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Lebanon's Human Security in Defense Strategy

Prospects for Civil Military Cooperation

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This paper delves into the concept of human security, advocating for it as the essence of societal defense from fear and want. In post-war Lebanon, the traditional doctrine of security has prevailed, allocating responsibilities to armed and police forces. An exception has been made for the "duality of arms" doctrine that justified Hezbollah's military role in confronting Israeli threats. But this, in turn, has been a topic of political disputes and polarization among Lebanon's divided society. This paper examines various defense strategy options and suggests a growing inclination in favor of a comprehensive human security paradigm that brings multiple partners and interlocutors across different sectors to strengthen society's resilience, readiness, and defense capabilities. Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC) is proposed as an entry point toward a comprehensive defense strategy and as a means to mitigate the "duality of arms" thesis.

Content

Acronyms	3
Executive Summary	4
Aims and Methodology	4
Background of National Defense Strategy in Lebanon	6
Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC) and Human Security	8
Comparative CMC	10
Lebanon's contested NDS and prospects for its CMC	11
Lebanon's CMC	13
Challenges and opportunities for the integration of CMC within NDS	14
A. Challenges	14
B. Opportunities	15
A Roadmap toward the Integration of CMC in NDS	16
A. CMC Forum	16
B. Civil Defense Forces	18
C. Strengthening Civil-Military Partnership	19
Towards a Human Security-Based Defense	20
References	22

Acronyms

CDF	Civil Defense Forces
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Community Safety Partnership
DDR	Partnership, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EU	European Union
GS	General Security
HA	Hezbollah
HQ	Headquarter
ISF	Internal Security Forces
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LAU	Lebanese American University
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MP	Municipal Police
NDC	National Dialogue Conference
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NDU	Notre Dame University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command
SANDF	South Africa National Defense Force
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon

Executive Summary

This report delves into the concept of human security while being advocated as the essence of societal defense from fear and want and freedom to live in dignity. This perspective considers military defense as a subcomponent of a wider array of threats that society must repel, including poverty, natural and man-made disasters, health degradations, crimes, cyber-attacks, economic meltdown, failing justice as well as internal strife and external military invasions among others. Such a perspective calls for the mobilization of civil, military, private, and public sectors to optimize resources and synchronize efforts to provide for the protection and the wellbeing of society.

In Lebanon, the traditional doctrine of security has prevailed, allocating responsibilities to armed and police forces. Often, this discourse has anomalized civilian or non-state actors from taking any defensive responsibilities. An exception has been made to the 'duality of arms' doctrine that justified Hezbollah's military role in confronting Israeli threats. But this, in turn, has been a topic of political disputes and polarization among Lebanese parties. A National Defense Strategy (NDS) has occupied the central stage of these quarrels, where political camps have been deeply divided on the question. Proponents deny the need for a strategy beyond the triad of "army, people, and resistance," claimed as the pillar of defense as spelled out in the government policy guidelines. Opponents, on the other hand, assert the need for an NDS that preserves the state's monopoly over the exercise of violence and defense and wherein disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of all non-state armed actors is enforced.

This study has examined various defense strategies and interviewed a selection of military experts, relevant politicians, and civil society stakeholders. The findings suggest a growing inclination in favor of a comprehensive human security paradigm that brings multiple partners and interlocutors across different sectors to strengthen society's resilience, readiness, and defense capabilities. Each component requires elaborate Civil-Military Coordination (CMC) and comprehensiveness that can significantly contribute to a strategic defense outlook, which can be discussed in any future National Dialogue Conference (NDC). In that direction, it is recommended that a CMC national council is formed to assemble different sets of stakeholders to draft a national outlook for CMC in an NDS to be proposed in any NDC. Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)'s CIMIC Directorate is suggested as the most appropriate focal entity to take on the lead in such an initiative and partnership with a selected Civil Society Organization (CSO). Outcomes of early experimentations and piloting by CIMIC, as well as various community-policing projects, are encouraging, and lessons learned can be instructive in bolstering successes through national up scaling. Reversing civil society's perceptions and attitudes toward the security agencies are among the first steps required to energize engagements and cooperation within a CMC context. Funding CIMIC's activities, including convening a CMC national council, is also among the prerequisites for achieving a CMC outlook in any NDS. Elements of this outlook can range from low-politics, such as CMC responding to national disasters, to contested high-politics such as forming a Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The latter proposition within the context of CMC may well mitigate exiting contentions around the 'duality of arms' doctrine and synthesis opposite perspectives.

Aims and Methodology

The primary goal of this research is to conduct a comparative NDS research study that extracts comparative advantages and lessons learned from deeply divided and weak states. The purpose is to jump-start dialogue between different stakeholders towards the formulation of


a conciliatory outlook that would integrate a military-civilian cooperation framework within an NDS.

The study claims that civilian-military cooperation is an essential component of an effective NDS and a means to diffuse and mitigate contentions surrounding dual arms debate.

To examine this claim, this study surveys the different NDS propositions by the various Lebanese political parties, assess their feasibility and explore remaining gaps that may contribute to a comprehensive NDS outlook. Particular attention is centered around the prospect of articulating civil-military cooperation within NDS concerning surrounding debate.

Evident divergence in political rapprochement toward a unified national strategy and lacking critical knowledge of human security modality in NDS is expected to be among the preliminary findings. But comparative country research would highlight experiences that have utilized civil-military cooperation within defense framework that has, simultaneously, helped diffused domestic contentions and provided comprehensive human security strategy.

Toward those ends, this research utilizes a mixed-method by surveying exiting views and establishing comparative research to extract advantages and lessons learned from different NDS modalities adopted in divided societies. Interviews are conducted with political party informants to map the different propositions, including those about civilian roles in defense strategies. Interviews will also compile military perspectives for effective strategies and potential civilian-military relations in any NDS. The interviews include retired military generals, experts, civil society leaders, and relevant stakeholders. We anticipate compiling the perspectives of selected informants who will respond to an open-ended questionnaire. While the instrument gathers perspectives and views on NDS, it probes for the integration of military-civilian defense outlooks. Comparative experiences and lessons learned from countries with similar contexts are utilized to propose recommendations. Finally, a roundtable of 20 experts is to be convened to validate and revise the findings of this research and to take practical steps moving forward.



