



LAC OF MULTILATERAL LEADERSHIP?

How the region engages in the multilateral system, its current challenges and its untapped opportunities





Main authors: Philipp Schönrock; Javier Surasky.

The authors acknowledge the contributions to this text by Thomas Tödting, Erica Mumford, Alexandra Roldan, and Lidia Fromm-Cea.

ISBN: 978-1-7369528-7-0

Copyright © 2024 KAS (New York) and Cepei.

This work is subject to a Creative Commons license CC BY 3.0 IGO (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/legalcode>).

The terms and conditions indicated in the URL link must be met, and the respective recognition must be granted to KAS (New York) and Cepei.

The opinions expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or official policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) New York Office or Cepei.

Design:

Before® Studio | +52 33 1512 2001. Guadalajara, Jalisco, México.

Cover photo credit:

Unsplash the blowup.

Konrad Adenauer Foundation New York Office
220 E. 42nd Street, Suite 3300
New York, NY 10017





LAC of multilateral leadership?

How the region engages in the multilateral system,
its current challenges and its untapped opportunities

Philipp Schönrock; Javier Surasky.



About Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)

Freedom, justice, and democracy are basic principles underlying the work of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).

As a political foundation, KAS advocates for democracy and the rule of law, the vision of a unified Europe, a social market economy and a multilateral rules-based order.

The KAS New York Office provides new perspectives into the discussions on multilateralism, sustainable development, and peace and security. It serves as a liaison between more than 100 KAS offices worldwide for experts, local partners, and the United Nations, as well as for national and international think tanks, NGOs, and universities based in New York and elsewhere.



About Cepei

The Centro de Pensamiento Estratégico Internacional (Cepei) is an independent think tank headquartered in Bogota, Colombia. Over 23 years, we have worked to develop a detailed understanding of global, regional, and national policy processes that support the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Our Mission is to strengthen political processes at the highest governance levels, enabling governments and their partners to better deliver on their sustainable development objectives.

Consultation and engagement are cornerstones of Cepei's work. The organization has cultivated and curated strong connections with decision-makers to become a trusted partner and facilitator of sustainable development policy dialogue.

Since our founding, our focus has predominantly been on tracking and accelerating global and regional processes from a Latin American perspective.

From 2023 onwards, we intend to translate lessons learned from Latin America for other regions' use. Taking a regional perspective—being an ambassador for the regions—to understand global sustainable development processes is a unique Cepei offering that responds to the new, emerging trends of transboundary, polycentric governance.

How Cepei Works

- Facilitating political processes by actively bringing together experts, local practitioners, and political actors to infuse new ideas into critical political moments.
- Curating evidence because accessible and policy-relevant information, communicated simply and clearly and put in the hands of decision-makers, can help deliver better policy results.
- Promoting inclusivity by opening decision-making processes to multi-stakeholder engagement as a cornerstone of all 21st-century policy development and encouraging a problem-solving approach to stimulate cooperative action.



Introduction

As we stand at a critical moment for global governance, with unprecedented challenges and opportunities on the horizon, this policy brief analyzes the leadership roles of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean in the next two years (2024-2025). It focuses on the **region's opportunities to make an ambitious and sustained contribution to framing multilateral processes and helping renew multilateral cooperation regionally and globally**. It concludes by providing actionable suggestions for unlocking the region's full potential as a proactive and influential force in shaping the future of multilateralism.



Latin America & the Caribbean in the Current Multilateral Context



UN Secretary- General Meets For
Affairs Minister of Costa R
@UN Photo/Eskinder Deb



Even when many countries share a common history and some cultural traditions, the region exhibits remarkable heterogeneity. Economic models range from resource-rich rentier states to diversified industrial economies. Politically, the spectrum stretches from established democracies to countries grappling with recent democratic backsliding and authoritarian governments. Overcoming internal differences is crucial for crafting effective regional positions and leveraging collective bargaining power, but although an ample menu of coordinating platforms exists, Latin American and Caribbean countries confront tensions related to different political ideologies that tend to feed fragmentation and undermine the potential to establish joint regional approaches, albeit with different perspectives.

The Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is diverse and fragmented, and its relationship with the United Nations and the multilateral system is broadly multifaceted. It has only sometimes seemed fully convinced about the effectiveness of the multilateral negotiations and agendas. We identified four reasons for this limited interest:

First, the lack of trust in multilateral processes derives from an analysis of their experience, like the disenchantment with political commitments to improving the quality of traditional development financing and the seemingly scant possibilities of complying with responsibilities accumulated since the Monterrey consensus on financing development.

Second, many platforms are functioning in the region to pursue cooperation, financing, and development. Separate agendas and work plans reflect diverging ideologies and interests that consume the time of national development bodies and government institutions. With so many regional platforms and networks to prioritize, time, capacity, and interest available for the global development agendas are limited.

Third, challenges-common among middle-income countries-are present in each of the 33 countries to a greater or lesser extent (IDB, 2024:22). Because of their income status and despite large pockets of continuing poverty, most countries have long been non-dependent on international aid flows, which tend to have been a main driver in the past for setting global development agendas.

Fourth, in addition to these factors and despite the ample menu of coordinating platforms, Latin American and Caribbean countries have faced inevitable tensions (Freeman, 2023). Strong institutions or established processes are lacking in promoting regional action-oriented policy dialogue. Some of the region's more promising political dialogue platforms have faded, been dismantled, or lost traction. Those are the cases of the Forum for the Progress and Development of Latin America (PROSUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the Organization for American States (OAS). At the heart of the problem are different political ideologies (Cepei, 2024a) that, attempting to co-exist, tend to feed contradictions and fragmentations that devour the potential to establish a joint regional approach, albeit with different perspectives. The different political ideologies hamper better regional multilateral cooperation to a broader degree than in other world regions.

As a result, Latin America and the Caribbean face mainly internally built obstacles affecting successful participation in multilateral governance. Despite countries from the region leading key international negotiation processes, obstacles to establishing clear and sound regional support for their work exist, making their regional positions fragile.



The UN Summit of the Future in 2024

The Summit of the Future is considered by the UN as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the UN Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to impact people’s lives positively.”¹

The Our-Common-Agenda-based UN reform process seeks to unite member states to tackle urgent global challenges and lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation. While the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, appointed by the Secretary-General, has presented several institutional and policy reform proposals, one particular critical factor for effective multilateralism has received little attention so far: how the ongoing North-South divide in the UN diminishes the UN’s role as a platform for global problem-solving.

So far, the intergovernmental preparatory process for the **Summit of the Future** does not bode well for the UN’s ability to address global challenges effectively. While global economic and geopolitical developments challenge old North-South dichotomies, the two global camps continue to harbor deep mistrust in the UN and fail to align around shared interests.²

At the Summit of the Future negotiation table, member states from the region have diverging interests on key issues like human rights; they converge on other equally important ones, such as moving beyond GDP by establishing a multidimensional development index that complements it, reforming multilateral governance, increasing sustainable development financing flows, and reforming the international financial architecture. Caribbean countries are mainly concerned with addressing gaps in the international financial architecture, climate disaster prevention, and risk management.



Another example of diverging interests on critical issues is the UN Security Council reform. While Brazil pushes for a permanent seat, countries like Colombia support a regional shared and rotating seat. Mexico seeks to abolish permanent seats completely. The same happens in relation to environmental protection. While countries like Costa Rica favor the highest possible levels of natural resource protection, Argentina prioritizes economic urgencies over environmental care.

As mentioned earlier, Latin America and the Caribbean countries have sometimes seemed unconvinced by the effectiveness of multilateral negotiations and agendas; they now have to work together to define responses to their common problems, building on their assets and being aware of their deficiencies.

The main question is how to get from agreeing on the problems to a “transformative global agenda” with a clear and concise vision of change, a compelling narrative, and a set of ambitious but practical actions.

¹ Summit of the Future website, Homepage. Available at <https://www.un.org/en/common-agenda/summit-of-the-future>

² Research exposé, “The G77 and global cooperation in the United Nations”. IDOS, Cepei, 2024.



