



CONFERENCE REPORT

NATIONAL SEMINAR

China

and the world

in the coming decade



Forum
for
Strategic Initiatives



Konrad
Adenauer
Stiftung



Dr Arvind Vermani | Inaugural Session

Introduction

As a nation that perceives itself to be the Middle Kingdom, with the mandate of heaven, a view that prevails is that China is likely to be a more assertive power in the coming years.

China's double digit economic growth over the last three decades and more is unprecedented in world history. With it she has lifted from poverty some five hundred million of her people. In turn this has also contributed to economic growth around the world and has helped make East Asia, the dynamic global growth centre that it is today.

It has also given rise to the China threat theory. As a nation that perceives itself to be the Middle Kingdom, with the mandate of heaven, a view that prevails is that China is likely to be a more assertive power in the coming years. Consequently, the thinking of policy analysts have centred around, 'balance of power' and the inevitability of a 'clash of civilizations'. Another set of views from Harvard portends the possibility of the "Thucydides Trap", when a rising power inevitably clashes with the existing global hegemon (USA) as happened in ancient Greece in the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta.

To explore this dynamic, the Forum for Strategic Initiatives and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung organised a national seminar on 'China and the World in the Coming Decade' on 22-23 November 2016, at the Claridges Hotel, New Delhi. The Conference Schedule and a list of principal participants are attached.

Dr Arvind Virmani

The world is in flux, and in the midst of an intellectual turmoil, where people are rattled about what the future portends. According to one index, the rise of China and its emergence as an economic superpower by 2017, is unprecedented and irreversible. At the same time, given its closed political system and non-transparent decision making, its overall growth followed by rapid militarization, more often than not, continues to lack detailed research and information. We have to make a special effort to understand the reality, by going through the international and diplomatic narrative, that like all other countries, China propagates. This is particularly important, especially when we are at a "turning point" wherein, despite our best analytical efforts, we might fail to correctly analyse and comprehend this important juncture. It is imperative then to gain a varied perspective on the several issues that may affect the developing environment.

Mr Pankaj Madan

Never have the dynamics of change in the world been so fast paced as they are now. A lot is happening with regard to

global equations as well as domestic situations in many countries. Given the interlinkages of a globalized world, where, borders have been rendered irrelevant and where no country can remain unaffected by circumstances prevalent in another part of the world, it is imperative for us to understand the ramifications of these developments, especially in a country like China.

The recent US Presidential election has brought about an unexpected result, but it is clearly a part of a larger shift in world politics. Liberal values are being challenged and broadly speaking, there is a discernible shift to the political right as well as towards an increasingly inward-looking policy in the US, Europe and many other countries in Latin America and Asia.

The personality cult being built around President Xi point to China becoming an aggressive military force contrary to what many reports indicate. Japan remains the most likely contender for the dominant position in East Asia, both because of its geography and because of its needs as a massive importer. China is building a large number of ships but has little experience in naval warfare and lacks fleet commanders needed to challenge more experienced navies, including the US and the Japanese navies.

Inaugural Session



Mr Pankaj Madan | Inaugural Session



Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee | Inaugural Session

But one can make these assumptions at only one's risk, for JRR Tolkien did say "it does not do to leave a live dragon out of your calculations, if you live near him." There is no decade without pain, and even in the most perfect of times, there is suffering. The crises that we expect in the next decade are far from the worst seen in the past century, and they are no worse than those we will see in the next but also let us not forget what Friedrich Nietzsche said: "In individuals, insanity is rare; but in groups, parties, nations and epochs, it is the rule."

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee AVSM

The world is presently in a state of turbulent transition. The larger region immediately to our west is experiencing a very complex civil war, with major external interventions and internal conflicts. This will surely, in the course of time, redraw the geography of this entire region beyond anything we can comprehend today. Elsewhere, in Asia and beyond the rise of extreme right, religious radicalism and its many counters, economic slowdown and financial instability are all leading to a new set of uncertainty.

Over all this is the emergence of a new vocabulary of "Trumpism" in the world's presently most powerful nation. What is Trumpism, or Donald Trump's likely impact on the world? The simple answer is 'we do not yet know'. But, if the new President elect's first three key national security appointments is any guide, it will be a strong move towards US nationalism, unilateralism and withdrawal from globalization, much as he

Even more than the rest of the world, our geography dictates that our policies will increasingly be shaped by what transpires in China. These are some of the larger questions that this seminar seeks to address.

Will the 21st Century belong to China, much like the 20th was America's and the 19th was Britain's? When may that century actually begin, coinciding with the two centenaries? In 2049 as Xi Jinping seems to have planned? Or even before that by 2021? Or, perhaps this is but only a Chinese Dream never to be fulfilled?

described it during his election campaign. This is a new departure in US policies of which we know little today, but about which many of us, in the US and the world are deeply concerned.

At the Global Think Tank Summit conference in Shanghai last fortnight where I was privileged to have been invited, 50 Presidents and Chief Executives of the top Chinese think tanks, were perplexed. As were another 50 or so leading international think tank heads. But, there appeared also to be a feeling of some satisfaction at this possible dysfunction in US leadership amongst Chinese think tanks. Coming soon after BREXIT, it appeared to them to demonstrate a serious weakness in the western system of political governance. Hence a sense of *déjà vu*. Some saw this as the beginning of America's slow fade out. They also

seemed to sense that their time had come. Will the 21st Century belong to China, much like the 20th was America's and the 19th was Britain's? When may that century actually begin, coinciding with the two centenaries? In 2049 as Xi Jinping seems to have planned? Or even before that by 2021? Or, perhaps this is but only a Chinese Dream never to be fulfilled?

We are looking ahead today only to the next ten years. That is perhaps as much in advance that we may be able to realistically predict. But, this is an important question for us In India. Even more than the rest of the world, our geography dictates that our policies will increasingly be shaped by what transpires in China. These are some of the larger questions that this seminar seeks to address.

Ambassador Shyam Saran

We are truly at a remarkable inflection point in international affairs. We already see Europe to be in quite disarray, disoriented after Brexit. US under Trump is likely to see significant discontinuities with the past. In the recent address by the President elect, it was stated that he will give notice of withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership. He has also indicated that whatever commitments the US may have made in the Paris Agreement are no longer valid, as there will be a revival of coal mining and thermal power. We have also heard that the labour department will start recording illegal immigrants, for them to be deported. So it's evident that at least most of the substantial agenda he had set in course of his campaigning will be

**Keynote
Address**

implemented. Thus, I think we will see significant discontinuities from the post-Cold War political, security and economic order that had essentially put in place and maintained by the US.

In contrast, China appears to be in a relatively stable, predictable, and some would even say, a positive factor, as far as the international landscape is concerned, which continues to be transformed. Very interestingly, the US and Chinese role seems to have undergone a complete reversal, with the US under Trump expected to head to greater protectionism, while Xi Jinping took the high road at the recently held APEC Summit and promised an even more open China: "doors are open and they will open even wider." Also China would lead a much broader Trans Pacific free trade agreement which the Chinese had already proposed when the Summit was held in Beijing a couple of years ago. So the Chinese leadership and the trade regime that China is proposing is beginning to look positively enticing, even to the major trade partners of the US.

In the next decade how will US-China relations unfold? Much of what happens in the rest of the world will very much depend on how this relationship unfolds. How will it shape the external environment for countries like India? How China perceives the Trump Presidency?

I believe that China looks upon the Trump Presidency as an opportunity to further China's regional and international profile. There may be some anxieties over Trump's threats of imposing punitive tariffs on imports from China and declare China as a currency manipulator. However, I think China believes that more than half a trillion dollar of US-China trade and significant investments which have been made by major US companies in China, in addition to China continuing to hold a very large volume of US Treasury securities, will restrain the Trump administration from damaging US-China economic relationships as damage to the US interest will be quite considerable. Thus, the Chinese believe that the threat to the economic and trade front will actually be limited.

On the other hand, they would welcome a possible retrenchment of US military presence in the Asia Pacific, which Trump has signalled, with loosening of US security ties with both allies and partners in the region. Since China believes that its dominant position in the region is constrained mainly by US power, a relative decline of that power will be welcome to China. However it would expect a graduated steady decline, so as not to trigger a possible nuclear acquisition by Japan and perhaps Republic of Korea as well. It would not want to push it in that direction. If trends are indeed in that direction, then I would expect pressures to increase on the South Asian countries, where pressures are already considerable from China. These will increase and there is likely to be more

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activism on the Taiwan issue, which China hopes the US will not be as prepared for, as it has been in the past, to actually defend Taiwan.

Against this background, a US-Russia détente under Trump, from the Indian perspective would be quite welcome. Until now, Europe has been following the American lead in trying to isolate and sanction Russia; though they followed the US lead, Germany and other countries were not particularly enthusiastic about sanctioning Russia, as it not

I do not agree with the view that China's capacity to achieve such technological progress demands political democracy. Chinese politics is likely to rather continue to trend towards authoritarianism. According to Chinese popular perception, internal peace and prosperity has flourished in times of strong, centralized and indeed expanding empires.

only affected their political relationship but also economic relations. However if there is a Trump outreach to Putin, this might revive several politico economic relations that had developed between Post-Cold War Russia and European partners, particularly Germany. Russia was always interested in seeing itself as an European power rather than an interloper on its margin, which once again is a question that lies in the horizon. Russia's traditional anxieties therefore about resurging China may resurface. This may thus include a degree of balance, in what otherwise unreservedly is seen as the Chinese decade.

Some analysts believe that economic imbalances in China

are reaching a point where crisis is possible, and economic slowdown is perhaps inevitable. Nevertheless, the Chinese economy has now reached a degree of maturity, as also diversity. The management of the economy has been remarkably sophisticated and the capacity for creative innovation and technological progress is evident. I do not agree with the view that China's capacity to achieve such technological progress demands political democracy. Joseph Niedham's monumental work on China's Science and Technology would lead us to think otherwise. Chinese politics is likely to rather continue to trend towards authoritarianism. According to Chinese popular perception, internal peace and prosperity has flourished in times of strong, centralized and indeed expanding empires. So, it is essentially ingrained in the Chinese psyche that it is when the Empire/Centre has been weak, there has been great economic distress and political fragmentation. So essentially this sense of need for a strong centralized centre of power is hardwired in the Chinese psyche. Therefore, I do not foresee the Chinese following the East Asia model of economic prosperity leading to some recognizable form of representative democracy.

So what does it mean for India in the next decade? The management of India-China relations obviously will become much more complex, much more challenging, than any time in the history of independent India. In my view there will be this need to keep a fine distinction between treating China as an adversary, which it obviously is and will possibly remain for the foreseeable future, and casting it in the role of an enemy. In acknowledging its role as an adversary, one will inevitably have to fashion a very nuanced mix of engagement and resistance, and this mix will change as India's own correlation with China changes, and the regional and global environment continues to evolve.

In the decade ahead I envisage the power gap between India and China, in terms of military and economic capabilities, to be large and ever expanding. China's economy is five times more than that of India and even if India was to grow in the next several years at 8-9% per

annum and China slows down to may be 4-5 % per annum, what China will be adding with that 5% on a huge base will still be much more than what India will be adding on a much smaller base. So I don't think we should have any illusion that this gap will narrow down in the next decade. Certainly not in the next decade, may be later but not in the decade ahead.

This would suggest to me a policy of prudence and not provocation. Caution and avoidance of bravado. On the contested border we need to deploy both air and ground capabilities, which would render any Chinese military probing or something more significant a risky affair for the Chinese with unpredictable outcomes. There should be no hesitation in continuing to strengthen security arrangements with the US which even with its power in relative decline will remain the indispensable global power with unmatched technological and military capabilities, in the decade to come.

The changed environment in the region will create opportunities for India too, as it does for China. Japan, South East Asia and Australia would welcome an expanded Indian footprint in the region and there may be greater willingness to seek expanded security, in particular,

maritime co-operation with India. These relations need to be pursued with greater vigour and we should not be inhibited by anxieties over Chinese adverse reaction. In my opinion Chinese restraint is more likely, if India has a strong network of political, economic and security relationships with major powers and other partners in the region, rather than if such a network was weakened because of China. A relatively isolated India will be more vulnerable to Chinese pressure than otherwise.

And the engagement aspect remains critically important. Although there will be points of contestation with China's relations with Pakistan and opposition to India's NSG membership and other similar issues. India's membership of the G-20, Shanghai Cooperation, BRICS, India- China- Russia trilateral are all very useful platforms for engaging China and providing opportunities for regular meetings at the top leadership level. Our experience over the past decade and more has been that such summits have lent a degree of stability in the relationship and has enabled both countries to manage very complex and sometimes fractious relationships. In the decade to come such leadership engagements/meetings will become even more relevant.

Professor Emeritus John W. Garver

China's Foreign Policy in the Coming Decade

Inaugural Address

Prof Garver pointed out that one very crucial guiding principle of Chinese strategy is China's Peaceful Rise, of rising into its deserving, great power stature and eminence in the world, and do so peacefully, without using military power, bloodshed and coercion. The Chinese draw a distinction between their coercive strategy in East China Sea and Vladimir Putin's coercive policy that involves much more bloodshed in Ukraine. Prof Garver believes that China realises its rapidly growing power to be unnerving for the neighbouring countries in the region. The strategy of Peaceful Rise is China's attempt for reassuring to its neighbouring countries that they need not be apprehensive of China's growing power. So, apart from being diplomatic, it

is also propaganda. Xi Zinping has identified 2049 as the point where China will realise an all round developed country status at the centennial anniversary of the foundation of the PRC. China imagines itself to be a great power not only in economic terms but also technological terms. China's Space Programme is perhaps the best indication of this. It is in also in sync with China's aspiration of being the leading technological giant, wherein they have targeted among their core state supported projects a number of transformative projects of Nano Technology, Quantum Computing, Artificial Intelligence so on and so forth. The Chinese term for this is Comprehensive National Power and they have devised complex matrixes to measure this Comprehensive National Power.