The main questions formulated to compile primary and secondary data. Main questions include:

1. What NDS approaches have proven effective in politically divided and resources lacking societies?
2. How has the integration of civilian-military framework defused domestic tensions and optimize national resources toward NDS?
3. What are the different Lebanese political parties and civil society stakeholders' positions on NDS and particularly civil-military framework?
4. What are the challenges and opportunities for the attainment of a conciliatory NDS that integrate civil-military outlooks in the Lebanese context?
5. How can such prospects move forward through practical steps?

This study compares several NDS country models with civil-military cooperation orientations that can be contrasted with Lebanon. While mapping Lebanese stakeholders, 20 informants, representing the diversity of Lebanese stakeholders, were interviewed. Stakeholders included relevant political, security, and civil society sectors. Triangulation of comparative case studies, existing literature, and research, as well as primary data compiled, is utilized toward analysis, findings, validation, and recommendations.

Background of National Defense Strategy in Lebanon

Lebanon's security sector is beset by a complex set of chronic geopolitical and structural challenges that call for innovative approaches to security and defense. Some of these challenges include fluid borders that have been subjected to intense security breaches and disputed demarcations. Continuous infringements and military conflicts on the southern front have resulted in two major UN Security Council resolutions (425 and 1701)¹ that dispatched 15,000 UNIFIL soldiers to accompany the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in stabilizing the area south of the Litany River. The Shebaa Farms and maritime delimitation remain contested between Lebanon and Israel, instigating ongoing cross border tensions. To the east and north, and following the eruption of violence in Syria in 2012, the borders have become riddled with more than 1,500 illegal crossings involving smuggling and human trafficking activities.² But border control is not the only challenge confronting the security sector in Lebanon; the widespread presence of non-state armed actors pose a major barrier to state monopoly over the use of force. Tribal armed groups control tariffs in various rural regions in the Bekaa area. Militant Palestinian groups maintain armed presence close to the Syrian borders while Palestinian refugee camps preserve their security control under the 1969 Cairo Agreement. Lebanon also recognizes the Resistance's right to arms alongside LAF, known as the "duality of arms" strategy, which gives autonomy to the armed activities of Hezbollah and Resistance Brigades. Meanwhile, the influx of Syrian refugees, estimated at more than one million, has presented a whole set of security challenges. Providing for the safety and security of the displaced and defusing host-refugee tensions have overwhelmed the capacities of the Lebanese security apparatus.

¹ For more on UNSCR 425 (1978), and UNSCR 1701 (UNSC SC/8808, 2006).

² For more on the smuggling and human trafficking activities in Lebanon, see Kadi (2018).

At the same time, the sector faces its own structural difficulties stemming from the state's political fragmentation along confessional lines, the post-civil war weakened institutions, overlapping roles between different security branches, and the unequal application of the law. Security decisions are often tied to a political consensus that complicates the ability to present a unified and comprehensive response to security breaches. Political consociationalism, a description often applied to the Lebanese political system, undermines the separation of power between branches of government. As a consequence, there has been a persistent lack of judicial and parliamentary oversight over the government's conduct, a situation that has culminated in a serious detachment of the civilian from the security sector.

Amid such daunting situational and structural difficulties, providing security and defense for the civilian population is of utmost urgency. Utilizing traditional security reform seems to be among the least likely options. Alternatively, building on comparative international experiences and extracting lessons learned from similar security challenges are considered to be among the more promising approaches to assist Lebanon's Security Sector Reform (SSR). The immediate proposition is to expand the capacity and reach of the security agencies to confront challenges through a community engagement and partnership framework.

A national defense strategy (NDS) is a de-facto template for defining the security roadmap of a particular country. NDS describes the state's approach to protecting its own sovereignty and territorial integrity against imminent danger or external threat. Thus, it incorporates various interconnected yet diverse aspects of protections that go beyond the traditional military conceptualization of defense. Modern elements include strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism, provide cyber-security, protect vital infrastructure and resources, and respond to natural and man-made disasters among others. Also, NDSs emphasize the need for international cooperation and agreements to establish the widest possible external support against threats. NDSs in militarily strong and economically advanced states are fundamentally different from those adopted by militarily weak and economically poor nations. The latter require significant optimization of human and material resources to build their capacities in deterring external threats. Formulating an NDS may catalyze divisive politics, particularly in countries where deep disagreements are embedded in domestic and external policy outlooks.

Consecutive post-war Lebanese governments failed to devise an NDS despite the many security challenges. A series of national dialogue conferences (NDC) after the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon attempted, in vain, to build consensus around a common vision for an NDS. But the sticking point remained that of Hezbollah's (HA) parallel military establishment, whose initial pretext was the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon which ended only in 2000. Thereafter, however, HA opposed disarmament or integration into formal military institutions, arguing that its parallel structure holds a higher deterrence ground against a potential Israel incursion than the LAF. Opponents rejected this strategy, fearing the utilization of HA's arms to serve Iran's regional ambitions. They likewise expressed concerns about the potential for HA's weapons turning inward to suppress domestic critics. Suspicions of HA's responsibility for the assassination campaigns carried out against its critics in 2005-2007 became more concrete when in 2008, the party waged a military takeover of Beirut with the mission of suppressing political dissenters – a conquest that was politically harvested in favorable post-2009 electoral arrangements and the imposition of pro-HA presidential choices.

Division over the NDS raged on, mitigated only by opposite political parties joining the government while bitterly cooperating with the "duality of arms" policy. Since 2009, Lebanese governments have expressed this parallel military establishment in respective policy

guidelines, declaring Lebanon's right to defend itself through its "army, people, and resistance," the latter implying HA.

