




האוניברסיטה העברית ירושלים  
המכון למחקר ע"ש הרי.ס. טרומן  
למען קידום השלום  
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem  
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June 2010

PRESS RELEASE

**Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, June 2010**

## **Despite the Gaza Flotilla incident, rise in willingness to compromise among Palestinians and Israelis, but two thirds on both sides remain pessimistic about the future of the peace**

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between June 6 and 16, 2010. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

**Following Israel's raid on the Gaza flotilla which resulted in 9 civilian casualties and a number of wounded soldiers and civilians, 63% of the Palestinians believe they came out the winners. Most Israelis (50%) put the blame for the grave results on the organizers of the flotilla rather than on the Israeli political echelon which approved the operation (28%) or on the military echelon which carried it out (13%).**

**There is an increase in support for the Clinton parameters overall package in both publics compared to 2009. The change is larger and is consistent across all parameters among Palestinians. Palestinians are now split half between support and opposition to the overall package (49% support and 49% oppose it). This level of support represents an increase in support of 11 percentage points from 2009. A majority of Israelis (52%) support the overall package, versus 37% who oppose it. This level of support is similar to that obtained in 2006 through 2008, and larger than the support indicated in 2009 (46%).**

**Despite the increase in willingness to compromise among the two publics, neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider it likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the State of Israel in the next five years. Two thirds in both publics think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low;**

**72% of Palestinians support the boycott on products produced in settlements, but 60% oppose preventing Palestinians from working in the settlements. 44% believe that the boycott will hurt the proximity talks, and the rest split between the belief that it will benefit the talks and that it will have no impact. About half of the Israelis think the boycott will make no difference, 37% believe the Palestinian boycott will hurt the talks, and 8% believe it will benefit the talks.**

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 10 and 13, 2010. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 810 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between June 6 and 16, 2010. The margin of error is 3.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email [pcpsr@pcpsr.org](mailto:pcpsr@pcpsr.org). On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email [jshamir@msec.huji.ac.il](mailto:jshamir@msec.huji.ac.il).

## **MAIN FINDINGS**

### **(A) Current Events**

- With regard to the Gaza flotilla incident, 63% of the Palestinians believe the Palestinians came out the winners, whereas 27% think Israel came out the winner.
- In the aftermath of the flotilla incident and while Turkish-Israeli relations worsen, Turkey emerges as the most popular regional country among Palestinians: 43% of the Palestinians believe that Turkey is the regional country most supportive of the Palestinian cause. But it is worth noting Iran was selected by only 6% and Syria by 5%. Egypt was selected by 13%, Saudi Arabia by 5%, Lebanon by 3% and Jordan by 2%.
- 50% of the Israelis attribute responsibility for the grave results of the raid on the flotilla to Gaza to the organizers of the flotilla; 28% see the political echelon which made the decision responsible, and 13% blame the military echelon which executed it.
- 46% of Israelis think the closure of Gaza benefits Israel's national interest, whereas 36% think it hurts it; 14% think the closure does not have an effect on the national interest.
- 47% of Israelis support Prime Minister Netanyahu's decision to impose a 10 months freeze on construction in the settlements; 44% oppose it. These figures are similar to those obtained in our December 2009 poll shortly after the freeze was announced.
- 72% of Palestinians support the boycott on products produced in settlements while 26% oppose it. However, 60% oppose preventing Palestinians from working in the settlements, and 38% support such a ban.

### **(B) Proximity talks**

- In the backdrop of the opening of the proximity talks and the raid on the flotilla to Gaza, 35% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 10% of the Israelis and 23% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 48% of

the Israelis and 40% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue.

