POLICY PAPER

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Ukraine – NATO: Non-Military Cooperation and Response to Common Proxy Threats

Hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine posed new threats to the Allies that required strengthening of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, primarily in non-military fields. In such circumstances, Ukraine needs more support from the Alliance, but, at the same time, it has become a source of knowledge and experience in countering hybrid warfare. Today such cooperation actually turns into a common response to hybrid threats, and it should further focus on such key non-military areas: information security, strategic communications, cyber security, energy security, emergency response, demining, protection of human rights, and democratization of society. Accession of Ukraine to NATO Centres of Excellence should play an important role[1].

Hybrid nature of Russia's aggression against Ukraine makes evident that military force does not play the only decisive role. Therefore, resistance to such aggression must be rather complex with a wide range of non-military countermeasures than exclusively military one. They should include diplomatic, informational, economic, energy, cyber and other countermeasures, based on the platform of society-government partnership.

At the same time, to reach the goals of its hybrid aggression Russia uses the still existing in Ukraine stereotype that NATO is a purely military bloc and not an organization of collective security and defense. Even some advocates of Ukraine's membership in NATO are not aware of certain non-military activities of the Alliance, including crisis management and disaster response, scientific and technical cooperation, inter-parliamentary cooperation, cyber defense, energy security, promotion of democratic values, individual freedom, and rule of law etc.

Therefore, non-military areas of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, which were identified at the NATO Warsaw Summit (on 8-9 July 2016) and the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, require practical content and amplification to common NATO-Ukraine response to proxy threats. Simultaneously, the process of Euro-Atlantic integration should involve not only governmental structures of Ukraine, responsible for security and defense, but also other ministries and institutions, because this policy is nationwide.

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[1] Prepared on the results of the international round-table "Ukraine-NATO: Non-military Cooperation as Response to Common Proxy Threats" (February 9, 2017, Kyiv) and the survey of Ukrainian experts in January 2017.

Crypto war (hidden war) of the Russian Federation against Ukraine began long before 2014 and was waged in non-military areas as a complex of provoked by the RF information, energy and trade wars, which were not perceived as wars but after August 14, 2013 transformed into aggression of hybrid type, started with the blockade of Ukrainian exports to Russia, and the military phase started on February 20, 2014 with the beginning of the occupation of Crimea by the Russian troops.

Cooperation with the Alliance in non-military spheres creates additional opportunities to develop mechanisms of early warning and counteracting actual proxy challenges and threats. Its importance was marked by the Ukrainian experts who participated in the expert survey in January 2017[2]. 73.9% of respondents noted that the development of the NATO-Ukraine non-military cooperation could become a basis for combating modern proxy threats. Perspectives of that cooperation were discussed by the participants of the international round-table "NATO-Ukraine: Non-military Cooperation as Response to Common Proxy Threats" on February 09, 2017 in Kyiv (Ukraine)[3].

Assessment of non-military areas of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO

At the above mentioned round-table, the Head of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Office in Ukraine Gabriele Baumann noted that actuality and importance of the non-military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO laid in promotion of Euro-Atlantic values and democracy in Ukraine. At the same time, the Head of the NATO Representation to Ukraine Alexander Vinnikov emphasized that the Alliance adapted to new challenges, especially hybrid ones, and prepared to face new threats, and that Ukraine had already been counteracting them, that especially actualized non-military cooperation. The non-military dimension of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, as said the representative of the NATO Section of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Denys Chornyi, was more open for the Ukrainian society than the military one and, therefore, more understandable for common Ukrainians.

Non-military cooperation between NATO and Ukraine is realized in the political and practical dimensions. In the political dimension, according to Mr. Vinnikov's opinion, the Alliance provides international support to Ukraine in improving governance, protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity to counter the Russian aggression. In the practical dimension, Ukraine receives support, envisaged in the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package and aimed at developing Ukraine's ability for its defense against the external aggression and realization of national reforms.

