mentoring teams engaged in intensive training, but they later pulled back to providing oversight as the Afghans exhibited greater competence in conducting operations.[12]

By January 2009, police in fifty-two of Afghanistan's 365 police districts were undergoing the FDD process. CSTC-A initially projected that the entire training cycle would take up to nine months. Only four of the first seven units trained reached proficiency in ten months, and it appeared that most units would require more than nine months to complete the training cycle. In addition, CSTC-A lacked the additional 1,500 military support and security personnel required to staff the hundreds of district and provincial training teams needed to complete the training of all Afghan police by the target date of December 2010. In April 2009, President Barack Obama announced the imminent deployment of 4,000 additional soldiers to train Afghan military and police forces. The Chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated that the trainers "were at the heart of building Afghanistan security forces as quickly as possible."[13]

Personnel and Afghan Cooperation." GAO-09-280. March 2009. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf

12. U.S. Institute of Peace, "Policing Afghanistan: A Meeting of the Security Sector Reform Working Group." http://www.usip.org/events/2009/0527_policing_afghanistan.html
13. Gilmore, Gerry. "Trainers Critical to Obama's new Afghan-Pakistan Plan, Mullen Says," American Forces Press Service, March 27, 2009. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53688

International Training and Mentoring Programs

The challenges faced by the Afghan police were exacerbated by a proliferation in the number of countries participating in the international police assistance program. On June 17, 2007, the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) formally replaced Germany as the "key partner" for police assistance. Initially, EUPOL Afghanistan contained 160 police officers led by a German police general. The arrival of a group of highly experienced European police officers promised to provide needed expertise and leadership for the police assistance effort.[14] By fall 2007, however, EUPOL was already mired in controversy. The first EUPOL commander resigned after three months, as the result of a dispute with the EU's special envoy to Afghanistan. EUPOL had difficulty in establishing working relations with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). European publics were unenthusiastic about their forces serving in Afghanistan. There was also a problem with differing goals for the program among member states. European police were slow to deploy, with many EU member states balking at honoring commitments for personnel. Although EUPOL's authorized strength was 400 members, it had only 218 police officers on the ground in May 2009.[15]

In addition to the European Union, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, and other coalition partners conducted police assistance programs. Police training and mentoring teams from these countries were assigned to their respective Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where they conducted training and provided equipment and technical assistance. These bilateral efforts, which varied in size, were not always coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs. In general they stressed the importance of community policing and taught civilian police skills, but they also reflected differing national policing philosophies and practices, adding on another level of confusion to an already bifurcated program.

14. International Crisis Group. 2007. "Reforming Afghanistan's Police." Washington, DC. 31 August 2007. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5052
15. Sedra, Mark. 2008. "Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan," in *Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat,* Geoffery Hayes and Mark Sedra, ed. Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo.

Interior Ministry Reform Efforts

Afghanistan's police cannot operate effectively without the supervision and support of the Interior Ministry. Efforts to reform Afghanistan's Interior Ministry, however, lagged behind those to train and equip the Afghan police. In 2008, CSTC-A reported that the Interior Ministry lacked: a clear organizational structure, chain of command and lines of authority; the ability to perform basic management functions, particularly in personnel, procurement and logistics; and an overall strategy for police operations and development. The ministry also suffered from endemic corruption, low accountability, and reduced institutional capacity at all levels. Institutional reform efforts, which began in earnest in 2005, were routinely resisted or thwarted by political interference, often from the highest levels of the Afghan government. In December 2008, CSTC-A, major donors, and Interior Ministry officials agreed on a plan for restructuring the ministry to improve efficiency and reduce corruption, but political resistance delayed implementation through the spring of 2009. Ministry reform also suffered from a lack of coordination between international donors and advisors. Senior ministry officials received conflicting advice from mentors from different countries. A plan to coordinate the work of international advisors was approved in January 2009, but implementation proved problematic. [16]

Conclusions and Recommendations

The role of police in successful counter-insurgency efforts is to establish relations with the public, protect citizens against violence, and work as a component of the criminal justice system along with effective courts and prisons. Only by preparing the ANP to perform this role can the international police assistance program help create a stable, prosperous,

16. U.S. Institute of Peace, "Policing Afghanistan: A Meeting of the Security Sector Reform Working Group." http://www.usip.org/events/2009/0527_policing_afghanistan.html, US Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2009. "Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation." GAO-09-280. March 2009. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf.

and democratic Afghanistan.[17] Focusing the ANP on controlling crime and protecting civilians would close the existing gap in police assistance programs between the United States and its allies. European donors view U.S. efforts to militarize the Afghan police as a mistake and counter to Washington's professed intention to promote democracy and the rule of law. European police assistance missions are attempting to correct for U.S. militarization of the ANP by providing training (albeit limited and poorly resourced) in civilian police skills. Europeans believe that only by creating a professional law enforcement agency that will control crime and secure Afghan society can the Afghan government establish its legitimacy and gain the allegiance of its own people.

U.S. rhetoric about expanding the Afghan National Security Forces blurs the critical distinction between police and military.[18] Sending additional troops to provide military training for the ANP will not enable the police to play their essential role in controlling crime, protecting Afghans, providing intelligence gained from close associations with the community, and increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In the words of former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, "Civilian police should be deployed in the country's cities, town and villages with the sole purpose of enforcing the rule of law. Their work will allow the Afghan government to develop legitimacy and the space to help the country's population."[19] Continued misuse of the police, as auxiliaries to the Afghan Army and coalition forces, will only reduce the likelihood of creating sustainable security in Afghanistan.

17. Andrew Legon, "Ineffective, Unprofessional and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Challenge," Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 5, 2009, E-notes, www.fpri.org.
18. Reidel, Bruce. 2009. Chair of the Interagency Policy Group. "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan." 27 March 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/
19. Jalali, Ali. 2009. "The Future of Security Institutions," in *The Future of Afghanistan,* J. Alexander Their, ed. USIP Press, Washington, DC, p. 32.

Civil-Military Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations: A South-American Perspective[1]

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This article focuses on questions concerning the scope of civil-military cooperation in United Nations (UN) peace operations, particularly in the case of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It discusses the evolution of regional approaches to security and development, examines the theoretical and operational limits on further cooperation among the civilian and military components of peace operations on the ground, and presents aspects of the Brazilian approach to this subject within the context of South American regional dynamics. It also refers to the maneuvering space available to the civilian and military components of MINUSTAH.

In the case of Haiti, the attitude of the force commander, in tandem with the strategy designed by the Brazilian Battalion, has helped to expand the limits for cooperation between the Mission's civilian and military components. Despite the obvious impossibility of replicating this experience in other contexts, one can learn at least two important lessons that will improve performances in other UN peace operations: (1) It is necessary to

1. Aide-Mémoire prepared for the Workshop on "Revisiting Borders Between Civilians and Military: Security and Development in Post-Conflict Situations and United Nations Peace Operations", Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro, August, 3-4, 2009.

understand the local elites' interests, which may be incompatible with those of the mission; and (2) It is useful to think of the responsibilities of civilian and military agents not as exclusive and discrete variables, but as complementary interactions framed in a *continuum*, the limits of which are defined by few activities that are necessarily military or necessarily civilian.

Security, development and interventions from a regional perspective

Since the mid-1950s, following the European experience, IR scholars have examined the regional dimension of security processes. Karl Deutsch's ideas of amalgamated and pluralistic security communities were perhaps the most influential concepts developed for interpreting such dynamics, which are conditioned partially by local processes and partially by global conditions. The focus on framing regional details within a global interconnected space—at that time characterized as a cybernetic approach—proved to be a clever tool, both for organizing universal knowledge about these new dynamics and for portraying the specifics inherent in each regional process. In the case of peace operations, this is even more important, since they tend to be conducted by, or to involve, regional organizations, such as the African Union and the European Union[2].

It is not a coincidence that scholars have revisited Deutsch's ideas after the Cold War. Creative analysts have reframed his argument on a constructivist basis, which stresses the reliance of states on their interactions to reinforce identities, to secure not only territorial integrity but also social institutions, and to monopolize the provision of public services to their populations.[3]

However, current international relations change faster than ever before. As the pace of events accelerates global flows, unknown interactions between evolving agents raise new threats, unveil vulnerabilities, and render identities and structures more fluid and ephemeral than ever4. Governments can no longer deal with these challenges on an *ad hoc* basis. They need a clear vision of the future that they wish to bring about.

2. See UN Factsheet Mantien de la Paix (Avril 2009) and SIPRI Fact Sheet (July 2009).
3. See Buzan, Waever & Wilde (1998); Adler & Barnett (1998); Anderson (1991); Albert, Jacobson & Lapid (2001).
4. See, for instance, Lagrange (2003) and Baumann (2006).

Taking an active role in shaping processes is paramount to security issues. Yes, we face new threats. Events that have not been seen before now threaten states, societies and institutions in contemporary Western societies. Securitization processes5 and the expansion of the concept of international security6 illustrate this phenomenon. As the grey zones between public and national security enlarge, the process of clearly assigning responsibilities to specific governmental agencies becomes more complex and difficult, particularly when distinct policies refer to the same objects, as in the case of the protection of human rights.

This is a serious problem everywhere; but it is dramatic in regions marked by poverty and misgovernment, where states lack the capacity or the will to provide basic human security and to establish a framework conducive to socioeconomic development. More often than not, in these areas local economies do not promote high levels of development. Yet people know about the levels of consumption and prosperity abroad, which raises perceptions of injustice. In general, there is a predisposition to revolt against local elites, which encourages them to try to maintain a tight rule, usually marked by extreme dissuasive violence. This creates an environment of social unrest, which can be interpreted under the light of Barrington Moore's reflections on the relation between injustice and revolt.

In this context, local political elites tend to raise tension in order to divert attention from poverty and want. Pointing to a common foreign enemy is a powerful tool commonly used to promote internal solidarity, as Tilly (1975) 7 has shown. It amalgamates the wills of individuals. Sub-Saharan Africa is perhaps the most illustrative example, as the cases of Rwanda, Eritrea and Darfur demonstrate, but other regions also face challenges to traditional state authorities that materialize during low intensity conflicts. In such cases, rulers tend to become strong and ruthless while blaming foreign countries or abstract forces (international capitalism, neoliberal policies, etc/) for their people's deprivations.

5. See Buzan & Weaver (2002).
6. See the US National Security Strategies since 2002 (available at www.dod.gov); the Hemisphere Defense Ministers Summits (available at www.oas.org) and countless articles discussing the expansion of the concept of security and the new threats.
7. See Tilly (1975); Barrington Moore, Jr. (1978).

Alternatively, where states are considered to be weak or fragile, their incapacity to monopolize legitimate instruments of violence creates a vacuum rapidly filled by criminal groups, often involved in transnational networks that organize flows of information, persons, and riches. In this context, regional processes play important roles. As a whole, international politics sets the stage, and in most cases it encourages interventions by the international community with the purpose of providing the local population with such services.

International initiatives need to take place on multiple fronts simultaneously, but the degree of legitimacy to do so is unclear. Even when they are sponsored by the UN, peace operations tend to launch political processes that go well beyond the need to reconcile the objectives of providing human and state security at once. In fact, many so-called legitimate interventions on behalf of human security have occurred since the mid-20th century, and such intervention may be considered a well-understood phenomenon.[8]

In part because these peace interventions proved to be fairly ineffective—and hence recurrent—it is clear that they need to focus on the creation of functional links between providing basic security, stabilizing social and political processes, and promoting socioeconomic development[9]. Without such achievements, which are clearly necessary to sustain long term development, how can peace operations end? This is a legitimate concern.

Framing legitimate Kantian concerns in Hobbesian contexts: The case of Haiti

No matter how legitimate such concerns may be, they can become matters of contention in certain social contexts. One important obstacle to establishing functional links between the stability provided by peace operations and long term development is often ignored. The UN conceives the peace operations it sponsors in national security terms and tends to base them on two premises: (1) that states at one time exercised a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in their territories; and (2) that states want to fully develop their

8. See Openheim & Lauterpacht(1955); Pureza (2006); Thakur (2006); Bellamy & Williams (2009).

9. See UN (2008).

economies, to improve social conditions and to maintain the stability created by international intervention. But one of these premises, or both, may be false. In some cases, states have never fully controlled the means of legitimate violence, as Sub-Saharan Africa suggests. In other cases, local governments may be interested in maintaining the intervention on specific terms in order to serve particular interests. More often than not, local elites permitted the extreme conditions that led to international intervention.

It may be naïve or presumptuous to believe that international intervention—which does not openly admit that it wants to impose a *civilizing* process destined to *transplant* adequate political institutions to under-governed areas[10] —conducted under the auspices of a peace operation will cause locals to change their attitudes and improve their deeds. Local social practices are often framed in contexts where violence is perceived as a legitimate means for solving conflicts. Social groups develop their sense of commonness, and individuals their identities, on an interactive basis. As Simmel argues, shared perceptions about individuals, friends and foes contribute to a sense of uniqueness, occasionally producing solidarity within the group; in some cases, this process involves external enemies that the group has to oppose. This is evident in the cases of the Hutus and the Tutsis, the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the Serbs and the Croats. But social cohesion may also be achieved in the absence of clear external enemies.

An abstract notion of oppression or a transcendental force may play the role of an external threat and thus encourage social cohesion. In the case of Haiti, it is pretty clear that a savvy elite, which for centuries has benefited from its position by exploiting the have-nots, has cleverly used the myth of absolute insulation to maintain an exclusive right to intermediate the country's exchanges with the rest of the world. The traditional argument maintains that Haitians have never been forgiven for carrying out the only successful slave revolt and that international capitalism will exploit the country's remaining riches. Hence all the evils within Haitian society are attributed to the racism of international elites (*les blancs*) and their unrestrained greed.