Security Council Members unanimously vote to adopt resolution 2694 (2023) during the Security Council meeting on the UN Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVIC).
@UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

2024–2025: *An Opportunity for Latin America and the Caribbean’s Leadership*

Highlighting the opportunity that Latin America and the Caribbean have to shape the future of multilateralism in the next two years, it is imperative to recognize the region’s unique position and the need for active engagement in multilateral reform processes.

With a rich history of leadership and diverse perspectives, the countries from the region could make significant contributions to accelerate efforts to meet the existing international commitments and take concrete steps to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities.

The favorable timing of the rotation of leadership positions within the United Nations system underscores the region’s growing influence and the importance of leveraging this momentum to drive meaningful change.

The next UN Secretary-General, who must implement much of the currently negotiated reforms, will likely be from Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries from the region currently hold the G-20, the UN General Assembly, and the ECOSOC presidencies. Brazil and Colombia will host COP 30 on Climate Change and COP16 on Biodiversity, respectively (*as shown in Box 1*).

Box 1.

Latin America and the Caribbean’s Multilateral Leadership

Trinidad and Tobago holds the presidency of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly (2023-2024).

Brazil is holding the presidency of the G-20 in 2024 and will host the COP 30 in 2025.

Colombia will host the fifth UN World Data Forum and COP 16 on Biodiversity in 2024.

Barbados, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Panama are co-facilitators of the ongoing intergovernmental consultations that are part of the preparatory process of the Summit of the Future (2024).

Dominican Republic co-facilitates the ECOSOC High-Level segment and the High-Level Political Forum review process in 2024.

Ecuador (2023-2024) and **Guyana** (2024-2025) are the region’s non-permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Chile holds the presidency of UN ECOSOC 2023-2024.

Antigua and Barbuda hosted the fourth International Conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS4) in 2024.

Mexico will co-host a fourth global conference on financing for development in 2025.

The different leadership positions hold significant potential to increase attention to important issues such as climate action, reform of global governance institutions, international financial architecture reform, and strengthening data ecosystems to accelerate SDG implementation. During the next two years, the region stands at the epicenter of global debates, with significant opportunities to shape the discourse within the G-20, COP 30, COP 16, Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) and the outcome of the Summit of the Future. The region could drive momentum towards more equitable and effective solutions, setting the stage for ongoing multilateral negotiations.

Advancing requires coordinated action from many actors, including governments, the UN, Multilateral Development Banks, non-state actors, and civil society. Each process brings unique and complementary themes to the negotiating table, which should allow for comprehensive alignment of agendas and effective means of implementation (*as shown in Table 2*).

Table 2.

Country Leadership position	Thematic priorities
Trinidad and Tobago Presidency of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly	Peace, prosperity, progress, and sustainability. ³
Chile Presidency of ECOSOC (2023-2024)	Leverage ECOSOC's policy guidance in an international context of multiple crises: Food crisis and strengthening humanitarian aid; Addressing gaps in the international financial architecture; The Summit of the Future; Concrete solutions for scaling up climate action in the face of the triple crisis; Promotion of gender equality; Strengthening institutions in a context of rapid technological change; Strengthen ECOSOC's engagement with civil society. ⁴
Colombia COP 16 on Biodiversity (2024) "Peace with Nature"	Approval of the global work plan for ethnic peoples as custodians of biodiversity; contribute to the financing of the fulfillment of the goals of the Kunming–Montreal Global Framework; follow up on countries' actions towards fulfilling the 23 biodiversity goals by 2030; promote more equitable access to the benefits derived from genetic resources. ⁵
Brazil Presidency of the G-20 (2024)	Social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty, energy transitions and the promotion of sustainable development, and reform of global governance institutions.
Brazil Host of the COP 30 on Climate Change (2025)	Priorities are still to be defined and awaiting the outcomes of COP 29, which will be held in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November 2024.

³ <https://www.un.org/pga/78/vison-statement/>

⁴ <https://ecosoc.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/incoming-statement-ecosoc-president-27-july-2023.pdf>

⁵ <https://www.minambiente.gov.co/paz-con-la-naturaleza-el-llamado-de-colombia-en-el-dia-internacional-de-la-biodiversidad/>




Challenges for countries from Latin America and the Caribbean to promote a better Multilateral Coordination

To better understand Latin America and the Caribbean challenges and opportunities to engage in global negotiations successfully, we need to understand how its countries engage with the UN and other geographical blocks.