Therefore, the governmental agencies of Ukraine should be actively involved into non-military cooperation with NATO. On the annual basis the Annual National Programme (ANP) under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission defines the list of these agencies and measures, implementation of which relies on them. It should be noted that the coordinating body of NATO-Ukraine cooperation is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine[4], and the ANP for 2017 is drafted with all elements of the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package.

The majority of measures of the Annual National Programme (around 60%) relates to non-military areas of cooperation, which are shaped mainly in the first chapter "Political and economic issues". They are, inter alia, internal policy and reforms, preventing and combating corruption, freedom of expression and information policy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic development, energy security, democratic control over the security sector, foreign policy, science, and ecological safety.

However, effectiveness of implementation of the ANP is low. In summer 2016, the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze estimated that a traditional level of implementation of the ANP was only 30%[5], and the main reason of that was a lack of interagency coordination. In addition, at the public discussion "Warsaw NATO

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[2] http://www.ucipr.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=516:ukra-na-nato-sp-lna-nev-yskova-sp-vpracya-u-protid-g-bridn-y-v-yn&catid=16&Itemid=186&lang=ua
[3] http://www.kas.de/ukraine/ukr/events/71489/
[4] http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5472016-20862
[5] http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2016/07/7/7051743/view_print/

Summit and Ukraine: What to Expect?" on July 06, 2016 in Kyiv (Ukraine), former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yevhen Marchuk stressed the extremely low involvement of Ukrainian ministries and agencies in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The same reason was suggested by the Ukrainian experts who negatively assessed the current level of activity of the Ukrainian authorities to develop non-military cooperation with the Alliance. The majority of respondents (78,2%) rated that level as insufficient and low, and only 13% of respondents rated it as medium and sufficient (Fig. 1). One of the reasons is ineffectiveness of ministerial structures, which are responsible for Euro-Atlantic integration.


Fig.1. Assessments of activities of the Ukrainian authorities to develop non-military cooperation with NATO.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is more active in the sphere of Euro-Atlantic integration among other Ukrainian state bodies. The Ukrainian expert community positively assessed the role of the parliamentary dimension of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. 65.2% of respondents noted that the dimension promoted cooperation in the whole (Fig.2). The reason is not only really more proactive position of the Ukrainian MPs, but also better public awareness of their activities.


Fig. 2. Role of the parliamentary dimension of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.

Nevertheless, speaking at the round table "Ukraine – NATO: Non-military Cooperation as Response to Common Proxy Threats", the Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Oksana Syroid noted that MPs underestimated importance of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, although NATO was the most effective international organization to counter the Russian aggression, because Russia had no leverage over the Alliance's decisions, unlike those of the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Possibilities of cooperation between Ukraine and the **NATO Centres of Excellence**, which play an important role in confronting hybrid threats, are not used properly today. It is confined to contacts at the working level, joint realization of some projects, initiatives and certain measures, but Ukraine does not participate permanently in the work of these Centres that is possible only after its complete

joining. In such situation Ukraine is losing an additional channel of cooperation with the Alliance, a full use of instruments and mechanisms of NATO, and an ability to present its position and transfer own experience to counter the Russian hybrid aggression that could further strengthen foreign policy and security positions of the state. For example, at the round-table the Director of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence Colonel Gintaras Bagdonas noted that Ukrainian experience to counter the hybrid aggression was important to the Alliance. Unfortunately, the effective practical cooperation with Ukraine in this dimension is developed mainly at the expert level now.

In the Ukrainian society, there is **insufficient awareness** of NATO activities, especially in the non-military dimension. Even among experts there is a lack of information on such initiatives as the NATO Trust Funds. As a result, only a half of the experts are convinced in their effectiveness. 8.7% of respondents assessed the Trust Funds as ineffective, and 30.4% of them were undecided. This indicates the need of strengthening the information campaign in Ukraine.