Meanwhile, local elites point to Toussaint l'Ouverture's legacy and portray themselves as freedom fighters, without whom the poor would suffer from

10. These are terms from Fukuyama (2004), which are coherent with the US National Security Strategy.

even worse conditions. Since most Haitians are only able to communicate in Créole, and access to information from abroad is restricted, this argument is generally accepted as truth. Once peace operations became inevitable in the 1990s, local elites rapidly perceived their dynamics and framed them within this ideology. They have also profited from them. In Haiti, intervention became a business. To quote two former Haitian presidents: "'*Plumez la poule, mais prenez garde qu'elle ne crie', disait Dessalines; 'Voler l'État, ce n'est pas voler' or 'tous les hommes sont voleurs', s'exclamait Pétion quand certains de ses conseillers lui faisaient remarquer la gravité de la situation de corruption qui régnait dans l'administration publique.*"[11] Dessalines was a hero of the Haitian independence, who immediately took the title of Emperor and was assassinated in 1806, two years after the country's independence. Pétion, the first President of Haiti, was also murdered in office, in 1818. This has been the fate of most Haitian leaders: Over 80% have either been assassinated when in power or have left the country to avoid this end. Corruption and violence have characterized Haitian history from the start.

Whenever the Haitian state has monopolized the means of violence in the country on a more or less legitimate basis (as throughout the Duvalier era), it has been under the control of ruthless and violent governments that have ruled on discretionary terms. Throughout the country's history, local elites have reproduced the pattern of exploitation initially established by the French. At least since Duvalier's fall, they have been clever and skilled enough to remain the key intermediaries between international institutions and local groups, often referring to the concepts of national sovereignty and non-intervention.

Local elites also keep the social situation unstable enough to justify international intervention, providing themselves with ongoing opportunities to make money from the services they sell to international civil and military servants: they own the restaurants and houses that are rented to diplomats and IO representatives; they provide the guidance and translation services without which peace operations cannot operate; they control the logistic frameworks that support all economic activities; they hold the most important political posts. Whenever the situation improves too much, they

11. See Étienne, S.P. (2007:141). The quotes mean «spare the chicken, but make sure it will not shout»; « to steal from the state is not to steal »; and « all men are thieves».

manage to encourage demonstrations that quickly evolve into violent riots. This leaves the international security forces no option but to suppress the local population, which reminds the international public of the fragility of the social equilibrium.[12]

Back to regional perspectives… and the Brazilian approach

As for the regional perspective, while it is true that regional flows and local values may play important roles, they are to some extent complementary to global processes. Not only do global flows involve each region in transnational socioeconomic dimensions—legal or not—but international organizations and organized public opinion across the board tend to attentively observe the implementation of peace operations.

Regional initiatives may establish more or less institutionalized efforts to organize joint endeavors that are aimed at increasing their effectiveness or reducing their costs. States may even use them to reach other political objectives, such as the consolidation of integration processes, the opening of new markets, or the projection of political influence into regions previously ignored. But their most important contribution is that participating members can empathize with the society in the host country and eventually share their assessment of the situation with the rest of the world. In the case of Haiti, this turned out to be Brazil's most important asset, one that has been used skillfully by professional military and diplomats.

Brazil has framed her participation in MINUSTAH both at the global and at the regional level. It contributes to the country's global foreign policy insofar as it reinforces an international order governed by rules and institutions, rather than by power politics, which is in line with the values that have traditionally inspired Brazil's foreign policy. It favors the development of cooperative efforts among South American countries, led by Brazil, in regional processes such as Mercosur and Unasur. This projects an image of coordination and cohesion. It is also consistent with the main innovations in President Lula's foreign policy: defense of an international order that

12. The April 2008 riots in Haiti were particularly illustrative of this pattern: Political groups connected to *Fanmi Lavalas* initiated violence, which the government tacitly encouraged by not ordering the Haitian National Police to act.

is less unfair, and the use—at least in rhetoric—of ideas of solidarity and compassion. These are the values that inspired the country to participate in the mission.

But we shall stress a *caveat* in this analysis. To Brazil, and to most countries in the region, a South American initiative, rather than a Latin-American one, makes sense. To foreigners, the concept of Latin America perhaps makes some sense, as it allows them to simplify realities that are complex and unique.[13] However, this is not true for South Americans or Caribbeans. It suffices to look at the Caribbean Basin Initiative and other lobbies before the US Congress to understand the extent to which these countries share a particular sense of community.

As for South America, over the last decades, Brazilian governments have been working to integrate South American countries with respect to various tasks: transportation, power generation and distribution, and the promotion of free trade. The problems the countries share—environmental threats, migration flows, drug-trafficking and other transnational crimes, all of which require joint efforts from governments—constitute another important reason to work cooperatively.

Perhaps the most illustrative example of South America's common challenges is the existence of more than one initiative to promote regional cooperation: Mercosur and the Andean Community still exist, but they compete with UNASUR and ALBA for resources and attention, which points to a lack of agreement on how to proceed. Notwithstanding diplomatic efforts to present these efforts as complementary, it is clear that they have different leadership styles and diverge in their support of projects that have been formulated by Brazil and Venezuela. The Brazilian approach is clearly more open to different ideologies and emphasizes sustainable economic development. It presupposes stable regulatory frameworks and institutional controls on economic processes. It focuses on the long run and establishes a radical democratic compromise. It accepts individual engagements

13. France has deliberately worked to strengthen the idea of Latin America because this was a means of associating the former European colonies with a Latin tradition, of which she was allegedly a paramount expression. The intent was to stress cultural ties to the French tradition while distancing these countries from Anglo-Saxon influences. Indeed, France has traditionally used the power of ideas in her foreign policy, as De Gaulle's saying that "*La France est une idée*" illustrates.

and attempts to empathize with societies that have different histories and values.

More to the point, these projects also produce impacts in Haiti. From the Brazilian point of view, participation in MINUSTAH has provided the region with opportunities to become more integrated. Brazilian troops have integrated personnel from other countries, such as Bolivians and Paraguayans, in the Brazilian Battalion, and the Brazilian government has developed joint projects of cooperation. Most importantly, it has empathized with the Haitian elites and helped translate social processes to developed countries, allowing them to better understand which kinds of investment are worth making. In this context, joint cooperation initiatives, involving Canada and the US on the one hand, and India and South Africa on the other, have proven interesting.

Theoretical and operational limits

Theoretically, two paradoxes constrain peace operations: one is a trade-off between human security and national security; the other concerns the need to reinforce a government which the international community does not trust. More often than not, a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decision to launch a peace operation and determine its mandates depends on the immediate interests of P-5 and E-10, rather than on substantial issues concerning human security. Occasionally NGOs and public opinion constrain states' foreign policies and encourage them to support peace operations, but this is usually not the case.

As for the second paradox, it is not a coincidence that the situation in Haiti became so intense. Governments have persisted in applying flawed approaches over the course of centuries. Countless projects have failed in Haiti, and international interventions allowed local elites to siphon aid money directly into tax havens or to financial centers such as London, Paris and New York. With time, Haitian elites disproved the assumption that governments aim at improving the living conditions of the populations they represent. As Bentham reminded us, it is naïve to believe that politicians are interested in working for the public good. They have their own interests and consistently represent specific parties. From the point of view of the

international community, it may be worth trying to promote best practices in developing societies; but it should be recognized that local elites may perceive this as a colonial process, an attempt to impose rules of the game that are alien to the local culture.

Moreover, the case of Haiti shows that governments may be interested precisely in maintaining a situation marked by poor governance, since this allows them to use international presence as a shield to protect vested interests and to avoid substantial responsibilities associated with the promotion of better living standards, while it acknowledges their formal authority in the international realm. Hence they can use an ideology of universal welfare to obtain the good will of governments and NGOs while at the same time avoiding their own responsibilities. In this context, local elites profit both from the exploitation of their people and from the exploitation of international interventions, which they manage to turn into a business.

Thus elites that have imposed extremely low conditions of development on their populations are more interested in problems than in solutions. They aim at partial solutions, so that the international community continues to send money but must stay for long periods—which, by the way, suits bureaucracies nicely. Depending on the local conditions, elites may even use the presence of peace operations as an excuse for their failure to govern.

As a result, the international community may have to work with elites that have created the abject conditions that are used to justify the intervention, which hinges on the questionable assumption that they now want to proceed differently. Hence representatives of the international community may have to face paradoxes such the need to transfer money to strengthen state institutions ruled by people who in the past proved to be corrupt. Or they can use NGOs and IOs in order to bypass local elites, thereby weakening their chances of developing local institutions. At the same time, they have to pretend that when stability is imposed on a society that has traditionally been excessively violent, it will convince people to solve their conflicts by negotiating with each other. This is a strange, irrational wager; nevertheless, it is one that is often made.

With regard to operational limits, the most obvious are imposed by mandates. They are often superficial and quite moderate, due to the need to acknowledge each country's interests in the UNSC. Other constraints are equally important, though they have been less analyzed: clashes between UN

bureaucracies, particularly UN agencies and the missions; disputes between the military and civilian components of each mission; and budgets that are limited not only in size, but also in terms of how they should be spent.

Brazil in Haiti: civilian & military cooperation aimed at expanding the maneuvering space

One way to think about the maneuvering space available to the civilian and military components of a peace operation is to substitute the "either-or" dichotomy with a kind of continuum marked by responsibilities that clearly belong to the military at one extreme, and those that are typically civilian at the other end. In between, there are many activities that may be performed by either or both in the context of cooperative initiatives.

QIPs and basic public services where the population is extremely poor, for example, may serve as a means to both legitimize the military presence, thereby reinforcing the necessary stability, and to gather intelligence. In the case of Haiti, this has occurred, expanding the mandate of the military. Not only does it help to improve local conditions; it also provides violent suburbs with a radically new experience in the population's relations with armed forces, since they manage to work side-by-side on socially relevant works.

Training is clearly another initiative intrinsic to these operations that may benefit from civil-military interaction. Most governments talk about it, but in South America only Chile and Uruguay have managed to operate integrated training centers. Most countries are unable to prepare their military jointly, let alone involve their police and civil servants. However, once on the ground, these elements have to learn how to deal with one another. It would be wise to jointly prepare all personnel that will be sent to an area, but bureaucratic resistance still prevents this from occurring, at least in Brazil.

Private security firms also occupy the grey zone between the civilian and the military. A growing market, particularly in misgoverned regions, these firms provide services that were previously offered by states. They are not exactly mercenaries, because they do not necessarily work for another ruler. They are simply filling a vacuum created by the local government's lack of capacity—or will—to do its duty. More often than not, people connected to the former military or police, as well as those currently responsible for those

institutions, figure among the dominant entrepreneurs in these markets. This blurs the lines between public and private responsibilities, creating a kind of mirror image of patrimonial practices often seen in public spaces.

Looking ahead…

The Brazilian experience in Haiti proved to be important: Brazilian officials managed to understand some of the Haitian dilemmas and to share their insights with developed countries. This helped establish a productive dynamic of civilian-military cooperation in MINUSTAH, within the framework of a regional approach to security and development, thereby expanding the theoretical and operational limits on providing effective results on the ground. This allowed a reframing of the paradox involving international and human security, providing an innovative interpretation of the civilian and military responsibilities in the terrain: They may be seen not as exclusive and discrete variables, but as complementary interactions framed in a *continuum*, the limits of which are defined by a few activities that are necessarily military or necessarily civilian. This process recognizes the fact that while there are huge opportunities for peace operations to improve internal coordination and to promote synergies among agencies, local elites' interests may be incoherent with those of the mission. If this fact is not considered, peace operations may be used as an instrument to perpetuate the very problems they were created to solve.

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South American Intervention in Haiti

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The central aim of this presentation is to provoke a critical reflection and analysis of the regional and international actions of South American countries that have assumed responsibility and visibility in post-war reconstruction missions. It focuses on the actions of those who intervene more than on the situations in which they intervene.

I

In 2004, the political collapse in Haiti, together with an escalation of violence, propelled the Southern Cone countries—Argentina, Brazil and Chile—to launch a regional initiative, combined with multilateral action conducted by the UN, which culminated in MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti). It represented the fifth UN mission in this country. Its main purposes were to reestablish the institutional order of the country, to promote political dialogue with the aim of achieving national reconciliation,

and to bring about economic and social development in Haiti.[1] Besides promoting stability, the Mission undertook a wide range of responsibilities related to electoral assistance, public security, humanitarian aid, protection of human rights and the environment, as well as economic development.

The types of responsibilities assumed by the South American countries in Haiti are closely connected to a new set of expectations imposed upon middle income countries (MIC) with consolidated democratic institutions and with values that are set by the international community. In fact, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (ABC) have softened their previous foreign policy anti-interventionist postures, assuming new responsibilities that seek to secure the regional political agenda while offering an innovative approach to post-conflict intervention.

II

In the last five years, the prominent participation of the ABC—together with other regional and extra-regional countries—in the re-building of Haitian institutions has become emblematic as a regional cooperation initiative. At the same time, it has been an outstanding example of post-Cold War multidimensional multilateral interventions.

The military presence of the Southern Cone countries in peace-keeping operations (PKOs) had different implications during the preceding fifteen years. In the '90s, this participation was mostly motivated by the idea of redefining the role of the military in the context of democratization processes, according to each country's recent history of civil-military relations. In each case, the motivations combined internal needs with external interests. While for Argentina this became a "compensation" for civil subordination by the military, for Uruguay PKOs represented a major source of income for the military, and for Brazil they brought a new source of international prestige that accorded with the country's foreign policy priorities. Chile has been a

1. The missions in Haiti include: MICIVIH (International Civilian Mission in Haiti, Res. A/47/208, April 1993), developed jointly with the OAS; UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti. Res. CS/940, September 1993–June 1996); UNSMIH (UN Support Mission in Haiti, Res. CS/1063, July 1996–June 1997); UNTMIH (UN Transitional Mission in Haiti, Res. CS/123, August–November 1997); MIPONUH (UN Civil Police Mission in Haiti, Res. CS/1542, December 1997–March 2000); MICAH (International Civilian Mission for Support in Haiti, Res. A/54/193, December 1999); and MIF (Provisional Peacekeeping Force, Res. CS/1529, February 2004).

late-comer, since the Chilean armed forces kept a defensive stance towards multilateral intervention until very recently. In all cases, participation in PKOs served to create positive civil-military agendas in the context of post-authoritarianism. At the present time, a step forward has been taken regarding the connection between PKOs and democratization. Internal motivations have been reinforced by a strong external political stimulus: a capacity of the region to work together in exporting stability and democracy to other countries.

In sum, the redefinition of civil-military relations within South American countries has favored identification of new external missions in the context of severe political and institutional crises that call for the intervention of the international community.

