

German- British Relations

and “the Spirit
of Cadenabbia”

Hartmut Mayer / Thomas Bernd Stehling (Eds.)



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**Prefaces by the Leaders of the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
and the British Conservative Party**

Shaping a Free Europe together

In the last century, the relations between Germany and the United Kingdom have had a chequered history. After our nations faced each other as enemies in frightful wars in the first half of the 20th century, we have, in the decades since, walked the path towards a peaceful and united Europe side by side.

It was none other than the great British statesman Winston Churchill who, after the experience of two World Wars, in his Zurich speech on September 16, 1946, envisioned a united Europe as a guarantor of peace and freedom. It is necessary, said the Conservative Party leader, "to provide (the European family) with a structure [...] under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe." At the time, Churchill believed that Germany and France should be the main forces in charge of creating such an order while he saw his own country and the United States in the role of "friends and sponsors of the new Europe". This British position – rooted in history and geography – of keeping a certain distance to continental Europe has remained unchanged until today, at least as far as Britain's political mentality is concerned. Reality, however, tells a different story: Over the years, Great Britain has become a reliable and important part of the European structures of integration. From Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl, Germany has been promoting this development.

Especially after Great Britain became a member of the European Community in 1973, German-British relations developed mostly on the basis of common activities in the European Community and later the European Union, but also in NATO. Both sides have always considered the debate about the progress of European integration to be the key issue. Although there were disagreements regarding this issue, it has always been German policy to keep Great Britain aboard the European steamer in spite of major and minor differences of opinion.

The relationship between the German Christian Democrats and the British Conservatives has always played a special role in this context. In 1979, the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher came to power. Three years later, the Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Helmut Kohl, was elected Chancel-

lor. As, from the German perspective, it was essential in the following years to come to an agreement with Great Britain with regard to all important defence and European policy decisions, maintaining contact between the CDU and the Conservative Party became increasingly important.

Apart from the contacts at party leadership and government level, useful relationships developed between parliamentarians of both countries: Exchanges took place between British-German groups of parliamentarians of both national parliaments, the cooperation between Christian Democrats and Conservatives in the European Parliament was strengthened, and last but not least the regular Cadenabbia meetings of British and German parliamentarians were established twenty years ago. It was at these meetings in particular that mutual understanding and personal trust have been built, which helped to steer British-German controversies regarding European policy issues and German reunification towards constructive solutions.

The German CDU and the British Conservative Party share social and political convictions and values: The CDU as well as the Conservative Party view themselves as people's parties to whom it is important to defend national traditions and institutions, to preserve individual freedom and to limit government interference in the economy. The CDU is pursuing concepts that will certainly sound familiar to British Conservatives. Our goal is to protect private ownership and free entrepreneurial activities as the foundation of growth and prosperity, while at the same time preserving social stability – ideas related and familiar to the basic values of the Conservative Party.

Christian Democrats and British Conservatives not only share similar views on economic, financial and social policies, but also on foreign and defence policies, and on the essential questions of European policy. We share the belief that the United States must remain anchored in Europe through the North Atlantic Alliance; we support the recent expansion by 10 new members of the EU; we have an interest in free and open European markets; and we insist on the principle of subsidiarity as the underlying regulatory system of the EU.

Together, Germany and Great Britain face the task of designing an economic model for our countries that is in line with the conditions of the 21st century. Our social and economic order is challenged as never before. The knowledge and information society,

new technologies, globalisation and demographic change are some of the catchwords describing these complex changes. In the future, comprehensive competition between companies and between locations and the struggle to attract the best brains worldwide will shape the conditions for political action.

All European countries are affected by these changes, but Germany as the major economic force in the EU has a particular responsibility to enact necessary reforms. In our country, as in Great Britain, the whole arena of social security systems and the rules of the labour market is under considerable pressure to reform. This presents a particular challenge to our parties. We now have the opportunity, as we did in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to shape the inevitable transformation on the basis of freedom and individual responsibility. This is also true at the European level. Here too we must strengthen the market forces and reduce overregulation. As a part of this effort we must welcome the competition which has increased due to EU expansion, instead of trying to stifle it with new regulations. There is no doubt that the lower tax rates in the new EU member states will put pressure on other countries to introduce reforms. This should be regarded as a challenge to improve the conditions which will be needed to achieve the desired upturn in our countries.