Yet reluctance about this duality has been a persistent position taken by HA's opponents. In 2012, a series of NDC meetings were convened under former President Michel Sleiman, who distributed a draft proposal titled "Comprehensive National Defense Strategy" (Sleiman, 2012). The proposal focused on three main strategic tiers: confronting the Israeli enemy, fighting terrorism, and gradually de-arming non-state actors. The latest attempt to jumpstart dialogue around NDS has been proposed by Sleiman's successor, President Michel Aoun, who called for an NDS during the Rome II conference (Naharnet Newsdesk, 2018). His call has been welcomed by the Future Movement, the Progressive and Socialist Party, as well as the Lebanese Forces party. However, HA and its allies remained hesitant, while NDCs have continuously failed to bring consensus around an NDS.

It should be noted that political parties in Lebanon have articulated different outlooks toward the NDS and have expressed their readiness to present them in an NDC. Hezbollah and allies, on the other hand, have expressed content with the current status quo, embedded within consecutive governments' policy guidelines that submit to the duality of "army and resistance." Thus, HA arms have remained a sticking point leading to a political paralysis that has prevented the realization of an NDS, on the one hand, while reducing all aspects of NDS to resolutions regarding the non-state arms.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC) and Human Security

The urgency of resolving the political stalemate surrounding the question of HA arms in an NDS has instigated a search for potential mitigating factors. The "duality of arms" has taken a central stage in the debate while obstructing political consensus. At the same time, a comprehensive discussion has not emerged to address other and equally vital components of an NDS; specifically, those that present ways to optimize national resources and mobilize civil support in any military encounters. Such factors may prove to be among the critical defense criteria and serve as potential entry points to the mitigation of the HA arms debate.

A growing body of comparative literature suggests that the integration of a civil-military framework in an NDS could prove relevant in the context of a divided society. Advancing civil-military cooperation (CMC) by expanding and mainstreaming successful experiences can defuse existing contentions surrounding the duality of arms thesis. An NDS that is based on a civilian-military partnership may strengthen local defense capacities while, at the same time, giving layaways to a greater formalization of military structure and command.

In general, CMC includes both the civilian and military elements of security and is widely approached from the perspective of human security doctrine. The latter has been gaining extensive attention as nation-states become increasingly interconnected while facing imminent threats that require defense strategies beyond traditional armed forces. The idea is to transform defense doctrines from being state-centered to people-centered strategies.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1994, p. 24) defines human security as an approach whose doctrine emphasizes the "freedom from fear and freedom from want." It means "first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs, or communities." UNDP's conceptualization of human security emphasizes the protection of seven sectors: the military, health, economic, food, personal, political, environmental, and the community (CHS, 2003, p. 4). In 2004, the United Nations established

the Human Security Unit with the intention of strengthening the organization in responding to multiple and complex challenges.³ The 2012 General Assembly resolution 66/290 established that “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.” It calls for “people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people.”⁴ In this sense, United Nations affirmed that freedom to live in dignity is another essential principle of human security.

In other words, human security stresses the need for people to be free from fear, requiring a whole set of integrated protection mechanisms that include the stipulation of international and human rights laws. Actors in this domain include the security forces and concerned public sectors, but also local and international organizations specializing in protection, such as the Red Cross, World Food Program, Human Rights Watch, and UNHCR. Protection, from this perspective, is military-centered but also economic, health, environmental, political, and technological, among other relevant domains.

The second aspect of human security calls for people to be free from want, requiring mobilization to achieve sustainable development and free society from drivers of violence and war, such as poverty and unequal developments. Again, partners in this field include a range of local and international stakeholders along with the security forces. The United Nations, whose Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (SDG2030)⁵ guide its many functions around the world, is essential in this field. Local organizations, as well as most civil public sectors, are mainstreaming SDG2030 within their activities and outlooks. Connecting the military with the civil sectors in responding to human security requirements constitutes the essence of strategic defense.

The third aspect calls for people to have the freedom to live in dignity, where their choice and decisions are made free from intimidation and imposition of others. In this sense, the role of the military requires ultimate coordination with the civilian population as to preserve its role as people rather than elite or state centered institution.

International experiences demonstrate that such a comprehensive understanding of security helps to increase the optimization of national efforts and resources in confronting contemporary challenges. Adversaries may utilize cyber-attacks, terrorism, protracted conflicts, espionage, destruction of food supplies, and the country's finance, etc. The recent outbreak of the coronavirus exemplifies the type of threat that looms ahead of society and the type of defense required to quell those dangers.

The drive toward the human security approach has grown as traditional security doctrines, especially in low-income and post-conflict countries, have proven inadequate to confront external threats. Being under-equipped and often divided along different political loyalties presents a serious challenge to high-cost militarization. Lebanon's attempts to repel external threats have repeatedly invited domestic divisions over ideologies and strategies, while its military is poorly equipped and hardly prepared to challenge external incursions.

³ For more on the HSU see its website: <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/human-security-unit/>

⁴ See UNGA Resolution 66/290: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/290

⁵ For more on the SDG 2030, see (United Nations A/RES/70/1, 2015).

A comprehensive coalition of stakeholders and partners from civil and military sectors can, therefore, help to substitute for the various weaknesses and deficiencies. The CMC component of human security and its integration in a national defense strategy for Lebanon would include essential partners such as the Army, security agencies (including international), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), other relevant ministries, the Parliament's Defense Committee, governorates, municipalities, civil society organizations (CSOs), civil defense units, political parties, think-tanks and research centers, local communities, and international organizations.

The outbreak of the COVID19 exposed Lebanon's security vulnerability in the face of pandemics and demonstrated the need to shift toward a human security strategy. Defense in this context requires comprehensive cooperation and coordination between the different civil (government and non-government) and security sectors to repel such a danger and protect the national population.