In circumstances of countering the Russian hybrid aggression, according to the Director-General for International Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Sergiy Shutenko, it is difficult to separate military and non-military areas of cooperation with NATO. Today the diplomatic body of Ukraine pays attention to the following non-military areas:

- Emergency response (aimed at common actions and adopting the system of emergencies of Ukraine to the NATO standards);

- Science for Peace (a number of projects is implemented, including two successful projects on tele-medicine and creating 3D mine-detector);

- Air traffic control (its importance especially increased after shooting down the Malaysian airliner of the flight MH-17 in summer 2014);

- Economic security, especially energy security;

- Protection of critical infrastructure;

- Reburial of radioactive waste;

- Improvement of critical education;

- Cyber security (formation of the corresponding NATO aid package comes to the end);

- Public information campaign on Euro-Atlantic integration;

- NATO assistance to improve the mine action system in Ukraine.

At the same time, the Ukrainian experts identified another gradation of priorities of non-military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, referring information security and cyber security to the priority areas.

The second priority group consists of science, modern technologies and energy security.

The third group includes education, strategic communication, ecology and countering terrorism.

The forth group, according to the experts, consists of emergency response, democratic control over the security sector, support to the civil society, democratic development, internal reforms, countering corruption, protection of critical infrastructure, sharing information, and social protection of military servicemen.

Ways of enhancing non-military areas of NATO-Ukraine cooperation

Speaking at the international round-table "Ukraine – NATO: Non-military Cooperation as Response to Common Proxy Threats", the Head of the NATO Representation to Ukraine noted that practical expansion of non-military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO will be a part of the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package in the following areas: advising on reforms in the security sector; cyber security; education; platform on studying hybrid warfare; strategic communications; science; support to civilians and gender support in the security sector.

Parliamentary dimension of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO will continue to play a key role. As noted the Head of Board of the European Movement of Ukraine Vadym Triukhan, the parliamentary dimension should be strengthened by providing a consistent cooperation with parliamentarians from NATO member states. This work among other should provide constant contacts of parliamentarians from Ukraine and NATO countries on various issues and revitalization of the NATO-Ukraine Inter-Parliamentary Council.

Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Oksana Syroid marked a **civilian parliamentary control over the security sector** as an important dimension of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, which should become an integral part of the national security model of Ukraine and an integral part of the process of security sector reforms in Ukraine.

Economic security is becoming more accentuated direction of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, focusing on economic capabilities to ensure defense of Ukraine, as well as retraining and adaptation of retired militaries to peaceful activities. NATO countries are also able to contribute actively to demining and economic recovery of the liberated and frontline territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions that promotes general cooperation and improves the attitude of the local people to the Alliance.

Energy security, as the direction of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, includes three components: stability of power supply; protection of energy infrastructure; ensuring energy autonomy for troops. To enhance this direction, Gintaras Bagdonas suggested Ukraine to invest more in human capital, further diversify sources of energy supply and develop energy efficiency, carry out necessary researches and implement them in practice, working more closely with NATO in those areas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine emphasized the importance of *protecting critical infrastructure*, in particular the energy one. In this context, on October 16-20, 2017 in Ukraine, the Table Top Exercise Coherent Resilience 2017 on the protection of critical infrastructure will take place. Representatives of NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence will participate in the exercise.

NATO-Ukraine Cooperation in the sphere of **emergency response**, especially in the zone of hostilities, becomes more important. Ukraine requires NATO's expertise and practical assistance in maintaining the normal life of Ukrainian regions, in conditions of cutting electricity supply, disruption of heat, water, gas provision, etc., especially in areas affected by fighting.

Development of **strategic communications** in Ukraine should receive more attention and clarification. It was formally enshrined in the NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications Partnership Road Map, which is a framework document that allows implementing various programs and projects. In its turn, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence is ready to assist Ukraine in a form of advisory visits and training. As it is considered in the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, an important step should be a change of approach to Euro-Atlantic integration for greater openness and transparency in the Ukrainian society. In the coming years, one of the actual dimensions of strategic communications should be deeper ties between politicians, civil society activists and experts in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration.

In 2017, *an information campaign ensuring support for Ukraine to join NATO* was launched within the framework of the Concept for improving public awareness of NATO-Ukraine cooperation for 2017-2020 years. As mentioned Valeriy Kravchenko, Director of the Centre for International Security, while in eastern Ukraine was still a predominantly negative attitude towards NATO, the information campaign there should be provided through NATO's practical actions in assisting the population affected by the fighting.