The region's influence in the global debates is tied to its ability to impact the UN negotiations. **The 33 countries in the region represent 17% of the overall number of UN voting member states.** Even though it has a significant number of votes, the region does not have a single country with veto power at the UN Security Council, and they need to compromise with other geographical blocks to secure followership and bring the region's interests to the negotiating table.

Figure 1:
Latin America and the Caribbean seats at major UN organs



● Latin America and the Caribbean seats

Source: Cepei, 2024

Countries from the region participate in UN processes through two main channels: the UN Group of Latin America and the Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) and the Group of 77+China (G-77+China).

The Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC)

This group is a non-binding, consensus, and dialogue group gathering all Latin American and Caribbean Permanent Representatives to the UN. As one of the five UN regional groups, the **GRULAC** formally exists for electoral and ceremonial purposes, but like almost all of them, it is also a channel to coordinate on substantive issues, share information, and seek consensus on like-minded policies.

The GRULAC operates under the leadership of presidencies that rotate alphabetically on a monthly basis. Among its tasks, GRULAC helps allocate seats on UN bodies by nominating candidates from the region and revising protocol communiqués. Nevertheless, the current modus operandi shows no structural political discussions occur, leaving GRULAC to deal with *“UN every day and formal business.”*

The Group of 77 + China (G-77+China)

With 134 member countries, the G-77+China is the UN system's largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries. It aims to provide a space for the countries of the southern world regions to articulate collective positions and to increase their negotiating capacity within the UN. Even if their members' priorities are not necessarily aligned, the G-77+China members represent almost 70% of the UN General Assembly votes.

Figure 2:
The G-77 voting power in the UN General Assembly



Absolute majority



Qualified majority



G-77 + China members



32 of 33 LAC countries are members of the G-77+China. Mexico is the only country from the region that is not a formal group member. Although it was among the founding members, it left the group in 1994, following the country's admittance to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; in 2023, Mexico announced it was considering a closer collaboration with the G-77+China as a permanent participant - rather than as a member state (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno de México, 2023).

Latin America and the Caribbean engagement in the G-77+China is currently characterized by political division among the region's countries, which hinders regional consensus building. Growing clashes between LAC countries' positions inside the group have come to light. Some of the most conflicting issues are human rights, environment protection, women's empowerment, and, more recently, civil society engagement in UN negotiation processes.

As the diplomatic rhetoric has deteriorated between several regional heavyweights, we are witnessing how smaller countries become policy advocates for important but often secundated issues. Costa Rica and Uruguay are good examples.

Costa Rica, on the one hand, has been a constructive policy broker at the UN's Disarmament Commission, promoting the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and working towards preventing an arms race in outer space (Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations, 2023.) It has also played a role in the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. This little-known but powerful United Nations body has become politicized and ineffective in its mandate of enabling civil society participation in the UN's work. A group of 12 countries, including Bolivia, San Vincent and the Grenadines, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, presented a document (A/AC.182/L.164) pointing out that "the idea of further strengthening the participation of civil society in the Organization is not correct" because this would deepen inequalities and challenge the Charter of the United Nations. It met with a harsh response from 58 countries, supporting civil society participation in meetings and United Nations processes. The countries supporting this statement were the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, all LAC G-77+China members (Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations, 2024). Costa Rica and the United Kingdom proposed reforming the committee that approves NGOs for UN accreditation, improving their engagement with the UN development system.

Uruguay's dialogues about its future with the whole of society have been a process from which many countries could learn and benefit. The outcomes of these dialogues feed directly into the Declaration on Future Generations negotiation process, which would, if intergovernmentally agreed, be annexed to the Pact for the Future and form one of the outcomes of the Summit of the Future.⁶ It is also worth pointing out that Jamaica is co-facilitating this process and engaging in discussions with the regional groups to grasp Member State positions better.

Despite these positive examples, Latin America and the Caribbean lack common positions to advance regionally at the G-77+China beyond general, historical, and hardly actionable demands shared by African and Asian countries, such as reforming the International Financial Institutions or defending common but differentiated responsibilities. Building regionally agreed-upon positions is, thus, the main challenge and a precondition for the region to gain influence at the G-77+China.