Comparative CMC

Viewed from a human security perspective, CMC comprises the "integration of the traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need" (Franke, 2006, p. 7). In the long run, the collaboration between military forces and civilian actors helps in promoting human security and developing safe conditions to transit from a conflict and fear-laden to a stable and secure society. As a response to the challenging operational requirements, states are increasing the working relationship between the military and civilian actors as well as creating specific policies and regulations to stipulate the nature of the CMC.

For instance, the United Kingdom, in its national defense strategy, focuses on the role of the civil-military Stabilization Unit in tackling conflicts and supporting a more effective cross-government crisis response (HM Government, 2015). Another example of incorporating CMC in the defense strategy is Canada, where both military forces and civilian personnel are needed to assist in the country's internal and external missions (Canada National Defence, 2017). In addition, both Canada and Norway are considered as the vocal promoters of human security along with other states that are in the "human security network" such as Greece, Switzerland, Chile, and Thailand (Paris, 2001, p. 87). Also, CMC falls under defense-diplomacy initiatives and is widely seen in European governments such as France and Germany (Cotter & Forster, 2004).

South Africa is a pioneer in integrating human security within its defense strategy through establishing the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). The move toward human security has allowed South Africa to focus on the security of its citizens within a comprehensive civil-military partnership (Lekota, 2008). Other countries, such as China, Israel, and Senegal, have given their armed forces a growing role in collaborating with civil sectors as a way to strengthen national defense capacities. Finland maintains an already trained civilian population ready to participate in any state of emergency to defend the country. Italy has been experimenting with the development of a civil national emergency force. NATO, UK, and EU have advanced civil-military projects that aimed to increase civilian role in regional defense. The United States has integrated civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) within its National Defense Strategy, while the United Nations has emphasized the importance of civil-military relations and human security approaches through development and peace strengthening programs. CIMIC is among the contemporary projects being integrated into the work of the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces but also mainstreamed into the framework of different military establishments, including Lebanon, to enhance civil-military relations.

CMC is emerging as vital for countries encountering a protracted state of conflict and instability. External powers are currently assisting weak states around the globe in rebuilding and reforming their systems. Both the United States and the United Kingdom utilized CMC strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq (Strachan, 2006). Another example is the African Union, which is conducting multilateral defense cooperation in several conflict regions in sub-Saharan Africa with the assistance of the US, UK, and France (Onuoha, 2017).

Lebanon's contested NDS and prospects for its CMC

Integrating CMC within a NDS requires the synchronization of a set of interests and objectives that can be tied to both the military and civil society while taking into consideration the resource limitations and the security threats (Nerguizian, 2017). Besides that, it entails the need for thoughtful planning and the optimization of resources tied to civil-military development, allowing it to work on both the institutional and operational levels (Gaub, 2016). In general, CMC is driven by three main tiers: liaison, support, and deconfliction and coordination (Kassermann, 2012, pp. 18-19). Military liaison is developed with the civilian population, i.e., the integration of civilian elements in the military operations through creating communication channels. The second and third aspects reflect the need for support and coordination in implementing projects taking place in the civil environment, as well as coordination for access to public resources (Kassermann, 2012, pp. 18-19).

But Lebanon's sectarian system has evoked a precarious history of civil-military relations (Nerguizian, 2011). Periods of war, civil unrest, and foreign occupation have reduced the state's monopoly over the exercise of violence. The role of the armed forces in security affairs was often detached from that of the communities. Elite commanders and occupying armies often determined the functioning order of the security sector. Thus, throughout post-war reconstruction, and following the Syrian troops' pullout from Lebanon, the restoration of the security sector's role and gaining the confidence of civil society have been among the major uphill battles for the peace-building process. Yet post-war strategies have been overly concerned with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Assumptions have centered on the need to rebuild a unified national army and security apparatus to assure post-conflict state-building, which has entailed distancing civil society and CMC from security affairs.

Throughout the post-conflict peace-building era, dominant political and military views have continued to consider security as the sole business of military professionals protecting the state and its borders. These perspectives have maintained the position that civilians should remain subordinate to military decisions without having comprehensive integration as partners in any overall NDS. Contemporary politicians have suggested that recurrent government policy statements provide for an adequate security doctrine that spells out Lebanon's right to defend itself through its "people, army, and resistance," a synonym for the "duality of arms" strategy. Though such an outlook appears to shift a state-centered to a people-centered security policy, it is largely undermined by political contestations and the cooption of "people and resistance" by sectarian and political interests. Hypothetically, having the "resistance" transformed into a non-partisan paramilitary national defense force would have implied CMC along with a human security perspective.

Thus far, Lebanon NDS has been informally discussed along track I negotiations with the aim to formulate a top-down policy decision, where civil society is turned into a receptive sector within a traditional defense outlook. However, pressure is building up to reverse such an elitist and post-war state-centric approach in favor of a multi-track negotiation that assures the integration of CMC.

The recent outbreak of the COVID19 has presented a widening opportunity to rethink defense in a more comprehensive context. This includes the requirement to negotiate NDS among experts from the private, public, and formal sectors toward a comprehensive partnership. Unintentional efforts have been picking up momentum to strengthen CMC, such as the formation of a military-civil committee headed by an army general delegated with the task of responding to disasters. The National Disaster and Crisis Response Committee established in 2013 is formed to complement the work of the High Relief Commission; both are led by an army general who also serves as the General Secretary of the Supreme Defense Council, also founded in 2013 and headed by the President.

These early steps prepare for an advance in CMC and serve as a means to restore confidence and build public support in the armed forces. Such a shift in strategy requires the full recognition of CMC within the overall goals and strategies of the different security apparatuses. Though major security agencies have begun a process to reformulate their strategic plans toward a rapprochement with the civilian sectors, they have remained short of attaining a comprehensive CMC (Lebanon Internal Security Forces, 2018; Lebanese Armed Forces, 2018; Lebanon General Security, 2018). The restructuring of the existing Supreme Defense Council would require a partnership with CSOs. Such a step would also charge CSOs with an active role in mobilization, support, and crisis management in a CMC strategy. Accordingly, CMC would turn into a vital component of any strategic defense doctrine, including the potential formation of paramilitary units ready to engage in an asymmetric armed combat.