III

The challenges faced by ABC troops in MINUSTAH were multiple and simultaneous: dealing with Haiti's tense political reality—especially the doubtful cooperation of the transition government; responding to pressures from the United States regarding compliance with the electoral timetable; dealing with the uncertainty of international donors (including the UN agencies); and responding to public opinion. From the point of view of the Haitian people, an increasing acknowledgment of the positive impact of the Mission was based upon a "least bad solution" rationale. In a neighboring area, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) initially rejected the multilateral initiative but came to support the Mission's reconstruction efforts. The tasks of rebuilding institutions, protecting human rights, and disbanding gangs (using methods that avoided directed confrontation) in the months preceding the elections obtained positive results.[2]

2. According to a source published in September 2005, 2.3 million people were already registered to vote, and it was estimated that the number would keep growing until it reached three or four million. With regard to security, the most difficult actions in Haiti were in Cité Soleil, which was under jurisdiction of the Argentine army, and in Bel Air, which was under the command of Brazilian troops. According to a report of the UNSC, MINUSTAH was successful in taking back police stations occupied by rebels and in reducing activities of criminal bands, especially in Bel Air. Meanwhile, the presence of MINUSTAH in Cité Soleil grew: In April 2005, Ravix Rémissainthe (an ex–military associated with the drug-trafficking group Grenn Sonnen), René Jean Anthony and eight members of important gangs were assassinated. See "Informe del

During the years 2004–2006, MINUSTAH's main responsibility was to achieve a balanced performance between the preparation of the electoral process and the maintenance of internal order in Haiti. Any mishap that resulted in an increase of violence as a means to contain insecurity would be used by the local elites as a pretext for postponing the elections. The implementation of this mission employed the concept of multi-dimensionality, which involves diverse tasks that include military and police actions, humanitarian assistance, human rights protection and public services management (especially in the areas of public health, roads, housing and sanitation). During this period, differences between expectations of the US government and the MINUSTAH command became clear. Washington claimed that actions should be based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which calls for the imposition of peace, while MINUSTAH sought to act in accordance with Chapter VI, which emphasizes the maintenance of peace. On many occasions, a "six of one, half dozen of the other" solution was used to deal with local threats to stability. This stage concluded with the presidential elections and the inauguration of the René Préval administration.

Since then, MINUSTAH has assumed the responsibility of ensuring governing conditions for René Préval. This task involves guaranteeing a context of stability (peace and security) in the entire national territory in order to consolidate the democratic process, and requires the organization of municipal and legislative elections determined by the Haitian constitution.[3] The arrival of Préval to office was accompanied by a first stage of deterioration of security conditions, which led MINUSTAH to decide in December 2006 to enter Cité Soleil for the first time, alongside the National Haitian Police. This represented a new stage in security actions, in which the use of force complemented dissuasion efforts.

Secretario General sobre la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití", Consejo de Seguridad ONU, 13 de mayo 2005.

3. In December 2006, 8000 local and municipal officials were elected. At the same time, a second round of parliamentary elections took place with the election of three senators and eleven deputies. MINUSTAH assisted the CEP with logistical issues and guaranteed the required security conditions. This involved, among other tasks, distribution of voting lists, training of electoral guards, and patrolling of specific areas. In April 2007, municipal elections took place in the South Department of the country, in which MINUSTAH also assisted the CEP with logistical issues, and the National Haitian Police provided security. In April 2009, senatorial elections took place, and similar tasks were carried out by the MINUSTAH forces.

IV

The sending of military forces to Haiti was a controversial topic in the political and intellectual arenas of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Although it is true that the controversy was embedded in local political agendas, in all three countries the debates centered on four issues: (I) the original sin of the Mission as an initiative that backed a coup d'état, (II) its subordination to US interests, (III) the costs and benefits for the country in undertaking such an action, and (IV) the chances of success of the Mission.

The first issue is closely related to a connection between the recent histories of the three countries and the Haitian political conditions that led to the UNSC's decision to intervene. A legacy of military coups that suspended the State of Law in Argentina, Brazil and Chile reinforced a negative perception with regard to the connection between MINUSTAH and the termination of the elected government of Bernard Aristide. This type of interpretation is directly linked to a perception that the decision of the governments to assume a leading role in the Caribbean was the result of an "outsourcing" or delegation of military intervention organized by the White House to deal with a situation of institutional collapse.[4]

Critical views as to the costs of participating in MINUSTAH have been associated with the idea that the armed forces and police should focus on domestic insecurity situations, instead of wasting their efforts on a distant reality whose outcome has little to no importance for national needs. This argument, which considers MINUSTAH an impossible mission, is sustained by a) the socio-economic and political-institutional conditions of Haiti; b) the history of repeated collapses of Haiti's democratic regimes; and c) MINUSTAH's lack of influence or legal instruments for containing the expansion of drug trafficking and organized crime in Haiti. This is the most complex issue of the ABC's participation in MINUSTAH: taking into account the existing gap between means and ends.

4. See: Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel. "El desacierto de enviar tropas a Haití", Página 12, 13 de junio de 2004.

V

A new connection between foreign policy and defense has taken place in ABC countries as a consequence of their presence in Haiti. The creation of the 9X2 (Defense and Foreign Ministries of Nine Latin American Countries) Group is the best example of this connection.

In the context of multilateral diplomacy, Brazil and Chile—both non-permanent members of the UNSC in 2004—worked hand in hand for the approval and renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate. It is worth noting that in 2005 and 2006, when the mandate was up for renewal, Argentina and Peru played a similar role. Brazil also sought to downplay opposition to MINUSTAH by the CARICOM, Venezuela and Mexico, and it has worked especially hard alongside of the donor community to support long-term development projects in Haiti.

For Brazilian foreign policy, the situation in Haiti has meant "the substitution of a policy of non-intervention for one of non-indifference."[5] The notion that Brazil assumed the responsibility of the MINUSTAH military command to prevent the presence of "others" was suggested from the beginning. It should also be noted that Brazil used MINUSTAH as a political platform for reinforcing the country's belief that in the present international order only the UN Security Council has the prerogative of legitimizing military intervention in sovereign countries. [6]

The ABC's cooperation in Haiti does not imply that the three countries have identical foreign policies. Participating in and commanding MINUSTAH in order to reinforce the policies of the UNSC—which is Brazil's intention—is not the same as participating in Haiti to compensate Washington for previous behavior—as in the case of Chile, which refused to support the invasion in Iraq.

5. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim at the 35º OAS General Assembly (06/06/2005).
6. This idea was expressed by Celso Amorim: "Brazil was right about sending troops and assuming the military command of MINUSTAH because, in the first place, it was a mission decided by the UNSC, the only organ with the legitimacy to determine the presence of foreign troops in a sovereign country". See: Governo Brasileiro, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Discurso do Ministro das Relações Exteriores, "Embaixador Celso Amorim, na sessão de abertura da Reunião Internacional de Alto Nível sobre o Haiti", 23 de maio de 2006

Furthermore, the participation of Brazil in PKOs has brought about a gradual acceptance of intervention on the part of the armed forces.[7] It was only after its presence in Timor-Leste that the Brazilian military agreed to be part of the operations inscribed in Chapter VII of the UN Chapter. The decision to assume command of MINUSTAH represents a benchmark in the country's defense policy. Besides the fact that it presupposes greater responsibility in PKOs, the presence of Brazil in Haiti stands out due to its extent and visibility. For the Brazilian Armed Forces it has become an opportunity to add a global political component to its institutional mission.[8]

VI

From a military perspective, the condition that justified the creation of MINUSTAH was not a civil war, which entails the existence of two or more conflicting parts, but a situation of lack of authority and institutional collapse, followed by an escalation of unpredictable consequences.

Nevertheless, as is well known, one of the shared principles of the Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean democratic transitions is that those countries' armed forces are prohibited from involvement in public security matters. This policy stems from an awareness of the consequences of allowing the military to expand its role. (In South America this legacy represents an important difference between the Southern Cone and the Andean region.) The fundamental principles of this policy have been extensively analyzed in the literature on democratization and security policies with regard to the issue of civil-military relations during the transitional stages of democracy in the

7. Since the end of the Cold War, Brazil has participated in 14 missions that have been finalized. Angola: UNAVEM II (1991-1995), UNAVEM III (1995-1997), MONUA (1997-1999). Mozambique: UNOMOZ (1992-1994). Liberia: UNOMIL (1993-1997). Rwanda: UNAMIR (1993-1996). Eastern Slavonia: UNTAES (1996-1998). Ex Macedonia: UNPREDEP (1995-1999). Croatia-Yugoslavia: UNMOP (1996-2002).Timor Leste: UNTAET (1999-2002), UNMISET (2002-2005). Central America: ONUCA (1989¬1992) El Salvador: ONUSAL (1991-1995), Guatemala: MINUGUA (1997). It currently participates in 6 missions. Ethiopia and Eritrea: UNMEE (2000-presente) Liberia: UNMIL (2003-presente), Ivory Coast: UNOCI (2004-presente). Sudan: UNMIS (2005-presente). Haiti: MINUSTAH (2004-presente). Timor Leste: UNMIT (2006-presente).
8. See: Entrevista com Comandante do Exército Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque. Exército Brasileiro, Defesanet, 09/05/06.

Southern Cone.[9] Haiti's security problems belong to the public security sphere; therefore, according to the politics adopted in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, they should be confronted with the use of police force and coercive power. How, then, is the military presence of the three countries explained—by a lack, in all cases, of police personnel available and prepared for external missions?

Undoubtedly, the debate concerning appropriate ways to deal with public security is most intense in Brazil.[10] A peculiar link between the use of military force to repress organized crime on Brazilian soil and Brazil's military objectives in Haiti has gradually emerged.

While it is true that the controversy over the use of military force raises questions about public security matters that relate to the very nature of the mission executed in Haiti, daily contact with the Haitian situation led the armed forces to undertake humanitarian efforts as one aspect of their permanent duties. This constitutes the true sense of the concept of multi-dimensionality currently attributed to the PKOs. It is important to keep in mind that this is a relatively improvised approach, one that assigns to the military tasks such as the construction of roads, schools, and hospitals and the improvement of basic sanitarian conditions, which are usually the responsibility of those involved in international cooperation efforts. (It also explains the composition of the Brazilian contingent, which includes both combat troops and military engineers).

Among the South Americans, the Argentine and Brazilian contingents stand out because of their large numbers, the nature of their responsibilities, and the level of communication among their officials. The ABC's military

9. See: Hirst, Monica. "Seguridad Regional en las Américas" in La Seguridad Regional en las Américas. Enfoques Críticos y Conceptos Alternativos, Wolf Grabendorff editores, Friederich Ebert Stiftung en Colombia, FESCOL, Bogotá, 2003. Domínguez, Jorge I. "Conflictos Territoriales y Limítrofes en América Latina y el Caribe" in Conflictos Territoriales y Democracia en América Latina, Jorge Domínguez (compilador), Siglo XXI editores, Universidad de Belgrano, FLACSO, Argentina, 2003.

10. A result of the controversy is the refusal in August 2006 of the government of São Paulo to allow its military to participate in public security actions aimed at containing the escalation of violence generated by the PCC. See: Centro Estratégico de Estudios. Resumen de Prensa Semanal, Grupo de Estudos da Defesa e Segurança (GEDES) de la Universidade Estadual Paulista, Brasil, 2006. Alves Soares, Samuel, "Las antinomias de las relaciones cívico-militares en el Brasil: de las viejas a la nuevas amenazas" en Ernesto & Saín, Marcelo (comp.) "Nuevas Amenazas": dimensiones y perspectivas. Dilemas y desafíos para la Argentina y el Brasil, López, Editorial Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2003.

demonstrates a special enhancement of the "style" of action adopted by MINUSTAH, which suggests that South American cooperation offers the UN a new kind of intervention that differs qualitatively from other PKOs.[11] With regard to the performance of Argentina and Brazil, the actions of their armed forces in Haiti maintain and complement the Confidence Building Measures that have taken place since the end of the 1980s, among which the program of bilateral exercises that presently include joint PKO simulations stand out.[12] Hence, the integration of the region's armed forces has gained new strength due to a shared interest in increasing their respective presences in POs. In fact, most military exercises in the entire region, whether bilateral or multilateral, are PO simulations. It is also worth mentioning other extra-regional initiatives, such as the creation of a Chilean-Argentine force in 2006 with the objective of acting in Lebanon.

However, the degree of understanding and cooperation between the South American contingents in MINUSTAH does not represent a solution to the challenges the Mission faces in the security domain. There is a shared perception that dealing with the problems in Haiti is an increasingly difficult job. It is believed that the presence of MINUSTAH is justified until Haiti becomes self-sustaining in security and political stability. However, the primary obstacles to achieving stability are no longer seen as political gangs or the ex-military, but rather the increasing presence of drug trafficking and organized crime and its regional connections—mainly with Colombian counterparts.

It is also acknowledged that the solution to Haiti's security problems depends on police action, which, in a self-sustaining scenario, implies assuring that the local force has the necessary authority and resources. For the governments of the ABC, this constitutes an issue with challenges and uncertainties, such as the increase and better training of local police forces (the Policia Nacional Haitiana) which are currently the responsibility of the United States and Canada.

11. This was the argument presented in the seminar "Is there a South American Style for the Execution of Complex PKOs?" See: Seminario "¿Existe un Estilo Sudamericano para le Ejecución de Operaciones de Paz Complejas?", Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para las Operaciones de Paz, Campo de Mayo, 12/07/07.
12. In October 2005, in the Marambaia Bay of Río de Janeiro, the 24th "Fraternity" bilateral exercises took place, which stimulated humanitarian aid and the execution of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See: Polak, María Elena, "Ejercicios con ritmo carioca", La Nación, 16 de octubre de 2005.

Civil-military interaction and Latin American troop contributors: a comparative perspective "from outside"

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The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparative perspective on the interaction between the military and civilian pillars of peacekeeping operations as concerns Latin American troop contributing countries (TCCs). These brief considerations are based on experience in interacting with the Brazilian military—both the Army and the Navy (Marine Corps)—and interviews conducted at the peacekeeping training centres founded by the military establishments of Chile and Uruguay. The main focus is on those specificities of Latin American militaries which are presumed to have an effect on the military-civilian divide in humanitarian affairs and on specific lessons from the field. Brief examples will be given from the cases for each factor, outlining both those elements granting commonality to the Latin American experience and those differentiating the continent's TCCs from one another.

