



POSITION PAPER
**A PLEA FOR A NEW
DIRECTION IN
GERMANY'S AFRICA
POLICY 2010**

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KEY PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Africa's increasing geopolitical and strategic importance needs to be adequately reflected in a new German policy on Africa, which should be fundamentally realigned. The formulation of conditions that promote development and sustainable economic activity as well as trade within and with Africa have become more significant than the amount of public aid.

1. BROADEN GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH AFRICA TO A GERMAN POLICY ON AFRICA

Africa should not be reduced to a site for charity activities: it is a strategically important continent. Although many of Africa's problems relate specifically to development issues, the challenges extend far beyond this political sphere. A new German policy on Africa should create reasonable consistency between new programme positions and key content in German policy per se, as well as with normative agreements with European or multilateral institutions. Such a policy should achieve a practicable coherence between the traditional spheres of development, foreign and security policy, economic and trade policy, and domestic (migration) and environmental policy. Consistency between national goals and international agreements will reinforce the reliability of German policy. New coherence between departments and institutions will increase both the efficiency of resource use and the credibility of German policy on Africa, which has previously featured too many voices and participants and sometimes even an ancillary foreign policy. It should now take the form of a seamless Africa policy with an Africa representative who has cross-departmental coordination abilities and a clear, strong mandate.

2. MAKE COMMON VALUES AND MUTUAL INTERESTS TRANSPARENT

African partners are aware not only of the need for solidary concern for the fate of their continent and people, but also of the desirability of their resources. If German policy on Africa intends to create a successful symbiosis to the advantage of both sides, then universal values such as freedom, solidarity and justice, the enforcement of human rights, the rule of law and democracy should converge with the mutual and reciprocal interests of Germany and its African partner countries. Only a genuine declaration of motives and political and economic interests will allow trust and a resilient basis for international cooperation to develop among partners in Africa.

3. ORGANISE STRUCTURES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MORE EFFICIENTLY, AND CONCENTRATE ON REGIONS AND SECTORS

German policy on Africa should not be characterised simply by more financial aid, but by its more purposeful, efficient and effective use. This entails a rational and more harmonised international division of labour and the redeployment of multilateral resources towards bilateral objectives that are concentrated on fewer countries and sectors, selected by clear criteria, and made more visible.



A positive prospect: despite substantial development problems, increasing political self-confidence is visible in Africa.

4. PROMOTE AFRICAN SELF-RESPONSIBILITY AND ASSIST REFORMS IN AFRICA

A partnership with Africa that is not characterised by the conventional donor-recipient logic, but by a symmetrical and equal relationship, requires that African states and players take explicit responsibility for their political actions. This expression of increased political and moral sovereignty, together with increasingly visible institutional and programmatic reform initiatives on continental, regional and national levels, deserves financial and political support as well as more intensive cooperation.

5. STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

The rule of law should be supported more strongly in Africa so as to protect human values and rights. The promotion of the rule of law also improves conditions for the economy, trade and investment to flourish. As only democratically legitimate and constituted communities can guarantee the rule of law in the long term, political parties, civil society and independent media should be supported along with democratic structures and processes in order to improve the quality of democratic governance and multiparty systems in political competition.

6. INTENSIFY DIALOGUE ON THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND PROMOTE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH AFRICA

The principles of a global social and market-oriented economic order and its value system should gain international prestige and become the regulatory framework of African countries. A socially oriented market economy that follows the guiding principles of personality, solidarity and subsidiarity is the proviso for prosperity, social justice and sustainable economic activity. Such an economic order will not only promote commercial involvement in Africa, but also requires fair international trade regulations.

7. STRENGTHEN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Religious and cultural dialogue within and with Africa should be continuously promoted, as this counteracts the risk of culture and religion being exploited for political ends and the concomitant escalation of security risks. Dialogue also helps to establish universally recognised values as a foundation for trustworthy cooperation.



Fighting famine and improving food security specifically require the promotion of rural development.

8. FACILITATE PEACE AND PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH NETWORKED SECURITY

Long-term development in Africa is dependent on peace and security. For this reason, the security architecture – with both its civilian and military components, crisis prevention, and programmes for ensuring peace should be promoted.

9. INCREASE CHANCES OF SURVIVAL AND OPPORTUNITIES IN LIFE: PROMOTE RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL AUTONOMY, HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Combating famine and increasing food security call for the promotion of rural development. Improved local autonomy facilitates the decentralised provision of important services in the fields of basic health care and education.

10. SAFEGUARD THE FUTURE: CONSERVE NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AND PROTECT BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATES

Strong African partners are required in the fight against global warming and climate change, as well as in the fight to conserve the environment. As Africa is affected particularly severely by climate change, measures to reduce emissions, to adapt to climate change, and to protect the environment should be promoted more strongly on the continent.

FOREWORD

In the last decade in particular, Africa has attracted increasing international attention and has once again become a strong interest in German politics. Despite substantial development problems in the 53 African countries that together make up more than a quarter of all member states (and votes) at the United Nations, there is a visible increase in their political self-awareness and self-confidence, which is highlighted by their geopolitical importance at international conferences such as the recent Climate Summit in Copenhagen. Africa's commodities are becoming increasingly important on global markets, above-average growth rates have been achieved in recent years, the continent is attracting interest as a sales market, and in many respects Africa is undergoing a transition.


Africa's heightened political, economic and ecological significance is not yet adequately reflected in many strategies directed at Africa in their predominant focus on the continent's diverse and complex development deficits. In addition, the Millennium Development Goals declared in 2000, with their strong orientation towards fighting extreme poverty and social problems, make Africa appear less as a strategically important partner and far more as a location for charity activities. Nonetheless, resignation over the continent's underdevelopment, inability or unwillingness to pull itself out of the spiral of poverty seems to be making way for an African renaissance through belief in its great potential and abundant opportunities.

The increasing strategic significance of this continental neighbour to Europe should, therefore, be adequately reflected in a new German policy on Africa that is normatively anchored within the multilateral framework of the United Nations and the European Union as well as in the framework of international bodies such as the G8 and G20, yet includes (rather than excludes) a change of emphasis and a revision of priorities that will evolve into a fundamental realignment. Primarily, universal values such as human rights and democracy, recognition of the separation of powers, the rule of law and international law should converge with the mutual and reciprocal interests of Germany and its African partner countries. Religious and cultural dialogue is another urgent task for the future of our global society. Issues of development, foreign and security policy, foreign economic and trade policy, and migration and environmental policy should be rationally harmonised.

With the beginning of a new decade, and accelerated by the planned realignment of German development policy, the Federal Government has the opportunity to accomplish a paradigm change in its policy on Africa, in which an equal partnership accompanies increasing African self-reliance. However, this

requires more intensive political cooperation (PC) with African partners, as well as an institutional reevaluation of PC as an independent pillar alongside technical cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC), in which political foundations should be given a major role.

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung has been represented in more than 20 African countries for almost 50 years, and has formed long-term and trusted partnerships. This paper was ratified at the Foundation's Employee Conference for Africa and the Middle East in Marrakech, held from 24 to 30 April 2010. With its critical outline of the problems and ten propositions for a realignment of German policy on Africa, it aims not only to stimulate the Africa debate in Germany, but also, and above all, to advise and support German policy on Africa by providing innovative and constructive ideas. Special thanks in this regard are owed to Dr Anton Bösl, the Foundation's Resident Representative in Namibia and Angola, who compiled this policy paper in consultation with the Africa/Middle East team.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Gerhard Wahlers". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'G'.

Dr Gerhard Wahlers
Deputy Secretary General of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

INITIAL SITUATION

In 2010, 125 years after the end of the 1885 Congo Conference in Berlin that divided Africa into colonies, the continent is searching for its geopolitical role. The Cold War, which also included numerous proxy wars in Africa, ended 20 years ago. At the same time, the era of colonialism came to an end with Namibia's independence in 1990. Since then a new, multi-polar world order has been emerging, with America in a key position, a more closely knit Europe, a repositioning of Russia, the rise of China as a global power, and an increased role for newly-industrialised countries. Africa's previously minor role in this system has undergone a significant change through global challenges such as international terrorism, global warming and climate change, and the fight against the drugs trade and pandemics – all of which make deeper constructive cooperation with African partners indispensable. In order to withstand challenges such as climate change, for example, Africa should be encouraged to become a strong and reliable partner in the containment of global warming, the protection of its rainforests, natural resources and biodiversity, and the prevention of greenhouse gas emissions.

Other developments that draw attention to Africa include the scarcity of important commodities from elsewhere or the fact that African countries, as seen in December 2009 in Copenhagen, agree on common positions and can visibly and permanently influence the United Nations (UN) system through their voting superiority. Africa's quest for its geopolitical role is characterised by fluctuation between being economically marginal on the one hand, with only a 3 percent share of world trade, but on the other, becoming increasingly politically relevant due to global problems, as well as being well-represented in multilateral institutions in respect of numbers and votes.