Political affiliation remains a key determinant of attitudes towards NDS and CMC as well as their articulation in strategic defense. While consensus exists that societal mobilization and support are essential to defeat any Israeli aggression, looming but less apparent threats have not attained a similar recognition. This is despite the fact that other threats are gaining prevalence, such as those presented by terrorist groups, transnational criminal networks, cyber-security penetrators, and epidemics, among others. For the multi-communitarian and divided society, demographic changes have been, likewise, a growing concern emerging out of recurring waves of refugee influxes. Israel and a majority of non-Shi'ite groups view Iran increasingly as an emerging threat and a growing political and military regional hegemon. For this segment of the population, a viable NDS must entail a DDR strategy in a direct reference to the need to disarm HA and in an effort to detach its national role from Iranian imposition. Opponents of this view, on the other hand, consider the preservation of HA's armed role as crucial for any asymmetric warfare strategy and as a means to deter Israeli ambitions, at a time when LAF lacks readiness to defend the country against superior forces. A minority view proposes aborting traditional state-centric defense doctrines in favor of an encompassing human security-based defense strategy that integrates CMC and provides for a diverse response to a multiple-threat environment.

Lebanese civil society is a proponent of CMC in an NDS. The country's vibrant CSOs have displayed resilience and capacity to sustain the repercussions of recurring wars and natural disasters. Many of the 7000 registered NGOs have taken a pivotal role in the humanitarian response efforts during the different Israeli military incursions in Southern Lebanon and those of the Syrian army in other parts of the country. Lebanese civil society has helped cater for the massive waves of forcedly displaced Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian populations for decades. It has responded to natural disasters and demonstrated effectiveness in taking a partnership role with the different security agencies to protect human rights or provide support to security arrangements. Local CSOs have built various coalitions and established critical partnership with INGOs, IGOs, and GOs in order to respond to crises, the latest in response to Syrian displacement and COVID19. Civil society's interventions to support Syrian refugees and host communities have been largely coordinated by the Working Group for

Persons Affected by the Syrian Crisis (WG PASC) a network of 26 CSOs that includes an array of Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian organizations (RDPP, 2019). During the COVID19 outbreak, universities and CSOs volunteered in the different health response campaigns in collaboration with Red Cross and the Ministry of Health to create awareness campaigns and mobilize medical students to support hospitals (The National, 2020). These interventions exemplify the central role undertaken by civil society groups in protection. They also highlight their relevance in any CMC, particularly in fostering communication, planning, resources optimization, protection, mobilization, and development strategies to confront traditional and non-traditional threats.

Therefore a CMC can be elaborated and adopted by the Ministry of Defense so as to incorporate a partnership with CSOs and to integrate them in any fighting or LAF defense doctrine. CMC preparation in that direction would include taking the lead to reintroduce some form of mandatory military service, form special civilian fighting forces and information gathering units, and allocate to civilian aspects of shelter management, fortification, awareness, and logistical support. For that purpose, immediate steps would include strengthening a CMC-enabling environment so as to consolidate partnership, facilitate communication, and build public awareness and readiness. Overall, an open engagement through CMC would help remove misconceptions and strengthen support toward the armed forces, hence contributing to a stronger national defense.

Lebanon's CMC

LAF has taken initiatives toward the institutionalization of CMC within its command structure. In 2015, it founded the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC-LEBANON) Directorate with a high-ranking commander and also three regional offices in the Bekaa, the North, and South of Lebanon. The aim was to establish and maintain two-way relationships between the LAF and civilian actors at all appropriate levels, support LAF military commanders by facilitating civil-military relations, provide LAF assistance to civil authorities, and coordinate direct LAF assistance to communities.⁶

The LAF has wide-ranging security roles and responsibilities, which include maintaining security on border areas and assisting internal police forces locally. Thus, it has gradually come to recognize the importance of CMC. UNIFIL's CIMIC operations in Southern Lebanon, which successfully improved relationships between the UN and the local communities in that area, inspired LAF's rapprochement toward civil society.

CIMIC programs have been an important component of the UN and other multilateral peacekeeping and peace-building missions for over 20 years. In contrast, CIMIC-LEBANON has come to focus on promoting long-term civil-military cooperation between the LAF and local communities at home country. Building on the LAF's historical roles in contributing to Lebanon's infrastructure development and assisting communities responding to crises or natural disaster; CIMIC-Lebanon has come to gain emphasis in LAF's strategic plans (Lebanese Armed Forces, 2018).

Despite being influenced by CIMIC-UNIFIL, CIMIC-LEBANON goes beyond LAF-UNIFIL cooperation in Southern Lebanon to form an independent national LAF Operational structure. Its current activities entail three main functions:

⁶ For more information on the Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate, see the website (Lebanon Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate, n.d.).

- › Establish a civil-military liaison to maintain two-way relationships between the LAF and civilian actors at all appropriate levels while facilitating information sharing, deconfliction, cooperation, and (where appropriate) coordinating and integrating planning and activities.
- › Provide support to LAF military commanders by facilitating civil-military interactions.
- › Provide LAF assistance to civil government ministries, on request, to support programs or services essential to the life, health, and safety of communities; and facilitate direct LAF assistance to communities, including in response to emergencies and natural disasters.⁷

Thus, within this framework, the CIMIC-LEBANON Directorate may undertake projects to assist local communities and promote good relationships between the army and communities. It has a strategic role in helping to consolidate the LAF's position as a national security institution that is well respected and valued by the diverse communities across much of Lebanon. It also provides a key institutional mechanism to facilitate information exchange and coordination between LAF and other security agencies and civil authorities in efforts to enhance community safety and security.

CIMIC-LEBANON's activities include firefighting, search and rescue operations, support to humanitarian organizations, and assistance in the mass movement of evacuees. In 2019, a drill pilot project response was conducted in the Lebanese town of Salhieh in Southern Lebanon. Combined efforts were utilized throughout the drill by governmental agencies and civil society organizations in disaster management and in simulating an earthquake response. Participating agencies included CIMIC-LEBANON, Internal Security Forces (ISF), Civil Defense, Red Cross, municipalities, hospitals, doctors, and local NGOs. The success of the drill demonstrated the potential for CMC in optimizing resources and specialties that, by far, exceeded those offered by standing armed forces. It provided incentives and requests to replicate and scale up this experiment on a nationwide scale.

Challenges and opportunities for the integration of CMC within NDS

In such a politically divided and complex environment, there are evident challenges and opportunities for the integration of any CMC in a prospective NDS.

A. Challenges

The challenges are many, but chief among them is a lack of political will combined with poor familiarity with the human security concept as an applicable defense doctrine in Lebanon (ALEF, 2017).

Additional difficulties stem from the fact that any discussion of defense or security strategy can become politically divisive when implicating HA and its weapons, leading to irreconcilable perspectives and, consequently, a stalemate.

Despite attempts by LAF to implement CMC through its CIMIC-LEBANON, this Directorate remains lacking in resources and capacities. Various technical and structural difficulties obstruct the mainstreaming and upscaling of its projects and pilots. Lack of funds is among

⁷ For more information on the Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate, see the website (Lebanon Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate, n.d.).

the major obstacles. Whereas UN sponsored CIMIC operations have access to external funds and resources, CIMIC-LEBANON has a much-constrained and limited budget.

Other difficulties are associated with assumptions embedded in the very foundations of CIMIC-LEBANON that intended to expand LAF's public relations and reach out. The military considers CIMIC-LEBANON as a LAF public relations arm rather than an essential component of a comprehensive defense framework. While strengthening the army's reputation and receptivity among the public are essential, CIMIC-LEBANON never intended to build a genuine partnership with civil society nor aimed to integrate such work toward an NDS. The Directorate is military-centered, and its strategy is determined solely by military officers. Hence, CIMIC-LEBANON's work has remained narrowly implemented in selected areas while attaining limited civil society's recognition.

CSOs, on the other hand, have kept a distance from the security sector while concentrating efforts on areas such as humanitarian reliefs or local developments. Long-standing suspicions of the security sector perceived as being a protector of political elites or being a force of repression, remains widespread. Experiences shared between the two sectors have been limited to experimental community policing projects and some assistance given to police and judicial sector in prison management. Initial engagements with CIMIC-LEBANON, such as demining in the South or participating in drills in response to natural disaster, are encouraging signs that require a stronger partnership to be nurtured and developed within the context of an NDS.

B. Opportunities

On the positive side, the global environment encourages the transformation from traditional state-centric and military-driven defense doctrines in favor of a comprehensive human security strategy. There is a growing pressure for nation-states to adopt a set of security requirements deemed vital for society and state survival. The COVID19 pandemic has catalyzed much of the thinking in such a direction. CMC can now emerge as a pivotal component of this outlook.

At the same time, there are international as well as domestic pressures for Lebanon to call for an NDC that is capable of confronting multiple threats facing the country, military as well as environmentally and economically. Thus, an enabling environment is present to advance the CMC proposition within a prospective NDS.

Contributing further to such an enabling environment are the positive responses emerging from the different security sectors, including LAF, ISF, and General Security (GS). All have included in their strategic plans the aim to strengthen their engagements with the civilian population while shifting doctrines to center around civilian services and people protection. It should be noted, however, that this strategy has not been articulated in any substantial plan of action beyond limited projects and pilots. The people-centered strategy of the multi-security agencies has been negatively implicated by public protests against governments and the subsequent street confrontations.

The fact that preliminary experimentations with CIMIC-LEBANON have been successful is encouraging. Besides UNIFIL's various peace-building projects that have strengthened CMC in the South along the different internationally funded community policing projects, the work of LAF's CIMIC-LEBANON has been successful despite limited capacities and resources. CIMIC-LEBANON has been positively received among communities while engaging the various ministries to improve civil military relations. CIMIC-LEBANON coordinates the necessary activities with the Lebanese ministries in the framework of civil-military cooperation. In a very

short time since its inception, it has successfully implemented projects and conducted drills in cooperation with international and civil society organizations, the first in Lebanon since the civil war.

Increasing awareness about CMC has been inviting to local and international organizations. The prospects for CMC within the human security context may soon increase the appetite for CSOs to pay more attention to such a domain. This may well ensure civil society and relevant actors are present in CMC, providing them a prime seat in an NDC to discuss ways to strengthen the country's security and form a coherent NDS. (Figure here)

Challenges	Opportunities
<ul style="list-style-type: none">› General lack of understanding of human security and CMC.› Suspicions that NDS targets Hezbollah and opposition to any discussion in this regard.› Irreconcilable political perspectives on NDS.› Existing CMC projects have limited resources and exposure, such as CIMIC-LEBANON.› Existing CMC projects have limited resources and exposure, such as CIMIC-LEBANON.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">› Human security and CMC are gaining international reputation and support.› Security doctrines by LAF, ISF, and GS contribute toward CMC.› International pressure on Lebanon to implement NDC and NDS.› Role of CIMIC-LEBANON in cooperating with several ministries (ex: Education, Environment, and Health) and drill are encouraging› Civil society gaining knowledge and interests in CMR

A Roadmap toward the Integration of CMC in NDS:

A. CMC Forum

Incorporating CMC as an integral component of any future NDS is a critical step toward the attainment of human security in Lebanon. This would entail engaging state and civil society actors in a dialogue to identify and underlie causes of insecurity, including those posed by the duality of arms, and to develop a consensual response to them. Such an exercise implies that the NDS needs to be drafted through a military-civil partnership, where civil society takes on a primary role in drafting its outlooks as well as identifying its goals for the preservation of human security.

Current European Union, UNDP, and UK sponsored projects with LAF and ISF have entailed components of CMC and have been generally designed to integrate a four-stage cyclical approach that places the community as the focal aim of security in military programs. The stages include; 1) research, assess, and analyze; 2) civil partnership project planning and

development; 3) civil partnership project implementation; 4) and evaluation and learning. It is intended to be an iterative approach, with inclusive civil dialogue at its core, which repeats in benign cycles of improving quality and effectiveness of consultation and co-operation on measures to identify and address safety and security for each community. The aim is for the security agencies, local and provincial authorities, all parts of the community, and other stakeholders (such as CSOs, religious or cultural leaders, and local businesses) to consult and work together inclusively in a sustainable set of good quality relationships.

These early piloted projects can serve as a platform for the formation of a nation-wide coordination mechanism that brings together the different stakeholders. The establishment of a national CMC Forum that would trigger a comprehensive strategy to identify CMC role in response to internal or external threats. Such a strategy would include the development of community resiliency through collaborative projects (capacity building, communication, local developments, neighborhood safety drills, etc.), building readiness to confront disasters and emergencies (environmental, epidemics, earthquakes, wildfires, economic meltdown, health, cyber-attacks, etc.), and prepare for defense against military threats and their repercussions (military-civil mobilization, civil defense, information gathering, protection, refugees, shelter, etc.).

CIMIC-LEBANON remains the most appropriate entity to play a focal coordination role in the formation of a national CMC Forum. CSOs would need to undertake a partnership rather than a receptive role in such a council. Together they could reach out to a variety of relevant stakeholders, including municipalities, ministries, Parliament's National Defense and Interior Committee, and security agencies.

The CMC Forum's initial task would need to focus on drafting a CMC component of an NDS. Lebanon has developed local security mechanisms to coordinate security responses on the governorate level. Headed by the governors, the local security council (Majlis Al Amn Al Far'ee) facilitates coordination between the different security agencies within respective governorate. Yet these councils have not included local CSOs in their coordination efforts, a serious deficiency that can only be addressed through a CMC strategy.

The CMC Forum's initial task would, thus, need to focus on drafting a CMC component of an NDS that explores the different venues through which CSOs can play a vital security role. Drafting assumptions suggest that the attainment of consensus will be more easily achieved on low politics (resiliency and readiness) as well as on non-contentious defense topics such as having a recall on mandatory or selective military services as well as activating civil society's role in local security councils and the Supreme Defense Council. However, high politics (contentious defense) such as the DDR or preserving Hezbollah's armed duality would certainly require a separate or parallel track-one negotiation. Therefore, it is essential to adopt an appropriate mediation approach that is incremental in any agenda setting, i.e., where it fosters step-by-step agreements while gradually building consensus toward the eventual mitigation of contentious topics.

Ultimately, the draft would need to establish a mechanism for the coordination between CSOs and the formal civil institutions, such as the National Disaster and Crisis Response Committee and the High Relief Commission, as well as those of the security sector. The plan can then be presented to the Supreme Defense Council as a proposition to be adopted in the NDS.

B. Civil Defense Forces

CIMIC-LEBANON can play a critical role in harnessing success stories, such as the Salhieh drill and similar local pilot projects, to draw lessons learned for a national strategy. CSOs rapprochement toward the security sector in general and LAF in particular would present another requisite to building a sustainable partnership. CSOs may be in a position to propose the formation of civil defense forces (CDF) or kowat al difaa al madani that can be mobilized during imminent military threats. CSOs in partnership with CIMIC-Lebanon would need to take on a primary role in articulating and commanding such a unit.

There are a variety of comparative country CMCs and NDSs that provide Lebanon with important clues to the formation of CDF. In Vietnam as well as the USA, for instance, the local armed militia is established alongside the formal military to intervene during situations of domestic insecurities or external threats. The US state militias are commanded by respective local authorities, i.e., states governors. Likewise, Vietnamese militias are organized and commanded among local communes and include all capable fighting citizens (Global Security.org, 2014). The entire community becomes fully mobilized through conscription and large reserves to engage in military combat whenever needed; this has also been the practice in Finland.

Lebanon can build on the experience of HA that demonstrated deterrence capability. It can also build on HA's formation of various Resistance Brigades (Saraya Al Mukawama) established in different localities and across sectarian groups. The already existing doctrines and policy statements that justify such formations are encouraging. For instance, the government national policy statements have recurrently called for the country's defense to be based on the triad of "people, army, and resistance." Such a doctrine is not only suitable for advocating human security as a comprehensive defense strategy, but also as an ultimate rationalism for CDF. Such a force may well serve the purpose of playing an intermediary defense role that combines "people" and "resistance" alongside LAF in a strategic sense.

CIMIC-LEBANON, through the proposed national CMC Forum, might be the appropriate directorate to draft a comprehensive vision for the CDF and would be well positioned to advance a thorough vision for the CDF. Any strategy must guard itself toward spoilers and skeptics, including HA, who might interpret such a proposition as an indirect way to impose DDR. This challenge might be mitigated by a gradual and piloted process combined with a reward package such as the allocation of salaries and benefits to those enlisted. A gradual and piloted implementation process may also include providing relative commanding autonomy to local units. This would help defuse resistance and assure skeptics. There are other challenges associated with such a strategy, including concerns that autonomy may strengthen local sectarian political parties' grips on local communities and encourage a relapse toward sectarian armament and violence. Safeguarding the process, however, is the existence and overwhelming power of the LAF that provide assurances and undermine such fears.

CDF is to serve as a backup force to LAF in wartime, providing urgent logistic support, information, and supply, among other services. Thus, it is a standing force that maintains readiness to mobilize during emergency. During times of peace, CDF would provide ongoing engagement to strengthen CMC's role while contributing to societal readiness and resiliency through public awareness campaigns as well as support through local drills and development projects.

