




Strengthening the UNSC: Tapping into the German and South African Experience

Sponsored by:



Compiled by Bilkis Omar

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Table of Contents

Acronyms	4
Introduction.....	6
DAY ONE: 30 May	7
WELCOME & KEYNOTE ADDRESS.....	7
Dr Jakkie Cilliers	8
Ambassador Dieter Haller	9
Dr Otto Lampe	10
Discussion.....	12
SESSION 1: BUILDING CONSENSUS IN THE UNSC	13
Moderated by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk	13
Ambassador Leslie M Gumbi.....	13
Dr Otto Lampe	14
Mr Eduard Lintner	15
Discussion.....	16
SESSION 2: REGIONAL BODIES AND THE UNSC: THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION	19
Moderated by Dr Petrus de Kock	19
Jürgen Schröder	19
Ambassador Roeland van de Geer	20
Dr Timothy Murithi	21
Discussion.....	22
DAY 2: 31 May	25
SESSION 3: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES	25
CASE STUDY 1: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO &.....	25
CASE STUDY 2: SUDAN	25
Moderated by Dr Garth Le Pere & Dr Judy Smith-Höhn.....	25
Jean-Marie Gasana	26
Brigadier General JG Martins	27
Ambassador Albrecht Conze	28
Discussion.....	29
Dr Petrus de Kock.....	30
Ambassador Torben Brylle	31
Mr Peter Bior Alier.....	32
Discussion.....	33
CONCLUDING SESSION: A WAY FORWARD FOR GERMAN-AFRICAN COOPERATION?	35
Moderated by JP Landman	35
Mr Günter Nooke	35
Dr Adekeye Adebajo.....	36
Dr Jakkie Cilliers	37
Discussion.....	39
Conclusion	43

Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific states
APF	African Peace Facility
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSU	Christian Social Union
DEU	Germany
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
E10	Elected non-permanent members of the UNSC
EU	European Union
FADRC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G4	Germany, Japan, India and Brazil
G7	Group of 7 (Finance Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States and Canada)
G8	Group of 8 (Heads of States of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)
G20	Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Reserve Bank Governors

HSS/HSF	Hanns Seidel Stiftung/ Hanns Seidel Foundation
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JPA	Joint Parliamentary Assembly
KAS/ KAF	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung/ Konrad Adenauer Foundation
MONUC	United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PSC	Peace and Security Council of the African Union
P2	China, Russia
P3	USA, UK, France
P5	Permanent 5 (5 permanent members of the UNSC)
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
USA	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Introduction

Global security threats and political instability remain some of the most challenging concerns for many nations. Recent events in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen demonstrate the rapid pace with which conflicts spread, as well as the extent of insecurity. Swift action by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is demanded in such instances, and non-permanent members have a key role in maintaining international peace and security. In January 2011, South Africa once again became an elected non-permanent member of the UNSC. Germany was also elected as non-permanent member of the UNSC. These tenures will conclude at the end of December 2012.

The African continent has been challenged by various security issues impeding peace, stability and development and will in all probability remain on the UNSC agenda. Germany and South Africa have been at the forefront of pursuing regional stability. In these instances both countries have much at stake – South Africa in relation to national and regional interests, and Germany in terms of technical, financial and trade interests. Given the common pursuits, the two countries can capitalise on the existing working relationship by exploring ways to further their objectives. While differences in the positions held by Germany and South Africa may in all likelihood reign in many instances, it would be to the benefit of the two countries to work together in pursuit of goals that they do have in common.

The conference “Strengthening the UNSC: Tapping into the German and South African Experience” sought to examine the extent to which Germany and South Africa have common objectives and the extent to which a strong working partnership can be maintained and further developed. The specific aim of this conference held on the 30th and 31st May was to strengthen collaboration between the South African & German governments in relation to conflict prevention in Africa by:

- Aiming to contribute to the efficiency of the actions of the UNSC,
- Improving multilateral dialogue with other member states, and
- Advancing the discussion of potential reform of the UNSC

These objectives were to be realised by:

- Providing a platform for dialogue between South Africa and Germany
- By encouraging dialogue between the government’s and civil society organisations

The conference was attended by about 120 delegates, including diplomats from embassies and various Governments, academia and civil society, as well as the media.

DAY ONE: 30 May

WELCOME & KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Dr Jakkie Cilliers

Executive Director: Institute for Security Studies

Dr Cilliers opened the conference by thanking all the organisers, partners and sister foundations involved in the conference, such as the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), as well as the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Parliamentary Groups.

Dr Cilliers informed the audience that the emergence of multiple centres of power complicates international relations and demands greater leadership and more legitimacy from countries such as South Africa and Germany. The complexity of transaction speed places extreme demands on the UNSC, designed to deal with Capitalism and Communism, and the disproportionate influence of the UNSC Permanent 5 (P5) members weighs heavily on Council business. For decades there have been few fundamental changes in the operational logic of the Council. Secretive, back-door diplomacy means most agreements are struck between the five countries before being presented to others in the Council, a fact that continues to irk the non-permanent members and detracts from the legitimacy of the UNSC as a whole.

Dr Cilliers further stated that signs of global realignment are becoming increasingly evident, most especially in terms of the growing importance attached to the G20 compared to the G8, and the competition between these clubs and the UNSC. Whereas for 40 years the original G7 produced around two-thirds of the global output, by 2010 this has dropped to about 50 per cent. In contrast, the G20, largely as a result of its inclusion of countries such as China, India and Brazil, reflects roughly 88 percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and will continue to do so for until mid-century.

Dr Cilliers continued saying that non-traditional threats such as terrorism, illegal migration, health pandemics, cyber-attacks and climate change dominate headlines. The theory of 'threat convergence' used by other powers, implies that since everything is connected in the emerging world, criminals, terrorists and others are also linked. He was sceptical saying that some of these relationships remain unproven, questioning whether terrorists and organized criminals really have that much in common.

Dr Cilliers continued by stating that regional security arrangements have become key actors in conflict prevention, management and peace building, although the trend is highly differential. With substantial support from the European Union (EU), including Germany, Africa has invested heavily in the construction of a formal response and conflict management capacity. Central and North Africa, with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union in North Africa, present particular challenges according to Dr Cilliers. He further postulated that AU capacities for humanitarian interventions in non-permissive environments differ.

The economic and political integration of Europe has created a zone of peace. Attention has shifted to terrorism, illegal migration and organized crime. Dr

Cilliers compared Europe's future looks to that of Japan, where national political changes produce new leaders but with little transformational leadership, and where foreigners are treated with acute suspicion if they look and dress differently. He added that rich country politics are moving into a more conservative direction, European defence expenditure continues to decline, European views to immigration from its Muslim periphery (North Africa and Turkey) will have to change fundamentally if Europe's future is to look more like the United States of America (USA) than Japan. Yet for all of the challenges, the EU remains a powerful international actor in building capacity in Africa and Europe is particularly important for Africa.

Dr Cilliers went on to say that the Western monopoly of responses to global challenges is rapidly coming to an end and the debate on how to balance effectiveness and efficiency, with legitimacy, representivity, and inclusion is intensifying. For many in the developing world perceiving themselves as victims of Western intervention, issues of legitimacy are more important than efficiency or effectiveness. While developed countries focus their attention on the lack of democracy and good governance within countries, developing countries demand equality between countries and decry the lack of democracy in the management or relations between countries. Whereas Western analysis points, inevitably, to the need to prioritize effectiveness and efficiency, the voice from the developing world is one that calls for a more consensual and measured approach to external intervention that is informed by regional dynamics.

Dr Cilliers concluded by stating that there was much to discuss on the way forward for Germany and South Africa in relation to the UNSC.

Ambassador Dieter Haller

German Ambassador to South Africa

Ambassador Haller informed the audience that the idea for the conference came about after Germany was voted onto the UNSC in October 2010, but also because political dialogue between the various sectors was important in the area of regional and global security. The thrust of the Ambassador's speech was based on four main points.

The first main remark is global security governance and the Ambassador believes many old (nuclear and small arms proliferation, poverty divide, and conflict) and new (water scarcity, climate change) threats still exist and the negative repercussions of the threats affect all.

The second remark of the Ambassador is the existing weak regional and global governance structures which hamper development. The Ambassador cited the 2009 financial economic crisis as an example of weak structures and emphasised that an intrinsic relationship exists between security, economic and political stability. He also emphasised that German support in Africa was about the integration of national economies into regional and global markets, not dependency on aid.

The Ambassador's third remark dealt with African ownership, particularly South Africa's engagement in peace building and post conflict consolidation efforts within the continent, which enabled a tri-lateral cooperation between the countries. 100 million Euro were provided to promote crisis prevention and management, the rule of law, democratisation, police cooperation and security sector reform. Countries that benefitted include Southern Sudan (with the establishment of a criminal justice system), Ethiopia (strengthening the AU's strategic management capacity) and Ghana (Kofi Annan Peace Centre).

The fourth remark of the Ambassador centred on security as broad based and inclusive reflecting the wide range of old and new security threats. Other root causes of conflict, which must be addressed according to the Ambassador, include, the poverty divide and implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, and the cultural divide between the Western and Islamic world. Reforming the UN will serve to provide global security governance.

On Germany's abstention in voting for Resolution 1973, the Ambassador reassured that Germany's stance is one of security, peace and development, and not ambivalence and nationalist calculation as suggested by journalists.