The globalisation of political and economic relationships, increasing juridification of international relationships, the growing significance of questions of



'global governance', serious security policy problems and migration make Africa a geopolitically important player and a strategically essential and indispensable partner.

Overcoming the global financial and economic crisis requires international regulations like the proven frame of reference provided by the organisational model of the social market economic order. The many African countries that stand out for their consistently above-average economic growth in recent years could provide a constructive regulatory contribution to giving these principles stronger validity, also on an international level. Furthermore, in the fight against international terrorism, Africa's fragile states in particular should not become retreats for Islamic terrorists but be reliable partners in networked security concepts.

The fact that a football World Cup took place on African soil for the first time in 2010 not only reflects Africa's increased profile and international role, but could also be symbolic of the dawning of a new era in Africa itself, characterised by the desire for political self-determination and economic awakening.

OUTLINE OF PROBLEM AND KEY CHALLENGES

The African continent is difficult to describe due to its size and its many different facets. Essentially, the term Africa is suitable only as the geographic label for a continent containing around one billion inhabitants across 53 countries, most of which are south of the Sahara. These countries are too heterogeneous to be encompassed in a single terminological bracket, and the political, economic and social challenges are too complex to solve with simple, 'one size fits all' approaches. The great disparities within and between Africa's individual countries and regions also appear to be widening. This paper can, therefore, outline only a few selected problems and challenges. These are not intended to overshadow the positive developments in various areas in the last few years, but are essential for a realistic view of Africa. In addition, although general statements about Africa apply to all countries, they do not always apply equally for every country. Thus, because of North Africa's uniqueness as a region on the continent, its numerous and specific particularities will be presented in a separate paper in 2010, which will cover aspects of its relevance to the Middle East region as well.

POVERTY, DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

Despite positive trends in some areas of human development, such as a slight drop in infant and maternal mortality, Africa remains the continent with the greatest development problems. Ten years after the ratification of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were intended to achieve significant progress in development by 2015, it is clear now that Africa will not reach most of the eight goals. Although the fundamental attainability of these goals can be called into question, methodological shortcomings and the absence of economic and social data as a statistical basis for the evaluation of the MDG process should be taken into account. Statistics had to be significantly revised on the basis of the new method introduced by the World Bank in 2008 for assessing poverty, which adjusted the poverty datum line from



Education is a human right and is indispensable for development.

US\$1 to US\$1.25, due to improved research. According to the new calculations, the total number of people living in extreme poverty is now more than 1.4 billion worldwide.

According to the new poverty projections, the situation in Africa is particularly difficult. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of persons living in extreme poverty in fact almost doubled between 1981 and 2005, although the percentage of the overall population living in extreme poverty remained steady at 50 percent for this period. In its MDG mid-term review, the UN points to the negative effects of the global economic and financial crises, the dramatic rise in food costs, and the declining involvement of donor countries. With regard to the goal of halving extreme poverty worldwide, China and India have been very successful and this goal is likely to be met, but Africa is the only region in the world where the absolute number of those living in poverty has significantly increased in the last two decades.

Poverty also affects the achievement of the other MDGs, and is reflected in Human Development Index (HDI) indicators such as life expectancy, infant

and maternal mortality, and access to clean water, medical facilities and schools, which have barely improved in Africa – and, in some cases, have significantly worsened. The effects of climate change such as droughts and floods obliterate cultivated areas and harvests, destroying the basic necessities of life and any development successes already achieved. Poverty and sustainable development are and will remain Africa's key challenges, which should be tackled more intensively by African governments themselves, with the support of the international community.

In recognition of the crucial importance of education, the second MDG requires primary school education to be provided to all children worldwide by 2015. Education is a human right and, at the same time, is indispensable for development. However, despite improved access to primary education, including for girls, this ambitious goal has not been reached in Africa. Although the official school fees that often drained a large proportion of household income have been abolished in many countries, and the number of schoolchildren has in some cases increased significantly, millions of children do not attend school at all, and do not learn to read or write. Their intellectual and economic potential is, therefore, barely used.

FRAGILE STATEHOOD, WAR AND CONFLICT

In the last 40 years, the African continent has been the site of more violent conflicts and wars than any other region in the world. During this time, more people lost their lives in Africa than in all the other regions of the world put together. Currently, a third of the current 24 major armed conflicts and wars in the world are in Africa. These are almost always domestic conflicts, sometimes with cross-border dimensions, where violent non-state actors and militias play an important role.

The failure of some African states and the emergence of conflict and war can be traced to the retention or increase of power by self-serving leaders, and to the fact that national borders were drawn arbitrarily by colonial powers without taking into account the populations' ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural requirements, and therefore contain heterogeneous and fragmented societies. Furthermore, the unequal distribution of natural resources within a country or region and governments' inability and/or unwillingness to improve living conditions for their people also lead to conflicts. Although the climate-induced scarcity of natural resources has not yet caused any violent conflicts, it has exacerbated existing ones.

Conflicts in Africa not only lead to the destruction of human life, they also lead to lives being disrupted. Currently, there are more than two million refugees and 13 million internally displaced persons in Africa. In addition, conflicts lead to the destruction of infrastructure, capital flight, decline in investment, and shrinking economic performance. Conflicts absorb high sums from the international community in various forms of intervention, including military, civilian and humanitarian. For example, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo, MONUC) alone costs over US\$1 billion per year.

Increasing climate change can lead to various conflict situations in African countries that are particularly affected by it. Thus, low rainfall and a rapidly growing population with increasing demands can exacerbate already problematic access to clean drinking water. Water shortages and increasing desertification can lead to a decline in food production, food crises, and conflict relating to the distribution of resources. An increase in natural disasters such as storms and floods and a rise in sea levels can have considerable impact on regions with already weak economic and political capacities, and can lead to migration. Migration, in turn, contributes to raising the conflict potential in transit and destination regions.

As a consequence of climate change in Africa, international stability and security is threatened. Among the threats are the potential increase in weak and fragile states with unforeseeable risks for global economic development; the risk of growing conflict between those who distribute and those who are entitled to receive resources; threats to human rights and to the legitimization of industrialised countries as players in the global governance arena; the induction and intensification of migration; and the overwhelming of customary security policy.

Three regions are the focal point of potential climate-induced conflicts in Africa. In North Africa, the population-rich Nile delta is at risk. Climate change causes further stress in the Sahelian zone, which is additionally characterised by weak states (such as Somalia and Chad), countries in the grip of civil war (such as Sudan and Niger), and countries receiving streams of refugees (such as Somalia and Sudan). In southern Africa, climate change would overwhelm governments' capacities, and human security would worsen in these already impoverished societies. In Africa, climate change can evolve from being a development problem to becoming a security threat; it can intensify existing

political problems and simmering conflicts and create a multitude of new ones, leading to further state fragility.

THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY

The state of human rights and the quality of the rule of law have improved overall in Africa. Political and civil rights and freedoms have increased in many countries. The establishment by the African Union (AU) of an African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the establishment of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the work of regional courts should be regarded as positive developments.

However, the improvement of institutional requirements for the protection of human rights in Africa in the last decade should not belie the fact that the actual state of human rights in Africa is still below average compared with the rest of the world. This is partly due to the large number of conflicts and wars which occasion high death tolls, rape victims, refugees, child soldiers, and more. Also at fault are the slow justice systems, lawsuits that drag on for years, and sometimes deplorable prison conditions – all of which contribute to undermining constitutional principles. In addition, African presidents' ostentatious display of solidarity with Sudanese President Al Bashir by explicitly ignoring the warrant against him from the International Criminal Court, and the non-implementation of court judgments such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal's verdict on the Zimbabwean Government's dispossession of farmers have shown that the resulting understanding of modern constitutionality and the rule of law is still far removed from the principles of the UN.

