



Lebanon and Accountability

Good Governance as a Compass

By

Dr. Nancy N. Kanbar

July 2024

The 'Land of the Cedars': From 'Switzerland of the Middle East' to a Failed State

Since its establishment in 1920, the 'Land of the Cedars' has been distinguished as a model of economic success in the Middle East. According to this narrative, the label '*economic miracle*' is used in many writings on Lebanon, highlighting the financial competences of its people as well the capability of the country to economically excel despite recurring political shocks (Assouad, 2023). Although Lebanon is portrayed by some as a weak and failing state unable to exert its sovereignty, still others describe it as a state with economic vitality due to the entrepreneurial outlook of its citizens and its free-market economy. This somewhat unique dichotomy among its neighbors allows it to grow as a bridge between East and West. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was known as the 'Switzerland of the Middle East' (Kaufman, 2021), and described as an oasis of economic prosperity and vibrant culture.

The 1975 civil war distorted the image of the country and the people struggled to live in dignity with the lack of basic living conditions. When the war ended in 1990, the Lebanese with their incomparable resilience placed their efforts in post-war reconstruction. Nonetheless, political difficulties continued with successive corrupt and dysfunctional governments. The 2006 hostilities with Israel reminded the people of the economic implications of the previous wars and regional conflicts. In 2011, the Syrian uprising further distressed the economy of Lebanon. According to the *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan* (LCRP) (2023), "Lebanon hosts an estimated 1.5 million Syrians who have fled the conflict in Syria, along with 180,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 31,400 Palestinian refugees from Syria". The LCRP (2024) indicates that Lebanon has among the world's highest numbers of refugees per capita. The large influx of refugees had a severe impact on a nation already straining to provide basic public services. In 2015, Lebanese gathered together -overcoming the barriers of sectarianism and political affiliations-and protested against the garbage piling on city streets. This latest crisis, in a continuing string of crises, unmasked and laid bare the dysfunctions of the government and its inability to provide the most basic of services for its citizenry.

On October 17, 2019, the proposed WhatsApp tax was the final straw in the public's failing support for its dysfunctional government. This tax was the impetus for a divided people to yet again mobilize against the government's decision. Lebanese demonstrated against politicians and bankers accused of abusing their power to expropriate the wealth of the people. Citizens awoke to the reality that this current crisis is the result of the failed post-war economic development model adopted by the corrupt ruling class. Protestors objected to the rampant corruption and demanded immediate restructurings to address the challenges threatening their well-being. From October 2019 to March 2020, they repeated the slogan 'killun yaani killun' (Arabic for '*all means all*'), implying all political parties should be held accountable. They called for reforms to end the politico-economic structure that had long governed the country (L'Orient le Jour, 2021). As is the case in most of the *causes célèbres* the Lebanese society confronts, no lasting or substantive changes resulted from these protests.

To date, the ruling class continue to shield themselves from accountability for their systemic corruption and feckless leadership. Since October 2019, Lebanese were denied access to their dollar-denominated accounts in private banks. The national currency, pegged to the U.S. dollar via a Ponzi scheme for the previous thirty years, lost its falsely engineered stability. Banks ceased dollar-based payments to depositors and imposed an unofficial and undeclared capital control, leading to many tens of thousands of depositors losing life savings. This banking crisis finally removed the underpinning of an already unstable economy. The result of this political graft caused unemployment, poverty rates, and inflation to rise to a level unparalleled in the nation's history. The on-going economic crisis was further deepened by

the Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing global health crisis, exacerbating already existing socio-economic problems. Adding to these burdens, on August 4, 2020, the country witnessed a massive blast at the Beirut port with a magnitude that is considered the largest conventional explosion, rivaling the destructive power of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. This catastrophe caused more than 200 victims, 6,000 wounded, and 300,000 people homeless as well as extensive destruction to the surrounding areas (Human Rights Watch, 2023). While people demanded accountability, their requests were answered by obfuscation and finger pointing from the various ministerial offices. The resulting investigations were no clearer in identifying a responsible party. Four years after the tragedy, the investigation has undergone many hurdles highlighting issues related to violation of human rights, corruption, negligence and injustice.