- 55% of the Palestinians will not grant legitimacy to an agreement reached in the proximity talks, while 35% will; 57% are pessimistic about the outcome of these talks, while 23% are optimistic.
- Among Palestinians, 44% believe that the boycott on products produced in settlements will hurt the proximity talks, 28% believe it will benefit the talks and 25% believe it will have no impact. Among Israelis, 37% believe this Palestinian boycott will hurt the talks, 8% believe it will benefit them, and 48% believe it will make no difference.
- If the proximity talks fail, the option endorsed by most Palestinians is to ask the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian State (65%). The next most popular option (60% support) is to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state. 51% support the option to start a non-violent resistance. The other options asked about received only minority support: 44% support the resumption of the armed Intifada (54% oppose it); 39% support the dissolution of the PA if the talks fail (56% oppose it), and 27% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding instead a one-state solution (71% oppose it).
- We also asked about Israelis' assessment as to Palestinian response to a failure of the proximity talks. Israelis correctly identify that the most preferred option to be taken by the Palestinians is to ask UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian state: 65% of the Israelis think the Palestinians will take this step. However 62% of Israelis think the Palestinians will resume the Intifada, whereas only a minority of the Palestinians supports this step. These two steps are assumed by Israelis to be most preferred by Palestinians, probably because they learned that a freeze of the peace process results in violent resistance and because of their awareness of the Arab use of UN institutions to condemn Israel. Israelis misperceive the Palestinian public's greater endorsement of non-violent resistance over armed confrontations: only 43% expect them to start a non-violent resistance, whereas 51% of the Palestinians support a non-violent resistance.

### **(C) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda**

#### ***The Saudi Plan***

- 59% of the Israelis oppose and 35% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our December 2009 poll 57% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 36% supported it. Among Palestinians, 67% support the plan and 30% oppose it; 68% supported it in December and 30% opposed it.
- 31% of the Israelis support yielding to American pressure to accept and implement the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative, while 60% oppose it. Among Palestinians 60% accept such pressure while 36% will reject it. In August 2009, 40% of Israelis thought Israel should accept such American pressure and 52% thought it should reject such pressure. Among Palestinians 58% believed they should accept American pressure to adopt and implement the Saudi Plan, 39% said they should reject such pressure.
- As to their assessments of the other side's response to such pressure: 32% of the Israelis believe Palestinians will reject and 55% think they will accept it, while 53% of the Palestinians think Israel will reject and 42% think it will accept it. In the August 2009 poll, 29% of Israelis believed that the Palestinians would reject American pressure, and 58% believed that the Palestinians would accept American pressure. 49% of Palestinians thought that most Israelis would reject such pressure, 46% believed that most Israelis would accept it.

## *Clinton/Geneva Parameters*

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the beginning of the proximity talks between the parties.

- The findings indicate an increase in support for the overall package in both publics compared to 2009. The change is larger and is consistent across all parameters among Palestinians.
- Palestinians are now split half between support and opposition to the overall package: 49% support and 49% oppose it. This level of support represents an increase in support of 11 percentage points from 2009.
- 52% of Israelis support the overall package, versus 37% who oppose it. This level of support is similar to that obtained in 2006 through 2008, and larger than the support indicated in 2009 (46%).
- Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. Among Israelis there was majority support for the Clinton package since 2004, except in the 2009 poll.

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package.

### **(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange**

**Among Palestinians** 60% support or strongly support and 38% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in August 2009, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

**Among Israelis** 45% support and 44% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In August 2009, 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 48% opposed it.

### **(2) Refugees**

**Among Palestinians**, 48% support and 49% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third

countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In August 2009, 37% agreed with an identical compromise while 61% opposed it.

**Among Israelis** 37% support such an arrangement and 50% oppose it. In August 2009, 36% supported it and 58% opposed.

### **(3) Jerusalem**

**In the Palestinian public** 37% support and 62% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In August 2009, an identical compromise obtained 31% support and 68% opposition.

**Among Israelis**, 38% agree and 56% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In August 2009, 34% supported this arrangement and 62% opposed it.

### **(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State**

**Among Palestinians** 28% support and 70% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in August 2009, 24% support, and opposition reached 76%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

**Among Israelis** 58% support and 35% oppose this arrangement compared to 56% support and 40% opposition obtained in August 2009.