In the last two decades, the number of countries in Africa that can be formally designated as multiparty democracies has increased significantly. Democracy appears to have prevailed as the formal political organising principle in Africa, and the number of single-party systems, military coups and violent seizures of power have fallen significantly. The willingness of African regional organisations to accept such violent seizures of power has also diminished. On the one hand, surveys confirm that the majority of people in Africa oppose single-party and military governments, and favour multi-party democracy over autocratic forms of government. On the other hand, a large proportion of respondents expressed scepticism with regard to democratic attitudes and good governance. Holding elections does not guarantee that they are

in fact free and fair, or that there are democratic attitudes among the population and among decision-makers and elites. Almost half of those surveyed were convinced that unpopular political leaders could not be ousted in elections. The phenomenon whereby dominant government parties attained over 70 percent of the vote in elections with sometimes almost 100 percent participation is justifiable cause for concern over the quality of democracy in Africa. Despite democracy's prevalence as the formal political organising principle, many so-called democracies in Africa are fundamentally defective or could even qualify as autocracies. Although access to power is ensured through 'show' elections, there is often a lack of guaranteed basic political and civil rights, a constitutional separation of powers and, therefore, a lack of control over such powers. Many African states should instead be classed as hybrid regimes, therefore. This is confirmed by the Freedom House Index report for 2010, which noted substantial steps backwards in Africa in recent years. Similarly, the 2010 Bertelsmann Transformation Index¹ notes that the quality of democratic government in such hybrid regimes in particular has deteriorated considerably, and that these show significant shortcomings in the democratic framework.

A further particularly critical issue in Africa is the often inadequate implementation of the principles of good and responsible governance, which not only requires a functioning state, but also active roles for civil society and the private sector. In addition to the quality of political processes and decision-making entities, i.e. (democratic) legitimation, good governance also specifically signifies the responsible management, provision and safeguarding of public goods and services for all sections of the population, and thereby aims to ensure lasting development for and the long-term welfare of the entire population. However, in many African countries, shortcomings in governance, including corruption, are already compromising earlier successes in development and preventing potential future development. Three types of states with governance shortcomings should be distinguished here, notwithstanding certain features they may share. These are as follows:

- **Fragile states:** These states have no legitimate monopoly of power, they lack control over political power, and they are characterised as having an almost non-existent legal system. Their security tools do not ensure internal or external peace, and they

¹ | Since 1972, this has measured political and civic freedoms and rights in a current total of 193 countries.



A lack of stability and development endangers the fledgling democracies of many African states.

do not safeguard natural resources. Furthermore, such states offer no key services as regards infrastructure, basic social security, education, healthcare, or environmental protection. Their political institutions and the separation of powers do not work. Fragile states also have no or only partially independent institutions protecting the rule of law, and are unable to fight corruption.

- Governments lacking the desire for development-oriented organisation: Here, the development orientation (if any) plays only a minor role in comparison with the retention or extension of power. Human rights abuses and repression, particularly of minorities, prevail, and corruption and a lack of transparency are the order of the day. Not infrequently, these are countries in post-conflict situations. Due to their 'poor governance', they are designated as difficult partners – especially as regards development cooperation.
- States and governments with limited political, economic and social organisational capacity due to a lack of resources and/or institutions: The explicit desire to act in a development-oriented manner is present, but fails due to a lack of structural conditions for implementation.

Due to the crucial significance of good governance for development, and the sometimes serious shortcomings in governance in Africa (most fragile states and so-called difficult partner countries are in Africa), particular attention should be paid to this problem. This also explicitly includes protecting freedom of opinion and especially freedom of the press, as well as reinforcing the media's sociopolitical mission.

China's politically unconditional involvement often circumvents international efforts to enforce compulsory minimum standards of good governance. The high average military expenditure of 10 percent in African states, while just 4 percent is used for the construction and expansion of infrastructure, reduces the scope for reasonable priorities to be set in state expenditure, and does not reflect development-oriented budgeting.

Although corruption is a global phenomenon, it is particularly serious and widespread in Africa. African countries, in particular those with large deposits of natural resources, are particularly susceptible to and conspicuous in a lack of transparency when it comes to using their income. On both a micro and macro level, corruption leads to legal uncertainty and tax deficits, and reduces or prevents essential investment and development.

ECONOMY AND TRADE

Africa's gross national product (GNP) is currently over US\$1,000 per capita. Economic growth between 2002 and 2007 lay constantly at over 5 percent, which was higher than global economic growth for that period. Moreover, Africa's share of the global economy has risen constantly in recent years, and by 50 percent (from 2.1 to 3.2 percent) between 2000 and 2008.

However, these African economic facts and data contain extreme disparities and should always be viewed in relation to external, global factors. Indeed, around 25 percent of Africa's entire economic performance is earned in South Africa, and per capita GNP is extremely unequally distributed – US\$5,914 per annum in South Africa, and just US\$115 per annum in Burundi. The Gini coefficient, which measures the unequal distribution of wealth within a country, has for years shown considerable inequality in African countries. A very small proportion of the population in Africa generates and possesses a majority of the economic wealth.

Although the global economic and financial crises had less of an effect on Africa's economies and their growth than on the rest of the world, while the economy shrank by 2.2 percent worldwide in 2009 and by 3.5 percent in the developed world – in other words, they experienced negative economic development, economic growth in Africa fell from over 5 percent in 2007 to 'just' 1.6 percent in 2009. Falling commodity prices, declining foreign direct investment (FDI) and less money sent from expatriate Africans to their home countries have also put the brakes on African

economic growth. Furthermore, a detailed regional and sectoral analysis reveals that economic development in Africa varies widely between regions. In 2008, growth was at 3.9 percent in east Africa, and -1.6 percent in southern Africa. In addition, this relatively high growth in comparison to global rates is not high, broad or sustained enough to keep pace with Africa's annual population growth of 3 percent, or to compensate for negative social developments or economic damage caused by HIV and AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis, for example, and achieve an adequate, poverty-reducing effect. It remains to be seen whether the projections of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which predict African economic growth of 4 percent in 2010 and 5 percent in 2011, will become reality.

Since 2000, trade relationships between China and African countries have grown tenfold to over one US\$100 billion. This makes China one of Africa's biggest trade partners, and makes Africa an interesting market for low-quality Chinese products. Even in South Africa, China has overtaken Germany as the largest trading partner. German companies are losing increasingly larger trade shares. Despite a distinct increase from 2.1 percent (2000) to 3.2 percent (2008), Africa's share of world trade is still marginal. This is remarkable, since 15 percent of the world's population lives in Africa, and the continent has numerous strategically important commodities such as rich oil fields in Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Sudan, among other countries; the majority of the world's gold and diamond reserves; 90 percent of the world's cobalt; 50 percent of global sources of phosphate, 40 percent of platinum, and large quantities of currently highly sought-after uranium and coltan. As the sale of these resources – in particular mineral goods such as oil, gold and diamonds – is seldom handled transparently, their proceeds provide only limited benefits to the population at large. Governments who are heavily financed from the proceeds of these resources have little dependence on tax revenue or a diversified economy and industries. In fact, many of Africa's economies are unilaterally supported by these resources, with industrial infrastructure barely diversified. Mineral commodities and agricultural products are exported at low global market prices, but investment goods are imported (usually expensively), which leads to structural deficits in foreign trade. Despite the presence of predominantly commodity-based industries, South Africa is the only industrial state in Africa; almost all others are agricultural states. Due to the mostly precarious energy supply in African countries, with regular power cuts, organised industrial production is barely possible.



Many of Africa's economies are mainly based on natural resources. Thus, industrial infrastructure is not as developed as it needs to be.

The relevance of energy supply can be shown by the example of Nigeria which, with its 140 million inhabitants, generates only around 10 percent of the electricity that South Africa has available for its approximately 50 million inhabitants. Thus, for example, Nigerian mobile telecommunications providers operate the majority of their network using electricity produced by generators.

So far, the Lomé Convention and Cotonou Agreement have not yet significantly changed this situation to the benefit of African markets. Newer trade agreements with the European Union (EU) by way of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and with the United States through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are viewed increasingly critically by African governments. Some feel disadvantaged by the major economic powers. The AU, which only became a member of the group of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) EU partner countries in March 2010, hopes that, through this membership, it can achieve greater influence on relationships with the EU, especially with regard to the use of aid from the European Development Fund and trade agreement negotiations – which have been faltering for years. The increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements between Western governments and African countries has not promoted dynamism in regional or, in particular, economic integration in Africa, and has had a negative influence on intra-African trade. Although it holds considerable potential and has grown overall in the last decade, intra-African trade is still weak. This is due to a lack of political will, a sometimes dull product range, and geographical factors such as market distance and market limitations in small and landlocked African states, usually with insufficient infrastructure and high transportation costs, which

leads to competitive disadvantages. Inefficient and multiple customs procedures, political instability and uncertainty, and even the uncertainty of trade policies: all hamper intra-African trade.

INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The global economic crisis is also reflected in FDI. Although such private investments in Africa rose by US\$20 billion to US\$87 billion between 2003 and 2008, according to reports in 2010 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), they fell by half in 2009 – more than the global average of 43 percent that year. Furthermore, FDI concentrates on just a few commodity-rich countries such as Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan. Countries such as China, India, Malaysia and Singapore are among the 20 most important investors in Africa. Chinese investments, often in return for oil supplies, flow into infrastructure projects where Chinese materials and staff are used, and from which the African labour market or the local economy barely profit.