Today, the country is deeply sinking into an acute and prolonged economic depression that is “likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crises globally since the mid-nineteenth century”, amidst “deliberate inaction” (World Bank, 2021). The economic collapse, layered upon the continuous influx of refugees over the last decade, is ranked among the worst in modern times. The Russo-Ukraine war severely impacted access to grain supplies, causing food insecurity. In June 2023, Lebanon recorded the second highest global food price inflation. With the cost of bread rising, 45 percent of the population are struggling to maintain adequate food consumption (WFP, 2023). The recent Gaza war caused another large blow to the volatile economy amid a lingering political and institutional vacuum. Since October 8, 2023, armed confrontations persist daily between Hezbollah, armed Palestinian factions, and the Israel Defense Forces on Lebanon’s southern border. Because of the hostilities, 25,584 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were displaced as of November 1, 2023 (LCRP 2024). The subsequent multidimensional crises are indicative why the ‘*Lebanese Cause*’ is still developing into a painful case in point since 1975. Lebanon’s presidential vacuum has further destabilized the country’s fragile political balance. The lack of consensus by the politicians to elect a new president for the previous two years raises uncertainties over an already tenuous political system, and further delays the implementation of an economic recovery plan. The current narrative denotes not just an economic crisis, but a country that is on the brink of complete failure, leading to what is universally defined as a ‘*failed state*’. Weakened public institutions and political-economic elites favoring their own gains within a sectarian system create dependencies between corrupt politicians and their constituencies. Citizens struggling to achieve basic living conditions lost trust in the government to offer any sustainable solution. The absence of accountability mechanisms allows policy-makers to make decisions prioritizing their self-interest with disregard to public welfare.

Good Governance as a Compass

“Lebanon is more than a country. It is a message of freedom and an example of pluralism for East and West”, Pope John-Paul II pronounced in the 1980s. During the darkest days of the Civil War, the Pontiff considered the country a ‘message’ of fraternity. Four decades later, Pope Francis reaffirmed that “Lebanon has a particular identity, fruit of the encounter of different cultures, that has emerged over the course of time as a model of living together”. He called for the people “to work together for the common good of this beloved country”¹. Lebanese aspire for a civilized model in diversity, coexistence, and citizenship within a participatory political system that respects public freedoms and human rights. As the country heads into its centennial, it is at a critical moment in its history and at a great risk of losing its

¹ <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2020-08/lebanon-gregory-mansour-maronite-eparch-interview.html>
August 11, 2020.


identity, ‘Lebanon-the Message’. Decades of systemic corruption and absence of accountability have culminated into a multi-layered crisis leading to socio-economic, financial and political turbulence.

Reform is long overdue. It is through good governance, where transparency and accountability are guaranteed that the development challenges can be addressed (Kanbar, 2019a). Good governance rests on two core values: inclusiveness and accountability. Inclusiveness protects people’s basic rights, treating everyone equally before the law and allowing all to participate in governance. Accountability depends on public transparency, which requires knowledge and accessible information on what the government does. Accountability also rests on mechanisms such as contestability and a strong ethic of public service (Kanbar and El Sayegh, 2016). Good governance is indispensable for reform and development. Implementing a comprehensive program of reforms that ensures Transparency, Accountability and Governance (TAG) is crucial. Offenders against the public good and the citizens’ rights should be identified and held accountable for their ineffective governance of common resources and for their failing and corrupt policy decisions. The latest Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database for the year 2022 indicated that Lebanon performs poorly in most governance indicators. The WGI cover over 200 countries, measuring six dimensions of governance since 1996, featuring: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These dimensions are defined in the following table (World Bank, 2023).