### **(5) Security Arrangements**

**In the Palestinian public** 41% support and 57% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In August 2009, 34% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 64% opposed it.

**In the Israeli public** 46% support and 42% oppose this arrangement compared to 49% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in August 2009.

### **(6) End of Conflict**

**In the Palestinian public** 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in August 2009 were 55% support and 44% opposition.

**In the Israeli public** 62% support and 30% oppose this component in the final status framework. In August 2009, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

### **The Whole Package**

**Among Palestinians** 49% support and 49% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In August 2009, 38% supported and 61% opposed such a package.

**Among Israelis** 52% support and 38% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In August 2009, 46% supported and 46% opposed such a package.

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people's calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts.

- If the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement this package as a permanent settlement, 40% of Israelis think Israel should accept it, and 47% believe it should reject it. Among Palestinians 48% think they should accept it, and 47% believe that they should reject it.

### **(D) Conflict management and threat perceptions**

- 49% of the Israelis support and 47% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2009 poll, 50% supported and 48% opposed such talks. However 61% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 23% think a majority supports it.
- Neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider it likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the State of Israel in the next five years. Two thirds in both publics think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 29% of Israelis and 32% of Palestinians believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2009, 69% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low.
- In addition to our systematic assessment of the two sides' support of the Clinton parameters we also examine periodically Israelis' and Palestinians' readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 60% of the Israelis support and 32% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Among Palestinians, 58% support and 39% oppose this step. A year ago in June 2009, 52% of the Israelis supported and 41% opposed this mutual recognition of identity and among the Palestinians support stood at 50% and opposition at 49%.
- Given the failure of the Fatah and Hamas dialogue, neither Palestinians nor Israelis believe that unity of Gaza and the West Bank will be resumed soon: only 16% of Palestinians and 10% of Israelis think so. 55% of Palestinians and 26% of Israelis think that unity will be resumed only after a long time. 26% of Palestinians and 48% of Israelis believe that Gaza and the West Bank will stay two separate entities.

- Among Israelis, 58% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 52% in our March poll. Among Palestinians 74% (compared to 77% in March) are worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.

**Israeli Poll #(32) 6-16 June 2010; N=810\***

*(Palestinian Poll 10-12 June 2010; N=1270)*

\*Listed below are the questions asked in the Israeli survey, and the comparable Palestinian questions. When Israeli and Palestinian questions differ, the Palestinian version is italicized.

**V5) What was the last education institute you attended?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Did not attend any	0.6%	1.0%	
2) Primary school	7.6%	9.0%	
3) Secondary school	37.6%	37.0%	
4) An institute offering supplementary courses (Up to one year)	5.2%	5.1%	
5) Post secondary institute such as teachers' seminar, nurses school etc.	16.4%	15.6%	
6) Academic institute	32.3%	32.1%	
7) DK/NA	0.3%	0.2%	

**V6) Do you support or oppose Prime Minister Netanyahu's decision to impose a 10 months freeze on construction in the settlements?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely support	11.6%	15.8%	
2) Support	31.8%	31.4%	
3) Oppose	28.8%	28.0%	
4) Definitely oppose	17.6%	15.9%	
5) DK/NA	10.2%	8.9%	

**V7) In your opinion, who is most responsible for the outcome of the raid on the flotilla to Gaza that resulted in 9 foreign citizens casualties and a large number of wounded soldiers and foreign citizens?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) The political echelon which made the decision	25.9%	27.8%	
2) The military echelon which executed it	6.5%	12.5%	
3) The organizers of the flotilla	57.0%	49.8%	
4) DK/NA	10.6%	10.0%	



**V8) (Q46) What do you expect to happen between Palestinians and Israelis now after the start of the proximity talks with American mediation and after Israel's raid on the flotilla to Gaza?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	7.1%	9.9%	22.6%
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	49.4%	47.9%	39.6%
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	35.3%	34.6%	30.5%
4) DK/NA	8.1%	7.7%	7.3%