Civil-military relations

The first factor to be pointed out in speaking of the relationship of South American TCCs to humanitarian tasks is the nature of civil-military relations on the continent. Two elements in particular, influenced by the legacy of military regimes in the area, govern the extent to which these states' troops will become involved in humanitarian tasks and the way in which they will interact with civilian actors. These are the degree of autonomy with regard to definition of the mission definition and the extent of experience with respect to internal missions.

To begin with the latter, one of the factors that facilitates South American armed forces' participation in non-traditional missions is the extent to which these forces are involved in internal missions in their home countries. Whereas internal missions are often used as an indicator of the quality of civil-military relations in the global North, the South American context differs in significant aspects from this model. The region's armies, in particular that of Brazil, have extensive experience in providing basic necessities such as infrastructure (e.g. telephone service, electricity) to rural populations as well as constituting the only state presence in sparsely populated areas. The same is true, perhaps to a lesser extent, of other current contributors from the Southern Cone. While this is seen in mainstream models as conducive to unwanted military involvement in politics at the domestic level, in the context of multidimensional PKOs, such experience represents an experience advantage over armed forces from developed countries, where such missions are fastidiously avoided. As a consequence, Latin American militaries are particularly well-equipped to handle the development aspects of multidimensional missions.

Similarly, differences in the character and quality of civilian control of the armed forces are manifest in another characteristic evident in TCCs' military contributions to humanitarian operations: the relative independence from civilian inputs regarding the mission's definition. Brazilian contingent commanders, as well as those of the Marine Corps Company deployed in MINUSTAH, enjoy considerable autonomy to conduct what are termed "civico-social activities", such as food distribution or refurbishing schools, even when this goes beyond the strict interpretation of the MINUSTAH

military mandate. Viewed from a certain perspective, this activity is a carryover from a negotiated transition to democracy where the Brazilian armed forces were able to maintain considerable autonomy in mission definition—another indicator of the quality of civilian control. From the standpoint of civil-military relations, one ultimate effect of this situation is to bring the armed forces closer to their target populations, as an ironic result of the distance that separates them from civilian policymakers. These activities are heavily criticised in those sectors of PKOs concerned with improving long-term development capacity, as they are seen as contributing to a dependency mentality and as impeding long term capacity-building efforts. On the other hand, this criticism is frequently met with incomprehension by peacekeepers, who understand the ultimate beneficiary of their efforts to be the local populations: they lament that civilian UN decision makers "nos van separando de la población" (are keeping us away from the people).

In contrast, peacekeeping instructors from Chile—where the legacy of military rule is considered more severe and the transition to democratic control more radical, with the armed forces retaining much less autonomy—adopted an approach to humanitarian tasks that is centred strictly on fulfilment of the mission mandate as defined by MINUSTAH's civilian leadership. As a consequence, much less attention is devoted to tasks traditionally carried out by civilians. Both of these factors tendentially differentiate Latin American militaries from "northern" militaries in that they possess more autonomy for field commanders to implement independent plans for humanitarian or development-related tasks—due both to more lenient civilian control and a problem-solving style more prone to improvisation.

Human security and the responsibility to protect

Human security and the responsibility to protect (R2P) encapsulate the two main aspects of relevance in setting apart South American TCCs with regard to the humanitarian aspects of PKOs: the use of military (or security-related) means to carry out development-related tasks (as in the case of "civico-social activities"), and the use of force to protect civilians. Of interest here is the apparent clash between a tradition of civil-military relations that encourages increased development-related or humanitarian activities, and foreign policy

traditions in the region that—with the notable exception of Chile—strongly reject both human security and especially R2P.

Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina are strongly reluctant to break with foreign policy traditions based on interpretations of sovereignty which differ from R2P by interpreting sovereignty purely or predominantly as horizontal—that is to say, defined as the inviolability of borders—rather than in light of the vertical contract between the state and the citizen that elevates the notion of human rights. These foreign policy precepts create a clash particularly in the case of Brazil, whose quest for a higher profile within the United Nations—especially within a potentially reformed Security Council—create a tension between the notion of non-intervention favoured on the continent and norms such as R2P, which are enjoying increasing recognition within the United Nations and have found their way into UNSC Resolutions laying out PKO mandates.

This is echoed most notably in these states' contributions to MINUSTAH, whose Chapter VII mandate represents a clear break with previous refusals by all three states to engage in missions under this provision. The exception in the region is Chile, which has expressed clear support for the principles of R2P and has enshrined human security as an organizing principle of its most recent Defence White Paper.

Cultural factors: is the *jeito latino* really Latin?

One of the factors advanced by interlocutors across the Southern Cone concerning the success of Latin American TCCs, particularly within the context of MINUSTAH, was cultural affinity. Numerous instructors and past and present peacekeeper officers attributed mission success to a Latin facility for interpersonal contact and high degree of interaction with the local populace. Such facility was seen as leading to increased security and more efficient delivery in the humanitarian realm due to a favourable operational environment, higher-quality information sources and better coordination with local leaders.

While this is indubitably a key factor in the positive experiences of South American contingents in Haiti, a look at other PKOs and NATO interventions shows that this factor is not unknown to northern European

TCCs either. Open and direct contact with the local population is, at least in pre-deployment training, a fundamental rule of the German ISAF contingent in Afghanistan, and even in the case of Iraq, differences could be noted early on in the security situations in British as compared to US-controlled areas due to differing policies regarding contact with the local populace. Similarly, despite clear cultural affinities in the case of Southern Cone militaries and the Haitian population, the language barrier remains equally as impermeable in Port-au-Prince as in Mazar-e-Sharif, with peacekeeping training centres in the region offering an average of 30 hours total of pre-deployment language training, the vast majority of it not in Creole.

Of some interest to a putative Latin pattern of interaction with local populations—ostensibly based on a higher level of interpersonal contact—is the impact of DPKO's "zero-tolerance" policy with regard to sexual abuse by UN personnel. Whereas Uruguayan peacekeeping trainers saw contact with locals as a particular strong point of their approach to peacekeeping, and saw this positive aspect threatened by possible allegation of misconduct, leading to a significant reduction in humanitarian activities by Uruguayan contingents in MONUC and MINUSTAH, Brazilian contingents have, up to nnow, sought to maintain a high level of interaction, with a record, to date, of not a single corroborated allegation of misconduct by members of MINUSTAH's BRABATT. Thus it remains to be seen what the impact of the zero-tolerance policy—seen by some as culturally bound to Northern patterns of conduct—will be on the extent and nature of highly interaction-dependent humanitarian activities by Latin American TCCs.

Taken together, these factors show both the common specificities of Latin American TCCs—the effects of contexts of civilian control of the armed forces still showing the effects of transition from military rule; clashes between a continental predilection for defining sovereignty exclusively as non-intervention; and putative cultural characteristics and, in the case of Haiti, affinities—as well as the variations between TCCs in the area along these axes, with Chile constituting somewhat of an outlier in a number of cases. Though based on interviews and personal research experience, these cases begin to shed light on the contours of what sets Latin American TCCs apart and to highlight their respective strengths, weaknesses and differences compared to their European, African and Asian counterparts.

Civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan – "state of the art"

Conor Foley

AID WORKER

I lived in Afghanistan for a year and a half in 2003/2004 and returned there twice in 2008: the first time to do some research for the Overseas Development Institute on how humanitarian agencies were dealing with the deteriorating security situation and the second time for an evaluation of the Italian government's justice sector reforms. I have also just written a Guide to Afghan Property law and a chapter on Afghanistan in a book on UN peace-keeping missions, with particular reference to the restoration of housing, land and property rights.

The ousting of the Taliban after the attacks of 11 September 2001 is often portrayed as part of the policy of "liberal intervention", the aphorism coined by former British premier Tony Blair that linked the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The intervention in Afghanistan was legally justified by the doctrine of 'self-defence' and both the US and UK governments reported this as the basis of their resort to military action under Article 51 of the UN Charter at the time. It also enjoyed widespread international support and the UN Security Council passed two resolutions threatening the Taliban with serious consequences for allowing Al Qaeda to establish a base in Afghanistan using its Chapter VII powers

which authorize military action. This is in marked contrast to the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was not backed by a UN Security Council resolution, not widely supported by other countries, and is widely believed to have been a violation of international law.

However, whatever view you take of Blair's arguments, Afghanistan never really fitted the "liberal interventionist" pattern at an operational level. No attempt was made to introduce the governance model that was developed in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina and then imposed, with varying degrees of success, in Kosovo, East Timor, Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone – or indeed in post-invasion Iraq. The initial United States "invasion force" consisted of a few hundred CIA and Special Forces operatives who flew into the country with suitcases full of cash and linked up with the various militias who were then engaged in an ongoing civil war. These bribed as many of the militia leaders as possible to change sides and called air-strikes down on the rest.

The postwar governance arrangements were agreed at a conference in Bonn in December 2001, where the victorious Northern Alliance forces, essentially agreed to the imposition of Hamid Karzai as president, but kept most of the other key positions in the new government. Critically, this led to the exclusion of Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group in the country, from the new regime.

The Taliban, which are widely acknowledged to have been a spent force by the start of 2003, re-emerged the following summer in response to a series of policy failures, which were quite obvious to all of us working there at the time. The US had deliberately decided not to engage in "nation-building", partly due to President Bush's ideological dislike of the concept and partly because it was gearing up its forces for the invasion of oil-rich Iraq.

A report by the International Crisis Group, in early 2002, estimated that it would take a minimum of 25,000 international troops to secure Afghanistan. The UN-mandated force was limited to 4,500 when I arrived and remained confined to Kabul. Compare this to the 60,000 troops who were sent to tiny Bosnia and the other large and well-equipped missions that have been deployed elsewhere. The UN mission to Afghanistan had no executive powers and was supposed to operate with a "light footprint" – a significant difference with the transitional arrangements established in other post-conflict countries. There was also no serious attempt to tackle impunity or draw on the array of international criminal tribunals and justice

and reconciliation mechanisms that have been established. Initial attempts to prevent known war criminals participating in the transitional government or enter parliament were unsuccessful and land-grabs were carried out by members of the new government quite literally in sight of the foreign Embassies who were implanting Rule of Law projects.

Little of the promised foreign aid arrived and international attention shifted to the invasion of Iraq. Corruption and impunity thrived. By late 2004, when I left the country, it is estimated that a half of Afghanistan's provincial governors and security force commanders were self-appointed. Many of these were gangsters and narco-traffickers who had been driven out by the Taliban in the 1990s and whose return was greeted with horror by most ordinary Afghans. Together with the exclusion of Pashtuns from key positions in President Hamid Karzai's government, this created the political basis for the Taliban's renewal.

Dozens of my friends and colleagues were murdered, maimed or kidnapped while I was working in Afghanistan and I saw several of these attacks up close. Some were carried out by the Taliban, but some, such as the murder of four of my colleagues from Médicins sans Frontières, were almost certainly carried out by local commanders who were nominally allied to the government. On one occasion a compound of the International Rescue Committee was struck by artillery shells fired by the former police commander of Jalalabad city who was involved in a dispute with the regional governor.

The term Taliban is also used as a convenient catch-all description for a range of disparate insurgent groups fighting the Afghan government. Many are doing so for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons and even within the Taliban itself, the various factions are deeply divided. The last time I visited, one observer estimated that up to 80% of the violence came from criminal groups rather than organised resistance forces. This was before the current offensive began, and one of the dangers of President Obama's new strategy is that it will unite these forces against a common foe.

While some lessons have been learned from these initial failures, western governments are still looking for quick fixes that are almost guaranteed to achieve the exact opposite of their policy goals. Aerial strikes have brought increased civilian deaths, boosting Taliban recruitment. Cross-border operations have spread the conflict to Pakistan. The large increase in western

troop numbers has also just given the Taliban more targets. In the meantime the use of humanitarian aid to buy "hearts and minds" has been massively counter-productive. As well as blurring the distinction between military and humanitarian actors – which has led to the targeting of aid workers – the strategy has encouraged corruption, cut across long-term planning and probably helped to spread the insurgency to formerly peaceful areas so as to attract aid to them.

The biggest problem was that the initial failure to tackle corruption and the legacy of the country's bitter civil war has created a deep-seated culture of impunity. Afghanistan is a party to the International Criminal Court, but none of its warlords have been arrested and they continue to behave as if they are above the law. Two of the worst of them were Karzai's running mates in the presidential election of August 2009. The fraud which took place during this not only tarnishes Afghanistan's government in the eyes of its own people, but also makes it more difficult for western governments to convince their own electorate that the foreign international presence is worth what it is costing in lives and resources to protect a discredited regime.

This is the context in which the anti-government insurgency continues to thrive and, put simply, there are no quick fixes to the current mess. The Afghan state lacks legitimacy because it is corrupt and compromised. It does not matter how many "military defeats" the western occupation forces inflict on the insurgents because the ground that they capture cannot be held while people remain alienated from the state.

While talk of building "effective grassroots initiatives to offer an alternative to fight or flight for the foot soldiers of the insurgency" is right, the concern is that what this really means is trading away human rights and democratic accountability to buy over warlords and Taliban factions to the government side. Localized peace deals are preferable to thinking that successes can be measures through a body count of enemy fighters – all of whom will have relatives who wish to avenge them. But actually neither side can win while the battle is conceived in purely military terms. The Taliban's support is concentrated among one ethnic group, Pashtuns, who are a minority within the country as a whole, and they have alienated many through their brutality, incompetence and primeval social attitudes. The government is not going to "win" either by physically eliminating its opponents or by co-opting them or their ideology into the state. However, it can "lose" if it surrenders its

legitimacy by failing to build an effective state with which ordinary Afghans can identify.

Viewed from this perspective, the main priority is actually the same as it always should have been, concentrate on creating a decent state in that part of the country where the writ of the central government still has some authority. This should be based on understanding the value of incremental improvements, building on what works, understanding the cultural specificity of the country and adapting strategies accordingly. Currently, the vast majority of the aid is being pumped into areas that are effectively under Taliban control in the mistaken illusion that this can buy the allegiance of local populations and convince them to stop killing our soldiers. Meanwhile, because the US refuses to provide its financial support through the central government, it cannot afford to pay decent salaries to its judges, policemen and civil servants who rely on bribes to supplement their meagre salaries. This has created a vicious circle where donors refuse to fund the government through fears of corruption, which creates an environment where corruption will continue to thrive.