In view of the difficult ratification processes across Europe, including Britain, with regard to the "Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe", it will be necessary to have a comprehensive debate between German Christian Democrats and British Conservatives about the future of the European Union. Once again, we must convince people that the destiny of Europe must be shaped within the Union.

For Germany, the growing together of Europe has never been an end in itself. By joining the precursors of the EU and the Western Defence Alliance after the catastrophe of two World Wars, Germany took a conscious decision in favour of peace in liberty. This decision also was and remains to be based on practical German interests: It is easier to guarantee safety within and without if we stand together, and our export-orientated economy will benefit from free trade in a large single market.

Over the last few years, the validity of these motives in favour of EU membership has been reinforced: In an era of globalisation, we need a large and strong single market to remain internation-

ally competitive. The threat of Islamist-fundamentalist terrorism and other security risks require the European nations to stand united more than ever. These new developments present many new challenges to Europe and the Western world as a whole: There are economic challenges – caused by instability in particular in the Middle East – as well as security challenges based on the danger of terrorist attacks and the uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction, and, finally, the threat to our common values and lifestyle.

One answer to these new challenges is the expansion of the EU by ten new member states: We have increased the area of peace, security and prosperity, thereby strengthening the position of Europe. The dimensions of the expansion are fascinating: The EU now comprises 25 nations; 450 million people form one of the largest single markets in the world; the mobility of people, goods, services and knowledge improves the opportunities for innovation and growth. Expansion will increase the trade volume in the old and new member states and provide positive economic stimuli in the entire EU. Having caught up economically in an exemplary fashion, the new member states are now growth markets whose dynamic development will benefit all of Europe, not least of all trade and export nations such as Germany and Great Britain.

If the EU wants to remain able to act and make full use of its potential in terms of economic and security policy, it needs an appropriate structure. For this reason, it made sense to restructure the treaties that Europe is based on. Together with the expansion of the European Union, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe is the answer to the grave problems confronting all European nations at the beginning of the 21st century. The CDU is convinced that Europe will need the Constitutional Treaty if only for the simple reason that a Union of 25 and possibly more member states in the future will require a reliable institutional framework to be able to take necessary actions and decisions; it will also need clarity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in its policies. Europe needs the Constitutional Treaty because a united Europe, i.e. a Community that is bound by a common destiny, common values and a common sense of responsibility, can only succeed if it becomes a truly political union. Finally, Europe needs the Constitutional Treaty because it may be able to contribute to the definition of a common European identity, thus adding a spiritual dimension to the political union.

Over the last few years, the CDU and the Conservative Party have always agreed on one point: All of this would not be guaranteed on the basis of the treaties signed in Amsterdam and Nice alone. For this reason, the Constitutional Treaty should always be viewed as an urgently needed correction of the existing legal basis of EU structures which, as we all agree, has its shortcomings. Therefore, we should not try to use the criticism of some parts of the EU Constitutional Treaty, justified as it may be, as grounds to reject it altogether. Instead, we should emphasize that, all in all, the Constitutional Treaty will be an improvement to the structures and mechanisms of the EU, compared with the present state of affairs.

It must be understood that the Constitutional Treaty is not about creating a European state in the classical sense of the word. We do need strong European institutions to be able to guarantee the ability of the European Union to act efficiently in areas such as security policy and the single market. What we do not want is a European "super state" with a centralist "super bureaucracy" imposing its ideas of cultural or social policy from above without taking into account how our citizens feel about it. The nation state with its cultural and constitutional traditions is and will remain the prime conveyor of identity and democratic legitimacy. By signing the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, member states do not only retain their identity as a nation, but also their sovereignty. This means that, while some rights can be transferred to the European level, the authority of the state as a whole cannot. This is precisely what is guaranteed by the EU Constitutional Treaty to be ratified. At the same time, it safeguards the rights of national parliaments within the framework of EU legislation.