**For each of the following steps tell me if the Palestinians will take it or not if the proximity talks fail?**

**V9) Will the Palestinians ask the UN Security Council's recognition of a Palestinian state or not?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Yes	62.8%	64.9%	
2) No	24.4%	23.6%	
3) DK/NA	12.8%	11.5%	

**V10) Will the Palestinians declare a Palestinian state unilaterally or not?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Yes	45.9%	45.9%	
2) No	42.9%	43.5%	
3) DK/NA	11.2%	10.6%	

**V11) Will the Palestinians abandon the two-state solution and demand a one-state solution or not?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Yes	29.7%	30.1%	
2) No	57.0%	57.8%	
3) DK/NA	13.4%	12.1%	

**V12) Will the Palestinians start a non-violent resistance or not?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Yes	41.1%	43.1%	
2) No	48.3%	46.5%	
3) DK/NA	10.6%	10.4%	

**V13) Will the Palestinians resume the Intifada including armed confrontations**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Yes	65.3%	62.0%	
2) No	26.7%	29.6%	
3) DK/NA	8.0%	8.4%	

**V14) Will the Palestinians declare the dismantling of the PA or not?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Yes	15.6%	19.6%	
2) No	68.6%	65.3%	
3) DK/NA	15.8%	15.1%	

**V15) (Q39) Recently the Palestinians started a boycott on products produced in settlements in the West Bank. In your opinion, will this boycott hurt or benefit the proximity talks?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely hurt	5.8%	6.2%	5.9%
2) Hurt	32.3%	30.6%	38.3%
3) Benefit	3.5%	6.4%	23.3%
4) Definitely benefit	0.7%	1.9%	4.3%
5) Will have no impact	50.4%	48.4%	24.8%
6) DK/NA	7.3%	6.5%	3.5%

**V16) To what extent do you support or oppose dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely support	14.4%	23.0%	
2) Support	30.2%	28.1%	
3) Oppose	25.7%	22.5%	
4) Definitely oppose	23.0%	20.1%	
5) DK/NA	6.7%	6.3%	

**V17-19) What percent of the Israeli public support dismantling most of the settlements?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
Percent of respondents believing that the majority of the Israeli public support dismantling most of the settlements in the	25.7%	24.9%	

**V20) If in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians, Israel will have to negotiate with the Hamas government - in your opinion, should Israel do it or not?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely should negotiate	17.9%	25.1%	
2) Think it should negotiate	24.9%	23.6%	
3) Think it should not negotiate	21.4%	19.3%	
4) Definitely should not negotiate	32.1%	28.1%	
5) DK/NA	3.8%	4.0%	

**V21) And what about the majority of the Israeli public? Do most Israelis support or oppose negotiations with the Hamas?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	23.4%	25.2%	
2) Majority opposes	61.8%	61.1%	
3) DK/NA	14.8%	13.7%	

**V22) Does the Israeli closure of Gaza benefit or hurt Israel's national interest?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely benefit	10.5%	15.6%	
2) Benefit	34.4%	30.2%	
3) Neither benefit nor hurt	15.8%	14.1%	
4) Hurt	28.1%	28.1%	
5) Definitely hurt	6.3%	7.4%	
6) DK/NA	4.9%	4.6%	

**V23) (Q47) Now, 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, what in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) None existent	28.3%	29.3%	31.8%
2) Low	36.3%	36.5%	34.8%
3) Medium	22.1%	21.5%	26.2%
4) High	7.7%	7.8%	5.5%
5) DK/NA	5.5%	4.9%	1.8%

**V24) And in your opinion is it possible or impossible to reach these days a final status settlement with the Palestinians?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely possible	5.2%	6.5%	
2) Think it is possible	29.2%	29.5%	
3) Think it is impossible	26.7%	26.2%	
4) Definitely impossible	34.7%	33.8%	
5) DK/NA	4.1%	4.0%	