Governance Dimension	It reflects the perceptions of
Voice and Accountability	the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism
Government Effectiveness	the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies
Regulatory Quality	the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development
Rule of Law	the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
Control of Corruption	the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests

The WGI methodology relies on individual country case reviews and includes 46 indicators targeting specific governance dimensions (Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, 2019). These indicators stem from different data sources to allow for meaningful cross-country and over-time comparisons (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2010). The data fact sheets provide access to organized data on several governance components and

aim to improve the general understanding on fundamental qualities and capacities of governments ‘to govern’, and on governance gaps that contribute to foresee future trends and drive sustainable development in line with the 2030 Agenda. The WGI analysis shows that while Lebanon came in third best among its regional peers in the Voice and Accountability dimension, its overall outcome remained rather poor in that same dimension (percentile rank: 30.92). Lebanon also performed weakly in the five remaining dimensions, namely Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism (percentile rank: 9.43), Government Effectiveness (percentile rank: 7.55), Regulatory Quality (percentile rank: 13.68), Rule of Law (percentile rank: 13.68), and Control of Corruption (percentile rank: 13.68). A comparison of these indicators covering the years 1996-2022 (graph below) demonstrates that Lebanon reported a decline in all but two dimensions (Political Stability & Absence of Violence / Terrorism as well as Control of Corruption) when compared to the year 2021 results (Credit Libanais, 2023).



Source: Graph by author. Data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 update (World Bank, 2023). <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators> Accessed on June 6, 2024.

Root Causes of the Tragedy in Lebanon: Who Reaps the Benefits?

Since its mid-twentieth century founding, the modern state of Lebanon has always been confronted with complex and interconnected challenges, underpinned by weak governance, poor accountability, systemic corruption, inefficient decision-making as well as conflicting interests among political elites. The challenge is how best to restore the social and political systems, as the *'irresponsible'* politicians -who were elected to be *'responsible'* for governing the country- fight to secure their privileged position regardless of the situation they have themselves created and placed the people in. While the urgent crisis is undeniably economic, its root causes are related to the way the political class governs the citizens

with a total disregard for their welfare. That said, framing the existing mass impoverishment of the population as an economic crisis disguises the root causes of the tragedy in Lebanon.

Regrettably, Lebanon is not governed to further the best interests of its citizens. Influential groups have full command to define 'social goals' according to their 'private gains'. Additionally, foreign powers contribute to the continuous conflicts where all Lebanese are relentlessly losing. In the absence of political consensus regarding policy-making, Lebanon has run on 'emergency' decisions and plans for long decades. The outcome is the crumbling of basic public services. The World Bank examined the impact of Lebanon's macro and structural policies on the failed provision of basic services and concluded that citizens end-up double paying and receiving low quality products or services. This reveals the vulnerability of the service provision model, "*itself a product of elite capture of state's resources for private gains. The weakening of public service delivery was therefore a conscious effort made to benefit the very few at the expense of the Lebanese people*" (World Bank 2022a). Unfortunately, public resources have been exhausted and no one is held accountable. This situation can be envisaged as a '*Tragedy of the Commons*' (TOC) exacerbated by institutional and political deadlock as well as by an untouchable impunity protecting the influential elites.

It is alarming to read Howard's article (1977) '*Tragedy in Lebanon*' and realize that the political maneuvering has continued since the inception of the Republic of Lebanon. No one was defending the Republic, "everyone seems to support either his tribe, his political chief, his geographical surroundings or, allegedly, his religious sect"². Since then, the "Byzantine argument among politicians" led to the country's partition and defeated the society with irreversible spillovers on the economy (in Howard, 1977), otherwise known as a Fool's Errand. It is evident that it would be difficult to get someone to adopt a position on an issue when their personal interest depends on not adopting that position (Kanbar, 2019b). Vital decision prerogatives remain with authorities who often distort the results of any scientific discourse and institute political elements into the policy-making process, allowing their individual interests to outweigh collective welfare. Despite its key importance, accountability remains a far-off element in reversing the TOC in Lebanon. Unfortunately, no sustainable solutions for any problem will be presented if politicians follow the same path of political disputes on 'who' reaps the benefits of the solution.

Conceptual Underpinnings of the Governance of Common Resources

In a much cited and influential essay published in the December 1968 issue of *Science*, Garrett Hardin posited a simple model of maximizing self-interest in the case of common resources. The incentive to consume a resource before others has the potential to result in overuse and depletion. "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons" (Hardin, 1968). The analysis of the inevitable tragic fate of the commons relies on an intuitive logic that assumes that social actors are economically rational as they constantly seek to maximize their private gains. Very compelling in its foundational economic logic, each individual is locked into a system that incentivizes him to maximize his private gain without limit, in a world that is limited. It is a tragedy because it would be in the interests of all if everyone were to conserve the common resources. As a solution to this classical tragedy, Hardin concluded that common resources must be either privatized or turned over to the government to regulate their use.