The CDU believes that, in line with the concept of subsidiarity, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe should ensure that on the one hand, the EU will be more active in areas where individual member states would be hampered if they tried; on the other hand, EU action should be clearly restricted in areas where the national state can act faster in a way that is closer to its citizens and therefore more target-orientated. Specifically, this means that the EU should focus on the single market, a joint foreign and defence policy and some questions concerning domestic security and refugee policy. However, sectors such as employment, education, health care and culture should remain within the domain of the member states.

We need greater European competence, in particular in the field of foreign and security policies. Europe must be willing to take on more responsibility for peace, freedom, law and justice in the world – both politically and militarily. There is still a considerable disparity between Europe's importance on the foreign policy stage and its economic strength. One of the reasons is that, in the past, the foreign policy competencies of the EU have been split up. It is distributed between the sitting Council President, the Secretary General of the EU Council, different commissioners and, ultimately, the foreign ministers of the member states. The Constitutional Treaty plans a greater integration of EU foreign policy competencies – a necessary step if Europe is to speak with one voice. Europe must also be enabled to take military action in crisis situations. To this end, the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force should be pushed ahead and adequately funded. We must also examine how we can use such a force in the fight against international terror.

However, setting up an efficient EU security policy with its own defence component must never be directed against the partnership with the United States, but must instead serve to strengthen transatlantic relations. For, in spite of the revolutionary changes of 1989/1990, a close relationship between Europe and the United States remains indispensable in order to guarantee European security and deal with global challenges. The stronger and more united the European Union presents itself, the better equipped will it be to be an active partner and ally of the United States.

Put in a nutshell: Europe cannot do without Great Britain; but at the same time, Britain will benefit from a united Europe. The following applies to all European countries, including Great Britain: A weak European Union will not be helpful to anyone, neither in the security nor in the economic policy sector. The problems of today's world can only be dealt with if we join forces. Globalisation, poverty, the spread of AIDS, climate change, migration and especially terrorism do not stop at our national borders. Neither Germany nor Great Britain alone will be able to bear the burden posed by these challenges which will determine our destiny.

In the long run, the European nations will be able to sustain freedom, peace and prosperity only if they succeed in creating an economically and politically united Europe with efficient and legitimate democratic institutions. No single European nation will

be able to deal with today's global challenges standing alone – but together we can. A united and strong Europe can make an important contribution to a better world; this united and strong Europe will also be better able to do justice to our values, our interests and our responsibilities in the world of the 21st century. German Christian Democrats and British Conservatives are called upon to continue working as partners to shape this Europe of the future.

Anglo-German Relations

Twenty years ago Cadenabbia hosted its first British-German Parliamentary Meeting. Since then, through these meetings, many of our MPs from both countries have met and discussed their political views in a constructive way. This has helped create the mutual respect and friendship that marks the relationship between the German CDU and Conservative Party today; and I am delighted and honoured to have been asked to write a few words for the series of essays that celebrate that anniversary.

Naturally enough for two parties from two countries with very different histories, we have not always agreed on everything; but our disagreements take place against the background of an understanding and a basic belief in shared fundamental values – of democracy, the rule of law, freedom for the individual. We both believe in market economies based on enterprise and choice with the minimum of regulation and red tape. We both believe that Europe and America would be the poorer and the weaker without a strong transatlantic relationship, and that those who put short term political gain ahead of that long-term relationship are putting at risk the new century's prosperity and stability.

I take great satisfaction in the way that our parties have worked so well together to promote our shared aims in the EU. We have a common understanding that, without economic reform, European countries will fall behind our competitors in the rest of the world. The EU cannot insulate us from changes beyond Europe but it can help us meet those challenges.

Today the relationship between the German CDU and the Conservative Party, and between Dr Merkel and myself, is a strong one – and Cadenabbia has certainly played its part in that.

It was to Berlin, thanks to an invitation from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, that I first went to set out my vision for Europe's future in 2004 – a vision for a Europe of twenty five members, which provides the flexibility to suit each Member State. We need to understand that different nations will have different aspirations and the European Union can and must be strong enough to embrace that variety confidently.