Dr Otto Lampe

Deputy Director General UN Affairs, German Foreign Office

Dr Lampe provided an outline of his speech, which included UN reform, UN peacekeeping and peace building, the relationship between the AU and the UNSC, and the relationship between the EU and the UNSC.

Dr Lampe stated that the world is facing many global challenges such as food security, transnational drug trafficking, mass migration, and religious radicalisation. Nations are unable to face the challenges alone and global cooperation is necessary. The UN plays a large role in this context and requires reforming to live up to being the only legitimate actor on the international stage. UN reform has been discussed on many fora, and is a continuous process. The UN is only as good as the member states allow it to be and reform must start with three questions: what was the purpose of creating the UN, do the conditions under which it was created still apply today, and does it still achieve its purpose effectively? If the conditions do not apply then reform is required and fine-tuning is needed.

According to Dr Lampe, in the development field, the new concept of delivering as one agency has improved, as experienced in Sierra Leone. It requires strong political will and the cooperation of Member States. Reform of the UN gender Architecture is also important and the creation of UN Women, supported by Germany and South Africa, has proved to be very successful. Other similar initiatives such as UN climate change is also supported by Germany.

According to Dr Lampe, UN peacekeeping missions have turned into complex operations, sometimes even taking over governing functions of the states involved. Peacekeeping missions have grown in size and deal with civilian dimensions such as human rights and rule of law. Dr Lampe contends that the exercises are expensive, in relation to training, resources, and management, with two thirds of the global budget spent on peacekeeping. Germany attaches great importance to civilian protection in peacekeeping missions and ensures effective training of their officers. The problems in Sudan, Congo, Ivory Coast and Rwanda have provided a better understanding of the problems, and operations now have strategies, best practice models, equipment and capacity to fulfil the robust mandates. According to Dr Lampe, future peacekeeping missions trends may change and will be best used by securing sustainable and long-term engagement by the UN as well as other regional and international methods beyond the life of a peacekeeping mission.

On the relationship between the UN and the AU, Dr Lampe states that the AU has shown a commitment to assuming responsibility to peacekeeping and operational responsibility of the continent, particularly to Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast and other countries in the region. The AU may not be able to solve conflict on its own but its cooperation is necessary for resolution. AU cooperation with the UN is enshrined in the UN Charter and a unique level of cooperation has been achieved between the UNSC and the AU PSC. Germany will continue to promote the AU in the UNSC, provide continued support to AU peacekeeping missions and the development of the AU through funding.

Dr Lampe continued that as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Germany's agenda is governed by the crises in the world. Germany has been commissioned to run the dossier on Afghanistan, focus on Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions, and examine issues of children in armed conflict and climate and security.

With regard to the relationship of the UN with the EU, Dr Lampe contends that the EU model of struggling nations peacefully living together is something to be proud of. The EU assumes itself as a growing actor on the international stage, believes in a multilateral rule and works with the UN on major crises such as the Middle East Peace Process and piracy.

The UN organisation is vitally important to the EU as it provides legitimacy in peace and security issues and is a universally accepted forum. It is in dire need of reform according to Dr Lampe and if not done soon, other competing elements of international governments will emerge and take over. According to Dr Lampe, the global South needs to be on board of the UNSC to provide a balance. As it stands Africa makes up one quarter of the Member States of the General Assembly and occupies 80% of the UNSC agenda. Instead, Africa does not have a permanent seat on the UNSC. Germany and the G4 have proposed that Africa should receive two permanent and one non-permanent seat. Similarly, Germany as one of the world's largest economies also requires a permanent seat on the UNSC. Dr Lampe promised that flexibility would be the order of the day if represented on the UNSC Reform Council. He also believes that African States should not be hindered in the representation on the UNSC by the restricted position of the Ezulwini Consensus.

Dr Lampe concluded his address by stating that Germany (and South Africa) supports the effective multilateral system with the UN at the core, and that if the UN did not exist, it would have to be invented, as global cooperation is the only valid answer for the global challenge.

Discussion

Questions

- Should South Africa join forces with BRIC and abandon the G4?
- Given the importance of South Africa and Germany and their impact on regions, are they at all reliable countries in the international arena?

Answers

- On South Africa abandoning cooperation with G4, there is no direct linkage as South Africa is not part of the G4 and has been well advised not to be part of the G4. While South Africa is a natural candidate for the UNSC, other African countries may have different views. China and the Coffee Club in New York are also against it, but the G4 has good friends, and it takes much conviction, power and patience to go through. Africa can prepare the ground and look for interim solutions. The Indians are not happy with the Intermediate Model as they want a 'stock & barrel' involvement.
- Germany is involved with 7000 soldiers in the UN. The recent history and military involvement in military exercise was not a priority, there was passivity in this regard. They are currently in Afghanistan and are considering leaving. Regarding the intervention in Iraq they made a decision to stay away, which caused a controversy in the EU. In the Libyan crisis, Germany abstained in the vote. So yes there is a controversy going on but Germany decided not to be in the way.

SESSION 1: BUILDING CONSENSUS IN THE UNSC

Moderated by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

Ambassador Leslie M Gumbi

Chief Director United Nations, South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation

Ambassador Gumbi began by stating that consensus in the UNSC has wide implications for maintaining international peace and security which the international community has to constantly address, taking into account the changing nature of threats. He went on to say that this has a direct influence on the manner in which the UNSC conducts its business. It is about national interests and priorities, which continue to influence positions of members on items on the agenda of the UNSC. These interests tend to make members work towards the least common denominator instead of what could constitute the optimal way of dealing with things.

Group solidarity also has a bearing on the kind of work that is done in the UNSC, which according to Ambassador Gumbi has an adverse effect on the voting patterns of the 10 elected non-permanent members, who face ostracism in the event that they support the P3. The composition of the UNSC plays a role in determining the level of co-operation amongst UNSC members, and this is instrumental to consensus in the Council. The management of unequal power is fundamental to the management of working relations amongst council members. If this is not well and carefully managed, there is a breakdown and there can never be a coherent and collegial working environment.

The principles underpinning the foreign policy of an Elected 10 member (E10), gives an indication of its likely conduct once in the Council; how it would vote and what would be its likely degree of co-operation with other council members. These factors are necessary building blocks for consensus in the UNSC.

In the case of South Africa, the Ambassador said the following should be taken into account in terms of underpinning the principles of South Africa's foreign policy: commitment to human rights, promotion of democracy, justice and international law, international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms and the resolution of conflicts, the African agenda, economic development, and issues associated with strengthening in general good working relations across the north and south divide. These principles as well as South Africa's national priorities are an integral part of the foreign policy objectives to promote and protect through the UNSC membership.

The Ambassador also provided strategic objectives that continue to inform the approach on UNSC activities, which include, an enhanced African agenda and sustainable development, strengthened political and economic integration of SADC, strengthened South-South relations, strengthened relations with strategic formations of the North, effective and efficient participation in global governance

and strengthening political and economic relations. He summarised saying that South Africa lends it support to UNSC consensus in accordance with its national priorities, its guiding principles in the conduct of international relations, as well as its strategic objectives. Unequal power and dominance of the P5 in the UNSC, as well as geopolitical and economic interests and UNSC working methods, are pivotal for consensus in the UNSC. Ambassador Gumbi however stated that the lack of well-defined criteria on when a situation is a serious threat is an impediment to the consensus in the UNSC.

Ambassador Gumbi added that after being elected to the UNSC in 2010 it was imperative for South Africa to provide commitment to availing political will and work as a collective. South Africa consulted with the P5 and the E10 members on its future conduct at the UNSC. There was mutual recognition of the areas of divergence and convergence of views and tacit agreement to actively promote cooperation in the realization of the mandate of the UNSC.

On the general framework underpinning South Africa's UNSC membership, much is envisaged by South Africa in partnership with the other members. As a bridge builder, South Africa has been active on issues of disarmament, non – proliferation and arms control. In the 2007/2008 tenure at the UNSC, the Ambassador emphasised that South Africa's bridge building role in enhancing peace and security was noted in various ways. He added that South Africa will continue to do so in the new tenure.

Ambassador Gumbi concluded by stating the actions of the UNSC in Ivory Coast and Libya and its inactions on similar situations elsewhere demonstrate the degree of consensus or absence in the Council. He also stated that there were differences between talking outside of and within the Council, and that media reports often distorted actual occurrences. He also added that the UN reform would not only level the playing field but could also help in preventing selective implementation of Security Council resolutions. Ambassador Gumbi thanked civil society for convening the workshop, which he said served as a demonstration of its willingness to play a role in contributing to the strengthening of the United Nations.

Dr Otto Lampe

Deputy Director General UN Affairs, German Foreign office

Dr Lampe stated that the UNSC as it stands has a strong composition, which includes BRICS, IBSA, the G4, and four EU countries. He however lamented that the agendas of the groups don't necessarily coincide with every aspect of the UNSCs work.

Dr Lampe emphasised that transparency and credibility, as well as consultations on divisive issues to establish a common ground are key to UN work. Understanding and consensus building could achieve this, and the example of the establishment of the E10 proved the usefulness of such a forum in consensus building. Dr Lampe also expressed a need for stakeholders, such as financial and

troop contributors, as well as neighbouring countries, to make their voices heard.