While FDI within other regions is considerable – amounting to 30 percent in the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, for example – intra-African direct investment amounts to just 13 percent in total. Most of this type of investment is from South Africa.

Shortcomings in the application of the rule of law in Africa are the reason for low FDI. The market economy conditions with investment incentives and the necessary legal certainty for domestic and foreign investment are not present in all African countries. Six of the ten countries with the worst conditions for company development are in Africa, according to the World Bank. The sometimes opaque allocation of public contracts often discriminates against foreign companies. Price controls, dispossession and the socialisation of private assets that, as demonstrated in Zimbabwe, often serve to benefit the country's own political clientele, lead to capital flight – which currently stands at approximately fifty US\$50 billion per year. The emigration of approximately 20,000 highly qualified Africans every year also represents a major economic loss. A large proportion (approximately 40 percent) of the African capital that is essential for building lasting economic structures is invested outside the continent. This reflects a considerable lack of trust by Africans themselves in the competitiveness of their own economies, and sends the wrong signals to foreign private investors.

Africa receives the greatest share of international Official Development Cooperation (ODC), plus private donations that cannot be precisely statistically determined. Some 34 percent (US\$44 billion) of ODC was poured into sub-Saharan Africa in 2008, which in many cases led national budgets to depend massively on this foreign flow of capital and net payments. In some countries, the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) made up by ODC is over 40 percent (2006: Burundi 45 percent, Liberia 58 percent), and the ODC share of public budgets is sometimes over 50 percent. While the average per capita figure for ODC in developing regions is US\$24, in Africa it is as high as US\$45 (2008).

The majority of the World Bank and IMF's creditor countries are in Africa. Due to debt service obligations, African countries' foreign debt impairs essential investment in infrastructure and human capital and, therefore, economic growth. In order to reduce the burden on heavily indebted countries and to shrink their debts to a manageable level, the Paris Club agreements have been arranging debt rescheduling since the mid-1950s and debt relief measures for over a decade with the most heavily indebted countries. Many countries, especially those in Africa, have benefited from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative that was launched in 1996. After a decision at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles (2005), this initiative was eventually extended by a Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) implemented in 2006. Of the 26 countries that had their debts successfully written off through the latter initiative, 21 (80 percent) were from Africa. A further eight countries out of nine participants (89 percent) have met the conditions for successful debt relief. Four out of five countries awaiting a decision on their applications for debt relief are from Africa. As the causes of high foreign debt are often structural problems such as a high dependence on global market prices and exogenous shocks (high fuel prices), there is a concern that many of these countries will soon be heavily indebted once more.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND MIGRATION

Africa is the continent with the highest population growth in the world. In its projections for 2050, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) assumes that Africa's population will double or triple to 2–3 billion people. The majority of the population is under 25 years old, with limited formal job prospects. The fact that around 30 percent of the African population are already living in areas characterised by aridity and drought, and 25 percent of Africans have no

percent access to clean drinking water and live under 'water stress', is problematic. Water stress refers to the situation where there is insufficient clean water, and where conflicts can arise as a result. The risk of water stress, which affected 47 percent of the African population in 2000, is predicted to rise by 2025 to affect 65 percent, and is substantially related to the increased need for water due to population increases.

The rapid pace of demographic development in Africa is aggravated by the continent having the highest growth in urbanisation worldwide. While fewer than 25 percent of Africans lived in cities in 1980, by 2005 the figure was already 35 percent. Estimates by the UNFPA assume that by 2050, 50 percent of the population in Africa, i.e. approximately 1 billion people, will be city dwellers. In west Africa, 40 percent of the inhabitants now live in the already heavily populated coastal towns, and it is estimated that the 500-km stretch of coast between Accra and the Niger delta will become a single megacity with 50 million inhabitants by 2020. Even though the current urbanisation figure in Africa is below the current global figure of 50 percent, the African situation is accompanied by serious social problems. Hopes for a better life in the city not only lead to rural exodus, but also to an urbanisation of poverty in city slums, an aggravated food situation, and increasing criminality. African cities are generally considered to be the most dangerous living environments in the world, with the highest rates of capital crime, violent crime, and crimes against property.

Migration has numerous causes in Africa. Often, these are conflicts and wars, but climate-induced deterioration of natural living conditions and food, as well as work-related migration, are also contributing factors. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2007), 2.3 million of the 11.4 million refugees worldwide live in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a slight decrease on previous years and a significant improvement on 1990, when the number of refugees in Africa was at its highest point, with almost 6 million. Some 83 percent of African refugees remain in Africa. The number of internally displaced persons, which in fact rose slightly to almost 13 million people (predominantly in central Africa and the Horn of Africa), is still worryingly high. Another cause for concern is the increasing number of migrants who leave for Europe, sometimes under perilous conditions, mostly due to a lack of economic and social prospects at home.

FOOD SECURITY AND HEALTH

Agriculture is the economic backbone of Africa. A total of 58 percent of all employed persons work in agriculture, and, although this sector produces just 16 percent of Africa's GNP, agriculture provides a living for 75 percent of the continent's population.

An increasing rural exodus and the effects of climate change are already reshaping Africa's rural areas. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that arable land will be significantly reduced and other areas will be affected by degradation in the years to come due to climate change. Cereal cultivation will be affected particularly heavily: in southern Africa, the production of maize will be drastically reduced, while the cultivation of wheat in Africa as a whole would completely disappear by 2080 – with substantial effects on the food situation of millions of people on the continent. Countries in east and central Africa would lose between 5 percent and 25 percent of their agricultural production, and in west and southern Africa, potentially even more than 25 percent.

The scarcity of food in Africa is exacerbated by the increased demand for biofuels and animal foodstuffs, as well as the emergence of foreign agricultural firms using large areas of the continent's farmland to cultivate foodstuffs for markets outside of Africa. According to estimates, in the last two years, at least 20 million ha of African soil were sold or leased to more than 30 countries for between 30 and 100 years, with China and the Gulf states leading the way. In addition, this farmland is increasingly becoming the subject of international speculation in the form of FDI in agriculture.

Despite massive efforts, it has not yet been possible to eradicate diseases that are a pandemic in Africa but barely a factor in other regions of the world, such as malaria and tuberculosis. Approximately 500 million people worldwide suffer from malaria, and almost 1 million die of it every year – most of them in Africa.

Africa is also the region most heavily affected by the HIV and AIDS pandemic. According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), in 2008, 67 percent of all HIV-positive individuals worldwide, 68 percent of all newly infected adults, and 91 percent of all newly infected children (1.9 million people in total) lived in sub-Saharan Africa (22.4 million people). Some 75 percent of all AIDS deaths (1.4 million people) are recorded in Africa. The number of children who lost one or both parents



Africa is affected by migration more than almost any other continent. The right to a homeland can often not be experienced at all due to a lack of resources and survival chances.

to AIDS in 2008 is estimated at 14 million. However, major regional and local differences can be noted in this pandemic, with the southern African region (2007: 16 percent) being hit significantly harder than east Africa (2007: 6 percent) and west and central Africa (2007: 4.5 percent). While the HIV infection rate continues to grow in Mozambique, it has stabilised in Malawi, South Africa and Zambia, albeit at a high level (with over 5 million being HIV-positive). In countries such as Mali and Nigeria, the number of infections is decreasing. At around 60 percent of the total, women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa are disproportionately affected by HIV and AIDS. This is not only due to the greater physiological susceptibility of women to immune deficiency disorders, but also to the position of women in society and their lack of rights to sexual self-determination.

Alongside humanitarian problems, HIV and AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases also create numerous socio-economic challenges. On the micro level, these include the collapse of social structures, the impoverishment of private households, and the loss of qualified workforces for the private and public sector. On the macro level, these diseases lead to lower economic growth, demographic changes (reduced life expectancy), lower tax revenue, a rerouting of resources into healthcare (instead of investment-related areas) and falling consumption and savings rates.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND DESERTIFICATION

The African continent, with its highly complex ecosystem and unique biodiversity, experiences the effects of current climate changes in a massive way. This is

despite the fact that Africa, with its comparatively low energy consumption and CO₂ emissions, is not a major contributing force to climate change. While extreme heat and drought, floods and hurricanes have always been considered as almost everyday events in many African countries, climatic disasters have been increasing and intensifying for several years, with ever more devastating consequences.