If the European Union stands for anything, it is for the healing of our continent from the horrors of the past – war, fascism and communism. That central mission of the European Union could never be complete without enlargement, and both Germany and Britain, and the Conservative Party and the CDU, can be proud that we have been among the first and strongest supporters of that process.

I have long been an admirer of the CDU. Through its many achievements – from the rebuilding of democracy in Germany to the intellectual creativity we see today – the CDU has made an outstanding contribution to European politics. Both the CDU and the British Conservative Party are prepared, where other parties are not, to face up to the challenges facing our countries today. For us in Britain, one major challenge is public service reform. Parents and patients have waited too long for the right to choose in education and in health care. For Germany, unemployment and economic reform are questions that must be tackled in order to secure the bright future which Germany deserves. Over the past few years the SPD government has shown itself incapable of meeting Germany's needs. Germany's friends look forward in hope to the next CDU government.

I have no doubt that the next twenty years will see the warm co-operation and the fruitful sharing of ideas between our two great parties continue, in which this book will take a fitting place.

Introduction

The *Festschrift* is a wonderful academic tradition. Having been started in Germany it spread gradually and became the model for other academic cultures. On the occasion of major, mostly late, birthdays of notable scholars and public figures those who have been associated with them for a long time, students and colleagues present them with a book in their honour. They reflect upon their work as well as look back over their career with personal comments, memories and anecdotes. The charm of these works rests in the close personal bonds between the authors, something that goes beyond the text and will be apparent first to those who have lived and worked with the person honoured in it.

This collection of papers is such a *Festschrift*. However, in contrast to its classical form this one celebrates an institution rather than a person and a very early birthday instead of a late one. The book marks the 20th anniversary of the meetings between German and British parliamentarians in Cadenabbia, a unique and fascinating form of Anglo-German encounter. Since 1984 parliamentarians of the German CDU/CSU fraction and the British Conservatives have been meeting once a year in Konrad Adenauer's famous holiday resort in order to exchange views and thoughts as well as maintain old friendships and foster new ones. In a relaxed atmosphere and surroundings of matchless beauty they have for the last twenty years examined the fundamental values they share and searched for answers to the political questions of our time; they have compared strategies and solutions for similar problems; they have quarrelled vehemently about their differences and striven for an understanding of positions incompatible with their own and have finally all come together again over a glass of red wine.

The authors of this volume don't just want to celebrate "Cadenabbia" and strengthen their personal friendships through their contributions but – as many of them imply – also to express their thanks for what has been achieved. The Cadenabbia meetings are without doubt the flagship of the London branch of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation and its varied and successful work. Private foundations and publicly funded ones, cultural institutes and

civic forums make invaluable contributions to the mutual understanding between Great Britain and Germany and to their increasing rapprochement. Among these the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation naturally, albeit by no means exclusively, focuses on the fostering of friendship between the German Christian Democrats and the British Conservatives and forms an important link in the Anglo-German network without which a successful understanding between the political elites of Germany and Great Britain would be unthinkable.

This collection of papers endeavours to recreate what has constituted the particular attraction of the Cadenabbia – Meetings: friendship, first of all, mutual exchange and overall agreement on common values and aims with variations in the content.

Consequently the volume divides into three parts. Part 1 is primarily for remembering the good old days, celebrating and thanking. Two of the most constant and important participants of the Cadenabbia-Meetings, David Hunt and Norbert Lammert invite the reader to participate in the "Cadenabbia Myth". These contributions link personal anecdotes with a historical analysis of the developments undergone by both parties and marked gratitude for that which they learned from each other. They also show how a particular generation of then comparatively young parliamentarians experienced a part of their political socialisation and gained their insights into the respective other country and the needs of the sister party through "Cadenabbia". Both texts will undoubtedly give great pleasure to all those who were present, but they also address themselves to anybody interested in this process as well as all those who as members of parliament will participate in future and continue the "Cadenabbia Myth".

Part 2 of the volume reflects all those matters that were central to the dialogues in Cadenabbia. German and British parliamentarians together analyse political questions and problems, describe and evaluate what is specific to the respective national point of view and compare it to the one of the partner country and the sister party. The first half of Part 2 deals with internal reform processes in both countries, the second part with the old and new challenges of international politics.