Dr Lampe continued, saying that there cannot be a single mechanism to make up for the diverse channels of discussion. A participatory, coordinated approach is required from non-permanent members, and he cites the example of the coordinated approach used by the P5 and E10 members in UNSC Resolution 1540. In this case, while all members agreed on the general objective of a renewal of the resolution to ensure continued commitment of the UN to fight against the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, issues such as the duration of the mandate and the nexus between disarmament and non-proliferation, were contested. The process that ensued, with negotiations, consensus brokering, informal coalitions, inclusive and participatory dialogue, highlighted that the process is as important as the outcome. The process was further helped by a short deadline, which pushed the countries to reach consensus promptly.

The other example cited by Dr Lampe was that of Ivory Coast in which the positions of African sub-regional organisations such as the AU and ECOWAS were elicited and employed. This demonstrated how strategic dialogue of UNSC and African regional organisations could help reach consensus on a particular position.

Mr Eduard Lintner

Former Member of German Parliament

Mr Lintner discussed procedures and problems connected with membership in the UNSC. His talk was specifically focused on German politics connected with decisions of the UNSC to deploy soldiers in particular places in the world. In this regard Germany has particular rules; the requirement of parliamentary approval or a majority vote in the German parliament.

Federal government has to table a motion for approval for deployment of armed forces. This results in a controversial debate in Parliament, and debate is further encouraged amongst citizens. This type of debate is unique to Germany; as in many countries government leaders make decisions of deployment. The advantage of the German approach, according to Mr Lintner, is that politicians and the public are informed of the pros and cons, and if approved, the government has a parliamentary mandate to send armed forces. Furthermore, soldiers participating in missions are certain of strong support in parliament.

Mr Lintner cited the example of the MONUC mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In this instance, parliamentary approval was sought and the proposal to deploy 780 soldiers won a majority in the Bundestag: 440 for, 135 against and 6 abstentions.

In the case of Resolution 1973, Mr Lintner states that the German government did not do well on consultations with NATO, the EU and allied governments on the decision to abstain.

Discussion

Questions

- Can you explain how South Africa came to vote in favour of Resolution 1973 on Libya, and if there are any second thoughts about the vote?
- To what extent does South Africa consult with the AU on issues?
- What does Germany think of the Western double standards in multilateral institutions?
- What is the position of the countries with regard to the veto right?
- What is South Africa's role regarding leadership as a bridge building at the UNSC?
- What additional role should civil society be playing at the UN?
- What was the South African governments role in relation to the Western Sahara issue and how serious does the UN consider the issue of human rights in relation to Western Sahara?
- What is the position of China and Russia on the UNSC in relation to Syria?
- What is the South African governments position in the implementation of human rights principles?

Answers

- On the Libya issue, a wide process of consultation within government in its entirety was undertaken. Any decision taken within government is passed through the International Cooperation Trade and Security Cluster for debate and recommendation. The UNSC Team, which consists of civil servants, and officials outside of government, such as the former deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, are also consulted and debate the process. Internally, the DIRCO UN Desk and the Africa Multilateral Team also discuss issues before a final decision is made. Regarding the Libya issue, the AU and the League of Arab States were also consulted. All the information and decisions are then forwarded to the principals at DIRCO. The next process is consultation with the Presidency. In relation to the Libyan crisis, thorough consultation was done before a decision was taken.

Civil society was not consulted as a decision had to be made swiftly and time was of the essence. Since the Libyan crisis DIRCO has developed a list of issues, which may hit the radar screen of the UNSC and will consult with civil society on the issues.

On the 'second thoughts' issue, everyone on the UNSC is having second thoughts. Members were taken aback by the manner in which Resolution 1973 was not implemented in accordance with the letter and spirit. If a

similar resolution were to come again, UNSC members will seriously ponder over this and it is logical to draw lessons from the Libya crisis. If ever suspicious actions are to take place over proposals in the future, then there will be an inactive and inefficient UNSC. All members are representing in good faith assuming things will be done in good faith. To make mistakes is a human trait and the UNSC P5 erred in the implementation of the resolution and a division from that good faith did arise. By the same token the UNSC cannot be hamstrung by doubts on its ability to act in good faith.

- On the AU endorsement of South Africa, South Africa is pursuing the African agenda in consultation with the AU and the African Group in New York, and South Africa is where they are because of the AU support. South Africa needs the AU vote, now and in the future in all matters. Recently there was a UNSC visit to Addis Ababa, to see what can be done to reinforce matters of the UNSC mandate. Consultation is ongoing. However, these times are not as rapid as developments are in the UNSC. But through the office of the AU in New York, prompt meetings of the African Group to consult on all issues before the UNSC. All views are taken into account.
- There may be double standards but there is no monopoly of double standards just in the Western world. It would do good to rather think of them as diverging degrees on leverage to certain issues. Germany supported the Western Sahara - no double standards prevailed there.
- Speaker 1: The veto system does render the UN system inoperative and paralysed and weighs on decision-making, but the UN has been extremely successful in the past, specifically on issues dealing with Sierra Leone, Cyprus, Afghanistan and Sudan in relation of peacekeeping. Veto system was in its peak during the Cold War. Veto may be deplorable but the UN has been moving forward.

Speaker 2: Reform of the UNSC particularly adding permanent members to the UNSC is crucial. But it is not necessary to cancel the veto right.

- On leadership in the UNSC, when South Africa got into the UNSC, they went in knowing they would act as a collective in accordance with the collective system on which the UN is founded. South Africa will respect this and not play a leadership role. It will depend on issues. France plays a lead role in some issues. South Africa will take collective responsibility on issues, even on UNSC reform. South Africa has called the AU on re-assessing the common African position contained in the Ezulwini Consensus. France, China and the UK have stated that UNSC reform must be done as soon as possible. South Africa therefore has to consult and decide on its position.
- In the last 10 years the UN has witnessed the increasing consultative participation of civil society in the UN process. But there is a red line and this exists in the decision-making, and States ultimately decide on a particular position.

- On Western Sahara, in as much as the media downplayed the matter, South Africa played an active role on this matter and achieved success with the international community. The issue cannot be discussed with a select few. Western Sahara is considered in the earnest in the UNSC. South Africa fought decisions on Western Sahara brought before the UNSC. South Africa has been successful in ensuring that the human element is integrated in the mandate of UN presence in Western Sahara. The matter of human rights cannot be avoided and this will be concretised in the future. There is a need for civil society backing in this matter as the intergovernmental process has run its course.
- On Syria, differences exist in the UNSC, particularly between the P2 (China & Russia) and P3 (UK, USA, France). Without speaking for Russia and China, if the huge Russian military and economic interest vested in Syria can be returned and Russia can receive guarantees on the money invested, Russia will rescind its veto on any action. China has also socio-economic interests and is very vocal on issues on sovereignty, therefore the reasons for its statements on veto. A draft resolution is on the table and it remains to be seen what will happen if China and Russia veto.
- In analysing human rights both within and out of government, no country in the entire world can say that they promote and respect the entire gamut of international instruments. In the North, on issues of women's rights, human rights, and vulnerable groups the picture does not look well. In the South, it is issues of the girl-child and vulnerable people. In Europe there is lots of lip service but in reality there are many disparities. Human rights are not implemented to the letter anywhere. It is important to declare certain binding principles to ensure they constitute a framework to keep a check on morale. Human rights constitute a serious test to all in the international community. All have to endeavour to fulfil the human rights principles.

SESSION 2: REGIONAL BODIES AND THE UNSC: THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Moderated by Dr Petrus de Kock

Jürgen Schröder

Former German member of European Parliament

Mr Schröder stated that European questions interpreted in a narrower sense refer to European conflict situation. Since there are no longer any serious conflicts in the EU, a definition of Europe is required as there is difference in the way the EU defines itself geographically. Similarly for the AU.

According to Mr Schröder, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy aims to deepen the relations between the AU and the EU by addressing global challenges together and enhance the capacity of both bodies to respond timely and adequately to security threats. The strategy goes beyond development cooperation by opening up the dialogue between the two regional bodies to issues of joint political concern and interest. Mr Schröder continued by saying the European Parliament (EP) should become a full-scale legislator in foreign and security policies to ensure greater homogeneity of EU engagement. The EP set up a permanent inter-parliamentary delegation with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), with both delegations meeting regularly. A pre-summit in Lisbon, demonstrated the indispensability of parliamentary action in EU-AU cooperation.

Another body to be mentioned, is the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) and EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA). The bodies undertake election observation and other missions together and are a platform for fresh approaches. The fact that the EP and the PAP are in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Joint Strategy may contribute to answer the question of who takes the lead in the AU's and EU's engagement on conflict situations. It is the combined legislative power of the two regional bodies that can lay claim to leadership.

On the issue of ensuring coherence of effort and political agreement on global security issues, Mr Schröder maintains decisions must be transferred from the UNSC to the UN General Assembly, as is stipulated in Resolution 377. The UK-France Summit Declaration of 2008 states that "UNSC reform requires a political commitment from the member states at the highest level", and according to Mr Schröder, the highest level could be interpreted as the representatives of more than 190 UN member states. In this way, strong regional powers such as South Africa and Germany, might best contribute to the cause in question: coherence of effort and political agreement in the world's most serious issues.

To sum up Mr Schröder averred that on conflict situations that require solving, the North-South-dichotomy is fading away. Gradual improvements of the overall

situation in Africa will make the countries prosperous and lessen the occurrence of ethnicity-based conflicts. Making democracy a priority of good governance may solve such conflicts, as the vote of the elected representatives of a country cannot be ignored. The vote of the representatives of all the countries, united in the UN General Assembly, should be the last word in global issues of peace and security according to Mr Scroder. It is within that framework that powers such as South Africa and Germany can play a highly constructive role.