Droughts and floods brought about by climate change destroy the lives of people and animals; reduce access to drinking water; devastate cultivated areas and harvests – and, therefore, basic livelihoods; affect Africa's unique ecosystems, biodiversity and important infrastructure (e.g. roads, energy supply); and often ruin painstakingly earned development progress. The increasing desertification of large areas of Africa, which is primarily but not solely being caused by climate change, and the expansion of existing and the creation of new desert regions, destroys cultivated farmland and pastures. The removal of large expanses of forests that are important for climate protection exacerbates this problem. Disappearing resources lead to an overburdening of the remaining agricultural land, increasing rural poverty, mass migration, and conflicts over land and water resources. In addition, Africa is currently experiencing the world's largest population growth, which exponentially increases the climate change problem and its effects. Urbanisation and progress in global economic development, combined with increasing energy and resource needs, can intensify existing or potential conflict situations. At the same time, the increasingly vital need to protect the environment in terms of conserving the basic necessities of life (safe disposal of waste, anti-pollution measures, etc.) is moving more sharply into focus.

AFRICA BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY: STATE, CULTURE AND RELIGION

On no other continent in the world are tradition and modernity, traditional ways of life and 21st-century technology as close together as they are in Africa. Deeply rooted ancestral beliefs and, in some regions, voodoo cults usually coexist peacefully with the benefits of modern education and health policies. However, some aspects of African tradition and culture challenge universally recognised principles of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Misunderstood or consciously manipulated traditions can sometimes serve as an excuse for human rights abuses and the retention of power. Genital mutilation or the handling of homosexuality, traditional jurisdictions in rural areas that often discriminate against women, and forms

of rulership without participatory legitimation are not rare, and in many places are obstacles to sustained development.

Islam and Christianity, which have established themselves in Africa as the principal belief systems alongside traditional natural religions and ancestral cults and have occasionally spawned fascinating syncretic belief systems, can look back on a 1,000 years of relatively peaceful coexistence. Around 40 percent of Africa's inhabitants profess to be Christians, and up to 45 percent Muslims. Almost one in four Muslims worldwide live in Africa, and half of all African Muslims do not speak Arabic but one of the continent's many languages and/or dialects. In many places, Islam has been able to become a part of African cultures, just as Christianity essentially shapes cultures in many other countries. Both Christianity and Islam also represent a political and socio-cultural frame of reference and identity for many people. All countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Sudan, practise the separation of state and religion. Islamic Sharia law has not prevailed against most modern constitutions and constitutional democracies, with the exception of a few regions and provinces such as in Nigeria. Africa's multifaceted Islam is tolerant and peaceful. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 have, however, led to a sometimes distorted perception of Islam in Africa too, and have frequently placed Muslims under general suspicion.

Conflicts and wars in Africa have consequently often been interpreted as a manifestation of a war between religions, although they are mostly related to the retention of power, resources, or ethnic conflicts. The unequal distribution of resources and an ethnic *mélange* of hundreds of different African cultural communities, whose habitats often do not precisely match the borders of nation states created during the colonial era, often become a problem when they are used as tools by agitators to suit their own political power interests. Religious, ethnic and cultural factors should, therefore, be more strongly included in political discourse with and about Africa in order to provide lasting cooperation in shaping its development process and reinforcing the bridges connecting it to the modern era and globalised world.



Africa's fate will also be determined by the way it conserves natural resources.

CONCLUSIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF GERMAN POLICY

Africa's changing geopolitical significance in the 21st century and the continent's serious and complex problems bring major, and sometimes new, challenges not only for the continent itself, but also for the international community and its members. The traditional political spheres of development and foreign policy, economic and environmental policy, and security and domestic policy that have so far often dealt with Africa in an uncoordinated way are certainly not capable of single-handedly providing a significant contribution to solving the problems and overcoming the challenges Africa faces. It is necessary, therefore, to consider new approaches and new avenues in Germany's policy on Africa. A reconsideration and redefinition of Germany's relationship with its neighbouring continent and to African partner countries and institutions is essential. The ten concise and pointed propositions described below represent a plea for a paradigm and policy change in this policy.

1. BROADEN GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH AFRICA TO A GERMAN POLICY ON AFRICA

Germany's future peace, freedom, security and prosperity are closely and indivisibly linked to the political, economic and social development of Europe and the world. Germany's interests in a united Europe can and should serve world peace. Germany has frequently proven itself to be a reliable partner to Africa, both bilaterally and as part of the EU and UN.

However, it is precisely the global, European and national developments of the last decade that make it necessary to reflect constructively and critically on the future development of Germany's relationship with our neighbouring continent and its countries. This is in line with German interests in deeper European integration and the EU's ability to organise international politics. It also does not conflict with Germany's willingness to play a role in multilateral institutions in the UN or groups like the G8 or G20.

However, the increase in Africa's geopolitical and strategic significance should be adequately reflected in a new German policy on Africa that is normatively anchored within the multilateral framework of the UN and EU as well as in the framework of international bodies such as the G20. This includes, rather than excludes, a change of emphasis and new setting of priorities up to and including their fundamental realignment.

With the beginning of a new decade, and in view of the imminent realignment of German development cooperation institutions, the Federal Government has the historic opportunity to achieve a paradigm shift in its policy on Africa. This should be characterised by

- the convergence of common values and mutual interests
- consistency between national objectives and international policies, and
- coherence between departments and institutions.

In a new policy on Africa, universal values such as freedom, solidarity and justice, the assertion of human rights, the rule of law and democracy should converge with the mutual and reciprocal interests of Germany and its African partner countries. Consistency should exist or be achieved between Germany's key content and policies and the normative position of European or multilateral institutions, particularly the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (2007). Coherence should be achieved between the traditional spheres of development, foreign and security policy, economic and trade policy, and domestic (migration) and environmental policy, which should all be sensibly harmonised.

This convergence of common values and mutual interests will lead to more honesty in dealing with African partners. Consistency between national goals and international agreements will lead to more reliability in German policy. Coherence between depart-

ments and institutions will increase not only efficiency in allocating resources, but also in the credibility of German policy on Africa. Previous policy featured too many voices and players, and sometimes even an ancillary foreign policy, which was seldom beneficial to German relationships with its African partners.

Despite Africa's serious development shortcomings, its partnership with Germany should not be reduced to the essential yet limited perspective of development cooperation, but instead be manifested as a seamless, cross-departmental policy, and with an Africa representative who has the ability to coordinate across departments and is given a strong mandate. Even though crises, conflicts, climate change, migration and unfair trade relations are in many ways related to development policies in general, such global challenges go far beyond the spheres of activity of development cooperation.

2. MAKE COMMON VALUES AND MUTUAL INTERESTS TRANSPARENT

The justification of international involvement – particularly in Africa – through altruism and humanitarianism, as is sometimes suggested or practised, represents a distortion of motivations and political reality. However, justification that refers exclusively to the assertion of one's own interests misjudges the aptitude for empathy as a human characteristic and driving force, and rationally-motivated Christian solidarity as a political motive. Neither a pure realisation of the necessity of cooperation due to globalisation and the consolidation of relationships between the two continents, nor the logic of reciprocal political and economic dependencies can sufficiently describe, by themselves, what has always linked us with our neighbouring African continent. Philanthropy as an exclusive motive of German policy on Africa, and development policy in particular, would be debunked as a camouflaged and dishonest position towards African partners, who are very aware of the desirability of their resources as well as the need for genuine and solidary concern for the fate of Africa. Only a genuine verbalisation of motives and interests will create trust from African partners; only a transparent, truthful and clear display of such motives and interests will create a resilient basis for political relationships and international cooperation. If German policy on Africa is to be a successful symbiosis of mutual benefit to both parties, there should be a convergence of common values and mutual interests. The starting point and basic principle of German policy on Africa should, therefore, be an orientation towards

universally accepted values, and common, reciprocal interests in and with African partners.

International cooperation should begin with human dignity, from which a moral and rationally justifiable obligation towards active concern for the poorest people in the world is derived. Relations with our neighbouring continent should, therefore, be characterised by respect for human dignity, by mutual respect, and by a symmetrical partnership. This excludes reducing partners to the roles of donor and recipient, and leads to a relationship of equals. The protection of human dignity and promotion of universally recognised human rights (as its legal codification) should be the basis for a value-partnership with Africa. Such a partnership should be based on the core values of freedom, solidarity and justice, which are the normative characteristics of all Christian-democratic politics and are also to be found in the Charter of the AU. Such a partnership of values is a solid foundation for a genuine affiliation where mutual and reciprocal interests are pursued. Africa is not simply a location for charitable activities, but a continent where and in whose welfare the international community has vital interests. However, the pursuit of these interests should not undermine the value-partnership.