There is no shortage of reports written by experienced aid workers, who know the country, about how aid could be delivered better. Unfortunately, because it is seen as part of the counter-insurgency strategy its delivery is often organized through military-led bodies such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, who are replete with the jargon of military academies, but clueless about the country that they are actually in. As one diplomat put it to me in Kabul last summer, military officers on six-month rotation tours, "spend the first two months undoing the work of their predecessors, two months trying to understand why all their previous assumptions were wrong and then the last two months just wanting to go home".

Long-term planning should actually mean that and so – for example – the country needs to plan for a military and police force that it can actually afford, which is not the model that the Americans are trying to foist on it. Similarly, while millions of dollars have been pumped into an official court system that is widely viewed as ineffective and corrupt, the Taliban have increased their credibility through developing their own justice system based on Afghan customary law.

Beyond this, more thought needs to be given about the role of Afghanistan's immediate neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, in supporting a settlement and

how a broader-based government can be created, which will almost certainly include some of those currently fighting with the Taliban – subject to the concerns voiced above. Afghan civil society, in particular its tribal elders, has been weakened by decades of conflict and were largely sidelined by the occupation forces – who preferred to deal with the warlords. They need to be given a greater stake in the country's future.

None of this is quick fix – and there is a genuine to debate to be had in the countries that are sending troops there about whether the cost in lives of their soldiers is worth the price paid in human lives. A "troops out" policy will, of course, result in a large upsurge in the numbers of Afghans killed – and that is why opinion polls have consistently shown that large majorities in Afghanistan support the continued military presence – just as Iraqis consistently opposed it. But it is difficult to see what the strategic objective of western governments is in being in Afghanistan.

The basic problem is that Afghanistan has been suffering from a discussion based on the politics of illusion. Perhaps the type of "liberal interventionism" that has defined western foreign policy over the last few years would not have been appropriate given the country's historical, cultural and political specificities. But despite all the hypocritical cant from western politicians about democracy and women's rights, this policy was never even actually tried. Beyond some vague, and unconvincing, claims about not allowing the country to becoming a base of an international terrorism, western politicians struggle to articulate the international mission in Afghanistan, because the claims to date have never matched the reality. That makes it all the more difficult to explain convincingly why western troops are now being asked to kill and die there.

Canada in Afghanistan: “Transforming a mission, making a difference”

Michael Harvey

CANADIAN EMBASSY - BRASÍLIA - BRAZIL

Overview

- **Why we are there?**
- **Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan**
- **Priorities, Canadian objectives**
- **…Through to 2011**

Why are we there?

Canadian deployment:

- September 11, 2001 attacks
- UN mandated, NATO-led
- Canada is a member of NATO
- At the request of the democratically elected Afghan government

Aim:

We are working to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a viable country that is better governed, more peaceful and more secure.

Where are we in Afghanistan?

Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

As part of NATO Mission…
Evolution of Canadian Military Engagement



Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

Increasing Civilian Engagement



Rebuilding Afghanistan

Integrated Canadian Engagement



Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

	2006	2007	2008-2009
	"3D" cooperation	inter-departmental coordination	whole-of-government coherence
Important Events			
	• London Conference and the Five Year Compact Agreement • Parliament approves two-year extension to mission • Operation Medusa • Clerk's visit to Afghanistan	• Afghan Detainee Issue • Announcement of Manley Panel • Elevated HOM position •Created "RoCK"	• Manley Report • Creation of Cabinet committee on Afghanistan • Afghanistan Mission passed in the House of Commons • Announcement of six priorities and signature projects • Quarterly Reports and Benchmarks

Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

Canada's Agenda to 2011

Manley Panel	Actions to date
Cabinet Committee	CCOA formed, Feb. '08
Leadership from Centre	PCO Task Force, Feb. '08
Parliamentary Vote	Afghan Motion passed, Mar. '08
International Partner	U.S commits 1000 troops, Apr. '08
Clearer, more focussed communications	Regular tech briefings; Quarterly Reports to Parliament
Necessary equipment	Helicopters & UAVs, Dec'08

Additional Actions
- Enhanced civilian presence
- Greater financial authority to the field
- Integrated civ/mil planning + US partnership

Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

Priorities and Canadian objectives

6 Strategic Priorities:

- **Training and Mentoring ANSF**
- **Basic Services (water, jobs, education)**
- **Humanitarian Assistance**
- **Border Security and Dialogue**

- **Democratic Development and National institutions**
- **Political Reconciliation**

Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

Three signature projects

1. **Rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam**

2. **Construction/rehabilitation of 50 schools**

3. **Immunization of 7 million children in an effort to eradicate polio in Afghanistan by the end of 2009**

Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

A management tool: Quarterly Reports



June 2008



September 2008



December 2008

Defining Canada's presence in Afghanistan

A new form of Canadian international engagement

- Security and development interconnected
- Integration of civilian and military
- Whole-of-government response in complex environments

Transforming Canada's engagement

Making the most of our contributions…..

- Setting realistic goals
- Reporting results
- Adapting to changing circumstances

…..to achieve an Afghanistan that is better governed, more peaceful and more secure.

"Looking back, moving forward: learning lessons from Haiti & Afghanistan"

Graham Zebedee

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(UK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS), LONDON

Introduction

The NATO military effort in Afghanistan is a large and very well-known operation. Its successes and setbacks are featured daily in the world's press. Less well-known is the civilian presence in Afghanistan, featuring many hundreds of diplomats, development workers, technical experts, law enforcement and criminal justice professionals and non-governmental organisation employees. Also relatively unknown is the way in which the two sides – the military and the civilian – work together, and the way that this has evolved in recent years.

The United Kingdom has long been one of the largest contributors of military force, civilian expertise and development money to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is now perhaps the UK's top foreign policy priority. There is a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Helmand province, Southern Afghanistan, which contains over 80 civilians – not just from the UK, but also from Denmark, Estonia and the US. They are not only based in the main provincial centre of Lashkar Gah, but also closer to the 'front line' of fighting with the Taliban.

The UK took responsibility, within NATO command structures, for Helmand in 2006. But even before then, the British government has been learning lessons about how civil-military co-operation can and should work. This paper gives a *personal* view on how the UK has, over the last few years, come closer to:

...the right strategy
...implemented by the right people (on both sides)
...who are receiving the right support
...to do the right civil-military tasks
...with the right partnership with NGOs.

Each of these elements is discussed below. Of course, neither I nor the British government would pretend to have all the answers. But it is hoped that the following comments are helpful to practitioners. The paper concludes by summarizing the lessons that may be applicable beyond the specific Afghanistan context.

The right strategy

It is often said that the overall strategy to a conflict or post-conflict situation should be politically-led. This is correct. There is often criticism, though, that instead of this, the strategy is led by the military. Can you blame them? They get the right people and equipment on the ground quickly and in large numbers. They have the logistics and support to be effective immediately. They have operated in tough places before. By contrast, civilians are few in number, slow to arrive, and not always effective when they do arrive. So we should not blame the military for driving forward the strategy – the answer is to ensure that the civilian side of the overall team is stronger, which is discussed below.

To make the civilian side stronger, it must be empowered to set the strategy. This means, to some extent, that the military will take direction from civilians in the field. This does not mean, of course, having a civilian take tactical control of an operation, or even saying precisely which operations the military should undertake. That is a recipe for disaster, and is in any event unnecessary. Instead, civilians should set the strategy in full

co-operation with the military and ask it to produce certain effects as part of the implementation of that strategy. There should be lines of activity other than military – political engagement and development activity, in particular. Having one person responsible for leading this strategy, and so bringing coherence to all of these strands, increases the chances of success. This is not theory. The United Kingdom has taken the approach of civilian leadership of an overall strategy in Helmand province for approximately the last two years, to good effect. This approach is not perfect, but the alternative – to ask the military not only to provide security, but also to ask it to lead political and development activities – is certainly worse. This is not fair to any military force, however skilled it may be; and it is not a task that it usually wants. On this basis, the UK has found that the military and civilians can work extremely well together.

The right people (on both sides)

As mentioned above, the military usually has few problems getting people to the post-conflict environment in question. The question is how to sensitise military personnel to working with civilians? The UK has found the presence of civilians in military pre-deployment exercises to be vital. Civilians usually spend much longer in Afghanistan than military personnel do, because they are not exposed to the same dangers, working hours or conditions, and because they have fewer breaks; so civilians with long experience of the country can return to the UK and pass on some of what they have learnt. The aim of sensitising work is to break down barriers to working jointly. This involves not only learning new acronyms, but also understanding deep-rooted cultural differences. For example, plans made by diplomats, whose main means of delivery is influencing, can look extremely vague and unconvincing to a military officer, whose plans are usually much more precise; and yet greater precision may not be possible, or even helpful. But similarities often exist too. Thus we have found that the long-term planning cultures of the military and of development communities can work very well together.

But what of the civilians? One lesson the UK has learnt is that finding the right people to go to dangerous, post-conflict environments is a very difficult, time-consuming task. It is necessary to start with a clear idea of the required

skills. Are the skills of policemen needed? Water engineers? Linguists? It is then necessary to develop systems to produce people with these skills who are able and willing to deploy to post-conflict environments. The point about systems is crucial. The UK has developed a database of 'deployable civilian experts' who are recruited because of their professional expertise and abilities and their willingness to deploy them overseas, on demand. It is no longer necessary to beg the Justice Ministry for a prosecutor when that skill is needed to help the Afghan criminal justice system. Through this system, we are getting much better, and quicker, at sending the right people to Afghanistan. For more information, see www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk

But not all civilians are outside experts – some are from a range of UK government ministries. Another lesson we have learnt is that, for the other ministries to be an effective counterpart of the military, it is necessary to plan for large numbers of people. For example, the political section in the British embassy in Kabul is now second in size only to that in Washington; some of these employees will need to speak multiple languages, so more and more UK government employees now speak Dari and Pashtu, although perhaps not enough yet. It is vital to plan for the long haul, even if the hope is to quickly bring stability and prosperity to a post-conflict environment. If you are highly successful, the money spent on training and equipment which cannot be re-used elsewhere will not have been wasted.

At the start of the UK's work in Afghanistan, we had a few civilians who were experienced at working with the military, having done so in the Balkans and elsewhere. Now far more have such experience, having participated in military exercises in the UK and elsewhere: There is a major civilian-military exercise every two years, which includes NGOs as well as UK government departments and the military. We are now putting in place a Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre of officials who want to make working in such environments and with the military a focus of their careers. More information is available via the link above.

The right support

Foreign ministries, development agencies and others are usually very good at sustaining embassies and offices in the capitals of stable countries. But

working in hostile or post-conflict environments is very different. The UK government has become much better at this over time, linking up its 'back office' functions to provide a good level of service to civilians in Afghanistan. But we have learnt this the hard way, by not having a sufficiently deployable capacity at first. Some of the key issues have been:

- **Communications**. We have developed portable, sufficiently secure means of communicating, so that civilians working with the military can communicate with London and elsewhere effectively.
- **Security**. All employers, including civilian ministries, owe a legally enforceable 'duty of care' to those who work for them. However, what if this effectively prevents civilians from doing what they need to do? No perfect answer exists as yet. It may be that these ministries need to develop a greater tolerance of risk, or that a new group of half-civilian, half-military individuals will emerge.
- **Accommodation**. At the beginning, civilians were living in tents; but now we have the means to get accommodations that conform to a reasonable standard to the right place relatively quickly. This is essential not only for security, but for morale.
- **Finance**. What do you do if there are no banks, but you need to spend money quickly? The answer is often cash, which raises the risk of corruption and fraud. By recognising this increased risk, one can begin to deal with it.

The right civil-military tasks

The right strategy, if it has good people receiving appropriate support, can make a big difference in a post-conflict environment when it is implemented skillfully by civilians and the military working together. It is important to stress that the military will usually have a key role in supporting the implementation of the civilian elements of the overall strategy – by providing transport, protection for civilians, engineering support, negotiations with local people, information operations, and so on. It is not a question of implementing in isolation two distinct halves of an overall strategy.

An example of such work is currently taking place in Helmand in order to create an environment conducive to the coming elections. The military

has pushed back the insurgency in various areas; development officials have worked with the local Afghan authorities to design projects which can be implemented quickly following the fighting; and political officers are working with the governor and others on negotiations with local tribal leaders. The overall aim is to assist the Afghan government to deliver for its people, which is a vision shared by civilians and military alike.

The right partnership with NGOs

Inevitably, governmental organisations (including the military) and NGOs do not always agree on how to proceed in a post-conflict situation. NGOs complain that governments do not listen or consult, have hidden agendas, do not spend enough money to stabilise or develop a country, take insufficient account of the impact of military operations on civilians, and so on. Governments sometimes find NGOs to be over-optimistic in their expectations of what their ministries and military can achieve. However, NGOs are very much part of the overall UK effort in Afghanistan and other post-conflict environments, either as project implementers, independent actors who rely on governments to provide security for their operations, or in other roles.

In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, the UK has recognised that local NGOs in particular have a vital role. They can often deliver on the ground where no foreigners can; where the local government is weak or non-existent, they may be the only people who can do so. It is therefore very important to ensure that the security environment makes this possible, and that legislation does not place more constraints on NGO activity than is reasonable.

But it is important to be clear about the limits of this co-operation. Some NGOs will want to criticise governments publicly, even whilst receiving funding from them, as is their right as independent organisations. They will often avoid military bases or contact with soldiers, because they fear any contact will compromise their neutrality and ability to perform their development, humanitarian or other tasks. None of this prevents them from having a constructive relationship with the civilian and military sides of the British government's presence in Afghanistan.

The right lessons

It is sensible, before drawing lessons from Afghanistan, to remember that it is not like most conflict or post-conflict environments: There is no UN peacekeeping force; there is a large Western military presence; there is a counter-terrorism mission, which was the trigger for this presence; and there is a determined insurgency, carried out using increasingly asymmetric tactics. This type of situation does not exist in, for example, Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi or Kosovo. In such places there may still be pockets of 'hot conflict,' where the main task is civilian protection, but the job is usually more about politics and development than the constant use of hard military force.