Event on Global Accelerator on Jobs and Social Protection for Just Transitions in Crises
@UN Photo/Ariana Lindquist

⁶ United Nations in Uruguay website. "Uruguay: Diálogos sobre el Futuro de Uruguay". Available at <https://uruguay.un.org/es/261844-di%C3%A1logos-sobre-el-futuro-de-uruguay>



President of Brazil Addresses 78th Session of
General Assembly Debate
@UN Photo/Cia Pak

(Re) emerging regional powers and their potentially equally emerging leadership roles

With Lula da Silva returning to power in 2023, Brazil's quest for international attention and opportunities for global leadership was back in full movement. During his first appearance at the UN General Assembly, he wanted the world to know that "Brazil is back...to make its due contribution in facing the major global challenges" (da Silva, 2023).

Brazil's geopolitics facilitates both. It shares borders with ten nations and is currently trying to preserve its capacity to mediate in the territorial dispute between Guyana and Venezuela; it plays a prominent role in the countries of the southern world regions, most notably through the BRICS, where it is trying to harmonize interests to expand its geopolitical and economic influence and the Group of 20 (G-20), where it currently holds its presidency and is emphasizing on social inclusion, fight against hunger and poverty, energy transitions, the promotion of sustainable development, and reform of global governance institutions.

Brazil has also assumed a central role in shaping global climate action, scaling and accelerating climate finance, and raising the ambition of developing new ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which embody each country's efforts to reduce national emissions and adapt to climate change's impacts. In 2025, it will host the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Buchner, de Miranda and Netto, 2024).

Nevertheless, controversies have marked Brazil's foreign policy in recent months. Wanting to be a green power and simultaneously confirming Brazil's entry into the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+, an oil exporters countries consortium) while attending COP28 in Dubai is one of several examples of the government's ambivalent political moves. Moreover, Brazil's demand for membership in the Security Council has not always been consistent with its commitments to the UN, for example, with regard to budgetary allocations to the organization or when it comes to developing clear visions for its potential role in the main UN organ (Spektor, 2023). President Lula's political space for policymaking is limited due to domestic reasons: the majority of seats in both chambers are in the hands of the opposition. As a result, the executive power is cautious in its approach to policymaking, and the domestic constraints help to understand some of the country's controversial shifts in its international stances.

Brazil, therefore, needs to cultivate partnerships worldwide (and in the region) from which it can obtain tangible advantages rather than alliances. The country seems to want to achieve this goal by implementing a strategy of "active non-alignment," focusing on three key goals: diversifying partners, focusing on development, and democratizing global governance (Magnotta, 2024).



Former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro ousted his country from the regional and world stage, and Mexico had a golden opportunity to become an international and regional leader. Still, the current administration has failed to make Mexico more internationally relevant on the multilateral stage, where it enjoyed a hard work prestige as an effective policy broker. The current foreign policy results show a lack of support for Mexico's proposals in regional forums. The administration of the current President, Manuel López Obrador, has shown little interest in foreign policy and has rather been focused on domestic issues.

His trips abroad can be counted on the fingers of the hands less than 10 official trips to other countries in almost eight years in office, without visiting a single country outside of the Americas or attending any G-20 meeting, and cutting the Mexican foreign services budget by more than 40% between 2018 and 2022 (The Economist, 2023). This is comparable to President Lula da Silva, who, since taking office in 2023, has made 17 international trips, visiting 28 countries in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia.

However, in the last year, Mexico has shown a proactive stand during the ongoing negotiations in New York to strengthen multilateralism and craft global and comprehensive solutions to international challenges. There could be two main reasons behind these actions: Firstly, ideological motivations consistently guide the country's international engagement and support a more equal multilateral system. Secondly, the new Foreign Affairs Secretary designation in June 2023 brought Mexico closer to the UN. Secretary Alicia Barcena was the UN's Economic Commission Executive Secretary for Latin America and the Caribbean for almost fourteen years and has rumored ambitions to succeed current UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

Finally, Mexico is also keeping a prominent role in advancing debt sustainability negotiations and the role of the multilateral development banks in the global financial system: During the eighth retreat of the Group of Friends of Monterrey on financing for development (March 2024), it laid the groundwork for the fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, to be held in Spain in 2025 -Mexico will host the preparatory conference in February (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno de México, 2024).