C. Strengthening Civil-Military Partnership

Other than a CDF role, CSOs possess complementary roles and capacities to offer expertise and consultancy to the formal institutions. They also maintain direct linkages with the different communities' social cleavages, hence serving as intermediaries between the state and society. Thus, civil society partnership can directly influence the character, sustainability, and success of civil military relations. International experience provides many examples of the constructive contributions of CSOs or experts in enhancing such engagements (Loada, 2015; Bruneau, 2019).

Initial skepticism by CSOs toward building civil-military partnership may need to be overcome by trust building and ongoing engagements with the security sector. Once relationships and a measure of confidence are developed and the good intentions of the security agencies have been demonstrated, most CSOs would be forthcoming to engage and partner in community policing and defense.

The limited experience of civil society in dealing with security services might suggest several ways for CSOs to be engaged in the formulation of an NDS. These include:

- a. Improving the capacity and willingness of CSOs to monitor and engage with security issues. This would include increasing support from international agencies and opening up CSOs to international engagement experiences. This also includes improving the CSOs' ability to provide technical advice.
- b. Building partnerships and trust between CSOs and security agencies. The only way to do this is to hold discussions at multiple levels so that individuals can share concerns and discuss issues in confidence.
- c. Improving and developing parliamentary oversight and engagement with security issues. This could/should include the development of partnerships between parliamentarians and CSOs to enhance their ability to exercise oversight and understanding of the work of security agencies in general and LAF in particular. Among critical aspects that require greater transparency is for the security agencies to abandon secrecy when it comes to strategies requiring public approval and decision making.
- d. Building better and more complete links at the local level with decision-making authorities, particularly governors and mayors and municipal leaders. This would help position CSOs to take an active partnership role in the Local Security Councils within the context of CMC.
- e. Improving professionalism and partnership working within the security services. Specifically, many CSOs and communities are reluctant to engage with security agencies because either they do not understand what they do, or they feel that they don't trust them. The LAF has benefitted from hugely improved publicity and reputation as a result of winning conflicts and clarity about what the LAF is there for. A more active and expanded CMC role is sure to consolidate confidence and support for LAF.
- f. Insure inclusivity and participation, particularly of youth, women, and the underprivileged groups in leadership role and engagement that contribute to building trust with LAF.

- g. Public awareness campaigns and information provision around security reforms and human security issues both to enhance confidence and to explain the role of security agencies and the rights of civil society to take direct partnership role in any defense.

Among the immediate tasks is to mobilize civil society to present its perspective toward human security while integrating its role in such a framework. These positions can be articulated throughout the formation and work of a national CMC Forum and, eventually, its full participation in the Supreme Defense Council.

Towards a Human Security-Based Defense

Human security is emerging as a comprehensive approach to combating a growing set of complex threats to society. It encompasses strategies to protect people from transnational crimes, international terrorism, epidemics, climate change, and poverty. Traditional military-centered defense strategies have proven ineffective in responding to complex and multiple-threats environments, particularly in war-torn and divided societies (Axworthy, 2001, p. 19).

Shifting towards human security would imply a comprehensive response that simultaneously addresses internal tensions, “promotes change, heals fragmentation, erases inequalities, and fundamentally recasts social, political, and economic bases for power” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007, p. 3). This will also bring to the fore the need for “cooperative and multisectoral responses” that incorporate agendas for security, development and human rights (UN Human Security Unit, 2009, p. 7).

Viewed from this prism, human security has been increasingly established as a comprehensive reform for the protection and wellbeing of society (Alkire, 2003; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007, p. 3). COVID19 has fertilized the ground for such a security paradigm shift. It has, once and for all, demonstrated the multi-faceted threats facing modern human society and the essentialism of a human security response (Han-Bum, 2020, p. 2). The pandemic has come to implicate every political, economic, and social sphere of life. The military has proven to take on a secondary role while medics and health professionals occupied the front trenches during the fight.

Alongside environmental and health threats confronting the very existence of humanity, economic challenges have also altered traditional thinking in security prioritization. This time, economic development and the eradication of poverty in poorer countries have taken the forefront defenses in societal protection (Das, 2020).

At other times, the proliferation of non-state armed groups has, likewise, infuriated domestic rifts around defense strategies. Undermining the state's monopoly over the exercise of violence in favor of non-state armed actors aggravates society's anxiety and elevates fears of genocide. Thus, an alternative rapprochement toward security outlooks is critically needed, particularly in weak and divided societies (Hazbun, 2015; Berti, 2016).

In Lebanon, these are among the concerns begging for an NDS to be founded on human security principles. Thus far, political deadlock has prevented a coherent vision toward an NDS; nonetheless, practical steps to confront the country's multi-threat environment have contributed toward a greater CMC. Local CSOs and security agencies have converged on collaborative projects and have coordinated efforts in respond to threats and national crises. CIMIC-LEBANON has been one of the outcomes of this rapprochement.

CMC is among the essential components of a human security based NDS as it brings multiple stakeholders to optimize resources and formulate a comprehensive outlook. Despite initial

steps taken toward CMC by LAF, shortcomings remain. CSOs and security agencies lack a comprehensive CMC in their missions, strategies, and activities.

Comparative analysis of the different international experiences and the various CMC collaborations in Lebanon are encouraging. The UN is a leading advocate for human security strategy. It has adopted "a holistic and integrated approach to mitigate and respond to the threats to Lebanon's stability and promote a broader conflict prevention agenda – the Whole of Lebanon Approach" (UNTFHS, 2017).

Thus, an enabling environment is building momentum to strengthen civil-military partnership. This is particularly the case as consensus on an active CMC in an NDS would remove critical reasons for the presence of non-state armed actors and would help mitigate political tensions around the "dual arms" standoff. A comprehensive CMC in Lebanon's NDS constitutes a critical step in the formulation of a human security agenda.

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