Ambassador Roeland van de Geer

Ambassador of the Delegation of the European Commission

Ambassador van de Geer discussed the EU regional body dealings with the Security Council, as well as the collaboration between the EU and the AU.

The Ambassador stated that the 27 Member States of the EU were also Member States of the UN. If the UN is criticised, the EU is censured as well. The EU Treaty, which established the European Union, envisages a well-coordinated EU position in international organisations, in the UN and the UNSC. The Ambassador raised the question of whether theory was the same as actual practice.

Consultations of member states take place at the UN on a weekly basis and are shared with the capital cities and Brussels providing a solid basis for ongoing discussions. There is a clear tendency to strengthen the position of the EU within the UNSC but at the same time avoid Member States feeling prejudiced in their actions. In reality there are instances when EU member states differ on certain positions, as was the case on UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya where Germany abstained, and France and the UK voted in favour of the Resolution.

According to the Ambassador, if South Africa is offered a permanent seat on the UNSC, he is certain that it would not refuse the seat. As the EU is not on the UNSC, coordination with South Africa is not a priority. However, Member States on the UNSC do coordinate with South Africa as the country is highly valued by the EU. Cooperation between the countries has been strengthened in many ways. South Africa is also an important member of the AU as well. In relation to the AU and the EU, Ambassador van de Geer states the two organisations maintain a very close working relationship, which is formalised in a strategic partnership, including a broad range of consultations. To facilitate this cooperation the EU has a permanent representative to the AU. While the cooperation is broad and diverse, peace and security subjects are particularly central to the relationship. Thus, the EU and AU frequently discuss issues on the UNSC agenda.

The Ambassador concluded his talk by stating that the EU is strongly committed to a strong UN and a strong UNSC, and to the promotion of peace and security through multi-lateral cooperation. This aspect is advancing slowly but steadily, moving towards presenting a unified EU position in the UNSC. Furthermore, the AU and the EU maintain close relationships, and the EU is also committed to reinforcing the capacity of the international community in the field of peace and security. They are also determined to proceed internally as well as continue

external cooperation with the international community and the AU. The Ambassador ended off saying there was much more to be achieved and many challenges to be overcome, and the EU remains committed to progress in the framework of the Security Council.

Dr Timothy Murithi

Head: Transitional Justice in Africa Programme: Institute for Justice & Reconciliation

Dr Murithi focused on the relationship between the AU and the UN on peace and security issues in Africa. Specific reference was made to the ongoing joint meetings between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UNSC.

Dr Murithi contends that since its inception the UN has had a relationship with Africa, which has vacillated between paternalism and partnership. African countries were preached to rather than consulted as equals, and issues, which would have been in the interests of African countries were not necessarily emphasised. African voices were not sufficiently heard in the formulation of peace, justice, security and in the development of policies. The paternalistic relationship can best be characterized as a top-down unidirectional relationship.

According to Dr Murithi, currently, more than 60% of issues discussed by the UNSC are focused in Africa, which suggests that it is vital to establish a genuine partnership based on equal respect, reciprocity and dialogue. On issues, with strong national interests, African countries have not always maintained a united position in negotiations and voting, generally adopting positions that best serve their interests. Occasionally, the Africa Group is able to secure a unified stance on issues, for example, in 2005; when the AU issued a declaration on the proposed reform of the UN - the Ezulwini Consensus.

Dr Murithi continued saying that Africa is attempting to forge an identity as a collective entity capable of functioning as an equal partner in the international sphere. In 2002, the AU launched the Peace and Security Council and the African Peace and Security Architecture. AU sceptics however argue that the AU has not demonstrated an ability to deliver and so it is not necessary to pay too much attention to it or treat it seriously.

Dr Murithi then raised the issue of the Libyan conflict stating that African countries were caught flat-footed by the UNSC. They could not dissent with the referral to the ICC because they could not propose an alternative way of dealing with Gaddafi. The only other UN Security Council referral, of President Al-Bashir has met with controversy and yielded few results. As a result of this referral the AU is in the middle of a stand off with the ICC and has decreased its cooperation with the Court. The fact that African countries on the UNSC overlooked this current AU-ICC stand off to support the resolution for a referral and sanctions, is telling.

Dr Murithi maintained that tactically, whether intentionally or not, the framers of the UN Security Council Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on Libya as a

result of the violence, caught the AU procrastinating about what to do in Libya and gradually painted it into a corner. If it was willing to accept the ICC indictment of Gaddafi why was it so reluctant to accept one for Bashir? This exposed the duplicity of the AU. It also exposed the absence of a coherent continental transitional justice policy as the ICC is supposed to be a court of last resort.

Resolution 1973 on Libya was adopted by a vote of 10 in favour, to none against, with five abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation. The three African countries on the UNSC, South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon voted in favour of the decision. South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon have since scrambled to retract their original support for the Resolution. Tactically and strategically the UN has out-played the AU on issues of international transitional justice in its own backyard.

Dr Murithi then turned his focus to the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), engaged in extensive mediation efforts in Côte d'Ivoire, and who ultimately failed to secure a resolution. The lack of activism is the continuing marginalization of Africa's interest at the UN. The AU needs to get ahead of events and become more proactive in implementing peace, justice and security policy in Africa. The AU Commission also requires its Permanent Observer Mission to the UN to be professionally staffed, so that it can provide leadership and adopt a more activist stance with regard to advocating for issues that concern Africa. The AU and the Africa Group need to develop a coherent strategy to influence, support and ensure the effective functioning of peace, justice and security policy at the UN.

Dr Murithi concluded by discussing the AU/UN relationship stating that the AU should guard against allowing the UN's historical paternalism to re-manifest under a new guise, with UN brawn being used to direct African bodies on the ground.

Discussion

Questions

- On the AU/EU relations, how should the process proceed?
- The Europeans are undermining the AU in relation to the Libyan crisis. The AU also leaves a lot to be desired. What is the position where the AU comprises of countries where democracy is a problem?
- There cannot be a sustainable partnership on an equal footing until houses have been cleaned up. What is the view on the way forward for African leaders to improve themselves so that they can present a joint force for sustainable partnership within the UN?
- What can be done to promote gender issues in the UN?

- Very few countries on the continent are showing signs of democracy. How can Africans cause the suffering of its people? Should the first line of action be the people?
- What motivated South Africa to vote for Resolution 1973? Do the African countries have a clear mandate from the AU to vote in favour of the resolution? What does this say about the AU in the UNSC in relation to future votes?
- In relation to Resolution 1973, does the AU not have to be informed at the beginning, instead of looking at the relation of the AU with the EU and the UN?
- Comment: Ambassador Gumbi mentioned that South Africa was caught unaware in relation to Libya and this is becoming the theme of the conference. He meant the department was caught unaware with the speed of the crisis and was unable to consult with civil society. They did what they had to do to get consensus.

Answers

- On the relationship of the AU with the EU, the reading is much more optimistic. The democracy race is not run in Africa. On the Great Lakes, much is to be said about the quality of the democracies. However, the development of democracy has improved considerably as compared to in 1978.
- On the AU, despite the criticism, it has a much stronger structure than the OAU and is developing at a reasonable pace. The AU was absent in the Great Lakes. The EU would like to increase its support to the AU, particularly on capacity building. The AU feels it is not ready for that and it feels difficulty in formulating a request for technical assistance. Gaddafi's important position in the AU has also caused much unhappiness in the EU and that has negatively affected the relations between the EU and the AU. The current wave of revolutions in Africa has also been a wake up call for the EU. The EU is committed to a cooperative relation with the AU.
- The AU leaves a lot to be desired, therefore the historical origins of the AU need to be understood, particularly the OAU and the link to Pan-Africanism. The AU and OAU were designed to be inclusive rather than exclusive, but at a cost. Some dictators are members of the AU and reluctant to relinquish their positions. But gains have been made as well in countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and in Botswana. The AU is not the only organisation that has dictators in it. The UN itself has a few dubious dictators. The best strategy is to work for the transformation of countries within these intergovernmental organisations.
- Speaker 1: Yes, Africa has to clean up its own house before it can complain about the activities of its neighbours to the north and the west. It is incumbent upon the African countries to commit to the principles, which they have signed up to. In principle the rule of law and democracy should be entrenching itself but that's not really the case. We cannot have a

sustainable partnership on an equal footing until we have really cleaned up our houses. The only way to predict the future is to shape it and that is what the AU is trying to do – mould the continent to put it in shape. It's early days and the AU is only a 10-year old organisation.

Speaker 2: Real life is more complex than that. It is not possible to clean house first before engaging with others on an equal footing. There are differences as far as building of democracies is concerned. Very often the north-south dichotomy is fading away, there may be improvements on the African continent whereas on the open continent called Eurasia, there are still problems to come. The differences between Africa and the ever-large EU will decrease and much progress has been made.