Security policy interests in stable political relationships are linked to the realisation of values such as peace, security and freedom so that, in future, no security-related risks or global threats emanate from Africa. Since 11 September 2001 or even earlier, fragile states (many of which are in Africa) have been the focus of security policy concerns as regards providing refuges for terrorists and armed non-state actors. Such states are potentially conflict-laden and also pose a risk to neighbouring countries and the region as a whole. It is not only the numerous conflicts in Africa that have led to refugee movements; the poor economic situation also leads to migration, including to Europe. Thus, Germany has a domestic political interest in ensuring that people in Africa are able to live in peace and prosperity and do not feel obliged to leave their homeland. Furthermore, as a country that is poor in natural resources, Germany is highly dependent on the import of such resources from Africa. In addition, Africa is of great interest as an export market for numerous German products. Mutual and reciprocal economic interests will safeguard jobs on both sides. The ecological interest in maintaining African biodiversity and the existence of large rainforests is of global importance. Africa is being brought to the attention of geopolitics because

of the world's increasing energy consumption and CO₂ emissions, global warming, and global climate change. An orientation towards universally recognised values and common, mutual interests should, therefore, be the benchmark for political objectives in a reoriented Africa policy.

3. ORGANISE STRUCTURES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MORE EFFICIENTLY, AND CONCENTRATE ON REGIONS AND SECTORS

Crucial to the realignment of German policy on Africa is its rational and goal-oriented implementation. In order to be able to provide a more effective contribution in Africa, however, all international and multilateral players and institutions should harmonise their regional and sectoral involvement in Africa and agree on a reasonable division of labour. The implementation of tools and concepts should be more effectively and efficiently coordinated between donors and partner countries (the joint-donor approach), and be at once complementary, differentiated and tailor-made.

Although various problems in Africa can be solved primarily by the mutual involvement of the international community through multilateral organisations, as the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has established, the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation "leaves something to be desired". Hence, the efficiency and relevance of multilateral organisations should be regularly investigated. Several years ago, the German Parliament's Budget Committee set an upper limit of 30 percent as regards Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) budget expenditure on multilateral involvement. This reduction in ODC from over 40 percent to 30 percent would then free up additional resources for Germany's bilateral cooperation with African countries. This will allow Germany's dedication to its global responsibilities to be more visible, and will enable the values and interests it shares with its African partners to be pursued more effectively. In addition, Germany's very strong financial involvement in multilateral and European organisations should be reflected in a concomitant representation in terms of its personnel in such bodies.

It is important to improve the effectiveness of Germany's international cooperation. This can be achieved by streamlining its institutions, concentrating on specific regions and sectors, and using more innovative tools. Although, with their pluralistic approach, the many German governmental and non-governmental

organisations involved in international cooperation can intervene flexibly and constructively on all levels of cooperation with Africa, streamlining those institutions, enhancing coordination among them, and strengthening their profiles would make their capacities more visible. There is reason to hope that the current revaluation of German political cooperation² will lead to a more effective contribution from Germany, including as regards its contributions to Africa. However, recognition of the programmatic necessity of more intensive political cooperation should be accompanied by an institutional revaluation of political cooperation (PC) as an independent pillar alongside technical cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC), in which the German political foundations should play a major role.

To increase the prospects of success for bilateral involvement in Africa, a progressive concentration on a few countries makes sense. The criteria for this should be need (solidarity), political importance (significance), economic relevance (German interests) and governance-dependent suitability as a partner. Political importance is principally dependent on population size, international presence, and the ability to exercise power. Economic relevance is determined by the size of the market, economic dynamism – especially in foreign trade, and the availability of commodities. As to suitability as a partner, the prospects of success are certainly higher for reform-oriented countries and 'good performers'. Difficult partners and countries with deficits in the field of governance can represent particular challenges for German political foundations that are not subject to the bilaterally agreed sectors of state cooperation; whose opportunities for intervention are flexible and effective; and who, in the event of being perceived as interfering in the internal affairs of the host country, are less likely to strain foreign political relations.

On the basis of the problems in Africa, as outlined above, it is essential to concentrate on the sectors of good governance and security, education and training, health and food security, and climate, environment and resource protection. More intensive economic cooperation should further shape the German profile of involvement in Africa. For this to happen, the expansion and protection of the private sector, its cooperation with the public sector, and the promotion of Africa's infrastructure and microfinancial systems are essential.

2 | At the start of 2010, the BMZ announced its intention to merge the three largest implementing institutions in technical cooperation – the GTZ, the DED and InWEnt – in order to ensure a more unified presence in future.

Although the more efficient use of international public aid would drive its effectiveness, aid alone cannot be expected to assist Africa in overcoming its massive challenges. An increase of ODC to 0.7 percent of GNP – as international institutions have encouraged industrialised countries to do since 1964, and set as a binding target for 2015 in the EU's step-by-step plan in May 2005 – is neither adequate nor generally conducive to assisting with solving Africa's problems. Good governance, which creates economic incentives through rational conditions, has greater and more effective levers than ODC, is a much more vital requirement for effective problem-solving in Africa.

However, a reasoned discussion of the concentrated, efficient use of ODC also obliges an honest look at those who subscribe to the maxim of "A lot helps a lot". Various initiatives in recent years, specifically those presented during the British G8 Council presidency in 2005 and by important figures such as Jeffrey Sachs (as an advisor to the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan), as well as high-profile charity concerts have in many places given rise to the impression that Africa's problems can be solved simply by increasing the amount of development cooperation. Moreover, the 'big push' promoted by Sachs implied a 'big trap': a large and tragic development trap into which Africa fell, and from which the continent can only be freed by massive support from outside (like a *deus ex machina*). More recent studies conclude, however, that there is no linear input-output nexus, and that each additional Euro does not have a concomitant increase in development policy results. In fact, after a certain ODC level, the effect can even be negative. In addition to this, increased ODC can lead to higher dependency and long-term economic problems. A quantitative increase in ODC (input) should, therefore, be accompanied by a qualitative improvement in concepts and tools (output). Thus, a targeted implementation of public aid in Africa that is more efficient and, above all, more strongly based on improved regulatory conditions and governance is urgently required in order to achieve lasting effects.

4. PROMOTE AFRICAN SELF-RESPONSIBILITY AND ASSIST REFORMS


The search for a new geopolitical role for Africa is not only characterised by the desire for political autonomy, but also by the dawn of a new era that – despite political, economic and social debt and racist relics – represents a new beginning in international relations. Several decades after the end of colonialism and its discrimination and marginalisation of the majority

population, more and more African leaders are taking responsibility for their policies, without reflexively attributing their collapse to colonial mortgages that ostensibly still condemn their efforts to failure. African states have manifested their increasing political self-reliance through numerous official documents such as the Cotonou Agreement (2000), but above all through the re-establishment of the AU in 2002 and the initiative for a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and by declaring democracy and good governance as normative objectives to be pursued.

Through these acts of political and moral sovereignty, partnerships with African countries can now transcend the traditional logic of donor and recipient, to symmetry and a relationship of equals, where partners act on an equal footing. The willingness to take responsibility for the solution of African problems deserves moral and financial support and intensive cooperation. Those countries where positive efforts towards responsible policymaking and reforms are visible should, therefore, be the first to receive support. A partnership of equals only deserves its name if problems and setbacks are openly discussed and joint solutions developed. Therefore, systematic demands for the principles formulated by the AU itself, such as democracy (with the carrying out of free and fair elections), the rule of law (with an independent judiciary) and good governance (with a strong role played by political parties and civil society) in the formation of political discourse and public life should not be regarded as interference in internal affairs, but as a reflection of an active partnership that is characterised on both sides by serious interest in the welfare of the other.

German policy on Africa and international cooperation will achieve its aims particularly when they build on the reform efforts of Africa's continental, regional and national organisations and initiatives. Institutional and programmatic reforms are usually mutually dependent. Institutional changes not infrequently result from changes to goals. Both these institutional and programmatic reform initiatives deserve essential and visible support in the long term.

The formation of the AU in 2002 did not simply supersede the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) founded in 1963, it also marked a paradigm shift in goals and international law. Due to painful experiences such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the AU Constitutive Act of 2002 now allows humanitarian and military intervention in the case of serious human



Elections should be more than a formal selection process with questionable results.

rights abuses, genocide and war crimes. This also applies to interventions in weak and fragile states that call on the AU for help. The establishment of a Peace and Security Council accompanied this programmatic reform, which visibly transformed the principle of national and territorial sovereignty. Programmatic reforms such as explicit intolerance of military coups and unconstitutional power seizures have changed the AU as an institution and its composition, and have temporarily excluded some member states. However, the limited success of the AU's initiatives to date, such as peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan, or the attempts at mediation in Kenya and Zimbabwe, clearly show that reform efforts are protracted and often do not show visible success for a long time. Therefore, long-term engagement is an essential ingredient in international cooperation and is required before international communities' involvement begins to pay dividends, especially with new and recent reform initiatives.