In such environments, the main military role is often ensuring stability and assisting with security sector reform and DDR. I say *assisting with* because these are very political tasks, in which military input is vital but should not drive the strategy. In such cases, civil-military co-operation often takes place within the UN, because it is usually the largest and most capable organ of the international community present. A detailed discussion of the way this happens in the UN is beyond the scope of this article, but the challenge for interested states is to find acceptable ways to assist the UN by contributing particular military or civilian skills needed by each UN mission. The UK does this in a number of countries in Africa and elsewhere, on the basis of requests from DPKO.

In conclusion, the ten lessons from Afghanistan which are valid in other environments, are:

- As soon as it is feasible, move toward **civilian control of the overall strategy**, though not of military operations.
- This **overall strategy should be political**, uniting diplomatic, development, military and other components.
- Its implementation may have some purely military components, but will mostly consist of **civil-military activities**, in which the military provides vital assistance aimed at achieving stabilisation and political objectives.
- There must be a **culture of sharing information and ideas**, not one of rigid divisions between the two sides. The military often has a lot

to offer regarding politics and development, for example, particularly since it may be able to go out on the ground more readily.

- **Plan for the long term and for many civilians**. However good the civilians are, they will have little effect if there are too few of them.
- Work out **systems to get the right civilian skills** to the right place, including language skills. Do not rely solely on ad hoc secondments from civilian ministries.
- **Make the military civilian-friendly**, through secondments, joint exercises, and general interaction with other ministries and with NGOs.
- **Get the back-office systems right** to allow government officials to operate effectively in these environments, which require more than the normal diplomacy or development work done in the capital cities of stable countries.
- Consider using a **unit that specialises in logistics** to help civilians deploy to hostile places. Leaving this to the usual teams in civilian ministries could be a mistake.
- Think of NGOs as a **possible means of delivering your strategy**, but remember their need for independence, and do not push them to be too close. Keep in mind that **local NGOs may well be your most effective means** of doing business.

Trends and dilemmas of civil-military cooperation

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Introduction

This paper is devoted to presenting trends and dilemmas of civil-military cooperation in both humanitarian and stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations. It is based on the insights, experiences, and knowledge contributed by the various authors of the book, *Managing Civil-military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability*[1]. We distinguish six themes that present trends and inherent dilemmas.

Structure follows strategy

Because of the complexity of today's conflicts and emergencies, interrelated political, economic, and developmental as well as security problems have to be addressed simultaneously. Consequently, international approaches

1. Rietjens, S.J.H. and & M.T.I.B. Bollen (2008). *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 joint effort for stability,* Aldershot: Ashgate.

increasingly involve all of the following: integrated efforts between civilian and military actors; operation on both state and non-state levels; and combining civilian expertise on governance, human rights, rules of law, and development with military expertise on security. This is especially the case in countries facing a high risk of conflict. Although integrated strategies and efforts appear to be better suited to multi-faceted and multi-level problems than are specialized approaches and strategies, integrated policies such as the 3D approach can be vulnerable to contradictions and conflicting interests between diplomatic, developmental and military domains.

In order to organize and deliver integrated efforts, civil-military interfaces encompassing actors from strategic governmental levels down to workers in the field are indispensable. Civil-military interfaces constructed to deal with the results of complex humanitarian emergencies are more or less clear in the sense that they are often characterized by limited humanitarian access, a serious lack of infrastructure and humanitarian resources, and extensive human suffering that requires immediate action by all available hands. Civil-military interfaces during S&R operations, on the other hand, are driven by a more diffuse rationale, causing relations in these interfaces to be less clear. Reconstruction is an integrated process designed to reactivate development and to create a peaceful environment. Many reconstruction processes suffer from a recurrent pattern of using too-short time horizons, reducing the process to a technical fix rather than a reshuffling of state-society and power relations, and—because of a strong national-level orientation—of leaving local people out of the equation.

We believe that integrated civil-military interfaces are needed to respond to the consequences of complex emergencies and post-conflict situations. Because of the complexity of today's peace missions, such interfaces require a unified civil-military leadership that works closely with national authorities and institutions and adjusts to local dynamics. As part of its 'entry strategy,' the international community should aim for national involvement in the operations and crisis management leadership, while humanitarian and reconstruction programmes should be decentralized to reflect local initiatives and to empower local parties. Strategic choices in stabilisation and reconstruction should rely heavily on local perceptions of what constitutes a peaceful environment. In this way, it is likely that the emerging structures will follow and promote the strategic choices.

Travelling light

In embarking upon peace missions, members of the international community travel to far away places with their luggage filled with Western beliefs and standards regarding organizational and operational behaviour in the field, the quality of extended aid and reconstruction, goals that have to be reached, methods for executing and managing operations, and the appropriateness of civil-military cooperation. As a result of the massive influx of international expats, it is often the case that socio-economic conditions in the host-countries' capitals and regions where international actors gather change drastically due to demands for hotel accommodations, sites for building military compounds, expansion of airports, harbours and roads, and other provisions that are new to the host country's population. Although on the short term host countries may seem to benefit from these developments, there is a flip side to the heavy international footprint. As has been argued by many, peace operations should be demand-driven rather than pushed by internationals, whether they be military or civilian actors. In order to define problems and solutions in a demand-driven way, international actors must understand the root causes of conflict, including local customs, norms, values and hierarchical structures. Internationals should facilitate participation by local authorities, farmers, villagers, and women's groups in the actual execution of activities, because this promotes skill-building, local ownership, sustainability, and increased security. Local participation reduces the gap between international outsiders and local communities in how they perceive the goals of peace and security. This reduces any mismatch in expectations between local people and internationals regarding the delivery of aid or reconstruction. In short, a localized footprint enhances a mission's long-term effectiveness.

Not only do demand-driven approaches address the needs of afflicted groups of people more effectively, but they may also prevent managerial stress and a too-internally- focused orientation within international peace missions. Often military missions have been largely supply based, causing major internal management problems for commanders in the field. In 1999, by the time AFOR was fully operational, the emergency relief stages had passed, and the demand for military assistance had changed from over 10,000 troops to just 200 engineers and drivers. Consequently, many commanders had to resort to civic action projects to keep their men and women at work.

Needless to say, civil-military relationships suffered as a result. In 2005, while providing medical care in Pakistan after the earthquake, the unlimited offering of healthcare by the Netherlands Military Relief Hospital not only resulted in duplication of other initiatives, but it also created long queues of Pakistani who wanted to be treated in a Western field hospital that applied much higher standards than they were used to.

By leaving their excess luggage at home, internationals will travel lightly and hence their footprints will be less deep. It is important, however, to note that to travel lightly does not equal passivity. International support, commitment, energy, know-how and expertise will remain necessary to complement and support local and national coping capacities. Although it sounds paradoxical, a light footprint may actually enhance the effectiveness of integrated international efforts. For instance, the goal of promoting gender equality by fostering the voting rights of women, having them elected to political offices, and providing educational opportunities for girls is best reached by playing second fiddle within initiatives aimed at raising awareness of local dynamics and social systems.

Multiple actors at multiple levels

Most researchers and practitioners support the idea that having successfully coordinated or integrated civilian and military efforts in these missions is the key to successful stabilization, relief efforts and reconstruction. The difficulty arises in defining who is to coordinate whom. Within military as well as civilian humanitarian circles multiple—and conflicting—stances on the appropriateness of civil-military cooperation are part of the everyday reality. Some humanitarian organizations are reluctant to be associated with a potentially unwelcome military force and thereby lose their protective patina of neutrality. These principled organizations are being referred to as the 'Dunantists.' 'Wilsonian' humanitarian organizations generally act more pragmatically and therefore interact more easily with military forces. There are basically four different approaches a humanitarian organization can adopt towards cooperation with a military actor: (1) principled non-engagement, (2) arm's-length interaction, (3) proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement, and (4) active, direct engagement and cooperation.

Regarding the local population, it is questionable whether they care much about who provides them with assistance. Research shows that many local people are surprised to learn that there is a fierce debate over the division of labour between the military and aid agencies. They are also surprised by the fact that some NGOs object to the military engaging in relief and reconstruction. In fact, in Afghanistan they tend to think ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) does too little rather than too much. In addition, local populations in Afghanistan were frequently not aware that military units had funded or contributed otherwise to the assistance activities. This makes it valid to question the sole-right of providing aid, which several humanitarian organizations have claimed[2].

The second way in which the multiplicity of actors comes to the fore is in the amount of actors in a mission area. In most areas, the main NGO players number in the tens rather than hundreds. However, in extreme and complex emergencies, NGO members can multiply into thousands. Such NGO overcrowding and overcapacity can have the following results[3]: (1) it can deter more experienced and expert NGOs from intervening in a situation that they consider to be too confused, (2) it increases competition among NGOs and raises the urgency to publicize their relief operations, (3) coordination becomes extremely difficult and time-consuming, and (4) the quality of NGO operations is not easily monitored or regulated.

The same holds for military actors. The numbers of different units and their sizes vary enormously per mission area. In Afghanistan for example, Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF are deployed at the same time, each having many different national units. In total, the ISAF military units have 102 national caveats[4], including patrolling by daylight only and a clear geographic bounding of troop deployment. This situation further complicates the general stance of civilian actors—be they humanitarian organizations, local populations or authorities—towards cooperating with the military.

2. Jakobsen, P.V. (2005). *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not sufficient.* DIIS Report 2005:6. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS.
3. Abiew, F.K. (2003). "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations." In: *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 10, no. 1, p. 24-39.
4. Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP) (2007). *CSCP Policy Brief, No.1, 5 July 2007,* The Hague, CSCP.

The actors involved in civil-military cooperation during humanitarian and stabilisation missions differ materially from one another. Among the ways in which these differences are reflected are in organizational structures and cultures, time frames, resources, and communication mechanisms. Generalizations about either 'the military,' 'the NGO community,' or the 'host nation' can therefore hardly be made. Civil-military cooperation has to be approached in a tailor-made fashion, or else, as Stockton[5] formulates it: 'a "one size fits all" approach to NGO coordination either fills up rooms with agency representatives deploying no significant strategic assets, or excludes some of the largest, best informed and most influential assistance actors completely.'

Most of the civilian and military actors are involved in cooperation processes at multiple hierarchical levels. In the case of military units, these levels vary from the smallest unit of action in the field up to international headquarters and nation-based operations centres that direct the military efforts. For humanitarian organizations, the levels range from field-level offices to headquarters, which for international organizations are often based in Western countries. And as for host nations, hierarchical levels can include national, regional, district, and community levels down to the men or women in the street.

Several authors have argued that insufficient tuning and aligning of policies, decisions and activities between the different levels creates many conflicts. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the importance of civil-military cooperation was acknowledged at field levels, but policy-making and coordination from both the UN Headquarters in New York and from the headquarters of MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in DR Congo) in Kinshasa, was very limited. In Kosovo, Caritas Austria's cooperation with the Dutch engineering battalion was overruled by Caritas' headquarters in Vienna.

The aid agencies' commitment to guidelines and codes of conduct regarding civil-military cooperation often reflect the views of the various headquarters and not necessarily those of the local implementing organizations and people in the countries concerned. This inter-level disconnect often stems

5. Stockton, N. (2002). *Strategic coordination in Afghanistan*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

from the limited awareness of policymakers, within both military and civilian institutions, of the field situation in general and the mission area in specific; often operational strategies reflect the sub-optimal quality of these policies. This leaves the workers in the field a wide space in which to manoeuvre and decide which activities to undertake. There is merit and appeal to this approach. Some argue that every crisis' unique characteristics require that strategies and structures for civil-military relationships reflect the specific circumstances and thus should be very malleable in order to be flexible. As a consequence, many efforts are person-dependent, and large differences occur within and between rotations and contingents. These differences include priorities, budgets, and involvement of local populations. This approach yields inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, inconsistency between rotations and conflicting objectives. Additionally, lessons learned regarding civil-military cooperation are happening on an individual or rotational level, but not at an institutional level. While some rotations learn and apply lessons, others repeat old mistakes and many persons involved in civil-military cooperation claim that they 'reinvent the wheel'.

It is therefore recommended that civilian and military executive officers communicate concepts such as 3D and the consequences of the integrated efforts to the field. At strategic levels, an open mind should be kept toward feedback from the field regarding the implementation and practical value of these policies in order to create the best strategic mix and to commit the operators to policy-makers and vice versa.

Uncertainty reduction

Cooperative arrangements in civil-military interfaces during peace missions take place in fluctuating, complex contexts between unfamiliar partners performing highly interdependent tasks within limited timeframes. Generally, mechanisms for governing the cooperation process are absent. Due to several reasons—such as the vagueness of military missions, the fluctuating stances on civil-military cooperation, too limited inter-level communication and information sharing, or the lack of proper training and experience—the net-result is that uncertainty in civil-military relationships

is high. This uncertainty has to be reduced to an acceptable level in order for cooperation to start and remain viable for as long as needed.

There are two mechanisms by which civilian and military partners can reduce their uncertainty about the other's behaviour and develop confidence. The first mechanism is based on control. Examples of control are goal setting, the use of standards and guidelines, and monitoring and reporting on progress and results. It would be self-deluding, however, to expect such instruments of control to act as watertight legal guarantees against any misuse of resources or opportunistic behaviour. For one thing, during crises there is insufficient time to negotiate instruments for control in any detail.

Although control alone is not enough to reduce uncertainty, when used at the onset of a cooperation process, the aforementioned instruments help in raising the unfamiliar partners' predictability. Trust constitutes the second mechanism for reducing uncertainty and developing confidence between cooperating partners in civil-military relationships. It refers to the positive expectations about another's motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk. In trustful relations, partners dare to depend on each other because they are convinced about the other's benevolent intentions towards them. In the absence of a shared hierarchy, trust should govern civil-military relationships until shared objectives have been reached.

What, then, are the ways to develop trust in civil-military cooperation? First, trust emerges in situations in which participants in a cooperative relationship feel comfortable with their own roles and positions, as well as with the roles and positions of their partners. In fact, they consider it perfectly natural and normal to cooperate and, moreover, they believe their cooperation will be successful. To facilitate the occurrence of situational normality, policies that advocate integrated approaches have to be communicated and shared between all actors at all levels involved in peace missions. In the field, situational normality is fuelled by daily interaction, open communication, and information exchange in formal as well as informal settings. Half a century ago in Malaya, General Templer may have been thinking along similar lines when insisting that the district and state committees meet once a day, ' if only for a whiskey and soda in the evening.'