- On gender equality, in Rwanda the percentage of women in Parliament is the highest in the world. This proves that Africa is better than Europe on the issue of gender equality.
- It would seem that the AU is not doing anything to alleviate the suffering of its people. The AU like the UN is not just a body sitting in Addis Ababa. It is the Commission of the AU, it is the 53 member states of the AU as well as the governments of the AU, and it is also the people of Africa. So the AU has failed in certain cases, but has stepped in some instances and have created marginal impact and prevented situations from getting worse, for example in the case of Kenya and the mediating panel. The AU is a work in progress.
- On South Africa's motivation to vote in favour of resolution 1973. The maths required the African and Arab countries to vote to get the 10, and even if five abstained, and one of the African or Arab countries dissented, the mark would have been missed. There was clearly much work done behind the scenes. It may have been diplomatic coercion as it often happens or a moral argument that nothing was being done and Gaddafi was approaching Benghazi to do untold atrocities. The case of Rwanda in 1994 where nothing was done to prevent the genocide, could have resulted in leaders lamenting that nothing was done in Libya to prevent further atrocities. The South African representative to the UN made a statement that the situation in Libya was fast becoming a civil war and that by adopting the current text the Council had acted responsibly to the Libyan people. This no certainty that the AU deliberated on the content of the Resolution, thus they were not in the position to prevent what was ultimately agreed upon. Much confusion has ensued on the Libyan issue and the recent Heads of States meeting in Addis Ababa said they never expected the problem to go so far.
- We live in an interdependent world and it is not possible for one part of the world to continue with its own affairs and to live independently and autonomously. For this reasons the UN exists, and if one did not exist it would have to be created, as a forum is required to get the governments of the world communicating. Globalisation has necessitated this approach to partnerships.

DAY 2: 31 May

SESSION 3: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 1: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO &

CASE STUDY 2: SUDAN

Moderated by Dr Garth Le Pere & Dr Judy Smith-Höhn

Jean-Marie Gasana

Associate Researcher: Institute for Security Studies

Mr Gasana began by maintaining that political dialogue approach should be used as a way of addressing conflict issues in the DRC and Burundi, and not aggressive methods. After almost 10 years of peace processes, negotiations and implementations of various political and security accords, Mr Gasana maintains that peace has still not been attained, yet the international community has pulled out of the DRC. Though a legitimate government is ruling, five years down the road nothing has been addressed.

Politically, the ruling presidential party is in control of everything and is destabilising the opposition. Transformation is no longer on the agenda for the DRC. Five months before the election the situation is still the same under the guise of an election, local dynamics have not been addressed, and unrest is still going on. Issues of foreign militias, relations with neighbours etc have also not been addressed.

Mr Gasana continued saying that the DRC is a large country, and the situation in Kinshasa cannot affect Kivu, but Kivu can affect the country. The two major wars in 1996 and 1998 started in the eastern provinces and ended in Kinshasa. At meetings held in Lusaka, concerns were raised on ways to attain peace, to withdraw foreign troops, and to work towards a functioning institution. As it stands, national, regional and local issues in the DRC have not been addressed. In Kivu, active militia are still operating, and the Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) is still present, in addition to other foreign militias.

According to Mr Gasana, the international community were involved in the Congo from the beginning, but have not been active on the ground when their active involvement is urgently required. Additionally, the Congolese expectations have to be tempered as they were told that democracy would bring dividends. The loss of credibility of the political leadership at all levels is also noteworthy.

Regional dynamics are evolving in various ways. Kigali and Kinshasa have managed to initiate joint military solutions instead of political solutions. The Congolese and Rwandan armies are attempting to address the issues of foreign militias in North and South Kivu. The Burundian army is in the South Kivu. New militias groups in Congo have been protecting their people from the Congolese army activity, which is affecting the lives with looting and rapes. A legitimate government is organising elections, which are being contested, but being supported by the international community.

In conclusion Mr Gasana said that while in the early stages, the issue of African solutions to African issues has not been addressed, currently observers are indicating that such an approach is still premature to deliver durable results.

Brigadier General JG Martins

Director: Pax-Africa

Brigadier Martins discussion centred on South Africa's engagement in the DRC. In the past 10 years, South Africa had dispatched at least 15 governments departments to the DRC, including for the recent election, costing approximately R200-250 million. The support was a logical follow-up from South Africa's efforts at negotiation and mediating the resolution to the conflict in the DRC. The Brigadier also acknowledged the contributions of other partner countries particularly, Tanzania, Zambia, USA, France, Belgium, the UK, Germany, Netherlands and China.

South Africa is currently reviewing its engagement with the DRC with a bi-national commission to be held in mid-June 2011, which will evaluate the efficiency and impact of South Africa's engagement in the DRC. As it stands, the engagement is uneven, and South Africa's performance has been average as well as fairly good, particularly since South Africa itself is a 3rd world country. South Africa's efforts in the security sector have been good in relation to training, and senior officials of the DRC want South Africa's continued support in professionalising their defence force.

The Brigadier raised challenges in relation to South Africa's engagement in the DRC stating that the engagement coupled with those of the development partners is not coordinated. He blames this on donor's unwillingness to coordinate, to rationalise resources and to share practices. The other challenge is that the DRC government itself is uneven in terms of institutional development in government ministries. For example, while South Africa has been engaged with the Chief of Staff of the FARDC on security sector reform, another security sector reform process from the Defence Ministers office has been happening. Donor countries also want to narrow down and prioritise the types of engagement the South African government should provide to the DRC. Each countries national interest must be considered, and if engagement is to be meaningful, then this must be measurable and effective. The Brigadier iterated that for this reason the results of the bi-national conference are important.

The Brigadier also addressed the issue of UN multilateral efforts in the DRC. Until recently, he had disagreed with President Kabila that the UN leave the DRC. He now thinks that the UN *should* leave the DRC. The brigadier stated that there was a case to be made in so far as the perceived threat of the north and south Kivus is concerned, as the extreme genocide element is not as significant a threat as it used to be. Based on a study conducted, the FDLR force numbers constitute approximately 50 to 100 individuals that have blood on their hands. They are scattered, live in remote areas, their means of survival is extortion, and they are severely compromised in terms of re-supply of ammunition and communication. More importantly the various UN, FARDC and Rwanda incursions have weakened them. From a military perspective, the Brigadier states that only one or two recently trained battalion could effectively deal with them.

The recent headlines on rape reported in the media have been isolated incidents of violence in Eastern DRC, and the Brigadier iterated that the FDLR is not as formidable as they used to be. He maintains that neighbouring states use the weakened FDLR as a scapegoat for their continued engagement in the eastern DRC. He further maintains that the FDLR in eastern DRC, as well as the Mai-Mai forces, exploit the resources, sell it to the FARDC people, who then bring it to Goma and Bukavu. The resources are transported to Rwanda and Uganda (an insignificant amount to Kinshasa). The Brigadier stated that neighbouring states want to pretend that the FDLR is formidable for their purposes.

Ambassador Albrecht Conze

German Ambassador to Zimbabwe

The focus of Ambassador Conze's speech consisted of reasons why the DRC slid into a series of protracted wars as of 1997, the response of MONUC and the international community in the DRC, and lessons that can be learned from MONUC's achievements and shortcomings.

Ambassador Conze began with a history of the DRC, suggesting it was complicated and the country too large in size, as a result difficult to administer. Factors such as the failure of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime, proxy business, and the genocide in Rwanda, had created a void in the DRC. Leaders in power after Sese Seko's decline used the void to control the riches of the area. The interests of Uganda, Rwanda and some old opposition die-hards such as Kabila, eventually ended in a war and thus began Kabila's reign of power, with four vice-presidents alongside. Politically the country's ethnic divisions, and questions of rules of democracy, majorities and minorities remain.

The conflict that followed received much media attention and international intervention was growing. The UNSC were keen on showing their teeth and MONUC, having started in 2001 as a military observer mission, was mandated as the DRC peacekeeping mission. MONUC was allowed to use force to protect civilians but proved to be weak. The mission was the largest and most expensive in the history of the UN. 40% of the one billion dollar budget was used to fly Ministers all over the DRC, making MONUC the substitute public service engaging in a way that went beyond pure peacekeeping. Logistics is an important component for peacekeeping according to Ambassador Conze.

The UN was required to disengage from the DRC but, as a structure had been created, the concern was that leaving would create a void. MONUC managed to keep the peace but the genocide at Ituri occurred thereafter, which resulted in further intervention, from the EU. The French foreign legion provided assistance resulting in the first cooperation of the Blue Helmets and EU. Though successful, it could not be repeated. The French intervention was reassessed and it was decided that peacekeeping through UN intervention was more cost effective than peacekeeping through US intervention, resulting in the US government warming up to idea of peacekeeping. MONUC had successes but many problems with rules

of engagement. Peacekeeping became a laughing stock, discrediting UN missions. As it stands, the rules of engagement in peacekeeping are being streamlined.

Reverting back to the political situation, Ambassador Conze stated that when the transition began failing, Mbeki was called to save the process and South Africa's engagement in the DRC grew. The elections held three years later attests to the successes. The result of peacekeeping was a political process, which could be covered by MONUC and which led to a takeover by the Congolese.

Ambassador Conze concluded by stating that MONUC was a successful peacekeeping mission in Africa. Its role is not fully over although Kabila wants a phased exit of MONUC. The UNSC has adjusted its mandate and MONUSCO has been established with more elements of peace building, which is the correct course. Armed conflict has lessened, but problems of governance are taking centre stage. The international community does not want to stay in Africa forever, which is not the idea of peacekeeping missions. The Ambassador continued saying that the transition to more capacity building and less peacekeeping should lead to more emancipation of the Congolese nation, and less dependency. The exact degree of disengagement is debatable, because if the UN disengages totally, there will be no transparency. A different kind of UN involvement is needed, taking into account lessons learned of the DRC, with an emphasis on peace building. The continued predominant role of South Africa is required to ensure the permanent tendency to instability is contained and Congo can serve the region with its riches.