To begin with the papers by David Curry and Roland Koch examine the fundamental questions of the respective democratic systems, namely the relationship between the central executive and the regional and local tiers of decision making. The more cen-

tralised democracy of Great Britain as well as the federal system of the Federal Republic of Germany are expressions of the entirely individual histories of the two countries and represent their two very different political cultures. It is a familiar cliché of the Anglo-German dialogue that both Britons and Germans may use the same concepts – whether “federalism”, subsidiarity, “Brussels” or “regionalism” – but constantly talk at cross purposes with each other because the connotations and fears each of them connects with these terms are so much at variance. Roland Koch and David Curry help us disentangle the familiar confusion. Curry explains the path of British “devolution” since 1997, Koch the history the current state and potential future of German federalism. A moderate re-ordering of the present relationship between central and regional centres of decision making is seen as unavoidable in both countries. The changes driven by the process of European integration and the newly developing multi-level system of political decision making within the EU as well as between the EU and its member states, the challenges posed by globalisation to national democracies and the desire of their inhabitants for regional identities and transparent political decisions all make such reforms necessary. Common to both authors is the desire to preserve what is tried and tested and successful in their countries and adapt it to new requirements.

The analysis of British devolution and of the reform of German federalism, for many the mother of all reforms in the Federal Republic, is followed by a topic which has dominated public debate in both countries for years: the state and future of the welfare state and of the Public Services. There is no other area, it seems, in which Germany and Great Britain can learn quite so much from each other. It is one of the ironies of Anglo-German relations during the last twenty years that the images of the two social models have been reversed. While many Britons in the 1980s saw the German way as the model for a stable and efficient economic power with high social security and an excellent infrastructure, now many Germans see in Great Britain the most promising European answer to the challenge of economic globalisation. David Willetts and Matthias Wissmann take up the topic in the best Cadenabbia tradition comparing the steps taken on the way to reform in Great Britain and Germany and carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of one system against the other. It is astonishing how open they are about the weaknesses of their own respective systems and how sympathic-

tic to the concerns of the other one. Using the Public Service Reform as an example David Willetts also manages to depict the conceptual and historic differences between continental European Christian Democrats and British Conservatives and to make them intelligible. Matthias Wissmann examines how the German infrastructure – which in the international comparison is still rated as excellent – can be preserved and improved in view of the empty coffers of the public purse. He is particularly interested in the tool of the private–public partnership for which the United Kingdom is seen as the trailblazer in Europe. The experiences made with it in Britain, both positive and negative ones, can, therefore, act as a guide for the use of similar reform instruments in Germany.

It is also primarily the future that Christian Wulff looks to. In a broadly based paper covering a number of political sectors he analyses the most urgent tasks for reform in Germany, i.e. the return to more economic growth, the fight against unemployment, the maintenance of an affordable welfare state as well as a solution acceptable to those affected by it of all those challenges arising from the changes in the age pyramid. He criticises the "Agenda 2010" put forward by the Schröder government for not being far-reaching enough, while admitting that it is necessary to create trust among the citizens and to maintain it whatever the reforms.

Following Christian Wulff's general survey Tim Yeo for the United Kingdom and Peter Müller for Germany examine specific details in selected problem areas. Tim Yeo describes the challenges faced by his country in the areas of traffic, health and education and places them into the context of the overall changes which have taken place since 1945. Peter Müller reflects on Germany's immigration policy with a view to the future. In a very sensitive essay he demonstrates why immigration is bound to become a test case for political culture and national identity in Germany. He pleads for the immigration debate in Germany to be de-emotionalised and tries to find a sound middle course between the fears of many people who feel threatened by it and the objective chances for Germany to derive great gains from immigration.

The topic of immigration and national identity leads from the national into the international policy debates in our volume. It is, in fact, primarily the conditions found in the international economic and political environment that cause increasing numbers

of people to immigrate into Europe, conditions like new wars, political persecution, human rights violations, economic inequalities, epidemics and natural disasters. The old continent, for centuries itself a war zone and crisis areas, today is a centre of stability in a still fragile world order.