**V25) Now after the Fatah-Hamas talks failed, what do you think will happen to the Palestinian Authority?**

*(Given the failure of the dialogue between Fatah and Hamas, what are your expectations for the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?)*

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) The unity of Gaza and the West Bank will be resumed soon	7.3%	9.8%	15.5%
2) The unity will be resumed but after a long time	24.3%	26.3%	55.3%
3) Gaza and the West Bank won't be united and will stay two separate entities <i>(Unity will not resume and two separate entities will emerge )</i>	50.6%	48.4%	26.1%
4) DK/NA	17.9%	15.6%	3.0%

**V26) (Q61) According to the Saudi plan, Israel will retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and a Palestinian state will be established. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed-upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194 (which allows return of refugees to Israel and compensation). In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her establish normal diplomatic relations. Do you agree or disagree to this plan?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	6.3%	12.8%	12.8%
2) Agree	19.8%	21.7%	54.0%
3) Disagree	29.9%	27.3%	20.9%
4) Definitely disagree	36.5%	31.6%	9.2%
5) DK/NA	7.6%	6.5%	3.2%

**V27) (Q62) And if President Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement the Saudi plan, should Israel accept or reject this American intervention?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Accept	22.2%	30.5%	59.7%
2) Reject	68.2%	60.4%	35.4%
3) DK/NA	9.6%	9.1%	4.8%

**V28) (Q63) And what would be the Palestinian majority opinion on this issue? Do most Palestinians reject or accept such an American intervention?**

*(What in your opinion will be the attitude of most Israelis to such American intervention – would they accept or reject it?)*

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
<i>(Certainly accept)</i>	-	-	9.5%
1) Majority accepts	51.9%	54.7%	32.8%
2) Majority rejects	33.6%	31.6%	46.9%
<i>(Certainly reject)</i>	-	-	6.3%
3) DK/NA	14.5%	13.7%	4.5%

**If Israel and the Palestinians return to permanent settlement negotiations, various compromise proposals may come up on the table. I will read to you now several items that might be included in the final settlement with the Palestinians. For each of these items tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree to it, taking into account all its elements.**

**V29B) (B5) The proposed permanent settlement will be based on mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict and no further claims will be made by either side.**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	18.8%	21.4%	5.1%
2) Agree	40.6%	40.6%	57.7%
3) Disagree	21.2%	20.0%	25.5%
4) Definitely disagree	11.2%	10.0%	9.3%
5) DK/NA	8.2%	8.0%	2.4%
	N=340	N=409	N=636

**V30B) (B2) Demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force and a multinational force will be established to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of terrorism and violence directed against each other.**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	19.1%	20.7%	2.3%
2) Agree	38.8%	36.9%	26.1%
3) Disagree	17.4%	18.7%	52.6%
4) Definitely disagree	17.4%	16.7%	17.7%
5) DK/NA	7.4%	7.0%	1.1%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V31B) (B6) Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian air space for training purposes. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space its land and its water resources. In addition Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state and its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force will be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor the territorial integrity of the Palestinian state and its border crossings given its being demilitarized.**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	9.1%	11.0%	5.8%
2) Agree	37.6%	35.4%	35.1%
3) Disagree	22.9%	23.9%	42.9%
4) Definitely disagree	17.6%	17.7%	14.1%
5) DK/NA	12.6%	12.0%	2.0%
	N=340	N=401	N=635

**V32B) (B1) The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza strip territories, except for several large blocks of settlements which will be annexed to Israel and will not exceed 3% of the size of West Bank. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. The Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza strip.**

*(An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map)*

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	11.2%	13.5%	6.5%
2) Agree	32.4%	31.9%	53.9%
3) Disagree	25.0%	24.9%	28.3%
4) Definitely disagree	20.3%	19.0%	9.9%
5) DK/NA	11.2%	10.7%	1.5%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V34B) (B3) Jerusalem will be the capital of both states. East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. The Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including those in the old city as well as the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty.**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	8.2%	13.2%	3.6%
2) Agree	24.1%	24.7%	33.4%
3) Disagree	23.8%	23.7%	43.6%
4) Definitely disagree	37.1%	32.2%	18.0%
5) DK/NA	6.8%	6.2%	1.3%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V36B) (B4) The solution to the refugee problem will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 (and on the Arab peace initiative). The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency:**

- Return to the Palestinian state
- Return to areas currently in Israel which will be transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above
- Residency in their current states
- Immigration to countries such as the US Canada and Australia
- Return to Israel.