Discussion

Questions

- In relation to the gender dimension, what can South Africa and Germany do regarding the suffering of women and children in conflict areas?
- How long will the DRC survive in terms of territorial integrity? Will it be divided into various parts? What is the role of the neighbouring countries?
- Are the principles of human rights practiced in the military?
- What is the position of the FDLR and the Mai Mai in the DRC?

Answers

- Peacekeeping is meant to protect women and children in a war. Yet women and children are the biggest chunk of victims in a war. Peacekeeping has evolved tremendously as seen in the Model of the Integrated Peacekeeping Mission, which comprises elements of peacekeeping, Mediterranean Police and also civilian staff, as well as specialised agencies such as UNDP and gender, children and educational issues.

- Non-Africans drew the boundaries of the DRC, and one principle that was borne after de-colonisation was 'lets not touch the borders'. The DRC has to decide whether or not to remark their borders.
- On human rights in the military, all military are trained in human rights as these are built into the courses. Military generals who executed coups were also trained in human rights. In the DRC a massive civil military campaign is needed for all state organs.
- In South and North Kivu, the numbers were confined and none ventured beyond 3000. On FDLR, most of the FDLR maintain they are born free, implying they were too young to have engaged in DRC atrocities. It is not in their interest to go back to Rwanda. In relation to the Mai Mai, due the lack of state in the Eastern DRC, small militias were formed

Dr Petrus de Kock

South African Institute of International Affairs

Dr de Kock began his case study by reminding the audience about the civil war in Sudan that has been ongoing for 50 years. He believes that the African continent seeks to evolve continental platforms like the AU and to develop mechanisms to solve conflicts and to successfully mediate through very difficult political circumstances. Sudan has tremendous lessons to teach. Dr de Kock stated that prior to the referendum in Sudan, there was much negativity about whether the referendum would actually take place, and whether there would be new war after the referendum. Despite the problems in Abyei, there was no resumption of conflict, and certain levels of success.

In terms of controversial issues, Dr de Kock argued that the ICC warrant of arrest for President Al Bashir, as well as South Africa's position in Darfur and the way in which Mbeki engaged with President Al Bashir garnered much criticism. In this context, the evolution of the relationship between the AU and the UN in Darfur on the hybrid force is noteworthy. The AU consisted of a mission of 3000 soldiers, but active conflict as well as negotiations is still ongoing in Darfur, and the process is facing difficulty in relation to mediation. Additionally, serious 'African' challenges in relation to building capacity, know-how, finances and equipment exists. With the principle of African solutions to African problems, institutional frameworks and experiences of dealing with this kind of conflict have to evolve according to Dr de Kock.

The mediation process has to be understood as a component of the larger multilateral engagement in the country. The resolution of the conflict around Sudan is not only about getting a peacekeeping force on the ground, but is also about understanding the local historical and political peculiarities. An additional challenge in relation to mediation is the South Sudan dependence on North Sudan for the export of oil. A cooperative relationship in relation to oil has to be maintained as oil has great potential for conflict. In this regard the AU and the UN can make a long term and in-depth analysis of the kind of mechanisms put in

place. Dr de Kock applauded the Sudanese people for the successes achieved as the loss of a third of its territory and other facets are traumatic to any country.

Dr de Kock also raised the issue of forms of cooperation to be learned from the Sudanese, specifically the joint initiative of the AU and the UN. While the intervention came about due the weakness of the AU, and the AU requires tremendous support as it builds its own capacity, the cooperation is dependent on manoeuvring and on how to engage in these types of things. On the issue of the warrant for President Al Bashir and African leaders' opposition to it, Dr de Kock stated that particular international agendas can be counter effective to African organisations and leaders, and it must be accepted that regional solidarity will take precedence. Dr de Kock concluded by saying that Sudan had many challenges to overcome before total resolution was reached.

Ambassador Torben Brylle

Former EU Special Envoy to Sudan. Current Danish Ambassador to Vienna

Ambassador Brylle commenced by stating that a range of organisations and expertise was vital for Sudan in its new configuration. The recent focus on the North-South Sudan issue is relevant given future events particularly the emergence of the new South Sudan. He stated that the lack of attention on the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement is interesting, despite recent attention, and represents a failure of an 'all of Sudan' approach to a crisis engagement approach and a lack of strategy of international engagement.

The Ambassador then turned his attention to the Darfur issue saying that the Darfur Peace Agreement, which was eventually signed, was never fully affected. Critical mechanisms were put in place after the agreement, such as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as well as the support mechanisms of the EU for ceasefire. According to the Ambassador, the situation on the ground deteriorated rapidly with various violations, and more appropriate response to the situation was required. The outcome was a multi-pronged approach, to establish a hybrid force, strengthen mechanisms for mediation, and to introduce sanctions. Within the EU, a decision was made to strengthen the efforts for the protection of civilians, the continuation of humanitarian delivery, as well as to tune the minds of the stakeholders towards engaging in serious and inclusive negotiations. The outcome was to establish a 3500-troop contingent in the Central African Republic.

The new dynamic arising out of this, according to the Ambassador, was that the Darfur Peace Agreement never seemed to materialise. International stakeholders, including the Tripoli process, which seemed to create a convergence in the attitude of the stakeholders, also introduced various new approaches. The Darfur issue finally began moving forward. On the ground, the situation was largely frozen and the issue of trying to sell the process was difficult. Much effort was made to bring on board the Sudanese Liberation Army, as well as the Justice and Equality movement, who had not signed the agreement at the time.

Ambassador Brylle said that the issue of the ICC also became a focus of much controversy and attention, particularly the warrant of arrest for Al Bashir requested for by the prosecutor. The Khartoum government chose a two-track approach, trying to rally African countries to question the legitimacy of the ICC, while at the same time accepting the deployment of the United Nation Mission in Darfur (UNIMID). The reactions of the international community were also significant, as the AU set up a High Level Panel headed by Mbeki, which succeeded in making a persuasive analysis of the problems, referring to the problems in Darfur as 'Sudan's Crisis'. The Ambassador continued saying that the root causes of the problems had to be approached for a sustainable political solution in the future.

On a parallel, there was a shift of attention to the North-South relationship. The Ambassador believes there was certain complacency in 2005 after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, a sense that major progress was made in the crafting of the CPA, ending decades of civil war. The engagement by the parties to the CPA resulted in them becoming owners of the CPA, and implementing it. A government of national unity was also established. Other changes included the AU High Level Panel being converted into a High Level Implementation Panel, tasked with a wider mandate of dealing with the broader issues of Sudan, particularly the final phase of the implementation of the CPA. Outstanding issues, according to the Ambassador, will have to be addressed in coming days in the build up to the 9th of July.

The engagement of the broader international community, the AU and the UN, has been a consistent and comprehensive factor, although not very well coordinated. A more consistent and integrated approach to coordination is required. The Ambassador further stated that the AU and the UN also did not agree on many issues. The lesson on the implementation of the mandate has been the question of minimising the ambiguity of the mandate, as many open questions have been evident to the implementers. The Ambassador also raised other essential challenges, particularly given the approach to the end of the CPA on the 9th July. He called upon the international community to support the High level Implementation Panel in resolving outstanding issues and ensuring the process is not undermined. The Ambassador also called for peace and stability, continued engagement with the North Sudan, and a reconciliation of progress made thus far into a process that can finally bring an end to the crisis in Darfur.

Mr Peter Bior Alier

Information Officer, Government of Southern Sudan, Southern Africa Liaison Office

Mr Alier commenced his speech by stating that it was unfortunate that Sudan was on the agenda of yet another forum, and for 'bad reasons'. He explained that political forces in Khartoum had implemented marginalisation in every part of Sudan, which became referred to as "Sudanese problem", and he disagreed with the diagnosis saying that politicising Sudan caused South Sudan 39 years of the 50 years of independence.

Mr Alier continued by providing a brief history of Sudan stating that initial negotiations began in Kenya. In 2004, South Africa sent a ministerial delegation to South Sudan to meet with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and a peace agreement was placed on the agenda. The UNSC also intervened in the process and in 2005; the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was born. Various processes came out of the CPA such as the South Africa/AU committee on post-conflict and reconstruction and development, as well as the justice system process of the German/ South African partnership.

According to Mr Alier, many agreements were dishonoured by the regime in Khartoum, including the CPA, and he quoted Dr John Garang, who stated, "Sudan was indeed too deformed to reform". Some of the implementation challenges of the CPA included: proxy wars where militias and civilians were re-armed despite disarmament, the referendum and anticipated independence, the world having suddenly gone silent, and the intensification of the Darfur crisis.

Mr Alier continued that although the UN had visited Sudan on various occasions, the agenda centred on the CPA not the other challenges. He further stated that a focus should be on the quality of peacekeepers rather than the quantity, that peacekeeping was dependent on the will of both partners, that the uncertainty on post-referendum issues are still an issue, the boundary demarcation is still incomplete and Abyei was invaded twice since and is still burning.

Discussion

Questions

- Should there be some type of institution established for peace building in the north and South Sudan?
- How will the continuation of peace building efforts be undertaken after the 9th July meeting?
- What strategies is the South Sudan adopting to the atrocities such as South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
- What is the vision of Sudan and what strategies have been put in place to deal with the root causes of the conflict in Sudan?
- What is the position of the South African government on the movements in Darfur?
- What lessons can be taken from the Sudan process to resolve all the problems in Africa?

Answers

- Speaker 1: The relations between the North and South have to be carefully organised. It is worrying to see the current situation in Abyei at the moment, and an assessment of the situation is foreseen. There has

been a discussion at international level of setting up some kind of security mechanism to ensure that there would be peaceful development at the borders. The emphasis on security cannot be underestimated with the current situation, more especially by the 9th July meeting. Socio-economic development missions may be affected if the current situation persists. In terms of root causes, the reconciliation and development committee and several partners have begun to look into the kind of approach required to address the fundamental issues, including that of governance.

Speaker 2: Regarding peace building, when the CPA was signed there was an important clause that made unity attractive to lay the foundation for Sudanese relating to each other. During the implementation phase it was evident that the South and North were diverging to their own agendas and no attempt to bridge the gap has been made. There are many challenges for the South in relation to peace building, and the referendum has prevented further initiatives. Peace building in the south is continuing.

- In relation to the need for continuation of peace building efforts, the trick will be in the design of the borders. Thus the future of peace building in Sudan will be dependent on two things: peace building at a technical level, for example the oil sharing, and peace building at a political level.
- Regarding the root causes of the conflict, in Southern Sudan land is a big issue and long-term solutions are required. Similarly with the water issue and the Darfur rebellion. In relation to the Sudan Peace Process, the five years of peace have had a positive impact on the neighbouring countries, with no attrition and positive economic development.
- On Darfur, discussion on national liberation (movements) has never occurred. The North and South issue can only be a win-win situation and the oil issue could constitute a peace building mechanism, and it flags the issue of the need for economic diversification. In relation to the lessons learned, the anxiety of the AU in terms of Sudan setting a precedence of a divisive country has been alleviated, as well as a long-standing conflict being settled in a peaceful manner.
- On lessons from the Sudan peace process, one needs to look at the positive impact that five years of peace on Southern Sudan has had on all the neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. There is no attrition of people who have to flee into other countries, and the positive economic impact on the countries is phenomenal, so the peace dividend on regional stability is massive.

CONCLUDING SESSION: A WAY FORWARD FOR GERMAN- AFRICAN COOPERATION?

Moderated by JP Landman

Mr Günter Nooke

Personal Representative of the German Chancellor for Africa, German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

Mr Nooke acknowledged the timeliness of the conference topic given the many controversial decisions taken on Africa at the UN in the past months. He emphasised the importance of South Africa and Germany's role in the UN as aspiring permanent members and economic heavy weights, and as countries attempting to shape international relations with their respective foreign policies.

Mr Nooke raised three questions for discussion. These include:

- Whether Germany's decision to abstain from voting for UN Resolution 1973 is a sign of continuation or disruption in its foreign policy?
- What the determinants of German foreign policy are?
- How Germany should react to changes in the global power landscape?

On Germany's abstention on Libya, Mr Nooke provided a view of a changing Germany citing examples of emerging powers' ever-increasing economic and political role as well as new partnerships, which he iterated that Germany was open to renewing. Public opinion suggested Germany was undergoing a reorientation of its foreign policy, but Mr Nooke assured this was certainly not the case as the transatlantic partnership is a cornerstone of Germany's foreign policy, and abstaining did not mean the beginning of a German 'Sonderweg' or a new nationalism. Its foreign policy and the associated responsibilities suggested that Germany was finally thinking, analysing and promoting national interests. Regarding the intervention in Libya, Mr Nooke is adamant that establishing democracy and human rights could have been done by supporting peaceful demonstrators instead of aiding rebels. This is what Resolution 1973 implied.

On the question on German foreign policy goals, Mr Nooke believes that the agenda on promoting human rights and peace is uncontroversial, but that Germany can be more vociferous in using its influence. Regarding Africa, a more substantial and strategic foreign policy is required, one that weighs interests and values. On the use of force, Mr Nooke states that this should be a last resort unless the State cannot protect its citizens, as was in Rwanda and the Balkans.

In terms of the voting behaviour of Germany, South Africa and Nigeria on resolution 1973 and the ensuing debate by other countries, Mr Nooke states foreign policy is a national prerequisite and that coordination of African and European countries on such matters is not always possible, nor always desirable.

He also confirmed that Germany was in support of the UNSC and other institutional reforms, but doubted whether the institutions would adapt to the power shifts quick enough. He suggested that alternative bodies such as BRICS would continue to be established.

Mr Nooke also confirmed that Germany supported Africa on the global political level, and in promoting peace and human rights, but he warned that representation meant responsibility and that Africa had to take the initiative.

Dr Adekeye Adebajo

Executive Director: Centre for Conflict Resolution

Dr Adebajo began his speech by putting the UNSC in context. He stated that unless the operations of the UNSC were understood, the recommendations would make no sense. He also highlighted issues around 'burden sharing', African organisations and the UN, and then made four recommendations to complement the discussions.

He said his speech was about the games that great powers play, and that these games and the UNSC determine the outcomes of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere. He further stated that the veto wielding P5 members of the UNSC still reflect the alliance of victors dating from the end of World War 2. While France and Britain were great powers, they no longer are and that it would make sense to merge their seats into a EU seat.

While the veto power of the P5 has declined, used behind closed door consultation of the UNSC, many of the archaic procedures and policies of the UNSC are well known to the P5 members, who also have the privilege access of UN documents. Decisions are based on complex and not always visible trade-offs between members of the P5, that have been worked out over many years, and since no written record of the closed doors consultations are kept, the P5 members represent the UNSC institutional memory giving them a huge advantage of the 10 other two-year rotating members, who are regarded as tourists by the P5. Dr Adebajo says it is important that the UNSC be democratised so that Africa and Latin America who are the two major regions in the world without permanent membership actually do have membership within this body.

In terms of the issues of the UN and regional organisations, Dr Adebajo says that Kofi Annan devised a 10-year capacity plan in 2005 in which donors were meant to support the AU and others. In December 2008 there was an important report by the former Head of the EU commission, which came up with recommendations in this area. It criticised the deployment of peacekeeping missions in difficult regions without the means to keep the peace, and called for a strategic relationship between African organisations and the UN, as well as the UN to fund peacekeeping operations that are authorised by it. Dr Adebajo called these recommendations 'incredibly sensible', and because the P5 wanted to retain as much flexibility as possible and intervene only in cases where their

strategic interests are at stake, nothing much was done in terms of implementing them. Kofi Annan's 10-year plan has not been funded half way through and there isn't even a programme of activities, and all that happens is ad hoc. Flexibility is important to note, according to Dr Adebajo.

Dr Adebajo other recommendations are based on a study of 15 peacekeeping cases in Africa. He stated that there was a need to encourage external actors, particularly the P5, to ensure an effective UN role in regional conflicts in Africa. An effective division of labour between the UN and Africa's regional organisations was important, and the UNSC has a primary responsibility for peace and security towards Africa as well. The UNSC he stated sheds its responsibilities towards Africa. He also said that the West should assist Africa as well, as it did for Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.

Dr Adebajo also asserted that the UN should cooperate with local hegemony like South Africa and Nigeria, current members on the UNSC, and who have shown their military clout. They need to enjoy the legitimacy of the UN, so as not to frighten neighbouring countries that they are pursuing parochial agendas. He further stated that South Africa and Nigeria's vying for permanent seats on the UNSC should be settled based on the criteria of population size. He further recommended that the UN should keep developing effective strategies for dealing with domestic and regional spoilers who want to wreck peace processes by killing peace keepers. The economic, political and legal sanctions imposed on Taylor and Savimbi would be appropriate, and he advised that other tools to achieve compliance should be used by the UN.

On the ICC, Dr Adebajo stated that the ICC would enjoy credibility if universal justice and not selective justice, were practiced. He concluded by quoting a phrase "there is always something new out of Africa".

Dr Jakkie Cilliers

Institute for Security Studies

Dr Cilliers commenced the concluding session by discussing global governance deficit and the push for UNSC reform stating that South Africa and Germany had entered the UNSC at a time of unprecedented global flux. The emergence of multiple centres of power with the rise of the global South and the relative decline of the US and the West complicates the conduct of international relations.

Current global challenges demand global responses and places extreme demands on the efficiency as well as legitimacy of global governance. The most important deficit to be overcome according to Dr Cilliers is the poor supply of global governance. South Africa and Germany agree that the UN should be the key platform in addressing this deficit. Both countries are key financial and/or troop contributors and both are regional powers, and Germany, an exception within the developed world as an export economy.

Dr Cilliers continued saying that Germany and South Africa, together with India, Brazil and Nigeria agree on the need for reform of the UNSC. The current composition of the UNSC, the enlargement of the UNSC, competition over potential seats, enhancing capacity and efficiency in addressing global challenges, streamlining decision-making procedures (which must eventually do away with both the category of permanent members as well as the veto right altogether), are all necessary components of UN reform.

Dr Cilliers continued that Germany and South Africa are strong regional candidates for seats in a reformed UNSC, which would possibly come down to the previous G4 proposal by Germany, Japan, India and Brazil in which both countries have a good chance at gaining a seat as part of a larger deal. He added that it was important to emphasize the similarities in South Africa and Germany's foreign policy objectives and the mutual gains from further cooperation.

Dr Cilliers then referred to two central guidelines of Germany's Africa Policy, as they are at the core of South Africa's approach towards the rest of Africa. The first is with regards to universal *values*. South Africa and Germany due to their respective histories of destabilization and repression share a common obligation and responsibility to promote respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and peaceful resolution of conflicts – particularly in Africa where many of these aspirations remain wanting in practice. South Africa has been a key institutional entrepreneur and Germany has been a key external supporter in the establishment of the African Union's current African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). South Africa and Germany both acknowledge that to secure an equitable future for themselves they cannot solely rely on their soft power capabilities. South Africa's relationship with the rest of Africa is key to the country's economic progress. In fact, South Africa's major destination for much of its exports is Africa. As a major exporting nation, Germany relies on a well-functioning world trade system, which cannot exist without peace and stability.

The second German guideline, according to Dr Cilliers, is *African ownership*. Germany acknowledges the 'dual approach', where external support should concentrate on strengthening Africa's own ability to handle its security challenges rather than imposing solutions from the outside. The establishment of the APSA, especially with the PSC and the evolving African Standby Force (ASF), is a major milestone in advancing Africa's own capacity of finding 'African solutions to African problems'. Sustainable funding and the lack of an integrated logistical support remains the largest challenge to African peacekeeping and an issue on which the UN Security Council has not made much progress. However, Germany's substantial contribution of financial and technical resources as well as personnel, through the EU's African Peace Facility (APF), the G8's 'Africa Programme', and bilaterally, will help each country coexist and rely on the idea of 'burden-sharing'.

Dr Cilliers maintains that the relationship between regional governance and global governance is not as straightforward as was recently demonstrated with the UNSC's passing of resolution 1973 in Libya. Although South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon as non-permanent members of the UNSC voted in favour of the resolution, European approaches sought to marginalize the role of the AU in the

process. The lack of 'African ownership' in the conflict brings to the fore serious questions concerning 'decision-making supremacy' and 'division of labour' in the evolving strategic partnership between the UN and the AU on peace and security. South Africa is championing the relationship between the PSC and the UNSC, and this has led to tangible improvements in the relationship between these two structures, including regular consultations, joint field visits and, more generally, increased synchronization in their respective decisions.

The AU has initiated a process intended to develop a stronger and more structured relationship with the UNSC. The joint UN-AU Panel from 2008 (the so-called Prodi Panel) on UN support for AU-led peace operations in Africa, authorized by the UNSC, is a step in the right direction. Consideration of the recommendations from the Prodi report has generally been ineffective and inconclusive and demonstrates that the question of 'burden-sharing' ultimately hinges upon the question of 'decision-making supremacy'.

The rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping and the resulting overstretched conflict management system is maybe the most evident example of the current deficit in supply of global governance. The balancing act between supporting the AU's increased willingness and capacity to provide regional governance and not undermining the UN's supremacy as the cornerstone of global governance, is indeed difficult and controversial, and the German guideline of "yes to assistance provided there is a genuine African ownership" is a step in the right direction and something which SA and Germany should cooperate on in this term in the UNSC.

Discussion

Questions

- On the issue of UNSC reform, Dr Cilliers mentioned that the Ezulwini Consensus was designed to prevent UNSC reform. Please elaborate.
- How is the responsibility to protect clause be adopted by the UN?
- What are the thoughts of a UNSC reform approach based on population as a criterion for regional representation?
- Is the Doha peace process a lucrative process for the country?
- Which African countries are likely candidates to obtain permanent seats on the UNSC, and what is the role of the USA on the UNSC?
- Is the issue of human rights a taken seriously at the UN?
- What are Germany's chances of obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC?
- What is the role of regional organisations in the UN?
- Comment on the UNSC reform: Whether it should and can be reformed should be left open, and the international community should help to replace it. The question on reform should be put to all parliaments,

democratic countries and regional bodies, and the outcome should be determined after these consultations.

- Comment: 120 agencies of the UN have been doing work thus far. The UN is like a global corporation, with States being the shareholders and the UNSC being the executive, and decisions are based on the interests of the shareholders. This is what UNSC reform should be all about.

Answers

- Speaker 1: The Ezulwini Consensus is a way to prevent UNSC reform. President Mugabe insisted on the inclusion of the clause with the right to veto, which obviates any reasonable progress, and for African to make progress there needs to be re-engagement with Ezulwini, and South Africa and Nigeria are ready for this. It is not realistic to speak about reform of the UNSC when in today's politics incoming members are going to have the right to veto.
- Speaker 2: On UN reform, anyone believing in democratic decision-making would want UN reform. But this won't happen any time soon because China is determined to block Japan, and the USA and Russia have been ambiguous about reform. A working group in the UN has been talking about reform but the Africans shot themselves in the foot, because Germany and Japan were prepared to give up the veto. The Africans should have been pragmatic.
- Speaker 3: On UNSC reform, it is difficult to find criteria for representation on the UNSC. Emerging economies like China will be satisfied with reform. In principle, Germany should be interested but I don't see what can be done. A responsible government is required on the UN. On Al Bashir, Germany was instrumental in establishing the ICC and when a court undertakes to do its work, then everyone is surprised. The indictment of Al Bashir created many problems.
- Speaker 1: Responsibility to protect is not just a label. Cote d' Ivoire is a complicated case and the UN did not do much to protect civilians and populations.

Speaker 2: On the responsibility to protect issue, there is a responsibility to prevent, to respond and to rebuild, and the sudden emphasis on the intervention is creating a challenge. The responsibility to protect and sovereignty is applied selectively when it is in the interest of key countries.

- Speaker 3: South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon voted correctly on Libya. No one could have foreseen the aggression with which France and the UK sought to pursue the responsibility to protect, and irreparable harm has been done to the responsibility to protect doctrine. The UN did itself incredible harm in its response. The action that has been taken on Libya is because it is on Europe's doorstep and because of the oil.

- On population as a criterion for regional representation, the call on Nigeria was tongue in cheek, but based on its peacekeeping record and legitimacy in just representing one in four or one in five. But it won't be happening anytime soon.
- On the Doha process on Darfur, a proliferation of mediators becomes complicated when there is not enough coordination. Doha is a peace process that should actually remain within the African continent. Most of the parties are not in Doha, which is the part of the problem, and too many cooks spoil the broth.
- Africa's appeal is for two permanent seats. The question then would be who will be appointed. Africa will resort to a process where countries are voted onto the UNSC. Currently three countries serve on the UNSC. Ethiopia is an emerging power; these four countries will determine Africa's future. The Ezulwini Consensus is important to UN reform. The USA is finally showing an interest in the UN and it will come on board if it is in its interest. The US is interested in constraining China, particularly because of the decline in its relative power.
- The Human Rights Council was elected in June 2006. It was difficult to find an institutional package dealing with human rights issues. In 2007, an acceptable institutional building package was reached, which had the potential to work. Others were forced to accept the rules. 1/3 of votes were needed to put human rights violations on the agenda. This is difficult as no one is interested. All the Africans are voting together. The Asian groups are voting the same. Asian and Africans present clean slates. The perception is that the Human Rights Council received a good push by Kofi Annan. Regional proportional representation may help to discuss human rights violations. To work, all three pillars are needed: security, economic development and human rights, but these should be discussed separately. We have to accept international law, and it is not easy to violate international law.
- Germany as a permanent member on the UNSC is not a problem, but how does it come about for Germany to become a permanent member of the UNSC. Playing a neutral, predictable role, taking into account economic and human rights, can perhaps make place for Germany.
- The complementary role of regional organisations and the UN is very important, particularly in Africa, where legitimacy provided by organisations such as the AU, is complemented by the effectiveness and funds that are provided by the UN system. In that line of reasoning, the future peace missions in Africa will be of a hybrid nature. While this provides for a very complex interlocking system of peace and security between the UN and the AU, it will have better collaboration politically between the UNSC and the PSC, and more consultation. At the moment the system is layered. International countries will have to grapple with a model to co-fund peace missions either done in collaboration or sub-contracted to African organisations. There is no other way forward. There is a chance for UNSC reform, but it will be a packaged response, of a

convoluted model, of intermediate periods. How to proceed on that will depend on the national interest of countries such as South Africa.

The session closed with Dr Krug of the Hanns Seidel Foundation thanking all the participants and speakers.

Conclusion

The conference sought to address ways in which to strengthen the UNSC, particularly using the experiences and lessons learned from Germany and South Africa's efforts in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the last few years. Session one centred around mechanisms for building consensus on key issues brought before the Council by exploring the role of the P5 members as well as non-permanent members on the UNSC, and determining, among others, which mechanisms constitute the bridge builders. The architecture of decision-making became clear and general consensus was reached that the UNSC requires urgent reform. However, it was also clear that national interests and P5 dominance would always over-ride consensus of a particular issue.

Session two examined various models of engagement between regional bodies and the UNSC, particularly the AU and the EU, and the methods employed in engaging issues within the respective regions. The AU and the EU are dissimilar geographically and where one region is suffering political conflicts, the other is facing disparate challenges. Despite this, shared interests, as well as mutual understanding, and common issues, ensure coherence and agreement on issues within the UNSC.

Session three dealt with Sudan and the DRC as examples of effective engagement particularly with South African and German assistance. The DRC example questioned the logic of multi-lateral efforts, particularly that of the UN, but it also brought to the fore the benefits of peacekeeping efforts. The lesson learned from the Sudan example is peace is attainable after prolonged conflict, with willingness from relevant parties and accessible support.

The concluding session determined that Germany and South Africa are strong regional candidates for continuous seats in the UNSC. There was also consensus that the P5 had outlived their tenure as permanent members typically for furthering national interests. If they were to remain as permanent members, the P5 are obligated to all of the regions, for continued peace and security, particularly Africa.