At almost the same time as the AU, NEPAD was established as an institutionalised development programme, which was renamed the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) at the AU Summit in February 2010. Its programmatic paradigm shift no longer regards African problems exclusively against the backdrop of colonial injustice which foreign aid money is required to solve. Instead, the NPCA aims to release Africa's endogenous development potential, and thereby further open up the continent to the dynamism of globalisation. With the Africa Partnership Forum (APF), the NPCA also created an important political platform for dialogue serving to strengthen political relationships within the G8 process and for relationships with other OECD countries. Although the NPCA itself can show few visi-

ble development successes, its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – currently the most innovative tool in African reform – certainly can. The APRM differs programmatically from the (binding) consensus principle of other multilateral institutions, and allows voluntary participation in its processes. A total of 29 countries currently participate in this APRM, five of which have already completed the process. As a system of reciprocal qualitative assessment of governance, the APRM develops independent African recommendations for democratic, administrative and economic improvements, and should speed up lasting development. Although the countries most strongly affected by governance shortcomings have not yet joined the APRM reform process, this does not call it into question as a positive development. Rather, it illustrates that reform processes require long-term support.

Alongside the abovementioned reform processes in the field of good governance, the consolidation of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court of Justice to form the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the establishment of a Pan-African Parliament (2004) are important reform efforts in the judiciary and legislative spheres. They are as deserving of support as the new African peace and security architecture, with its Peace and Security Council established in 2004 and the African Standby Forces that should be present in all regions from 2010 onwards. The development of peace and security architecture is particularly dependent on the support of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Supporting their peace-promoting and peace-keeping institutions and interventions is less expensive in the medium and long term than financing post-conflict scenarios. By the same token, the role of the AU in the reform of the security sector in its member states should be increased, and the understanding of military participants' altered roles should be enhanced. In addition, RECs also deserve support for their initiatives towards regional integration and good governance, as only capable regional organisations can guarantee the institutional and programmatic expansion of the AU.

National reform efforts in the fields of good governance, jurisdiction and legislation can have substantial and diverse effects. On the political level, they can help to overcome governance shortcomings and reassess inherited government structures, reinforce key state institutions, and improve public finance management, resulting in greater accountability and transparency, improved political participation

and, therefore, greater acceptance of policies and governmental structures. On the material level, these reforms would increase public revenue, decrease corruption, and improve the allocation of available resources. Political decentralisation is particularly deserving of support.

5. STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Only a functioning rule of law can ensure inalienable human dignity and rights. Only a democratically constituted state can guarantee the rule of law in the long term. Democracy and governance by the rule of law require, complement and reinforce each other. Structures relating to the rule of law are not only extremely important to the development and survival of the democratic state, they are imperative for development in general to be sustained. Thus, besides constitutional structures being guarantees of universally recognised human rights and freedoms, they are also engines and catalysts for lasting development.

The modern separation of powers into consolidated multiparty democracies (legislative) with effective and good governance (executive) and an independent jurisdiction (judiciary) is an essential requirement for lasting political stability, economic progress and social development.

However, democracy and the rule of law will remain empty terms until these formal organising principles are legitimised through free and fair elections, independent justice, and embodied values, and until such a democratic constitutional state is determined to and capable of protecting the ethical requirements and moral principles which anchor it. Therefore, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law comprises more than just the guarantee of proper elections or the reinforcement of constitutional structures; it also requires the tools of value-oriented, trustworthy and long-term political consultation, and an associated dialogue on the rule of law – particularly in countries with shortcomings in this respect.

The key role and relevance of good governance for lasting development and international cooperation makes increased involvement in this area indispensable. The focus should be on the development of functioning state and democratic structures and an intact multiparty system. Thus, development-oriented government action and active parliamentarianism could be promoted, the independence of the judiciary and legal security for ordinary people and investors could

be ensured, and the participation of civil society could be guaranteed. Only where there is legal security will African and foreign investors utilise capital and not externalise the profits they earn. The reinforcement of civil and property rights, which are also human rights, and the completion of investment protection agreements would support the flow of capital to Africa. Furthermore, the securitisation of rights to own or use land by way of registration, particularly in rural, communal areas, would allow the owners of such rights to use such registrations as collateral when applying for loans. The enhancement of legal security plays a significant role in this regard in terms of improving conditions for economy and trade, and should be intensified through legal advice.

The promotion of free and independent media, so that journalists can fulfil their sociopolitical information, opinion-forming and monitoring obligations, is particularly important for the formation of a democratic African society oriented towards constitutional principles. Improved education and training, especially in the spheres of political and economic reporting, should put media representatives in a position to constructively and critically monitor Africa's development.

The proven tools of German foreign and development policy, especially the value-oriented education and training of African elites, should be purposefully implemented here. However, a clear division of labour is essential among organisations in order to avoid duplication and create synergies.

As pioneers in the field of promoting democracy, the rule of law and good governance for over 40 years, German political foundations have gathered a high degree of experience and established a comprehensive network of political contacts worldwide. Since their role has been increasingly recognised on all sides, particularly in the last few years, the function of political consultation in the form of work carried out by political foundations should be adequately taken into account. Their particular contribution consists of those activities in international cooperation that involve value orientation and the communication of standards. International cooperation should be more strongly flanked than before by the work of political foundations. It would, therefore, only be consistent to develop political cooperation – alongside the usual technical and financial cooperation – into an independent pillar of German international cooperation, where the relevant political foundations play a fundamental and prominent role.

6. INTENSIFY DIALOGUE ON THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND PROMOTE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH AFRICA

The increasing globalisation of political and economic relationships requires a sound international framework. The rules and principles of a global social and market-oriented economic order and its system of values, which have proved themselves many times on a national level, should establish their international position and become the regulatory framework for African countries as well. A social and market-oriented economic order, which follows the guiding principles of personality, subsidiarity and solidarity, is a condition for prosperity, social justice, and sustainable economic stability. Personality places human dignity above a person's economic value, and prevents a utilitarian curtailment of personhood. Subsidiarity bolsters the individual against premature and unnecessary state intervention, and solidarity aligns the free market economy towards the common good. In order to overcome the global economic and financial crises and their effects, dialogue with Africa on the economic order should be intensified, and an international consensus with a clear commitment to lasting economic activity and prosperity obtained, making social justice possible.

Public aid alone is insufficient to assist in reducing poverty and creating prosperity in Africa. Public aid and private donations together represent an important and essential tool for Africa's economic development, but are inadequate in terms of what the continent needs. Both private economic involvement and national and foreign investment will be promoted primarily through the creation of a social and market-oriented economic order. As the innovations of private entrepreneurs penetrate into areas where the state reaches its limits, the reinforcement of such economic involvement can generate considerable momentum for development. The institutions and tools of German foreign trade cooperation should, therefore, be implemented far more purposefully – but also more flexibly – than before. Their direct and measured promotion, flanked by partnerships with private and public sponsors (private–public partnerships, PPPs) should, however, involve the necessary financial liquidity. Such liquidity can be produced in Africa, particularly by improved microfinancial systems and new financial facilities.

Partnerships between the public and private sectors are particular incentives for private economic involvement. These partnerships create jobs, grow the

socio-economic middle class, increasingly formalise the informal sectors of the economy, and generate additional tax revenue. Improved economic activity and increasing economic growth in Africa are likely to be the most lasting opposition to poverty. However, a high degree of self-reliance, entrepreneurial spirit and motivation among African partners is a vital condition here, as is more transparency in all spheres and at all levels, especially in the field of commodities. These requirements are the same as those being promoted for governments, corporate institutions and civil society by the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).

In addition, access to international markets, particularly agricultural markets, should be further facilitated, and fairer trade terms should be created for African products and services. The trade talks begun in Doha in 2001, which besides extensive liberalisation of trade also aim to enhance and improve developing countries' integration into the existing world trade system, are targeting a gradual reduction in trade-distorting subsidies (especially in the agricultural industry), sanctions and duties. However, the further opening of African markets and their alignment with the 'new' trade regulations set by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and currently being negotiated in the Doha development talks also require monetary compensation. These are now under more serious discussion as part of the WTO's Aid for Trade initiative, and have so far led to visible results. As an overall package, however, along with public aid to Africa, there should also be further opening of industrialised countries' markets to products and services from Africa, from which additional development impetus and further economic growth can be expected. Debt relief initiatives involving the removal of the causes of renewed debt can provide at least short-term relief, despite the danger of rapid re-indebtedness of state budgets, and can release resources to promote trade and stimulate the economy.