Training and education

After the post-war occupations in Europe and Asia came to an end, most of the specific knowledge of civil affairs and military government evaporated, leaving only the US Army in possession of a dedicated civil affairs organization. NATO created doctrine and staff functions for civil-military cooperation, but treated the civil-military interface as a problem that existed on the margins of military operations. Meanwhile, in Bosnia and Kosovo in the late 1990s, most European NATO members were hardly able to deploy fully trained CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-Operation) generalist staff officers.

This constitutes a recurrent theme. The often-quoted 'military's lack of humanitarian expertise' should not lead us to exclude the military from any contribution to humanitarian operations; it should instead be encouraged to provide hands on the deck. To be able to do this, the military in the field must be aware of the dynamics within the sectors of development and diplomacy, just as aid workers are raising their awareness on safety and security.

To improve the level of knowledge of the military, humanitarian workers, and policymakers, specific training and education is needed. To address this, a distinction is made between four separate phases. Raising awareness of differences between military and civilian actors in humanitarian and S&R missions should be stressed during *primary education* of both future officers and non-commissioned officers at defence academies and schools. In many of these institutions, the subject of civil-military cooperation receives very little attention in the curricula, which leaves many future officers unfamiliar with it.

Currently, training and education during *pre-deployment* receives the most attention. Several organizations such as UNOCHA (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and NATO, through the CIMIC Centre of Excellence and the NATO School, offer integrated courses on this matter aimed at deployed personnel. Several armed forces, including the Dutch, have introduced extensive role-playing exercises to allow its personnel to become familiar with the local situation and stakeholders. Despite being largely imaginary, these exercises are considered to be beneficial regarding future deployment, as the topics include cultural awareness, language, safety situations, gender and local governance structures. Another important subject relates to the necessary skills for cooperating, such as communication skills, open-mindedness and cultural sensitivity.

At the start of the *deployment*, a robust 'hand-over, take-over' is essential to raise awareness and to prevent duplication with former activities. As many personnel, military and civilian alike, transfer regularly, a 'hand-over, take-over' becomes very important to ensure continuity. In Kabul, UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) provides an Afghan-specific course for newcomers within humanitarian organizations. Having settled in the mission area, deployed personnel continue to learn on the job. This broadens and deepens their insights. Furthermore, reach-back functions such as a back office and the creation of civil-military platforms to communicate and share information can contribute to raising awareness during deployments.

If possible during the actual deployment, but at least in the *post-deployment phase*, it is necessary for personnel to record lessons learned. Lessons learned in any operation should not only be put to practice the next time around, but they should also be as widely exchanged as possible. Governments and international organizations usually undertake standard 'lessons learned' exercises after their military or civil operations. Understandably, some of the information contained in these exercises is sensitive. Still, wherever possible, government agencies and non-governmental international organizations should share the lessons they have learned from their operations for the benefit of future operations and subsequent phases in their operations. However, it is not just about recording lessons learned: The challenge is to make sure that the treasure trove of experience is used for future missions and integrated into training and exercises. Often the best way to do this is simply to get people from the various sectors together and to have them exchange experiences. This can be done through mechanisms such as role-playing or the creation of civil-military platforms to communicate and share information.

Measuring performance

Measuring the performance of humanitarian and S&R operations is important for several reasons. First, performance measurement leads to transparency and can thus contribute to increased accountability. Through performance measurement, individuals (e.g., fieldworkers and politicians), units,

organizations or alliances can make clear what products they provided and what resources were involved. Second, performance measurement enables the evaluation of outputs and outcomes, and therefore the strengthening of effective administration. Based on this evaluation, military commanders or civilian leaders can reallocate part of their resources or adjust their strategic planning. Third, performance measurement enables organizations to learn what they do well and when improvements are possible. A final reason raised here is that performance measurement can improve the communication between participating organisations such as NATO, the UN and host nation authorities. This can also contribute to aligning expectations of the international community with those of the host nation stakeholders. The term coined by General David Petraeus in Iraq for this approach is 'managing expectations'.

According to critical reflections, performance measurement of S&R operations faces severe difficulties. These include, but are not limited to, the following. First, despite an increased focus on metrics within many institutions, selecting the right measures has proven to be very difficult. Organisations must increasingly balance the desire to maintain simple, easily assessed, comprehensible metrics that provide adequate measures of effectiveness with the kitchen-sink approach, in which increased data collection and subsequent analysis attempt to satisfy all prospective users' requirements.

Second, finding a causal relationship between actions and the effects or outcomes is extremely difficult. To establish causality requires that very specific conditions be met, and organizations would have to be able to control for (isolate) all variables that could be influencing the outcomes. A commander of an American military unit observed that 'even if we can successfully measure an outcome, it's extremely hard to know what caused the outcome. There are so many things happening at once that causal relationships are next to impossible to identify. There is a certain amount of guessing and operational art in measuring success.'[6]

A third major difficulty in measuring is political. Pressures exist for official pronouncements to declare that policy objectives have been obtained;

6. Glenn, R.W. and S.J. Gayton (2008). *Intelligence operations and metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Washington: National Defense Research Institute.

therefore, claims of success may be merely political spin. Individual agencies are inclined to report their success at implementing programmes rather than their impact on nation building. A system of metrics, or measurable indicators of progress, should provide the ability to confront facts on the ground.

Fourth, performance measurement increases bureaucracy. When an organization emphasises performance measurement, it often assigns great resources to producing data and information on performance results and, if possible, impact. This can increase the load of bureaucracy enormously and has been referred to as an 'audit explosion' or 'audit society.'

Finally, the complex relationship between civilian agencies such as NGOs, donor organisations and military actors hampers an integrated attempt to measure performance.

The six themes reflect the mixture of experience and knowledge, theory and practice that are characteristic of living with and working on dynamic civil-military interfaces, and are very deserving of in-depth research.

Strengthening civil-military cooperation with the UN system – what reform is required?

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Over the past few years, there has been a growing perception within the United Nations system that new and integrated responses are needed to adequately address the challenges posed by conflict and post-conflict situations. In the past, documents such as the Brahimi Report attempted do update the conception that guided UN peacekeeping operations in order to address challenges that are still faced today. As a consequence of this effort and the lessons learned, there is a clear awareness that certain elements are necessary if peacekeeping operations are to succeed: genuine commitment to a political process; clear, credible and achievable mandates; unity of purpose in the Security Council; supportive engagement by neighbouring countries and regional actors; host country commitment; and an integrated approach. There is also an awareness that missions need to demonstrate credibility while on the ground, strengthen their legitimacy and promote national and local ownership.

Despite the important contributions made among others by the Brahimi Report, the fact of the matter is that United Nations peacekeeping is now at a crossroads. The scale and complexity of operations today are straining

its personnel, administrative and support machinery. The increasingly multidimensional nature of operations reflects the new political and military challenges faced and point to their need for a new unity of vision and purpose.

In a recently published paper entitled "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", the DPKO/DFS has proposed suggestions that build on the Brahimi Report and call attention to essential measures that the UN – the Security Council, in particular – has not yet implemented, frequently due to lack of political will.

The report indicates some areas that need to be strengthened to achieve a new vision of purpose for UN peacekeeping: clear political strategy and direction, cohesive mission planning and management, faster deployment, clarity and delivery on critical roles and crisis management. These are important areas that need to be the object of future work within the UN. From the Brazilian perspective, however, one important issue that only now is gaining due recognition is the close interdependence between security, solid institutions and socioeconomic development.

The exact nature of this interdependence is not as obvious as it might first appear. In the past, peacekeeping operations often worked on the basis that security was a prerequisite for development. This axiom has sometimes led to situations in which complete demobilization of fighting forces was deemed necessary before the development of any economic project was considered. As a consequence, the daily conditions of the population within conflict-stricken States showed barely any improvement, which in turn stimulated further violence and turned peace into a far more distant goal.

Recognizing the key role played by development in a post-conflict strategy casts a new light over civil-military cooperation. Taking the case of MINUSTAH as an experience from which several conclusions can be drawn, the question that now emerges is how best to frame a civilian approach to the military. A clear view of the role each agent is expected to perform on the ground is a prerequisite. This is important because it enables the actors to know who is responsible for what. In the case of military actors, it is essential not only that their mandate is well defined, but that the related activities can be clearly and easily mapped.

When establishing the mandate of MINUSTAH, Brazil understood from the outset that the only way the mission could succeed was to not restrict

itself to the traditional fields of security and protection. One of the aspects that explains the success of MINUSTAH in Haiti is precisely that its mandate allows for activities that are not covered by the traditional understanding of "peacekeeping" (e.g., the implementation of Quick Impact Projects, paving roads and securing access to water). These activities make a huge difference in the daily life of the Haitian population and show that peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures have a greater possibility of producing positive impacts when applied concurrently.

But even in the case of MINUSTAH, military activities with social impact have limits. Such limitations point to the need to include the civilian component in any post-conflict strategy. The experience of MINUSTAH has showed that civil-military cooperation is an essential component in order to implement projects that have a socioeconomic impact and hence to generate an atmosphere conducive of development.

Non-governmental organizations such as Viva Rio have been able to carry out their work in Haiti in close coordination with MINUSTAH, to the benefit of the civilian population and the overall situation within that country. The key word here is cooperation; cooperation must be engendered with a mindfulness of the specificities and distinct character of each actor and with a clear sight of one another's limitations.

Strengthening civil-military cooperation within the UN System, especially in the context of the synergies between security, development and solid institutions, needs to be re-evaluated in terms of the ways the DPKO works together with other UN bodies, especially the Peacebuilding Commission, PBC, and the Peacebuilding Support Office, PBSO. Although the DPKO is the leader on all operational matters related to the planning and the conduct of integrated peacekeeping operations, the PBC can play an important role in providing advice on mandated activities, especially by assuring that they are sustainable and in conformity with peacebuilding strategies. Opportunities for partnerships in post-conflict situations need to be further explored, among other things, to improve the participation of civilian actors.

The need for further interaction between the DPKO and the PBC/PBSO was one of the points highlighted by this year's report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations – the C-34 – together with the recognition that the challenges facing peacekeeping need to be tackled in a holistic manner. In view of its representative composition, Brazil believes

that the Committee should continue to be the main forum of discussion for peacekeeping operations.

Another important issue pointed out by the C-34 report is the need to enhance the relationship between those who plan, mandate and manage UN peacekeeping operations and those who implement them. Governments who contribute with troops, police officers and/or civil servants should be involved in all stages of peacekeeping operations, so that they can help the Security Council to achieve timely, effective and appropriate decisions through their experience and expertise. In particular, troop-contributing countries must be given the opportunity to meaningfully contribute to the decision-making process within the Security Council when the agency mandates or renews an operation. As countries in charge of implementation have a greater say in the way mandates are actually written, they will be in a position to positively influence some of their features and to strengthen civil-military cooperation on the ground. In this sense, a reconsideration of the "two step" approach once suggested by the Brahimi Report (consulting with potential troop-contributors before the UNSC establishes the mission) might prove useful at this stage.

National ownership and the multidimensional nature of operations are two other essential principles that the MINUSTAH experience has confirmed as being an integral part of the Brazilian view of peacebuilding. Both ideas were reflected upon in last June's report of the Secretary-General, dedicated to peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Although it does not deal directly with civil-military cooperation, the report suggests reforms that will make this kind of cooperation easier by improving dialogue between stakeholders and giving decision makers in New York a clearer view of what is happening on the ground.

Civil-military cooperation is also deeply affected by the question of funding. The current practice within the UN is that budgets for funding of each operation are analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In 2009, operations have been subject to drastic budgetary cuts in the Fifth Committee, despite the concerns raised by developing countries against such measures. Just to mention one example, the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur, UNAMID, received around US$ 200 million less than requested, a cut of almost 11%. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated case. The United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC had a 5% budget cut. In the

debates in the Fifth Committee, Brazil has explained why the proposed cuts (explained by developed countries as being concerned with "efficiency" and of the principle of "doing more with less") were unacceptable, unreasonable and put at risk the general objective of peacekeeping.

The suggestions for institutional changes advanced above are made without prejudice to the fact that sometimes peacekeeping is not as effective as it could be due to lack of strong political will. No institutional change can compensate for disagreement within the Security Council or for reluctant engagement by the host country and political parties. However positive the impact of institutional changes might be for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, we should not forget that institutions cannot work properly in the absence of active engagement and political commitment from the international community.

Strengthening civil-military cooperation is one of the most critical challenges on the peacekeeping horizon. In order to succeed, we need a change of mindset at the UN. Maintaining international peace and security cannot be something that a few countries in the Security Council do behind closed doors on a minimal budget. It must be an ambitious joint undertaking, where North and South, civil and military, governmental and non-governmental partners come together. As long as we are unable to accomplish this, the promise of peace will continue to elude us.

Stabilizing the fragile frontier: Reflections on the Future of civil-military cooperation within the UN system

Dr. Robert Muggah

RESEARCH DIRECTOR OF THE SMALL ARMS SURVEY

A number of specific themes raised over the last few days resonate when it comes to thinking about CIMIC and the UN. Not coincidentally, they reflect a wider preoccupation amongst multilateral and bilateral agencies with how to coherently and effectively engage so-called "fragile" and "collapsed" states.

First, is the way "context" determines all. There is no terra nullius or blank slate when it comes to peace support operations and CIMIC. A dynamic constellation of geo-politics, interests, and ideologies are present from the outset. The donor community constantly repeats the importance of "context", and yet interventions are frequently "template-driven" in both discourse and practice. It must be recalled that a vast array of "contexts" confront peace-keepers from highly insecure areas (e.g. Afghanistan) to the more benign (e.g. Timor-Leste). These "contexts" feature massive variation in relation to the "nature of violence", the "reach, capacity and legitimacy of public institutions", the "absorptive capacities of communities", and levels of "international interest and presence". So when asked whether each context requires specific intervention strategies, the answer is that of course they do!

When it comes to determining whether the specific experience of Brazil's peace-support efforts in Haiti can be replicated the answer is no, not in their current form!

The second theme relates to the primacy of the personal. It seems that in many cases, the extent to which CIMIC was effective was due to a combination of structural opportunities and constraints but also the specific attitudes, behaviour and competencies of individuals on the ground. We've alluded to this over the course of the past few days as an "ethics of empathy". But when it comes to CIMIC what I've observed is that ardent Dunanist organizations such as the ICRC and MSF *will* collaborate with militaries if their directors and personnel "get it" – if they are attuned to the nuances and subtleties on the ground. They won't collaborate with military personnel if they don't. One question is whether the cultivation of this kind of ethic is possible, whether it can be institutionalised?