Information security will continue to take an important place in Ukraine's cooperation with NATO. Given the nature of modern war, according to the Director of the Institute of Post-Information Society Dmytro Zolotukhin, this area should take the leading role in Ukraine's cooperation with NATO. But this cooperation should be bilateral, as Ukraine is already more a source of knowledge than a consumer in this area. However, as noted the Advisor to the Minister of Information Policy of Ukraine on strategic communications Alina Frolova, Ukraine should learn the

experience of NATO countries in protection of their information space in various aspects including protection of cultural heritage.

Cooperation with NATO was established in the field of **cyber security** with the assistance of the appropriate Trust Fund of the Alliance. NATO assists Ukraine to improve legislation, policies and strategies, providing practical support in the development of the technical infrastructure and the potential development of cyber defense, which will remain a priority for the near future. As mentioned Eugene Dokukin, Founder of the "Ukrainian Cyber Forces", the Ukrainian authorities did not monitor security of their websites, so security sites in Ukraine were not audited properly. Only in January 2017, 84 Ukrainian sites, 57 of which were public, suffered cyber-attacks. In 2014, the NATO Cyber Security Trust Fund launched the project, aimed at the establishment of the Center of incident management and critical information systems protection, as well as creation of two laboratories for cyber research. Once preparatory procedures are completed, practical work will begin soon. NATO will also pay attention to cooperation between public, private and non-governmental actors in Ukrainian cyber security sphere.

Having determined Slovakia as the framework state of the Trust Fund for **demining**, Ukraine will pay full attention to launch this tool and build its financial capacity in 2017. One of the main threats to the life of Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainians, living in the ATO area, were mines, explosive remnants and devices, with which the territory of Donbass is practically strewn. Up to 80 per cent of all civilian casualties occurred because of explosive devices disruptions[6]. According to preliminary estimates, at least 20 thousand square kilometers of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions are subject to comprehensive testing, demining and clearing from remnants of explosives[7]. Today, Ukraine has not adopted yet a law on anti-mine actions that would meet IMAS (International Mine Action Standards), so it is impossible to create an efficient system for mine actions, while NATO's assistance in this segment remains fragmented.

To enhance these areas of NATO-Ukraine non-military cooperation and boost the process of Euro-Atlantic integration in general, the necessity of **Ukraine's accession to 24 NATO Centers of Excellence** was evident and urgent[8]. Ukrainian experts also supported that idea (Fig. 3), and 87 per cent of them voted in favor of Ukraine joining activities with NATO Centers of Excellence of Energy Security (Vilnius, Lithuania), Strategic Communications (Riga, Latvia) and Cyber Security (Tallin, Estonia). However, Ukraine already has an opportunity and should be more active in developing cooperation with these institutions at the working level.


Fig. 3. Degree of promoting relations with NATO depending on accession of Ukraine to NATO Centers of Excellence on energy security, strategic communications and cyber security.

Today, the **civil society** is a driving force of Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine. It should be more involved into the cooperation with NATO and work in synergy with governmental bodies. Civil and

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[6] http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/society/2016/02/160217_donbass_mines_nk
[7] http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/vibuhonebezpechna-zemlya-donbasu-_.html
[8] http://www.act.nato.int/centres-of-excellence

expert communities could fill those gaps in cooperation with NATO, which the authorities are not able to fill, because of their red tape and regulatory constraints. Therefore, cooperation between experts from Ukraine and NATO countries should last including creation of various platforms that are more effective than ad hoc individual contacts.

Prospects of joint NATO-Ukraine countering proxy threats by non-military methods

Hybrid warfare, as defined by Grigory Perepelitsa, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, suggested using primarily non-military methods and tools by the aggressor that determined the urgent need for non-military cooperation and joint NATO-Ukraine countering proxy threats. In this regards, absolute majority of experts defined the role of NATO in supporting Ukraine's resistance to proxy threats as very important (39,1 per cent), important (39,1 per cent) and important but not determinant (13 per cent) (Fig. 4).