7. PROMOTE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Dialogue between cultures and religions is an urgent task for the future in a globalised world that is growing closer more and more quickly. Although different religious and cultural ideas and practices in Africa rarely lead to violent conflict, and serve rather as additional arguments behind what are in fact heterogeneous, tangible interests such as the retention of power or access to resources, the targeted radicalisation of religious or cultural content or partial

aspects thereof still holds considerable potential for international terrorism, could become a security risk, and could destroy development progress. Continuous dialogue with and between religions and cultures in Africa could prevent clashes and counter the danger of their continued, argumentative instrumentalisation and security-related escalation. Dialogue oriented towards factual issues should also promote a normative-ethical direction among religions and cultures in solving global issues about the future.

Aside from this, regional differences in religions and cultural practices can clash with universally recognised values. Some aspects of African traditions, religions and cultures challenge the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Again and again, for instance, traditional laws clash with modern constitutions that provide for equal gender rights, due to not infrequent discrimination against women. Misunderstood traditions sometimes serve as a pretext for human rights abuses and for the retention of power. Dialogue with Africa and relevant parties should be carried out continuously and on many levels in order to put the theory of common values into practice. Regular reassurance and the nurturing of common values can also promote individual and collective civil rights, solidarity, and well-understood social justice in Africa.

8. FACILITATE PEACE AND PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH NETWORKED SECURITY

As well as stable statehood, the absence of war and conflicts is key to achieving lasting peace and security. This requires a capable state with a functioning monopoly of the use of force, the provision of key state services (infrastructure, basic social security, education, health) and a political order legitimised by broad participation. Despite an increase in democratically legitimised governments in the last two decades, the number of weak, fragile or even failed states where the state monopoly of the use of force is eroded and war economies with cross-border dimensions in Africa are disproportionately high in comparison with the rest of the world. Crisis prevention and conflict management are, therefore, basic areas of intervention for international cooperation, peacemaking and peacekeeping measures, as is assistance in building up African security architecture. The goal is to contain or end African conflicts and wars primarily through African peace initiatives. Thus, there should be only subsidiary use of military and security-related intervention by the EU (EU Battlegroups) and the UN



Constant dialogue with and between sects, religions and cultures in Africa can prevent clashes.

(‘blue berets’). Through the AU’s Peace and Security Council founded in 2004, and the African peacekeeping forces (African Standby Forces) which should be stationed in all five regions of the continent and permanently available from 2010, the AU has created an important and simultaneously ambitious basis for the continent’s security architecture. Despite the ongoing discrepancy between aspirations and reality, these institutions deserve financial support (e.g. through the African Peace Facility Fund) and, particularly, personnel support – as do African (and international) peacekeeping missions in Africa, the establishment of continental early warning systems for violent conflicts (e.g. the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, CEWARN), and initiatives for containing the uncontrolled proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons.

While the military dimension is currently the focus of African security architecture, underpinning the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) is an understanding – expanded by the concept of humanitarian security – that offers a key link for a civilian dimension, including traditional development cooperation. In this sense, policy approaches the concept and understanding of networked security, which explicitly allows for civilian as well as military components in the development of peace and security. In many cases of conflict, including those in Africa, there is not so much a traditional threat as an asymmetrical one from violent non-state actors, which causes traditional patterns of foreign and security policy to become overwhelmed. The close interaction of foreign, development and security policy concepts and tools – known as the three Ds: diplomacy, development and defence – should produce pacifying effects in the form of the concept of networked security and a policy which will pay dividends.

Germany's involvement – particularly via the EU – in supporting African security architecture needs to coordinate with the United States' Africa Command (AFRICOM) established in 2008. AFRICOM also aims to more closely mesh the US's development, foreign and security policies towards Africa. It can be concluded from their implementation problems – in the shape of a lack of acceptance by African states and regional organisations, and reproaches of militarising development cooperation – that the early involvement of African governments and regional organisations is essential, and that the integration of civilian and military aspects does not have to be dominated by security policy in order to increase acceptance among those involved on the ground.

9. INCREASE CHANCES OF SURVIVAL AND OPPORTUNITIES IN LIFE: PROMOTE RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL AUTONOMY, HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Every day, around 25,000 people die of starvation and malnourishment. More than half of these are children below the age of 5. Despite the decline in the proportion of the world's population who are starving, the absolute figure has not fallen due to population growth. Although available resources would be sufficient to feed the entire world population, more than 1 billion people are currently starving, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa. The situation is expected to worsen in the coming years. Famine and precarious food situations in Africa have many and complex reasons which are also connected by many interdependencies. Only rarely is famine caused purely by a natural disaster or by conflict; usually it is also due to structurally induced poverty as a result of low income and rising basic food prices. Poor political and economic frameworks that do not provide adequate resources for food security; unfair conditions in world agricultural trade; restricted access to productive resources such as land, seeds and fertilisers; deterioration of soil quality: these and other reasons lead to precarious food situations, which in turn have a negative impact on health.

Rural development should, therefore, be more strongly promoted in order to contribute to the security of food production and sustenance. To bring human rights to the highest attainable level of health, the impoverished in the population should be guaranteed access to suitable healthcare services and protection against the risks of illnesses. The HIV and AIDS pandemic and other illnesses also exacerbated by poverty pose serious humanitarian, social and economic prob-

lems. African health systems and the prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS and other diseases should, therefore, be enhanced. Indeed, multilateral initiatives and global funds lend themselves to these ends. The promotion of rural development also requires a shift in competencies on a regional (local) level according to the subsidiarity principle, as this would allow state activity not only to meet regional conditions, but also to be more decentralised and citizen-oriented. Improved local autonomy can deepen citizens' identification with state institutions and structures, and improve democratic structures and participation.

In addition, the expansion of the fields of basic and further education and training is of central importance, as a flourishing economy requires qualified, well-educated professionals. Functioning democracies require educated and informed citizens. Fair international partnerships should increase the transfer of knowledge and know-how. This could, for instance, be facilitated through improved cooperation with African universities, particularly in respect of training experts and elites. Through targeted scholarship programmes locally and in Germany, selected students should be offered the opportunity to purposefully develop their talents and qualifications. Cultural exchange should also be more intensive. Such exchanges contribute to a broader education, while foreign cultural policy contributes to international understanding. Together, they facilitate access to people and markets, and the identification and pursuit of common economic interests.

10. SAFEGUARD THE FUTURE: CONSERVE NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AND PROTECT BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATES

Climate change not only affects directly environmentally related subjects such as ecology and biodiversity, but also consequently threatens the preservation and protection of the natural foundations of all life on earth. The debates in the last decade about global warming and environmental protection have shown that climate change, as a key challenge of the 21st century, can only be overcome by the international community together. Climate change is also likely to have devastating effects in Africa in particular. African countries should, therefore, be further motivated to join the global effort as strategically important partners in the fight against global warming and for the protection of their biodiversity. Sensitive mining and the responsible handling of natural resources in Africa

are not just in the global interest but in the interests of Africa itself. The protection of Africa's immense biodiversity and the tropical rainforests that are vital to the climate (such as the world's largest rainforest in the Congo basin) as well as other globally important environmental initiatives should be supported further. African countries barely have the resources to overcome the consequences of climate change, and are highly dependent on swift external emergency aid after climate-induced disasters. There are hardly any financial resources available for preventative measures. If before there was often a lack of awareness of the necessity of investment here, today there is often an absence not only of the political will, but also of the financial and technical resources for measures to reduce and adapt to climate change.

International cooperation should, therefore, make the necessary financial resources available to assist in combating the causes of climate change and to mitigate its effects in Africa, on the one hand, and simultaneously, on the other, mainstream climate change issues when planning development programmes. 'Climate-sensitive' development processes should incorporate and more critically consider questions of location (flooding areas), precipitation (agriculture), and potential health consequences as overarching influencing factors in any development planning. Climate-neutral production of essential energy makes the development of renewable energies, particularly solar energy, a trendsetting investment in Africa. A holistic strategy in German foreign trade should, therefore, closely interweave the spheres of development and climate and, organisationally speaking, seamlessly combine development policy experiences and technical knowledge with regard to its policy on Africa. The fight against further global warming, the containment of desertification, efforts towards sustainable cross-border water management, and the conservation of natural resources are not only ecologically sound, they also have global repercussions. At the same time, more should be done to promote concrete steps being taken to protect the environment, to heighten awareness of the importance of conserving environmental resources in Africa, and to create the infrastructural requirements to do so (e.g. waste disposal facilities, water purification plants, air pollution mitigants).

The environmental topic of climate change also implicitly begs the fundamental question of, on the one hand, how the world should unite in raising awareness of the issue of climate change, and on the other, how to fairly distribute the concomitant duties and responsibilities among industrialised and developing countries. Climate change forces us to consider an important debate about ethics and justice, global partnerships, and intergenerational justice. Thus, Germany's 21st-century policy on Africa needs to be characterised by a convergence of global trends and a concurrence of topics on environmental protection and development.

EDITORIAL

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