Prof Garver underlined that a key component of this

Comprehensive National Power idea is avoidance of any direct confrontation with the US. Since 1978 it has predicated upon American support of Chinese development, overall scientific, agricultural, economic and educational development by getting access to western capital and western markets. Tracing back to 1899, the core idea of traditional US' Chinese policy was to support the Americans for a strong united China so as to maintain the balance of power in the region. Because of China's increased assertiveness, US is now revising and questioning its original, traditional policy of US-China relations, as it is apprehensive of China's intentions. So, the world is going through a turbulent phase of change.

There are a few inflection points in China's increasing assertiveness, which again underlies US rethinking its traditional policies. In 2008 the global economic crisis had struck, employment skyrocketed over 10%, and Europe was in depths of a stagnant debt crisis. China on the other hand, handled it quite stably by initiating





Prof John W Garver | Inaugural Address

massive infrastructure projects that took it off from the crisis having a much advantageous position. The conclusion was that China should be more assertive, proactive and use its power not in a coercive way, rather it should be forceful in asserting its demands in the world forum. China's intention in the East China Sea and South China Sea was to effectively change the status quo by creative use of coercion and persuasion.

Regarding the change in correlation of forces, and change in the Comprehensive National Power, the second inflection point came in 2012, wherein the regime in many ways is fragile and the Chinese centralised regime is apprehensive about a spark off of a democratic revolution from within the state. It is an authoritarian, centralised state but in many ways it is brittle; India on the other hand has an advantageous position of ingrained democratic traditions.

The other mechanism is appeal to nationalism, the rhetoric of 'China Dream' as how it is projected and propagated under Xi Jinping's leadership. This rhetoric of nationalism resonates in China throughout as it is also enunciated through the doctrine of One Belt One Road and all other massively ambitious projects. China perceives such ambitious infrastructure projects to be laying the basis for a win-win situation, where communities of common development in China and its neighbours, powered in part by the Chinese economic locomotive, can conjointly develop and enhance trade and commerce in this region.

Because of China's increased assertiveness, US is now revising and questioning its original, traditional policy of US-China relations, as it is apprehensive of China's intentions. So, the world is going through a turbulent phase of change.

China's Domestic & Political Challenges

Premise: Internal Developments in China. Xi Jinping's authoritarian governance principles include, crackdown on corruption targeting top level Party and PLA leadership, hardliner towards media freedom, human rights and censorship. Simultaneously there is emphasis on the **China Dream**. Yet, these measures are creating tensions in society that according to some views may challenge the leadership of the Communist Party itself in the coming decade. What are the possibilities of this development?

Ambassador

Nalin Surie

(CHAIRPERSON)

The general consensus was that China has progressed and evolved from its original temperament. It has developed both as a society and a political system over the years. The change has originated from economic, social, political, external pressures. This is also a consequence of unprecedented double digit growth since 1979; a growth that would not have been possible without external support and dependence. During the last few years, China has been coping with the fall out of the global financial and economic crisis. At the same time, it has begun to match its ambitions with its exponential growth. China visualizes itself as part of a new G-2. It has also begun to over-reach for example, in the South China Seas.

The main features of China

today include, inter-alia, the following:

- China has a relatively open system which is seriously impacted by outside influences.
- Corruption has grown very significantly and has been recognized as a critical problem by the Party. The Party's distance from the people has grown; there is huge growth in inequality, debt and regional disparities. Growth rate has reduced. There are serious inadequacies in health, education and urbanization. The economy has many sectors where there is over capacity and unemployment is a problem.
- The forthcoming Trump presidency, distress in Europe and impact of the situation in the South China Seas require to be factored in.

The challenges before the Party, therefore, include the following:

- i) Maintain supremacy of the Party and reform the Party.
- ii) Sustain growth to meet the targets set for doubling



Amb Nalin Surie

Session
One



Prof Alka Acharya

GDP and converting China into a moderately prosperous developed country. To meet this objective, China requires the world. It has to decide which model to adopt to reform the economy.

- iii) Surmount social challenges.
- iv) Address spiritual and religious issues
- v) Address cultural challenges and
- vi) Reform of the PLA; issues of absolute control by the Party Vs. modernization.

Prof. Alka Acharya

Prof Acharya initiated the discussion by raising the first issue about comprehending the remarkable challenges that are existent within China and also those that it poses outside, and the consequential effect it has on the entire system. She emphasized the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and its omnipresent supremacy that has contributed to the success of the country. A relevant issue in understanding the dynamic of change in the political system within China today, with recourse to human rights question, acute ethnic repression and an increasingly isolated party from the people. Considering the profusion of questions that are raised in order to assess the trajectory of China's development, the consequences of its rising power globally so on and so forth- a conundrum that rests still, to be answered, is whether China is going to break up like the Soviet Union in the near future?

The Party's distance from the people has grown; there is huge growth in inequality, debt and regional disparities. Growth rate has reduced. There are serious inadequacies in health, education and urbanization.



Further, the extension to this question is what foretells Chinese future accurately – the literature that is divided into two broad frameworks, firstly a western Eurocentric view that requires China to democratize or a Confucianist approach that gives more emphasis to East Asian tradition. Prof. Acharya opines that giving any one approach sole emphasis projects an inadequate and skewed understanding of China. The truth lies somewhere in the integration of both approaches.

An overview of the legacy of history and the institutions that have evolved in the last three decades, the role of outside world in bringing China where it is today, and a party that has sought to adapt itself in the ways in which these changes has come about helps to comprehend the dynamics at play. Literature on the issue, although many a times are critical still proves that a remarkable scope of flexibility exists in the workings of the CPC. Prof Acharya believes that all evidence in this

regard point to the fact that the party and the polity despite its authoritarian nature has proved to be remarkably flexible and resilient towards addressing the challenges that have come about, they have sought to incorporate the challenges within the system. Thus, while maintaining stability and emphasizing the continuity of primacy of the party above all, they have been open to 'change within the system', so as to reduce attempts at 'change of the system'. The Chinese have provided themselves their own safety valves, with an allowance of protests happening, despite variations in the process of how this is handled.

She quotes research by Tony Sage that although points out the dissatisfaction among the local population on certain issues, gives great credence to first, the absence of restriction in collecting this data and second, a general acceptance and approval of the direction of reform being implemented by Xi Jinping among local population. Thus

dissatisfaction although present, it is not of the order that could threaten the system.

The challenge is thus for Xi Jinping to successfully implement core strategies like the One Belt One Road and leading the global discourse on policies for internet governance, environmental protection, renewable energy and space and reduce corruption. He must thus provide for a moderately prosperous society, while simultaneously ensuring a socialist modern economy.

Mr. Pramit Pal Chaudhari

Mr. Chaudhari, the discussant for the session, initiated the dialogue by laying out the challenges facing Xi Jinping in China in terms of issue areas, of politics, economy and foreign policy. Economy and politics are although conjoined phenomena in China, the necessary amount of stimulus that is required to keep the wheel going is however, unsustainable, which the Chinese recognise. He drew attention towards the importance of a successful transition after the reform process started by Xi Jinping. Xi's plans of the One Belt One Road (OBOR), strengthening of regional platforms, pushing the World Bank for loans, environment and defence reforms and becoming a world leader in internet security issues, are ambiguous at best and adventurous at least.