Fig. 4. How important is the role of NATO in supporting Ukraine's resistance to proxy threats?

President of the Centre for Global Studies "Strategy XXI" Mykhailo Gonchar pointed out that the continuing policy of international pressure, in particular through tightening sanctions up to the full cessation of the Russian aggression, was an important aspect of the joint counteractions against the Russian hybrid aggression. Blurring of definitions and separation of the Russian aggression from other areas of the Russian foreign expansion, which fit into the concept of hybression (hybrid aggression), are unacceptable.

In the conditions of hybrid warfare, Ukraine and NATO should work together to protect their information borders and ensure **information security**. Experts consider information security to be an important field of common NATO-Ukraine cooperation in countering proxy threats (Fig.5). At the same time, Ukraine should not only proceed from the need of current protection against Russian propaganda, but also consider this issue comprehensively, with the prospect of building future state's information space and national narrative. Expert of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Dace Kundrate determined following key aspects in countering propaganda and proxy threats: to raise public awareness to realize the danger of aggression; to prevent supplying information that goes beyond the usual for recipients information space; to take into account a speed of information dissemination through social networks; to develop cooperation between information volunteers; to keep information messages coinciding with actual deals in order not to lose the credibility.

Fig.5. What is the key sphere for NATO-Ukraine cooperation in countering proxy threats?

Ukraine's cooperation with NATO in information sphere, as suggested Professor of Uzhgorod National University Ihor Todorov, should also be aimed at raising awareness in NATO countries neighboring Ukraine to improve public opinion there in favor of Ukraine and effectively counter Russian propaganda, spread there by the Kremlin.

In **strategic communications,** identified as priority by 17.4 per cent of responding Ukrainian experts, Ukraine should distinguish the direction of the temporarily occupied territories. With the NATO`s support and assistance, it is reasonable to develop a communication strategy for certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (ORDLO) that should become part of the process of returning and reintegration of these territories. Ukraine can use the experience of the Alliance in returning governmental control over the territories temporarily controlled by illegal armed groups, and ensuring social security of the local population and internally displaced persons (IDPs)[9]. The basis of the communication strategy should rest on public confidence to the local authorities, central governmental bodies and international organizations, including NATO. This approach will reduce the level of support for illegal armed groups and weaken the ground for the Russian hybrid war.

In **cyber security**, NATO will pay special attention to building the capacities of Ukraine, providing necessary equipment and staff training to assist Ukraine acquiring the ability to protect its infrastructure from cyber-attacks. Not by chance, 17,4 per cent of Ukrainian experts have called this area a priority for joint countering proxy threats, because a growing number of attacks have been carried out by Russian hackers for the last three years. According to Eugene Dokukin, since December 2015, Russia switched from small break-ins to a real cyber-war that among other affected local energy system shutdowns in Ukraine via the Internet. Along with strengthening Ukrainian cyber-space protection with the Alliance's assistance, an important area of cooperation is to prevent and suppress activities of persons, who reside in NATO member states and provide various kinds of support to terrorist and extremist activities. Also, it is necessary to enhance the level of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO countries in comprehensive blocking activities of "DPR" and "LPR" representatives, especially at the level of private campaigns (e.g. PayPal), as well as other foreigners, involved in the aggression against Ukraine and especially included to the sanction lists.

In **energy sector,** NATO-Ukraine cooperation should focus on joint researches and implementation of their results, conducting exercises on protection of critical energy infrastructure, diversification of sources and routes of energy supply, involving the widest possible pool of international partners to solving energy issues, strengthening cooperation between national institutions and enforcing an exchange of information. According to Gintaras Bagdonas, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence is ready to contribute to enhancing energy security in Ukraine, but a stable cooperation should be provided to assess objectively weak points and identify clear problems.