A third theme relates to the importance of generating common understandings, frameworks and sensitivities amongst military and development actors. This theme has been picked-up by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its efforts to promote both "whole-of-system" and "whole-of-government" approaches in "fragile" states. The issue of forging common understandings also touches on the distinctions between "instrumental cooperation" versus "genuine collaboration" and seems to be central to joint decision-making and effective determination of comparative advantages amongst stakeholders. The fact is that in any complex environment there will always be a host of competing priorities, interests and modus operandi among the key players. What seems critical is recognizing the interests on the ground – working with and around them – and building collaboration based on some mutual respect, including with affected government partners.

A fourth theme relates to the central importance of pragmatism and flexibility and not being beholden to rigid mandates. In any peace support operation there is an obvious tension between adhering to doctrine and guidelines on the one hand and allowing for opportunism and discretion on the other. It seems that effective CIMIC requires dealing with the world "as it is", rather than "as it ought to be". In some cases hard and fast principled intervention – including working through formal state institutions - is critical. In other cases, it may be more important to work with informal non-

state actors who are seen as more credible or legitimate by people on the ground. It is of course crucial to be sensitive to strict mandates and remain culturally attuned, but it is also the case that we cannot expect to always "talk to angels". In other words, it is important to be conscious of the limits of rigid doctrines and to incentivize (where possible) reasonable risk-taking.

In the remainder of my presentation I would like to reflect on the role of context and how it is influencing CIMIC operations. Specifically, I would like to consider how global and domestic forms of "fragility" are shaping the character and structure of so-called "integrated missions" and "stabilization" operations in the coming years.

Over the past few days we have tentatively considered the ways war- and post-war violence is transforming. We are aware that the lines between political and criminal violence are often blurring in post-war theatres. We also know that global and trans-national networks of "violence entrepreneurs" are capitalising on illicit rents and confounding traditional mediation strategies. Military strategists are also watching how warfare is migrating to the city and they are documenting the ways civilians are becoming directly implicated in these "new wars". These changes are not academic or esoteric: they are dramatically changing the way multilateral and bilateral actors are conceptualising and responding to "fragility" from the regional and national to the city and household levels.

Peace-support operations are facing a paradox when it comes to understanding global patterns of armed violence. According to the Global Burden of Armed Violence (2008) about 740,000 people are killed by violence each year. About 52,000 are violently killed in war in a relatively small number of countries. About 10 times that number – 490,000 – are violently killed due to homicide in non-war zones, including ungoverned, unstable and so-called "fragile" states. In other words, it seems that many non-war zones are just as dangerous, if not more so, than war zones. It is no surprise, then, that international and domestic preoccupation with fragile states and cities is growing. This is particularly the case in Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean where homicide rates are amongst the highest in the world – 4 times the global average. The present concern with narco-violence and gangs along the US-Mexico border is case in point.

Alongside the archetypical cases of fragility such as Afghanistan and Haiti is a sprawling architecture of fear from Guatemala to Port of Spain. Most

OECD member states now consider fragility (and not necessarily war zones or even post-conflict zones) to be "the most dangerous security threat" to future global order. For example, a recent US National Security assessment described how the world's primary threats stem from weak and fragile countries rather than strong and authoritarian ones. Not to be outdone, UN member states have described fragility as a threat to – in the vernacular – "international peace and security."

Overall, the Word Bank and the OECD count as many as 50 fragile or failing states. Taken together, they account for more than one billion people worldwide – many of them falling into Paul Collier's so-called "bottom billion" of the world's most poor. More than $USD 26.8 billion in development aid was channelled to poor fragile states in 2008. According to the World Bank President Robert Zoellick, the Bank promises to redouble investment in fragile states over the coming years. This represents a surprising reversal on trends in the 1990s when only "good performers" were rewarded with aid dollars.

So how is the so-called international community responding to "fragility"? In addition to more traditional peace-keeping activities in post-conflict countries, it seems that a coalition of (primarily) western countries is investing in wide-spectrum "stabilization and reconstruction" operations. Many of these "stabilizers" talk of "comprehensive", "integrated" and "whole-of-government" approaches to fragility. In practice, these interventions are short-term, open-ended, and multi-pronged with wide-ranging and often ambiguous objectives. Their clear fusion of military objectives with development interventions, a central tenet of "kinetic" (counter-insurgency) operations, belies a new and controversial willingness to publicly deal with fragility.

What if anything is new about all this? Conceptually, I think it's worth recalling that today's stabilization agenda has deep historical roots. In some ways, it can be traced back to nineteenth and early twentieth century paranoia stemming from disorder in the colonial hinterlands. It also features echoes of mid-twentieth century fears of the (presumed) linkages between poverty and communism and later, liberation theology and fledgling nationalist movements. In other words, elites at the centre have long been wedded to the idea of stabilizing the periphery.

We've also discussed here how stabilization seems to be traced to other, arguably more benign, currents of thought including recent calls for more explicitly "people-centred" foreign policy doctrines. Labelled by some as

"human security," these doctrines position human rights and the protection of civilians at the centre of national security and stability objectives. By the end of the 1990s, the human security concept acquired considerable legitimacy in the hallways of multilateral and national institutions around the world.

More recently, some policy entrepreneurs have advanced an initiative designed to make state sovereignty and the responsibility to protect (R2P) contingent on guaranteeing human security. Both the human security and R2P concepts were surprisingly influential – even if concerns persist about how they can be instrumentalized to promote more interventionist and promiscuous foreign policy. Indeed, these concerns are not without some justification. By linking a country's "internal" fragility with "international" instability, the doctrines of human security and R2P potentially advocate for more muscular forms of stabilization by outsiders. By transforming a fragile state into a "governance" state, stabilization embraces wholesale state-building and social engineering.

Supporters of the stabilization agenda in US, UK, Canada, Australia and elsewhere have leveraged diplomacy, defence and development to precisely these ends. Previously regarded as something of an afterthought, development and humanitarian assistance have been elevated to a new strategic importance. Also - when put into practice – as in the case of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan – the lines between what is military and what is development begin to blur. Not surprisingly, this new stabilization agenda has been greeted with mixed responses and even derision from some in the humanitarian and development communities. Critics argue that at best it diverts funds away from the "real" poverty reduction agenda. At worst it bolsters a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism agenda that potentially undermines the humanitarian enterprise altogether. Particularly since wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, relief agencies complain of a progressive closure of the humanitarian space.

Humanitarians quickly divided into two camps over the stabilization question. On the one side are those who contend that stabilization erodes the (supposed) "neutrality" and "impartiality" of relief agencies and their ability to maintain an apolitical stance in the face of egregious violence – we saw this view expressed somewhat by ICRC and MSF at this conference. On the other are multi-mandate development agencies who say that stabilization

can protect aid workers and widen the humanitarian space, deal with root causes and ultimately expand the number of people who receive life-saving assistance. The reality is that most humanitarian and development agencies working in "fragile" states are simply trying to make do in the new and uncertain climate of stabilization. Many already spend in excess of a quarter of their annual budgets on protecting their personnel and assets. In most cases, they are trying to insulate their humanitarian and development operations from those undertaken by the military through the introduction of distinctive symbols and icons. In places such as Afghanistan/Somalia these have had little effect in deterring victimisation. In Haiti and Timor, they seem to work. According to recent studies such efforts seem to have more purchase in Latin America and Africa than the Middle East and Central Asia.

For many relief workers toiling away in fragile situations the stabilization agenda is viewed ominously as a pretext for advancing the narrow political interests of certain Western states. There may be some truth to this. Since their establishment less than a decade ago, the U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the UK Stabilisation Unit and Canada's START have been doing brisk business. Many of their initiatives are described openly as counter-insurgency operations and a bid to win hearts and minds. And while stabilization has generated some important short-term dividends in places like Haiti and East Timor, humanitarian and development personnel are sceptical about whether these missions will make communities and households safer in the long run.

Some concluding thoughts

So what are the key messages emerging from this short retreat into concepts of fragility and stabilization?

First, I want to emphasise that the "stabilization and reconstruction" operations are a reality for the UN and others. Even if they are not explicitly calling it thus, in many cases they are already participating in "stabilization" efforts. In such cases even the pretence of impartiality and neutrality is abandoned.

Second, I want to stress how the stabilization agenda is not restricted to the US or UK – much less to Iraq and Afghanistan. There are massive stabilization

exercises underway in Eastern DRC, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere – some 19 countries for the US alone, at least 9 for the UK. So, while not "labelled" as such, the discourse and practice of stabilization is now fundamentally part of UN peace-support and peacekeeping operations and the UN's widening engagement is expanding in this "fragile context".

It seems that the participation of UN agencies is also set to continue growing. Under the newly minted "capstone doctrine", the UN is now expected to lead increasingly complex and challenging multi-dimensional engagements. These missions seem to go far beyond traditional peacekeeping based on strict impartial inter-positioning between consenting parties. Many new UN missions are explicitly authorized to use force (Chapter VI and VII), undertaking what effectively amount to 'stabilisation' operations often through new 'integrated' structures under unitary leadership at country level.

SHORT BIOS

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A graduate of Anderson University, Indiana, Dr. Ann Livingstone earned her Masters at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. She did post-graduate studies at Oxford University (UK) and was awarded her Ph.D. from University of Keele (UK).
Dr. Livingstone joined the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) in 2003 following her career as a university professor. She was drawn to work in an environment where the concepts of peace and conflict are approached from a multi-dimensional perspective. At the PPC, she has the opportunity to research and work with the civilian, military, and police personnel who play a critical role in complex peace operations.

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Born in Rio de Janeiro, in 1959, Mr Duarte holds a B.A. in Economics from the University of Sussex, United Kingdom (1980). He graduated from the Rio Branco Institute (the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy) in 1983, and in 2002 successfully defended his thesis (PhD-level) at the Institute, titled "Brazil, State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – implications for Brazilian foreign policy on disarmament and non-proliferation".

At the Ministry of Foreign Relations, he worked as assistant to the Head of the United Nations Division (1984 - 1985) and as an official at the office of the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs (1985 - 1987). He also worked at the Office of the President's Diplomatic Advisor (1993-1995) and at the Office of the Minister of Foreign Relations (2001-2003). From 2003 to 2004, he was Head of the United Nations Division at the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Mr Duarte has held diplomatic posts at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York (1987-1990), at the Brazilian Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela (1990-1992), at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva (1995-1999), at the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina (1999 – 2000), and again at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York (2004-2007).

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- Commander of the 43º Infantry Light Battalion – Cristalina / GO / Brazil – 1998 / 1999
- Military Attache to the Braziliam Ambassy in Moscow / Russia – 2001 / 2002
- Promoted to Major General in November 2004
- Commander of the 13ª Brigada de Infantaria Motorizada – Cuiabá / MT / Brazil – 2005 / 2006
- Force Commander in MINUSTAH from 10 Jan 2007 to 08 Apr 2009

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Worked as a consultant in a variety of conflict and post-conflict settings. This has involved: carrying out assessment missions; writing proposals; the establishment and management of projects; and evaluations and monitoring. Also, designed and conducted trainings, written manuals and other reference material and drafted laws, regulations and policies.

His particular areas of expertise are: judicial reform, legal aid, land and property rights, mediation and community justice, advocacy, human rights, transitional justice, refugee law and the laws of armed conflict.

He is a Research Fellow at the Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham and a Visiting Fellow at the University of Essex, and also writes a regular column in the Guardian on-line.

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2009: Deputy Head, Africa Directorate, FCO, covering Horn of Africa, East Africa and Great Lakes region: 2009
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From November 1992 to June 2000, Mr. da Costa was Chief of Personnel Management and Support Service in the Field Administration and Logistics Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. Prior to that, he served in a number of other positions at United Nations Headquarters, including with the Office of Human Resources Management and the then Department of Conference Services, having joined the Organization in 1969.

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He holds an A.B. (Departmental Honors) from The Johns Hopkins University and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (IUHEI) in Geneva. He was previously a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre of International Relations of the University of British Columbia and has been Visiting Researcher at institutions in Canada, Brazil and South Africa. A German citizen, he is a specialist in peace operations and intervention and has also published in the areas of civil-military relations, small arms, and defence policy decision-making. He has published in the Journal of Political and Military Sociology and the Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval as well as in several edited volumes.

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After completing his degree in Political Science/International Relations Michiel de Weger (1970) started his career with a three-year period as an officer in the Royal Netherlands Navy. He then worked for seven years as a strategy consultant at Capgemini (Ernst & Young) where he conducted research and managed projects, mostly for government security agencies, including police, defence, intelligence, counterterrorism and foreign affairs. In 2006 Michiel gained his PhD at Tilburg University in the Netherlands with a thesis on the history of the domestic security role of the Dutch armed forces, including the work of the Dutch gendarmerie, the

Royal Marechaussee, explosive ordnance and military counter-terrorist forces. This led to the invitation to carry out a research programme on 'policing by the military' at the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda. Over the last four years this included research on Dutch counterterrorism, Dutch operations in Iraq and Afghanistan/ Uruzghan province, Dutch national security policy, the Royal Marechaussee and the effectiveness of international policing operations, assistance to civilian authorities in military doctrine and the European Gendarmerie Force.

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Before coming to USIP, Robert Perito was a United States Foreign Service officer with the Department of State, retiring with the rank of minister counselor. He served as deputy director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the Department of Justice. He also served as deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in the White House under Presidents Reagan and Bush. Perito was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nigeria.

Robert Perito has taught at Princeton, American, and George Mason Universities. He holds a masters degree in peace operations policy from George Mason University. Perito is the author of three books: *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?*

America's Search for a Post Conflict Stability Force; America's Experience with Police in peace Operations; and, Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent *Crime* (forthcoming). He is the editor of a *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and* Relief Operations.

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She has been an aid worker for the past twelve years, a number of which were spent in different countries in Africa and Asia. Mme. Rocha has also held the position of Humanitarian Affairs Advisor in MSF´s headquarters in Spain and Belgium. She is a journalist and holds a Masters degree in International Relations. Currently she teaches humanitarianism at the under-graduate faculty of International Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro.