



## American-European Cooperation for Common Security

### Memorandum of the German-American Strategy Group

Americans and Europeans must understand that neither side will be able to shoulder the burden of securing peace and the stability and welfare of our nations alone. There is no better way to achieve this goal than to maintain the transatlantic cohesion which allowed the West to prevail in the Cold War. However, it is essential to realize that NATO, the cornerstone of transatlantic cohesion, is badly damaged. Indeed, the entire Euro-American relationship is at risk. Disagreement goes far beyond the Iraq quarrel but meanwhile affects major pillars of transatlantic relations. Vital reconstruction work is necessary.

To repair this truly irreplaceable alliance, the US and Europe should initiate three major steps to adjust NATO to the new requirements of the post-9/11 era and to re-establish a viable European-American security relationship:

#### **1. Adapt NATO's Strategic Concept to bring it line with the National Security Strategy of the US and the Strategic Concept of the EU.**

This means to respond to three challenges:

- The obligation to protect human lives at home and abroad;
- The duty to prevent failing states, proliferation of WMD and increasing terrorism;
- The responsibility to stabilize NATO's strategic perimeter.

In order to accomplish this NATO has to broaden its instruments far beyond the military realm and align its political processes with the reaction capability of its military forces. Furthermore NATO has to modernize the armed forces of all of its members to adapt them to a new and wider range of missions.

#### **2. The Immediate Challenge is to Develop a Strategic Concept for Stability in the Greater Middle East**

Such a concept must be developed in close consultation with moderate elements in the region. Moreover, and most importantly, no concept for the region has any chance to be accepted in the Middle East without a credible effort to bring about a solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict. Core elements should be:

- ***Conflict prevention through cooperation and dialogue.*** The aim of this preventive part is to stop proliferation and to eliminate the reasons for conflict and terror through a combination of aid and dialogue. This will require dedicating more substantial resources, intellectual as well as financial, to support reform in the greater Middle East. What is needed is a commitment to generate the expertise, ideas, and policies to spur processes of reform and modernization throughout the Greater Middle East. It may also require NATO secu-

rity guarantees in conjunction with the renunciation of WMD. We also believe that the United States and Europe must work with Israel and the Palestinians to achieve a two states solution to their conflict.

- ***Accompanying efforts for stabilization.*** This requires a common approach between NATO and the EU in Europe and in the Great Middle East. A NATO role for Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly elsewhere in the region seems to be both sensible and feasible.
- ***Military intervention capabilities.*** NATO must have the political resolve and the military capability not to exclude proactive intervention outside the NATO treaty area in order to minimize the risks to the Euro-Atlantic space and to counter proliferation. Thus NATO must be able to act decisively if all other options fail in order to undergird deterrence.

### 3. NATO'S Role in Iraq

Applying these principles to the Greater Middle East puts NATO's emerging role in Iraq into a wider perspective and would facilitate agreement on such a role. The rationale for a multinational engagement in Iraq is compelling: a failure to stabilize Iraq would not only harm the United States. Instead, a collapse of the coalition of the willing, and a withdrawal of the U.S. military from Iraq could create a power vacuum, possibly opening the door to further chaos in the region. This could dramatically affect the security of the European partners and the United States.

Of course, any agreement on a NATO role in Iraq will require

- the request for a stabilizing peacekeeping force forwarded to the UN by the transitional Iraq government which will take responsibility on 1 July 2004;
- a UN request that NATO should take on this responsibility and a corresponding UNSCR;
- a NATO decision to accept the UN request.

Klaus **Naumann**, General (ret), Former  
Chairman NATO Military Committee

Klaus-Dieter **Frankenberger**, Frankfurter  
Allgemeine Zeitung  
The Hon. Karl Theodor zu **Guttenberg**, MP  
Michael **Haltzel**, Senate Foreign Relations  
Committee  
The Hon. Klaus-Jürgen **Hedrich**, MP  
Jacob **Heilbrunn**, Los Angeles Times  
John **Hulsman**, The Heritage Foundation  
Karl-Heinz **Kamp**, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung  
James **Kitfield**, National Journal

Charles **Kupchan**, Council on Foreign  
Relations  
Flynt **Leverett**, The Brookings Institution  
The Hon. Ruprecht **Polenz**, MP  
Franz-Josef **Reuter**, Konrad Adenauer  
Stiftung  
The Hon. Andreas **Schockenhoff**, MP  
Julianne **Smith**, CSIS  
Helmut **Sonnenfeldt**, The Brookings  
Institution  
The Hon. Karl von **Wogau**, MEP

The views presented by the signatories reflect their personal, not their institutional, opinions.