There is a growing sense of bereavement, and an overall consensus formation for implementation of changes/ reforms or else growth levels will fall by 2 % ,(according to one estimate). This might prove extremely damaging to the legitimacy of the Party. But, Chaudhari reinstates that despite this, Xi has emerged out with enormous consensus within Polit Bureau committee, other factions so on and so forth. Xi Jinping has been recently declared the core of the party, yet his resistance towards reforms, rather a lacklustre attitude towards implementation of the reforms that are being propagated in the party literature has continued. A rough estimate states that, out of a 1000 economic reforms that he had announced or the courtly had put out in literature, a mere 200 of them has actually been taken forth. This has a resounding effect on the growth trajectory of China which as Chaudhari opines is slowly, but surely declining.

Xi's face resistance towards the military, a strong hand towards carrying out an anti corruption drive is juxtaposed with a combination of definite political resistance, along with a sense of disillusionment and passivity from many in the system and especially the bureaucracy who are in disarray as to what is actually going on. Bureaucracy is terrified, at the provincial level, it's not apathy but rather bafflement at what is going on, but Xi is definitely not carrying out even the fraction of the reforms they sought out to do, failing to implement even the basic reforms.

Although, Xi has successfully consolidated power within the party, dissent and passivity still grows among the bureaucracy and the PLA against the anti-corruption campaign, and inability/incompetency of Li Keqiang to implement reforms and the radicalism of the same.

A micro look at the economy would suggest growing property speculation and creation of credit bubbles that has stemmed the flow of funding for infrastructure projects in cities and townships. Thus in effect the structural reforms are going on very slowly, and the stimulus itself has also gone array.

Mr. Chaudhari also cautions that the change in guard from the Obama government to the Trump administration could lead to instability and currency wars, with an effective reversal of the external variable which China has not actually expected, and also during the time, wherein they are carrying out enormous reforms within the system.

The discussion concluded the session. Questions about the nature of transformation and continuity, the position of Li Keqiang within the CPC, and best practices that can be developed were raised and answered.

The challenge for Xi Jinping is to successfully implement core strategies like the One Belt One Road and leading the global discourse on policies for internet governance, environmental protection, renewable energy and space and reduce corruption.



Mr Pramit Pal Chaudhari



Lt Gen SL Narasimhan
Mr Jayadeva Ranade

Session Two

A New PLA? Reorganisation and its Implications


Premise: China has recently initiated a massive and unprecedented restructuring of the PLA. The reforms extend to not just a reorganization and restructuring of the PLA, but also doctrinal transformation meant to orient the PLA to fight a new form of war to be conducted in likely six major dimensions - land, sea, air, space, undersea and cyber. What are the specific developments in these fields and their implications? How will it impact on the Indo-Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass?

Mr. Jayadeva Ranade

To set it in the context of what China hopes to achieve and what these reforms constitute, this is the most critical and sensitive reform initiative that Xi Jinping has taken. This reform of the PLA is the most far reaching and extensive ever undertaken. The CCP has depended on the PLA as a vital pillar to enforce its legitimacy and maintained a firm grip over it. Within days of Xi Jinping taking over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he declared that political reliability will be the determining criteria for promotions in the PLA. Within the PLA the Party presence has been increased with the expansion of responsibilities and the role given to the Party Commissar attached to each company. The promotion of PLA field or operational commanders too depends solely on assessment of their political reliability.

Understanding Xi Jinping's personality is prudent while assessing this courageous reform initiative. With him being designated as the 'core of the Party', Xi Jinping has got more authority and been placed a definite notch above all other Polit Bureau Standing Committee members.

As the PLA reforms are undertaken, it is pertinent to note that Xi Jinping's acolytes claim he is ushering in a new 30-year era akin to those earlier of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. His articulation of the '**China Dream**', '**OBOR**' etc, represent the benchmarks that he hopes to achieve and which the PLA, once it is restructured and reformed, is going to be called upon to achieve. Relevant too is China's vision of what is happening around the world. There have been increased references by Chinese leaders and in China's official media - indicating a fear or apprehension - to 'colour revolutions' being propagated or being pushed by the US. In their year-end assessments of the international situation China's



National Defence University and Academy of Military Sciences both observed that strain in the US-China relationship has increased, tensions in the Asia-Pacific have heightened and tension has increased along the southern borders with India. In fact, Chinese diplomats now say that China-India relations are at a "critical stage".

Meanwhile, since about 2007-08 Chinese strategic analysts have advocated new strategies such as the theory of 'boundless national interest' {wherever China has national and strategic interests, there the Chinese military has the right to intervene}. There are other arguments and recommendations that have been accepted and are now being followed by China. These include: China should shape the neighbouring environment rather than just integrating into it as China today has the capacity to do so; and China should confront difficult issues instead of setting them aside so as not to offend the other country.

Recommendations of China's Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy held in Beijing in October 2013, have also been accepted. These include such decisive measures as China for the first time in its history forming security alliances, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) for the first time in its history designating countries 'friend' and 'foe' and promising the former untold financial, diplomatic and other benefits. It also suggested that China should, with some select countries, form a "community of common destiny". These recommendations are being implemented and examples are: the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is actually trying to bend borders, China's tough stance vis-a-vis Taiwan, and China's persistence in what it calls the 'recovery' of its sovereignty

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over the South China Sea.

Xi Jinping worked hard to build a consensus to push through the modernisation and reform of the PLA. His efforts were facilitated by a series of conferences covering over 700 PLA units, a 40 percent pay hike to PLA troops and officers, consecutive 'education campaigns' by the General Political Department throughout the PLA and, most



campaign spearheaded by the CDIC which has felled over 86 PLA officers of the rank of Major General and above. The latter has obviously been used to eliminate opposition.

The PLA is critical to Xi Jinping's '**China Dream**' and for implementing the OBOR and CPEC. In the near future the PLA shall be given the responsibility to ensure the smooth construction of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and implementation of the OBOR. The success of China's peripheral diplomacy and 'Theory of Boundless

National Interest" also involve PLA involvement.

For India crucial could be the period around 2020 when the PLA's reform and restructuring is completed and its coinciding with the deadline for achieving the China Dream which is 2021, or the CCP's centenary! It is around this time that the issue of the Dalai Lama's reincarnation could again surface.

Col. Arvind Chauhan

Along with Mr. Ranade, Col Chauhan, talked about the nature of reforms. It includes creation of theatre commands in the North, South, South-East, Central and West. The General Staff has been significantly reduced. Three new commands have been built - PLA's General Command Army, PLA Rocket Force, and PLA Strategic Support Force. There has been a reduction in the number of defence institutions, and work has been outsourced to civil institutions. The PLA Air Force is being downsized whereas the Navy has been given more importance to fulfil the maritime ambitions. There is increased effort to boost indigenous research and development from building 6 aircraft carriers in the next 15 years, to building a jet engine for fifth generation aircrafts and acceleration in plans for building better, faster nuclear submarines. Although the doctrinal aspects of these reforms indicate defensive strategies, these

indicate an offensive role. The Rocket Force has been tasked to improve the range and accuracy of the rocket systems. The strategic support force has been raised to develop cyber security as well as offensive cyber operations capability.

Lt. Gen. SL Narasimhan

(CHAIRPERSON)

He cautioned against paranoia from the Indian side regarding reform plans of the PLA. He opined that although the reform plans are admirable, it would be prudent to note that it will take a long time to be raised to operational status. Furthermore, the Indian Army too has undertaken a major reform process and is modernizing rapidly. Recommendations included a development of a vision, timely reforms, promoting indigenous R&D, promoting strategic partnerships of defence services with corporate structures and building affiliations with new technology centres. The stimulating discussion concluded that even though the PLA reforms planned were substantial and were being implemented rapidly, India too was in the process of undertaking similar modernization. This must remain an important issue of study and analyses and that counter measures must be put in place to prevent any surprises from the PLA in the future.

Session Three

China's Economy - Stumbles for a Tiger Economy?

Premise: China's economy is likely seeing a 'new norm' of growth. From near double digits in recent years, it is slipping now to about six percent and entering a period of lower growth. With rapid demographic changes there is a real possibility that China may grow old before it gets rich. Will it then fall into the middle income trap? Or, to avoid this possible outcome, will it adopt aggressive economic expansion into Eurasia and Indian Ocean littoral through its OBOR initiative? What will be the response from its larger neighbourhood? Will the Chinese economic growth satisfy internal demands for better living conditions?


Ambassador Lalit Mansingh

(CHAIRPERSON)

The Chair flagged questions regarding China's overcapacity in selected industries, enormous public debt, questionable trading model and the uncertainty of the success of reforms, which have all questioned the future of the Chinese market. Another issue is the Chinese quest for heading the largest market of the world, will that come to fruition with the CPEC lead by China? Furthermore is the issue about the ambitious project of the Chinese Development Model, will China be able to afford this lavish generosity to developing countries? Pakistan and many African countries have started



Amb Lalit Mansingh, with panelists Dr Mohan Guruswamy, Dr Sanjaya Baru and Dr Arvind Virmani



Dr Mohan Guruswamy

Pakistan and many African countries have started questioning China's promise of investments; India hasn't seen much support either, despite the frequency of PM Modi's visits to China.

questioning China's promise of investments; India hasn't seen much support either, despite the frequency of PM Modi's visits to China. Finally, what is the impact of Chinese growth on the bilateral economic relations? The Chair opened the floor for further debate on whether to accede to a pessimistic assessment of the lopsided India-China bilateral relations. The discussions revolved around whether there were economic cracks in the Great Wall of China today.


Dr. Mohan Guruswamy

Dr Guruswamy set off the discussion, by opposing with the viewpoint of a likelihood of a second crash of the Chinese market in the near future. While he conceded that there has been a slowdown in the market, he attributed this slowdown not to the Chinese industry but to the global economic crisis. He shared data wherein it showed that the world as a whole is slowing down, with growth rate of 2.5 % and per capita growth of 2%. This growth is quite spectacular, with world GDP growth in the last 6 years coming down from 5.4 % to currently 3.16%. Dr. Guruswamy predicts a further drop in this level wherein, this

slowdown will invariably have a major impact on China. He opined, that this will inevitably lead to slowing down of the Chinese economy, but the more crucial issue is a demographic hit that China is facing currently. Moreover, owing to its blistering growth levels, China is increasingly becoming richer, that in turn raises possibilities of a reduction in growth rate.

Dr. Guruswamy raised the question whether India can catch up with China and close the gap. He assessed that regardless of the slowdown in Chinese economy and the rapid growth of the Indian market, India can never catch up to China's growth rate. This is because of the significant great leap forward China has made since 1978 wherein China has become the driver of world trade and the prime contributor to most of the world's GDP. In 1998, from a 1trillion worth economy it had to expand by 100billion \$/year and consumed 10 % of world's raw materials. In 2011 in order to grow from a 15 trillion economy it had to expand by 550billion\$/year and thus it used a whopping 30% of the global commodity production. Dr. Guruswamy says that although there is a definite limit to this growth trajectory, yet in terms of sheer value addition, these growth figures are much higher than what India contributes, even if it reaches a 10 % GDP growth rate.

He explained the dependency



level of world economy on Chinese growth, that's twice that of US. Data projections, predict that China will contribute to the world 26.4 % in the next six years whereas US will contribute 12.8 % and the European Union and India contributing 10% and 9.95 % respectively. This attributes to the kind of weight China carries in the world economy. The Chinese trajectory is along the line as projected by EIU and The World Bank, the trend is 5% which is still superior to any other despite a nominal GDP drop.

China's world GDP in PPT terms is projected to increase from 16.5 % to a peak of 20 % in 2030 before easing slightly to 19.5 % in 2050. However this growth rate will decrease as demographic fortunes are overturned, as China grows old, a phenomenon which Mr. Guruswamy calls as the Great White Hope. As demographic dividend is over and demographic fortunes are reversed, the economy will slow down, irrespective of other factors driving growth. Since Chinese factors driving economic and political governance is premised on a near double digit growth, that will require substantial policy change. He opines that a more realistic projection will be that the growth will level off at about 6%, with work force projections slowing down due to demographic downfall. Following the most tremendous of economic expansions in the world history, China's gradual transition towards a 'New Normal' of slower but more sustainable growth is to be welcome. What the Chinese need to ensure is that, future growth occurs at a durable level.

He concluded the session by reiterating that all the talk on the likelihood of a collapse of the Chinese growth model is slim. The Chinese still have many years of increasing prosperity, the biggest step to such crash is not

All the talk on the likelihood of a collapse of the Chinese growth model is slim. The Chinese still have many years of increasing prosperity, the biggest step to such crash is not a stock market crash or a credit bubble but it is the danger that China's peaceful rise will be disrupted by conflict with its neighbours.



At a time when world growth is slowing down, and political tensions are prevalent in China, the ability of the rest of the world to drive China's growth is actually weakening. This suggests that there lies more power in import capability rather than export capability.

a stock market crash or a credit bubble but it is the danger that China's peaceful rise will be disrupted by conflict with its neighbours.

Dr. Sanjaya Baru

The discussant of this session, Dr Baru, believes that the recent developments in geopolitics within South Asia where China is building its allies, isn't a surprise. This strategy had been put to play a decade ago. It has started to manifest itself now in the form of the OBOR project and the CPEC. In Dr Baru's opinion China has enough managerial potential, political heft to resolve its problems that China has time and again demonstrated with its immense political resilience. He, thus, believes that it is immature to predict what shall happen, and how the numerous data projections might bear out. Furthermore within China, the enormity of the anti-corruption campaign, which has massive political consequences at the provincial level and at the centre, is yet not destabilising to the point that will threaten the party rule in China.

Contrary to Dr Guruswamy's argument regarding the world's trade dependency on China, Dr Baru believes it is as much of strength as it is vulnerability, with China's increasing export dependency that is bound to have cracks in the structure. He rather believes, that at a time when world growth is slowing down, and political tensions are prevalent in

China, the ability of the rest of the world to drive China's growth is actually weakening. This suggests that there lies more power in import capability rather than export capability.

Finally in terms of bilateral ties with China, Dr Baru believes that India must make an increased effort to reassess its bilateral relations and seek massive investments from China. This requires acceptance, and working on the assumption that China will remain a dominant economy, a dominant power in decades to come. The biggest challenge to India, is to deal with this disparate power differential, and build a strong economic relationship to balance out the troubled political relationship. Contradictory to Arvind Subramaniam's view in 'Eclipse', Mr. Baru believes it is going to be a multi-polar world where China will remain a significant player.

Dr. Arvind Virmani

He gave an optimistic assessment of India's future. According to him, gaps in production do not matter as much as growth rates that can be met and surpassed. He predicted that within the next three decades this economic gap will be closed between India and China. When the gap is closed both the PPT and the current is converged.

He also opined that although the Chinese model has been resilient,

there has been no actual reform in terms of reorienting the economy from external to internal or from investment to consumption that is an absence of basic structural reforms. Furthermore, he differed from Mr. Guruswamy's opinion that China can be called a driver of growth despite its massive contribution to the world GDP. The recent market crash in August 2015 represents the precariousness of the Chinese economy. The discussion that followed raised questions on whether an opportunity cost maybe incurred due to environmental factors and other asymmetries or disjuncture in the Chinese economy and its implications. Whether it is responsible for widening or closing the gap between Indian and Chinese economy? Among other questions, the implications of the Trump presidency on the Chinese economy; and the debate regarding China being the driver or contributor of the world economy were also raised and answered.

Session Four

India-China relations in the coming decade- Cooperation or Confrontation?

Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee in conversation with Dhruva Jaishankar, Zorawar Daulet Singh, Jabin T. Jacob and Mallika Joseph

The discussion centred on what could possibly be the nature of India-China relations, and the subsequent implications of this evolving liaison , on shaping policies for both India and China in the near future. Also what could be the varied terms of engagement with China that will allow a constructive relationship to thrive?

Mr. Dhruva Jaishankar

was of the opinion that there has been a sharp deterioration in India-China bilateral relations in the past few years. This can only be remedied through dialogue and clarity on issues like regional security; bilateral security; multilateral issues such as

trade, nuclear non-proliferation, cyber security, environmental protection and finally bilateral economic relations. Certain policies that have been articulated by the two governments such as the 'China Dream' and the 'Make in India' project overlap and are points of possible convergence. However, areas of divergence in policy, like China's OBOR initiative and India's Act East and Neighbourhood First policies, and the ambitions of both nations to project themselves as leading powers, can give rise to competition and possible confrontation/conflict.

The obstacles to the relationship between India and China could be lack of internal balance, problems of



Mr Dhruva Jaishankar

connectivity (both in terms of infrastructure and institutions), differences on global governance, ambiguous red lines and inability to enforce them and inability to use asymmetric options to find solutions. In order to maintain balance of power in asymmetric relations, India should respond through engagement with Chinese civil society; overseas capability [critical infrastructure and offensive cyber capabilities]; market access etc.

The core policy assumptions that has been driving India's China policy for the last decade, are firstly that, the US will be the preponderant power in Asia-Pacific and secondly China will maintain an accommodative posture to this US led order. These presumptions are proving fool hardy,

Mr. Zorawar Daulet Singh

emphasized that the core policy assumptions that has been driving India's China policy for the last decade, are firstly that, the US will be the preponderant power in Asia-Pacific and secondly China will maintain an accommodative posture to this US led order. These presumptions are proving fool hardy, as US is redefining its role in the Asia Pacific where it is not seeking preponderance, but is rather adapting to a multi-polar setting. The Chinese on the other hand are defecting from their prior stance and are re-crafting an independent

position. He pointed out that India- China relations today are at a 'hinge' moment and thus India can no longer work its foreign policy around China by treating it as the elephant in the room. There has to be a new form of interdependence. In order to play an effective balance of power strategy in the Asia Pacific region, India requires anticipating and preparing for counter responses in its immediate setting and engaging directly with China.

About the significance of geostrategic dimension of India China relations, he highlighted the significance of the border dispute and military security in the South Asian region. He advocates military deterrence and security; and developing financial capacity; state capacity as toolkits to deal with the highly sophisticated geo-political and geo-economic influence that China is projecting. India also needs to make realistic assessments of its material capabilities and role in South Asia, which might include the possibility of working with China in managing sub-regional affairs.

Dr. Jabin Jacob opined that there would be both confrontation and cooperation between India and China in the next decade. The focus had to be on developing best practices in the practice and implementation of India's foreign policy. Dr. Jacob advocated a re-conceptualisation of the centralised Foreign Service to one that grew organically from the States upwards. In other words, Foreign Service officers had to be recruited from the states and go up the ladder into the central government's Foreign Service after having served at the state level dealing with foreign countries on issues such as soliciting economic investments, managing sister-city and sister-province partnerships, and diaspora affairs. He suggested federalism could only be strengthened by engaging Chief Ministers of Border States in discussions on foreign policy. He also called for increasing the number of groups that have access to information on China and inviting public opinion, which would go a long way in providing greater creativity to and shaping India's China policy.



Mr Zorawar Daulet Singh



Dr Jabin Jacob



Prof Mallika Joseph

India had to reconsider its present system of interaction and engagement with China. The modes of communication with the Chinese government and its policy community had to be sustained despite ups and downs in the relationship and red lines had to be communicated clearly. To support such a process, Dr Jacob called for developing qualified China experts within the various branches of government including the military and legal services as well as greater pressure on academia to improve quality and skills.

Prof. Mallika Joseph talked about the dialectics at play in China in terms of economic stability, political stability and congruence at a larger level that is shaping up the relations between the State and the people. She called for a focus on common issues plaguing both countries like health, education, population growth and increasing political consciousness.

Prof Joseph assessed that despite the demographic dividend growing in India, there is much less investment, lack of implementation of policies. This will have a greater destabilising effect in creating differential narratives in between the people and the State, unlike in China.

She lastly re-emphasized the importance of the neighbourhood in shaping up India-China relations, and re-focus and implementation of Act East policy for strengthening India's sphere of influence in the neighbourhood region.

India needs to increase the number of groups that have access to information on China and involve them in public discussions. This would go a long way in providing greater creativity to and shaping India's China policy.



Valedictory Session | Dr C Rajamohan, Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee and Amb Shiv Shankar Menon

Valedictory Session

The nature, history and growth of both nations are diverse and dissimilar. It is imperative to accept this fact and move beyond catching up with China.

Dr. C Raja Mohan

Dr. C Raja Mohan set off the discussion by contextualising the present setting wherein he cautioned about the dire need to change our assumptions about China's rise, the single most significant and transformative geopolitical fact in time. This requires an urgent reversal of strategy that assumes an illusive parity with China. The nature, history and growth of both nations are diverse and dissimilar. The strengths of one can't be compared to the strength's of the other. It is imperative to accept this fact and move beyond catching up with China. Raja Mohan opined that the world will see a new Chinese rise to power, that has the political will to exercise it in the system. Wherein in order to satiate its demands, China will assert its authority to achieve the objectives in the world domain.

He suggests that the crucial step towards building sustainable strategic solutions is acceptance of the asymmetric relations with China. Power imbalances in the system needs to be met by building alliances and partnerships with other countries at a global level, that is integral to bridge the gap. To this end, civil society interactions, trade relations, and regional security engagements must be used as common ground.



Dr C Rajamohan

Valedictory Address

Between 2012 and 2014 China, Japan and India put in power authoritarian centralizers, conservative within their own traditions... This matters because it makes dialogue difficult, and compromises much more confused.

His advice to policy makers: hold the North with China and consolidate the South; integrate the South Asian region and balance the East. Indian policy in the near future needs to take account of the current power asymmetry with China and shape a policy of prudence, that while accepting this reality ,will seek new balances and partnerships. This requires a fundamental re-crafting of

strategy with the neighbouring countries and building flexible, issue specific, ad hoc coalitions at the global level. If China is to emerge as a major strategic challenge, should we not attempt to redefine our relations with Pakistan?

Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon

What is the present context?

Between 2012 and 2014 China, Japan and India put in power authoritarian centralizers, conservative within their own traditions, who present themselves as strong leaders, and who rely on nationalism bordering on xenophobia for legitimacy. Asia led; Europe and the US have followed. This matters because it makes dialogue difficult, and compromises much more confused and much less favourable international and bilateral situation. We are in an age of ultra-nationalism.

Both India and China have no choice but to undertake major internal restructuring of their economies. The CCP and the Indian electorate know that we are at a hinge moment of transformation. But the actual record of ability to change and reform is poor in both countries. China has done almost none of the reforms approved by the third plenum three years ago. India has reportedly implemented about 20% of the big 30 reforms that this government came to power promising to undertake.

On top of diminished capacity to drive internal change and compromise externally, the external environment is also much less favourable. Uncertainty in the international system has never been so high. We are all wondering how the sole superpower will behave under Trump. Some disengagement from the world and increasing de-globalisation seems likely.



Despite the increased uncertainty, the prospect of great power conflict is still low, but that the risks of great power involvement in conflicts with lesser powers or in regional flash-points is today higher than before.

Despite the increased uncertainty, the prospect of great power conflict is still low, but that the risks of great power involvement in conflicts with lesser powers or in regional flash-points is today higher than before, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. The Asia-Pacific is unstable, but not critical. Unstable because of rapid shifts in the balance of power in the region; because the world's and history's greatest arms race in the last 30 years is happening in the region; because of the rekindling of territorial and maritime disputes; because of the return of geopolitics or great power contention between China and the US; and so on.

What is new in India-China relations?

The old *modus vivendi* of 30 years has now been broken. Signs of strain are clear. NSG membership, Masood Azhar listing etc. Both India and China have expanded their definitions of their core interests: India and CPEC/Karakoram highway in 1979; China in SCS etc.

When it comes to balance of power, the gap is growing. Not just relative or absolute gap; but perceptions too. Today peace is possible, because both think that their relative position will be better in the future. In which case why settle or decide issues now? Both wait for a stronger hand. There's some rubbing up against each other in the periphery that we share. Nevertheless, there is a basis of hard interest that shows we can work together.

Also putting into context the change in US factor - if Trump implements 20% of what he promised in the campaign, we will see a significant US

security disengagement from Asia-Pacific, creating space for China. We already see an Asia-Pacific tending towards China: ASEAN on SCS; Philippines, Malaysia only the latest to accommodate China's wishes. Can Japan hold to Abe's hardline alone? China's increased commitment to Pakistan - CPEC; Gwadar and IOR. Their long term presence in POK is a Chinese bet on Pakistan's continued hold on POK, and therefore points to an interest in Pakistan's stability that did not exist before.

Where will we be in 10 years?

China: Where China will be in ten years depends less on economics than on politics: Xi's role is a big question. Will he be a revolutionary or reformer, a Mao or a Deng? In the sense of being will he be a hard revolutionary trying to change the international system and China's control of it? Or be accommodating abroad and concentrate on internal changes?

Whatever the prognosis, China will be in the front rank of powers, probably the world's largest economy, with preponderant military power in the Asia-Pacific. But geography ensures that China will be a hemmed-in power in a crowded region.

If Xi Jinping succeeds in his 'China Dream,' in making China great again, do not expect China to behave as Western hegemon or

powers did in the past. China will not be another US setting international rules and providing security for an order that it manages. This is today's equivalent to the western wish/myth that China's economic development would bring democracy in its wake. To understand China's future behaviour, look at its past. There has never been a pax Sinica in Asia even in its immediate neighbourhood.

The real source of danger lies in the fact that China has no historical experience of a multiverse. Compare Chanakya and Sun Tzu. China has always been used to its own universe; homogenous, not plural; in its own image; hierarchical, obedient, and unipolar ; not multi-polar. It has sought primacy, status and recognition of its primacy, rather than the responsibility of running an international order or being a provider of security. This is not very good preparation for what China will face in the future if it succeeds in hitting its double hundred targets. Will it realise that in order to attain and maintain primacy it will need to work with others, with more than Pakistan and North Korea? If it does, then there is scope for us.

India's trajectory in the next ten years, on the other hand, depends on our success in managing our economic issues - providing the 11 million new jobs that are necessary

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Ten years from now India will be a great power, but again a different power from what IR theory predicts, not a superpower... We will therefore remain an internally focused power, concentrated on our internal transformation - a navel gazer.

to ensure our demographic dividend does not become a demographic disaster; ensuring the raw materials and energy that are missing from our resource endowment; managing the social and security consequences of urbanisation and inequality, and so on. Irrespective of the nature of the party and leaders in power, there has been remarkable consistency in Indian external and internal policies for the past twenty-five years.

Ten years from now India will be a great power, but again a different power from what IR theory predicts, not a superpower. We will still have a way to go in eliminating poverty, despite our accumulation of hard power and agency in the international system. We will therefore remain an internally focused power, concentrated on our internal transformation - a navel gazer. We will therefore still be accused of free-loading on the international system, such as it is or will be, and will still face calls to step up to our international responsibilities, even though our primary responsibility is to our own people.

What should India do?

- Hedging, keep our head down while internal balancing, and deal with the fact of China;
- Have an effective strategy for the IOR and Indian sub-continent. Don't whine; compete with China in the sub-continent. This is the key. We have strengths that we underestimate - outside state structures with each of our smaller neighbours;
- Build up comprehensive national power;
- Work with others; be as integrated and important to the region and others as possible;
- On that basis, engage China in a real strategic dialogue to work out a new *modus vivendi* involving managing differences; sensitivity to core interests where possible; and cooperating when opportunity presents itself.

The geopolitical scenario is changing for India. Conventional allies like Russia are also adapting and adjusting to the new international political system with China at its helm. To mitigate disaster, direct conversations with China are all the more necessary. Conventional methods cannot suit an asymmetric relationship. The use of civil society, soft power, institutions and language can help with bilateral relations. India and China must prevent external influence within the South Asian region and protect the interests of the region. The need of the hour is specific strategic intervention.



Programme

DAY 1- TUESDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 2016

Inaugural Session

1830-1900	Registration
1900-1905	Opening Remarks: Dr. Arvind Virmani , President FSI
1905-1910	Welcome Remarks: Pankaj Madan , KAS, Delhi
1910-1915	About the Seminar: Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee (retd)
1915-1945	Keynote Address: Amb Shyam Saran , former Foreign Secretary
1945-2005	Inaugural Address: Prof John Garver China's Foreign Policy in the Coming Decade
2005-2015	Discussion
2015-2130	Dinner

DAY 2- WEDNESDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2016

Session 1: China's Domestic and Political Challenges

1000-1030	Tea/Coffee
1030-1040	Chair : Amb Nalin Surie
1040-1100	Prof Alka Acharya
1100-1110	Discussant : Mr Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
1110-1130	Discussion
1130-1145	Tea /Coffee

Session 2: A New PLA? - Reorganization and its Implications

1145-1150	Chair : Lt Gen SL Narasimhan (retd)
1150-1210	Mr Jayadeva Ranade
1210-1220	Discussant : Col. Arvind Chauhan
1220-1300	Discussion
1300-1400	Lunch

Session 3: China's Economy - Stumbles for a Tiger Economy?

1400-1405	Chair : Amb Lalit Mansingh
1405-1425	Dr Mohan Guruswamy
1425-1435	Discussant : Dr Sanjaya Baru
1435-1445	Discussant : Dr Arvind Virmani
1445-1500	Discussion
1500-1515	Tea/Coffee

Session 4: India-China Relations in the Coming Decade – Cooperation or Confrontation?

1515-1600	Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee in conversation with Mr Dhruva Jaishankar, Mr Zorawar Daulet Singh, Dr Jabin Jacob, Prof Mallika Joseph
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Session 5: Valedictory

1600-1615	Dr C Raja Mohan , Carnegie India
1615-1645	Valedictory Address : Amb Shiv Shankar Menon , Former Foreign Secretary and NSA
1645-1700	Discussion
1700-1800	High Tea


Participants Profile



Arvind Virmani

Dr Arvind Virmani is the President of the Forum For Strategic Initiatives (FSI). He is also Mentor (economic policy) to FICCI and is also President of the non-profit Chintan® (www.ChintanLive.org),

96), Executive Director, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo, South Asia 1999-2002 and the IPCS as Director (1996-1999 & 2003-2011) and Mentor (2011-2016) and is now a Member of the Board of Governors, Forum for Strategic Initiatives.



Shyam Saran

Ambassador Shyam Saran, is a former Foreign Secretary and has served as the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for Nuclear Affairs and Climate Change. He is former Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board and currently Chairman, Research and Information System for Developing Countries. Saran was awarded the Padma Bhushan, for his contributions to the Indian Civil Service.



Dipankar Banerjee

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee, retired in 1996 from the Army and has been with the IDSA (Deputy Director 1992-



Nalin Surie

Ambassador Nalin Surie a retired senior diplomat who has extensive cross- sectoral experience on issues ranging across India's northern neighbourhood, China, Eastern Europe, The European Union, Africa, Latin America, Canada, IBSA and the UN. Since July 2015 he is the Director General of The Indian Council of World Affairs.



Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is the Foreign Affairs Editor of the Hindustan Times, based in New Delhi, and has been with the paper since 2000. He is also Distinguished Fellow and Head of Strategic Affairs, Ananta Aspen Centre.

John W. Garver

Dr. John W. Garver is Emertius Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He specializes in China's foreign relations. He is a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and is the author of twelve books and seventy-five refereed articles and book chapters dealing with China's foreign relations.



Alka Acharya

Professor Alka Acharya is currently on deputation as Director and Senior Fellow of the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, from the Centre for East Asian Studies (Chinese Studies), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), where she is Professor and former Chairperson.



SL Narasimhan

Lt Gen SL Narasimhan, is a distinguished former military officer in



the Indian Army and retired in 2016. He served as a Defence Attache in China. He is presently Member of the National Security Advisory Board.



Jayadeva Ranade

Mr Jayadeva Ranade, is President of the 'Centre for China Analysis and Strategy'. He is also a Member of the Core Group on China of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA); Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi; and Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi.



Col Arvind Chauhan


Col Arvind Chauhan is an infantry officer, commissioned into the First Gorkha Rifles in 1991. He has served in various parts of the country holding a variety of military appointments. He holds post graduate degrees in defence and strategic studies and has also trained in the United States of America, attending the Infantry Captains Career Course at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning where he was adjudged the Distinguished Honor Graduate having stood first on the course attended by 154 officers from 15 countries including the US. He is currently Director (Net Assessment) at Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence.



Lalit Mansingh

Ambassador Lalit Mansingh served as the Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs as well as the High Commissioner of India to UK and the Ambassador of India to USA. Since his

retirement he has been actively involved in several international organizations and Think Tanks as a Consultant, Advisor and Member, including the Brookings Institution in the US. A member of the Board of Governors of the FSI, till 2016 he was its President.



Mohan Guruswamy

Dr Mohan Guruswamy, one of the leading economists in India is presently a Member of the Board of Governors of the FSI. He is also Chairman of the Centre for Policy Alternatives and a Fellow of the Observer Research Foundation. He holds degrees from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Graduate School of Business and Stanford. His field of research is Public Policy, International Affairs and Management.



Sanjaya Baru

Dr Sanjaya Baru is a Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institution of India and Consulting Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK. He was director, Geo-economics and Strategy Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK and Media Advisor to the Prime Minister of India (2004-09).



Dhruva Jaishankar

Mr Dhruva Jaishankar is Fellow for Foreign Policy at Brookings India. He was previously a Transatlantic Fellow

and a program officer with the German Marshall Fund (GMF) in Washington, a research assistant at the Brookings Institution, and a news writer and reporter for CNN-IBN television in New Delhi. In 2013 he was selected as an IISS-SAIS Merrill Center Young Strategist



Zorawar Daulet Singh

Mr Zorawar Daulet Singh is a foreign-affairs analyst based in New Delhi and an Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies. He is a columnist and author and is presently a doctoral researcher at the India Institute, King's College London.



Jabin T. Jacob

Dr. Jabin T. Jacob is Fellow (Associate Professor) at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Jacob is co-editor of a book each on India's foreign policy and India-China relations and is presently Associate Editor of the ICS journal, China Report



Mallika Joseph

Professor Mallika Joseph was formerly a Director of the IPCS and the Executive Director, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies based in Colombo. She is currently Professor and Head of the Department of National Security Studies, Central University of Jammu. She specializes on security sector reform (SSR) and is one of 24 experts inducted into the UN Roster of SSR Experts in 2009.