² Interview with Elias Saba, a former Deputy Prime Minister, in Middle East Economic Digest, January 23, 1976 in Howard (1977).

At the heart of the TOC lies the conflict between individual and collective interests. The general concern that underpins these concepts is how to explain individual actions that move beyond the predictions of 'thin' models of self-interest (Ostrom, 1998). Cooperation in the case of the commons has been extensively used in analyzing behavior in various disciplines. It is intrinsically linked to sustainability and development -meshing economic growth, social justice and environmental protection. The same logic arises in a variety of contexts with minor permutations, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma, the undersupply of public goods, the problem of free riders and collective action. The TOC and the provision of public goods are members of the same family of intellectual problems. Fortunately, world observations indicate that much behavior deviates from what is predicted, thus cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games and maintenance of common pool resources are not surprising. Vayda and Rappaport (Rappaport 1984; Vayda and Rappaport 1968) brought this issue to the core of theoretical debates related to why humans would behave in the interests of the collectivity. In evolutionary theory, the problem is discussed in terms of '*altruism*' that incorporates a concern with the satisfaction of others, a 'warm glow' effect that conveys the interconnectedness of humans.

Ostrom (1990) explored conditions under which collective problems were solved and provided a theory of institutional arrangements related to the effective governance of the commons. Elinor Ostrom was the first and only woman to win the Nobel Prize in Economics for her groundbreaking research on the ways people organize themselves to manage common resources. She argued that societies regularly devise rules and enforcement mechanisms that avert the collapse of common resources. In contrast to the proposition of the TOC argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Ostrom's *behavioral theory of collective action in social dilemmas* is central to the conceptual development from the TOC model to the more robust view of the common resources reflected in the '*Drama of the Commons*' (Ostrom *et al.* 2002). The individual is acting in his self-interest, but that self-interest is conceptualized more broadly than in the narrow rational actor model. Dietz (2005) explains that the term 'drama' is used because stories of the commons often have happy endings, and thus there are comedies as well as tragedies. Hence, the term '*drama*' seems more appropriate for the current understanding of behavior in the commons dilemma than the narrower '*tragedy*'.

'Tragedy of the Government Created Commons' in Lebanon

When Hardin wrote the TOC, the role of the government was to protect the public from the collective harm resulting from the overexploitation and collapse of the commons. He associated the lesson of ensuring the sustainability of common resources to the necessity for government intervention in individual's decisions to mitigate the pursuit of self-interest. Collectively, individual self-interest leads to collective harm. The role of the government is to manage and supervise self-interested individuals to avert the tragedy. In the original model of the TOC, the government was the solution and management and rationing were the main instruments.

Away from the conceptual underpinning of a drama, the case in Lebanon seems to be always an inexorable tragic outcome. The Lebanese government is perhaps one of the major creators of the commons; it does so to gain power and maintain control. In this sense, the government becomes the problem rather than the solution. Politicians in Lebanon advocate for a more centralized control. Creating a common good and making it larger (when it collapses) helps politicians gain power. This paradigm results in a tragedy because creating collective harm is not a legitimate role of the government. In a press release, the World Bank (2022a) indicated that "*public finance in post-civil war Lebanon has been an instrument for systematic capture of the country's resources, as it served the interests of an entrenched political*

economy. Excessive debt accumulation was used to give the illusion of stability and reinforce confidence in the macro-financial system for deposits to continue to flow in. Lebanon's depression- deliberate in the making over the past 30 years- has hollowed out the state of the provision of basic services to its citizens". In such situations, politicians increase spending (corresponds to increasing the size of the commons) as a way to gain influence. The cycle repeats itself and the government has a bigger problem to address. Kauffman (n.d) indicates that "in the government created commons, government purposely creates commons to unleash its destructive powers of collective harm. Along with the traditional solutions of rationing, the collective harm justifies the government's solution to increase the size of the commons and to increase its power and control in an effort to solve the problem. Unfortunately, because the underlying tenets of the commons are not addressed, the problem persists and is exacerbated as is the need for even more governmental involvement to solve the problem it created". According to the Lebanon Economic Monitor (LEM) 'The Great Denial', "Lebanon's deliberate depression is orchestrated by the country's elite that has long captured the state and lived off its economic rents" (World Bank 2022b, 2022c). In situations where the government becomes the problem, increasing taxes diverts resources from the individual to enlarging the commons. Politicians gain power by transferring resources from the private to the public sector. They have a vested interest to increase the welfare (the commons) because it creates greater dependency on the government, thus more votes. Kauffman (n.d) suggests that "most likely those in government have enlarged the commons without having made the conceptual connection to the commons. Over time, they have intuitively learned that the collective harm from a government created commons is advantageous to advancing their political agenda of enlarging government".

The failure of the government to provide basic services for citizens is a clear evidence that the *Tragedy of the Government Created Commons* is prevalent in Lebanon. In the power sector, for instance, authorities have failed to properly manage the state-run electricity company, Électricité du Liban (EDL) for almost 30 years, resulting in the collapse of the sector. The ruling class has benefited from EDL's weak governance structures, using the utility for political aims, such as hiring practices evading accountability. With EDL unable to meet the electricity demand, an informal and unregulated private diesel generator industry has proliferated. In the aim of expanding business operations, generator owners exert local power and distribute free electricity to influential entities such as municipalities. In some cases, officials or political parties themselves run the generator networks in areas under their authority, which also gives them a vested interest in exchange for political support. Also, diesel importers exert great influence due to the connection between the shareholders of these companies and the political establishment. Although costly and highly polluting, reform in the generator sector is hindered by challenges related to the governance structures and political interferences (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Many examples related to managing public issues (e.g. waste, water, etc.) suggest similar patterns of governance and justify why the country is on the brink of collapse.

Concluding Remarks

The absence of good governance practices is one of the major causes for impeding development, creating more conflicts and political tensions, rentier economies and weaker systems of governance. Years of administrative mismanagement, negligence, and corruption have damaged the political, administrative, and socio-economic pillars of Lebanon. The lack of accountability in a sectarian power-sharing system added severe impacts on government institutions that have become paralyzed and unable to provide basic services. Heightened levels of political tension and escalation of insecurity in the region hinder any effort towards good governance, creating additional gaps. The driving forces of

governance deficits seem to interact with a complex array of variables that mutually reinforce themselves through an endless loop with detrimental outcomes shaping development at various levels.

Simply put, governance is the way government gets its job done. Many national and international reports long documented the numerous failings how the government of Lebanon functions. In 2019, the people protested against a political system that enables corruption permitting self-interested political and sectarian elites to acquire public resources and evade accountability. Regardless of political affiliation and sectarian identity, protestors collectively united against a ruling class and demanded sustainable solutions to the economic collapse and the deterioration of living standards. They called for structural and political change grounded in improved human rights, good governance, and accountability for corruption.

One might argue that socio-economic development in Lebanon is constrained by geopolitical pressures; however, it is fundamental to reflect deeper on the dynamics that resulted in the emergence of weak government institutions. The 'deliberate inaction' since 2019 uncovers in full force the dysfunctions of the government. The predicament lies in the fact that recovery is impaired by existing structural deficiencies and political deadlock, and no country can recover without a strong and empowered public sector. It seems to be a 'catch-22' where the creators designed arbitrary governance systems to rationalize and camouflage their abuse of power. This problematic condition opens a window for a paradigm shift, a change in the mindset. Policy reforms should be made in isolation of the battleground of pendulum politics. What is required is the will to shift the process of policy-making from a political combat to problem-solving with outcomes that have 'collective gains' rather than 'private gains' for those in power. Managing collective action problems requires a clear understanding that the public sector is not a place to hire based on sectarian allegiances and nepotism, rather it employs qualified personnel able to join efforts to solve common problems. Essentially, transformative leadership in the public sector is strategic in inspiring civil servants and in inducing deep-rooted positive actions. An important formula to apply in the process of re-building Lebanon:

*Reversing the Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) requires
Transparency, Accountability and good Governance (TAG)*

The recipe seems simple, yet hard to implement when government elites create the commons and they enlarge them to gain more power. Thus, there is a necessity to enhance TAG mechanisms within the public sector to restore citizens' trust in policy-making. Accountability is improved by increased pressure for transparency against corruption. To the degree that corruption is controlled, other advances in governance will follow (ESCWA, 2011). It is essential to establish and strengthen the link between civic awareness, policy structure and institutional framework. The challenge is not to act as individuals, but as members of society (active citizens) to achieve win-win solutions. Lebanon is not poor; its resources are badly governed without accountability measures. Active citizens should seize the opportunity to develop a comprehensive plan that takes the country on a corrective path, away from cosmetic reforms towards deep transformations. Change is never easily achieved; nevertheless, it can be easier when working together. Only then, Lebanon like the Phoenix will rise again and will regain its identity and its place within the family of nations.

Author's Short Bio

Dr. Nancy Kanbar is an academic scholar and a development policy expert with an interdisciplinary background spanning environmental science and policy, agricultural economics and development as well as education. Dr. Kanbar is currently an Associate Professor and Head of Department at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of the Lebanese University. Her research interests focus on studying the dynamics of environment-human interactions that result from decisions related to allocation of scarce resources. She has particular concerns integrating economic and social aspirations; studying tradeoffs involved in decision-making and identifying policy options for harmonizing human needs to better serve issues related to international development. Dr. Kanbar has previously consulted for government agencies (Ministry of Environment, OMSAR) and for international multilateral organizations; namely the World Bank, UN agencies (UNESCO, UNDP, UNEP), and IFPRI. Within the framework of Erasmus+, she was the National Coordinator and the External Reviewer for EU-funded projects and she coordinated efforts among education practitioners of diverse academic disciplines from Europe and MENA to develop and implement joint interdisciplinary higher education curricula that address sustainability. She published on issues related to Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), behavioral change and citizens' engagement, community development, policy reforms, governance and citizenship. She is a co-author of the UN-Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the lead author in the Arab Millennium Assessment. She developed the Environmental Economics for Development Policy course for the World Bank Institute. She is a member of Phi Beta Delta Honor Society for International Scholars in the USA. She received her PhD in Environmental Science and Policy from George Mason University and she completed a Master Degree in Science Education from the Lebanese University and a Master Degree in Agricultural Economics and Development from the American University of Beirut.

Bibliography

- Assouad, L. (2023). Rethinking Rethinking the Lebanese economic miracle: The extreme concentration of income and wealth in Lebanon, 2005–2014. *Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier*, vol. 161, March 2023 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.103003> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387822001456> Accessed June 21, 2024.
- Credit Libanais (2023). Economic Research. Lebanon Performs poorly in most governance indicators in 2022 <https://economics.creditlibanais.com/Article/211827#en> October 02 2023. Accessed June 18, 2024.
- Dietz, T. (2005). The Darwinian trope in the drama of the commons: variations on some themes by the Ostroms. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* Volume 57, Issue 2, June 2005, Pages 205-225. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.018>
- Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) (2011). The governance deficit and conflict relapse in the ESCWA region <https://www.unescwa.org/publications/governance-deficit-and-conflict-relapse-escwa-region> Accessed June 19, 2024.
- Howard, N. F. (1977). Tragedy in Lebanon. *Current History*, Vol. 72, No. 423, The Middle East (January 1977), pp.1-5, 30-32. University of California Press. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45314310> Accessed May 31, 2024.
- Human Rights Watch (2023). "Cut Off From Life Itself": Lebanon's Failure on the Right to Electricity. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/03/09/cut-life-itself/lebanons-failure-right-electricity> Accessed June 21, 2024.
- Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan (2019). MENA Countries Governance Profile <http://www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/data/mena-governance-data-2/> Accessed June 19, 2024.
- Kanbar, N. (2019a). *Lebanon and the Tragedy of the Commons*. Annahar online (May 22, 2019).
- Kanbar, N. (2019b). *Lebanon Tragedy: An opportunity for long term reforms*. Annahar online (May 25, 2019).
- Kanbar, N. and Z. El Sayegh (2016). *Lebanon: Sustainable Governance and Accountability... It is the Challenge!* In *Emerging Lebanon: Towards Economic Growth and Social Welfare*, R. Nasnas (et.al.). Dar An-Nahar. Available in English, French and Arabic. <http://www.emerginglebanon.com/En/pdfs/books/Emerging%20Lebanon%20-%20Towards%20Economic%20Growth%20and%20Social%20Welfare%20.pdf>
- Kauffman, R. B. (n.d). The Tragedy of the Government Created Commons. https://www.frostburg.edu/faculty/rkauffman/_files/pdfs/TragedyGovernmentCommons.pdf, Accessed June 10, 2024.
- Kaufman, A. (2021). Lebanon's tragic path from economic miracle to collapse. <https://kellogg.nd.edu/news/lebanon%E2%80%99s-tragic-path-economic-miracle-collapse> Accessed June 14, 2024.
- Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A. (2023). Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update (www.govindicators.org), Accessed June 10, 2024.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Massimo, M. (2010). *The worldwide governance indicators: methodology and analytical issues (English)*. Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 5430 Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130> and <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/630421468336563314/The-worldwide-governance-indicators-methodology-and-analytical-issues>. Accessed June 11, 2024.
- L'Orient-Le Jour (2021). Lebanon's October 2019 protests weren't just about the 'WhatsApp tax' 17 October 2021. Online <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/lebanons-october-2019-protests-werent-just-about-the-whatsapp-tax/> Accessed June 14, 2024.
- Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) (2023) <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/100389> Accessed June 20, 2024.
- Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) (2024). IOM UN Migration. Published January 19, 2024. <https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/lebanon-crisis-response-plan-2024> . Accessed June 14, 2024.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, Nov 30, 1990 - Business & Economics - 280 pages.

- Ostrom, E. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: presidential address, American Political Science Association. *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 1-22.
- Ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C Stern, S. Stonich, and E. Weber, eds. (2002). *The Drama of the Commons*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
- Rappaport, R. A. (1984). *Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Vayda, A. P., and R. A. Rappaport (1968). Ecology, Cultural and Noncultural. In *Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, edited by J. A. Clifton. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- World Bank (2021). Lebanon Sinking into One of the Most Severe Global Crises Episodes, amidst Deliberate Inaction <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/01/lebanon-sinking-into-one-of-the-most-severe-global-crises-episodes> Accessed June 14, 2024.
- World Bank (2022a). Lebanon's Ponzi Finance Scheme Has Caused Unprecedented Social and Economic Pain to the Lebanese People (press release, August 2, 2022) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/08/02/lebanon-s-ponzi-finance-scheme-has-caused-unprecedented-social-and-economic-pain-to-the-lebanese-people> Accessed June 14, 2024.
- World Bank (2022b) Lebanon's Crisis: Great Denial in the Deliberate Depression [Online] available from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/01/24/lebanon-s-crisis-great-denial-in-the-deliberate-depression> Accessed June 14, 2024.
- World Bank (2022c). Lebanon Economic Monitor, Fall 2021: The Great Denial. © World Bank, Washington, DC. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36862> License: [CC BY 3.0 IGO](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4a48d3e4-4a27-52fb-a9db-2af230dd8120> Accessed June 14, 2024.
- World Bank (2023). Worldwide Governance Indicators. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators> Accessed June 5 2024. <https://databank.worldbank.org/WGI-Table/id/ceea4d8b> Accessed June 18, 2024.
- World Food Program (WFP) (2023). WFP Lebanon Situation Report - July 2023 <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/wfp-lebanon-situation-report-july-2023> Accessed June 14, 2024.

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V.

<https://www.kas.de/en/web/libanon>



The text of this publication is published under a Creative “Commons license: Creative Commons Attribution-share Alike 4.0 international” (CC BY-SA 4.0), <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

Civic Influence Hub

<https://cihlebanon.org>

Beirut Central District - Allenby St.,

Port136 Bldg., 4th floor. Beirut - Lebanon

info@cihlebanon.org


Phone: +961 1 986 760

Phone: +961 8 1 624 012

Mobile: +961 3 002 797

 CIHLebanon

   CIH_Lebanon

 CIHCivicInfluenceHubLebanon

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the “Civic Influence Hub” (CIH) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or its Lebanon Office.