Security and human rights, as Oksana Syroyid estimates, are in direct correlation, as the hybrid war against Ukraine had already led to massive violations of human rights and freedoms by the aggressor. However, human rights are inextricably linked to the preservation of the sovereignty and

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[9] http://www.rs.nato.int/article/focus/afghanistan-peace-and-reintegration-program.html

territorial integrity of Ukraine, because a weak state and uncontrolled territories reduce the level of human rights protection there. Therefore, the direction of **human rights protection** should become more important in the future NATO-Ukraine cooperation to combat the hybrid aggression.

Ukrainian experts also noted following areas as important for joint NATO-Ukraine response to proxy threats: science and new technologies; democracy and domestic reforms; public support; education and training; exchange of information; creating a center of countering hybrid threats. The latter is already being implemented in Ukraine under the **NATO-Ukraine Platform on Studying Hybrid Warfare**, which has become the main platform involving experts from various sides to oppose proxy threats. This should provide a comprehensive view on the war unleashed by Russia and facilitate development of effective mechanisms to protect and ensure constant cooperation at the expert level.

Ukrainian experts stressed the **imperative to involve experts and civil society** in NATO-Ukraine cooperation in countering proxy threats. The major proposals of such involvement relate to an expertise and advocacy campaigns, enhanced communication between the government and the society, networking and establishment of special platforms, extensive information campaigns and countering Russian propaganda.

Thus, the prospects for joint NATO-Ukraine countering proxy threats by non-military methods can be specified in the following recommendations:

1. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine should be considered by NATO as a basis for the European security, preservation of international order, guarantees of Euro-Atlantic values, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

2. Enhancing various networks of Ukrainian parliamentarians with the Alliance partners, who are representatives both the ruling political forces and the opposition, including within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Inter-Parliamentary Council, will bring the parliamentary dimension of cooperation to a new level that counter proxy threats more consistently.

3. Involvement of NATO countries in demining process and economic recovery of the frontline and liberated territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions will contribute to increasing cooperation in general, improve the attitude of the local people to the Alliance and neutralize social and ideological basis factors of the Russian aggression.

4. In the energy sector, Ukraine and NATO should concentrate on protection of critical energy infrastructure, diversification of sources and routes of energy supplies, creation of the corresponding to NATO standards logistic system for energy supply of the Ukrainian military units, attracting the widest possible pool of international partners to address energy problems.

5. It is necessary to learn and apply experience of NATO member countries to maintain the normal life of locals in a zone of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, combining it with practical help from the Alliance.

6. In strategic communications, it is required to take practical steps with NATO assistance aimed at deepening ties between Ukrainian politicians and representatives of the expert community and civil society, development of a communication strategy for ORDLO, facilitate the return of territories, temporarily controlled by illegal armed groups, under governmental control and ensure social security of the local population and IDPs.

7. Information sphere should be a space not only for NATO support to Ukraine, but also for learning and considering practical knowledge and experience, which Ukraine has got in countering Russian propaganda to ensure joint information security, including by raising awareness in NATO countries neighboring Ukraine on actual events that happen here.

8. NATO should pay particular attention to building the capacity of Ukraine in cyber security and joint countering and curbing the activities of persons, which are involved in supporting terrorist and extremist activities and violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

9. Ukraine should as fast as possible approve the law acts and regulations, which are necessary for implementation of humanitarian demining actions according to IMAS (International Mine Action Standards), to facilitate the full launch of the NATO Trust Fund on demining and mine cleaning works on the Ukrainian territory with international support.

10. Ukraine should join the NATO Centres of Excellence, primarily for Energy Security (Vilnius, Lithuania), Cyber Security (Tallinn, Estonia) and Strategic Communications (Riga, Latvia), whose work is critical to counter Russia's aggression.

11. Implementation of a system of civilian control over the security sector in Ukraine should not be limited to its parliamentary component and include development of cooperation between experts from Ukraine and the Alliance on these and other issues, including through creation of various platforms and filling them with effective actions to counter proxy threats.

12. Creation of the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Studying Hybrid Warfare with the support of Alliance, as main discussing platform involving experts from different sides to deal with proxy threats, should not be a final goal but a comprehensive joint tool for countering the war, unleashed by Russia.

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