Who would dispute that – despite all the differences between the German and the British position on the European project – this stability is a success resulting from the European process of integration which Germany and Great Britain, Christian Democrats and Conservatives have helped to create and to fashion in such different ways. In the course of 20 years of Cadenabbia Europe was always a special concern, albeit often also a dangerous minefield. Indeed, the often opposite positions on European integration and the frequently less than smooth cooperation between the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives in the European Parliament were the reason for calling into being the Cadenabbia talks in this form in 1984.

Above and beyond this the forum was, however, always also interested in the wider strategic questions of worldwide international politics. Together they made the move from the second climax of the Cold War under Ronald Reagan to the fast rapprochement with Michael Gorbachev, observed the revolutions in Eastern Europe and shaped the changes resulting from the upheavals of 1989 which for Germany brought unity within a united Europe. In the 1990s they quarrelled about the consolidation and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO which were to lead the way to the now so successful integration of the Central- and Eastern European states into the West's structures for security and stability. They also shared their hopes for a new peaceful world order after the end of its bipolarity, and together they were quickly disillusioned as they faced new ethnic conflicts around the world. Especially the wars in the former Yugoslavia which were particularly painful for Europe and the search for ways and means of overcoming the crisis in the Balkans created a bond between British and German politicians involved in foreign affairs. The terrorist threat after 11 September 2001, the war in Iraq, the tensions in the transatlantic relationship, the unresolved problems in the Middle East as well as the international integration and liberalisation of China remain challenges which Germans and Britons will be able to meet only in cooperation. The authors of the foreign policy part of the book deal with a large number of these topics.

One event of the past twenty years still stands out: the German unification. For those who witnessed that time it would be impossible not to remember the tensions in Anglo-German relations in the years 1989/1990 when the Federal Government under Helmut Kohl created the internal and external conditions for the peaceful unification of the two German states against the opposition of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Relations between Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher were never particularly warm, but rarely were they as bad as during the most important months of Kohl's chancellorship. As a result of the now common personalisation of politics – and what better opportunity for it than the clash between Kohl and Thatcher – many of us are not aware of the fact that Great Britain played a very important and constructive part in the process of German unification in the 2+4 negotiations. In this volume Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary of the time and one of Germany's most knowledgeable and best friends, in a very personal and open review of the time elucidates the British political stance in the process of German unification. In its own way it is a document of contemporary history.

This is followed by Wolfgang Schäuble's analysis of Anglo-German relations within the triangle of the three major capitals London, Paris and Berlin. He writes about the particular potential for close cooperation between those three in and for Europe. He defines the combined efforts of Britain, France and Germany as the dynamic hub or motor of Europe and expresses the hope that a common European identity will be able to rein in national egotisms in future. Despite the existing problems politicians should neither denigrate what has been achieved nor be dazzled by it. Schäuble emphasises that Europe must achieve an even greater degree of communality, particularly in view of the worldwide threats, in order to be a player in world politics and to fashion its own future in the global order.

Francis Maude in his contribution concentrates on the increasing closeness of British-German relations and traces the development of the last 20 years. He proposes the thesis that the best political analysis may possibly be gained from examining the attitudes of the senior politicians. Therefore he focuses on the personalities and attitudes of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair.

Friedbert Pflüger and Michael Ancram apply themselves to the transatlantic relations which are so important for both countries.

They ask with some justification whether Europe and the USA continue to sing from the same hymn sheet at the beginning of the 21st century and in doing so will carry on to implement the most important lesson of the 20th century, i.e. the necessity for the free world to cooperate. Pflüger makes it clear that a new generation of politicians who did not experience the Second World War or the Cold War have to be won over for the transatlantic partnership again and again, that NATO has to be revitalised and Europe has to accept its global responsibilities more wholeheartedly. What is needed on both sides, he claims, is a transatlantic "we-feeling", and he believes that British-German cooperation could contribute to developing this indispensable identity and strengthen it.