Both Brazil and Mexico have shown a common pattern. When they understand that the G-77+China does not properly reflect their national interest, they abandon the shared decisions made by the group and vote against or abstain from their vote. An example was their voting pattern during the last Session of the UN General Assembly (2022-2023), where the G-77 sponsored 87 projects of resolutions, Brazil voted against two of them and abstained in 19 opportunities (22%), and Mexico never voted against a project but abstained 11 times (13%).

Mexico and Brazil are the two regional powers, but other countries, especially smaller ones, have shown leadership in critical ongoing negotiations on reforming the multilateral system. The most noticeable examples come from Caribbean countries, which have considerably increased global engagement. As we previously highlighted:

The Bridgetown Initiative was introduced by Barbados, calling for changes and new mechanisms to provide inclusive, resilient finance to address the climate and development crises.

Trinidad and Tobago holds the presidency of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly.

Barbados, Jamaica, and Saint Lucia are co-facilitators of the ongoing intergovernmental consultations, which are part of the preparatory process for the Summit of the Future.

The fourth International Conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS4) took place in Antigua and Barbuda in 2024.

Guyana is currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Colombia also wants to become a leading environmental voice on the global stage. It will host the next round of global biodiversity negotiations, putting nature and efforts to adopt a fossil fuels non-proliferation agreement at the heart of the international environment agenda during the COP16 summit later this year.

Finally, there is also a small but growing group of countries whose leaders have taken a more antagonistic approach towards the UN and the process it leads. Among them are Argentina, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The most prominent being President Milei of Argentina, who claimed on his way to the World Economic Forum (2023) that he aimed to "seed ideas of freedom in a forum that is contaminated by the 2030 socialist agenda, which will only bring misery to the world".



LAC of leadership? How Latin American and Caribbean countries could shape the multilateral system in the next two years

The region faces a lack of multilateral leadership or at least does not live up to its potential. However, it stands at the epicenter of global debates; it has a rare and concrete opportunity to further its interests by shaping the G-20, the outcome of the Summit of the Future, the COPs on climate and biodiversity, the Fourth Conference on Financing for Development, and as outgoing president, to a lesser extent, the ECOSOC agenda.

Still, it is equally important to remain realistic about the challenging geopolitical context and to be clear that it will be impossible - in the near future - to find regional common positions and actionable demands to gain more influence during the ongoing negotiations to reform multilateralism.



Secretary-General Holds Town Hall for ECLAC Staff
@UN Photo/Mark Garten

We suggest that the region cultivates partnerships worldwide during the next months to obtain tangible advantages rather than alliances. The countries should concentrate their efforts on like-minded issues with common positions to advance actionable demands shared by African and Asian countries, but also European countries, align agendas where they hold leadership positions to transform global governance and climate action, and bring together the brain trust from the region to support its government's efforts effectively.

In the short term, concentrate on important convergence issues and drive momentum towards more equitable and effective solutions, such as moving beyond GDP, climate action, and reforming multilateral governance and international financial architecture.

Each process brings unique and complementary themes to the negotiating table, which should allow for comprehensive agenda alignment and effective implementation. The favorable timing of the rotation of leadership positions should be used for this purpose.

Countries like Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Mexico must demonstrate pragmatic, proactive, and robust leadership. They hold key positions at the negotiating table and should, therefore, assume a central role in shaping global climate action and governance reform. This role should translate into promoting the convergence of the member state-led and civil society proposals around the reform of global governance institutions and demonstrate the same leadership in assuring the integration and alignment of climate-change activities.

Bringing together the brain trust from the region, we say, "Nothing about us, without us." A future approach of the region for the UN should be collaborative, innovative, open and effective. (Cepei, 2019). For this to happen, Latin American and Caribbean development advocates urgently need to connect more meaningfully with key constituencies to successfully influence policy-makers in critical political opportunities in 2024/5.

Acronyms

CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
COP	Conference of Parties
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
FfD4	Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRULAC	Group of Latin America and the Caribbean
G-20	Group of 20
G-77+China	Group of 77+China
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
OAS	Organization for American States
PROSUR	Forum for the Progress and Development of Latin America
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UN	United Nations



References

Buchner, Barbara; de Miranda, Giovanna & Netto, María: Strengthening Climate Finance Delivery: The Path from Brazil's G20 Presidency to COP30. April 12, 2024.

<https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Strengthening-Climate-Finance.pdf>

Cepei: Latin America and the Caribbean 2024 perspective and its possible impacts on sustainable development. February 13, 2024.

<https://cepei.org/en/documents/lac-2024-perspectives-impacts-on-sustainable-development/>

Cepei: A Sustainable Regional UN. Bogota. 2019.

<https://cepei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SustainableRegionalUN.pdf>

da Silva, Luiz Inácio (Lula): Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the opening of the 78th UN General Assembly. 2023, September 19.

<https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/follow-the-government/speeches-statements/speech-by-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-at-the-opening-of-the-78th-un-general-assembly#:~:text=Brazil%20is%20finding%20itself%20again,facing%20the%20major%20global%20challenges>

ECLAC: The Challenge of Accelerating the 2030 Agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean: Transitions towards Sustainability. Santiago de Chile. 2024.

<https://repositorio.cepal.org/items/925b6688-040e-4736-8838-983b56f5ee6>

FDI Intelligence. Costa Rica again tops the list of FDI overachievers. 2023, June 21.

<https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/data-trends/costa-rica-a-gain-tops-list-of-fdi-overachievers-82539>

Freeman, Will: The coming crisis for Latin America's left-wing leaders. 2023, September 27.

<https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-coming-crisis-for-latin-americas-left-wing-leaders/>

IDB: 2024 Latin American and Caribbean Macroeconomic Report: Ready for Take-Off? Building on Macroeconomic Stability for Growth. Washington DC. 2024.

<https://publications.iadb.org/en/2024-latin-american-and-caribbean-macroeconomic-report-ready-take-building-macroeconomic-stability>

Magnotta, Fernanda: A Balancing Act for Brazil's Foreign Policy. 2024, February 5.

<https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/a-balancing-act-for-brazil-foreign-policy/>

Ministry of Environment of the Government of Colombia: Colombia unveils COP16 logo to the world and sends a message of 'Peace with Nature'. 2024.

<https://www.minambiente.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Colombia-unveils-COP16-logo-to-the-world-and-sends-a-message-of-Peace-with-Nature.pdf>

Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations: Statement by Ana Avila, Minister Counselor, on the Disarmament Commission. 2023, April 3.

[https://docs-library.unoda.org/United_Nations_Disarmament_Commission_\(2023\)/Costa_Rica_-_SP.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/United_Nations_Disarmament_Commission_(2023)/Costa_Rica_-_SP.pdf)

Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations: Intervención en el marco del Comité Especial de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y el fortalecimiento del rol de la Organización. 2024, 23 de febrero.

https://legal.un.org/committees/charter/docs/english/2024/dominican_rep_wg.pdf

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno de México. Posición de México respecto del Grupo de los 77 más China (Comunicado N° 383). 2023, 19 de septiembre.

<https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/posicion-de-mexico-respecto-de-l-grupo-de-los-77-mas-china?idiom=es>

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno de México. Eighth Retreat of the Group of Friends of Monterrey on Financing for Development (Press Release 112). 2024, March 3.

<https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/eighth-retreat-of-the-group-of-friends-of-monterrey-on-financing-for-development?idiom=en>

Spektor, Matias: Brazil. UN Security Council Reform: What the World Thinks (Ed.: Stewart Patrick). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington DC. 2023.

https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Patrick_et_al_UNSC_Reform_v2_1.pdf

The Economist. Mexico's foreign policy is unambitious and erratic. 2023, November 16.

https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/11/16/mexicos-foreign-policy-is-unambitious-and-erratic?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=19495686130&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjw3ZayBhDRARIsAPWzx8pVhL2DyG-L3EMFp0WdARjjZuMDsQA7dtonSHNjT_wbEx6IQSKpg1AaAkbOEALw_wcB&gclid=aw.ds