**Return to Israel will be restricted and at the discretion of Israel.**

**As a base for its decision, Israel will consider the average number of refugees who will immigrate to states such as Australia Canada and Europe. Do you agree or disagree with this item?**

**All refugees irrespective of their choice will be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of properties**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	5.3%	7.7%	4.6%
2) Agree	27.4%	29.2%	43.1%
3) Disagree	28.8%	27.7%	35.6%
4) Definitely disagree	25.9%	22.4%	13.6%
5) DK/NA	12.6%	13.0%	3.0%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V37) (B7) And now after we went over the main features proposed as part of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general, when you consider all features together as one combined package.**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	6.5%	11.0%	3.4%
2) Agree	41.2%	40.9%	45.1%
3) Disagree	23.2%	21.7%	36.4%
4) Definitely disagree	18.2%	15.5%	12.5%
5) DK/NA	10.9%	11.0%	2.7%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V38) (B8) In your opinion, what is the Israeli (Palestinian) majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israeli (Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza) support or oppose this combined final status package?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	30.3%	28.9%	49.3%
2) Majority opposes	44.4%	46.1%	42.2%
3) DK/NA	25.3%	24.9%	8.4%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V39) (B9) And what is the Palestinian (Israeli) majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Palestinians (Israelis) support or oppose this combined final status package?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	39.4%	43.4%	36.5%
2) Majority opposes	33.5%	30.4%	55.6%
3) DK/NA	27.1%	26.2%	7.9%
	N=340	N=401	N=636

**V40) And will you vote for or against such an agreement in a referendum initiated by the government?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) I will definitely vote for	18.2%	22.7%	
2) Think I will vote for	25.9%	25.2%	
3) Think I will vote Against	17.4%	16.0%	
4) Definitely will vote against	26.5%	23.7%	
5) DK/NA	12.1%	12.5%	
	N=340	N=401	

**V41) (A12+B10) If the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement this combined package for a permanent status, should Israel (the Palestinian side) accept or reject it?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Accept	35.0%	39.8%	51.8%
2) Reject	53.1%	47.4%	43.6%
3) DK/NA	11.9%	12.8%	4.6%

**V42) (Q64) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	16.0%	16.8%	6.0%
2) Agree	42.6%	42.7%	51.9%
3) Disagree	20.2%	20.4%	29.2%
4) Definitely disagree	12.4%	11.6%	10.0%
5) DK/NA	8.9%	8.5%	2.9%

**V43) And what is the Israeli majority opinion on this issue? Do most Israelis support or oppose the mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	48.0%	46.5%	
2) Majority opposes	31.4%	33.1%	
3) DK/NA	20.6%	20.4%	

**V44) And what is the Palestinian majority opinion on this issue? Do most Palestinians in the territories support or oppose the mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	41.4%	43.3%	
2) Majority opposes	34.0%	32.7%	
3) DK/NA	24.6%	24.0%	

**V45) (Q48) To what extent are you worried or not worried that you or a member of your family could be hurt by Arabs (Isreal) in your daily life (or that your land would be confiscated or home demolished)?**

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Very Worried	21.8%	21.4%	29.0%
2) Worried	38.2%	36.2%	44.4%
3) Not worried	25.6%	25.9%	20.5%
4) Not worried at all	9.7%	11.9%	5.6%
5) DK/NA	4.7%	4.7%	0.4%