Michael Ancram stresses that the USA are undoubtedly the heart of our geopolitical environment. Europe should always act as a partner rather than a rival to the United States. Germany has a key role to play in this, in his opinion, and ought to help to keep Europe on the course of a close transatlantic cooperation. He believes that a close union of Great Britain, the USA and Germany must inevitably be a goal if the global threats are to be repulsed, and that a triple alliance of Washington-London-Berlin would serve to unite Europe and America as opposed to dividing them, as was unfortunately the case with the Iraq crisis.

In the concluding contribution of the international part of the book Friedrich Merz poses the question, how Germany should reposition itself in the globalised economic order. He views globalisation in Schumpeter's interpretation as a dynamic process of destruction and renewal. He emphasises the opportunities arising from the worldwide division of labour. Countries that are afraid of the destruction and renewal of their traditional structures could, however, quickly join the ranks of the losers of globalisation according to Merz. This is why it is important, in his view, for Germany to accelerate the process of structural changes, since any delay would cost the country dearly. He sees globalisation as both fate and opportunity for Germany, and he advises that Germany must be made fit for the transition from traditional industrial nation to global information and technology society without delay.

Part 3 of our volume opens up the dialogue with outside experts. Parliamentarians are always dependent on exchanges of ideas with scientists, captains of industry, the media, as well as repre-

representatives of the churches and civic groups. Three papers serve as examples for this transfer of knowledge which have enriched the Cadenabbia gatherings. Frank Bösch, a young historian, traces the history of the CDU over the past 20 years. He argues that the Christian Democrats have undergone a continuous liberalisation during this period without the kind of drastic changes that may have to be faced by the British Conservatives. He explains the success of the CDU at recent elections as a result of this – in contrast to the Tories – low-profile and gradual form of inner renewal.

In conclusion two prominent representatives of the media, Tim Gardam and Michael Rutz, examine the changes which have transformed the media during the past 20 years and the effect they have had on the conditions for political life in both countries. Tim Gardam analyses the far-reaching changes in the electronic media in Great Britain. He regrets that the content of British television has become increasingly impoverished and that it has abandoned its rightful task as cultural and social catalyst. Michael Rutz enquires into the way the power of the media is organised in modern societies and asks whether we might not already be living in a time of the breathless pursuit of the insubstantial when the fast-moving media business overdoes the staging of politics and thereby creates resentment against politics instead of transmitting and controlling politics. Rutz sees the danger of a power struggle between the political elites and the media elites which might prove detrimental to the entire democratic system. In an important and well-balanced paper Rutz connects with universal thinkers like Rousseau, Weber and Luhmann in explaining the reasons why it is of such vital importance for the functioning of democracy to think long and hard about the role of the media.

The concluding reflections of the editors finally place the key points made in the individual texts into the broader context of German-British relations during the last 20 years. They also risk a preview of topics to be discussed by the Cadenabbia participants in future. A brief preliminary remark may be permitted here. Regrettably one repeatedly hears the view in some academic circles that purely bilateral dialogues, be they on politics, economics, diplomacy or the civil society, are in fact, out-dated in an increasingly integrated Europe. In view of the closely interlinked relations between the rich democracies of Europe and the normal professional interchanges between their elites, they believe,

that bilateral forums produce only marginal gains for the countries involved, apart from the personal enjoyment of the participants. Increasingly scarce resources should be used for larger European forums, in their opinion, for exchanges with the new EU member states or for the dialogue with the global regions and regions. This volume clearly shows that such views fall far short of the reality. The strengthening of classical bilateral relations and new multilateral and interregional forums are not mutually exclusive, instead, they complement each other. The trust between the decision makers of the big European states has always formed the basis for progress in Europe as well as for common answers to the global questions of the time.

The value of a 20 year long dialogue between German Christian Democrats and British Conservatives cannot be measured exactly, nor would anybody want to demand or wish such a thing. However, all the authors in this volume bear witness with their contributions to their high estimation of what has been achieved in the past 20 years. The relations between the German Christian Democrats and the British Conservatives, between the non-socialist parties in the European Parliament and between Germany and Great Britain would have developed differently and certainly more problematically. This key message links all the texts in this volume. It binds together the book and the "Cadenabbia Myth".