

Political-Military Aspects of Operations Abroad (Konrad Adenauer Foundation Tokyo, September 30, 2015)

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Phase I: Humanitarian Operations

- German Forces have been deployed out of the NATO area several times already before the end of the cold war. The purpose has been strictly humanitarian, i.e. to provide help and support after natural disasters – earthquakes, floods – or mitigate the effects of famine.
- „Apolitical missions“; no tool of German security policy; use of military force unthinkable; strictly collective defense; no role of the parliament
- Examples:
 - 1960 Morocco – Earthquake
 - 1970 Nigeria – Floods
 - 1973 Algeria – Drought
 - 1980 Somalia – Famine
 - 1988 Soviet Union - Earthquake

Phase II: Stabilizing the European Neighborhood – The Balkans

- Changed political environment for Germany:
 - End of the Cold War; Deepening of the European Integration Process (Treaty of Maastricht); Central Eastern Europe becomes part of the „West“
- Changed security challenges:
 - The return war to Europe: Instability; 400.000 refugees came to Germany
- Important experience – Mission Creep: Missions start as peace-keeping, but develop into robust peace-enforcement
- multilateral military cooperation as political as well as military test: “Reliability” and “Interoperability” (IFOR/SFOR; EUFOR Althea; KFOR)
- mixed record: end of hostilities, but fragile political situation.

Phase III: Going Global - Afghanistan

- started already at the beginning of the 1990s: UN operations in Cambodia and Somalia
- accelerated with the end of the cold war and its constraining effects: Security threats as well as risks may come from around the world (transnational terrorism; ethnic conflict; WMD proliferation etc.)
- major example: **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)** in Afghanistan with up to 5350 soldiers (2001-2014); started as a protection for the civilian UN mission, developed into counterinsurgency/counterterrorism and ended as state/ institution building operation.
- defining moment for German armed forces: heavy combat, 55 casualties; effects on perception of the German armed forces.
- limited success: Military success, but security situation is deteriorating due to the lack of political reconciliation and dysfunctional state institutions.

Phase IV: From Security Provider to Security Consultant

Focus on „Enhancing and Enabling“

- aims at empowering global partners to take more responsibility for regional security and to strengthen international crisis prevention through the provision of training, advice, and, if necessary, equipment. Examples:

- EUTM Mali: 153 soldiers

- Training Mission Iraq: 90 soldiers

- EUTM Somalia: 8 soldiers

Sustainable Accomplishments: Remains to be seen

The Status quo

German commitment to UN-mandated operations:

Resolute Support (Afghanistan): 860 soldiers (since 2001 - as ISAF)

KFOR (Kosovo): 690 soldiers (since 1999)

EUTM (Mali): 195 soldiers (since 2013)

Atalanta (Horn of Africa): 164 soldiers (since 2008)

UNIFIL (Lebanon): 115 soldiers (since 2006)

2840 soldiers deployed abroad (September 21, 2015), compared to almost 11.000 some years ago.

Major lessons

- a) Success is dependent on a clear political goal, which is pursued constantly over the time of the operation and guides the military operation.
- b) Success is dependent on a broader understanding of the mission: Comprehensive Approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of countries. An integrated approach means that an actor has a set of objectives developed by and agreed to by all relevant institutions and it then has policies, complementary military, diplomatic, financial tools, and activities to implement these objectives.
- c) Success is crucially dependent on the cooperation and input of a variety of other actors (other IO, other nation states, NGO's) involved in the mission; Coordination is required, however rarely accomplished.

Domestic Politics

- Wide spread state-building disillusionment in Germany: Kosovo; Bosnia; Afghanistan.
- Disengagement - 2014: 60% argue in favour of a restricted German role in international security (1994: 37%) 37% argue for a more active role (1994: 62%).
- Germany has already enough problems to be taken care of first (73%); Lessons of WWII and the Nazi regime (50%); Germany simply does not have the necessary influence to make a difference in international security (37%).
- 82% argue in favour of less military missions (across all ages, East/West)

Future Trend I: The Return of Collective Defense

- Since 2011 focus on NATO collective defense and preservation of the interoperability experiences gained in Afghanistan already **before** the Ukraine/Russia crisis
- Reduction of international military engagements as much as possible
- Reinforcement/ Acceleration of this development due to the Ukraine crisis
- Active role within NATO's response to Russia (Wales summit; VJTF)
- Focus on the European neighborhood as well (Normandie format; Minsk agreements)
- Implications for the German Defence White Book/European Security Strategy

Future Trend II: Germany's International Redefined

Munich Security Conference 2014; Speech by President Gauck: *„What role do we want to play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? Are we playing an active enough role in that field in which the Federal Republic of Germany has developed such expertise? I am speaking, of course, of conflict prevention. In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”*

Review 2014 (Foreign Office); Defence White Paper 2015/16 (MoD)

Drivers of Change:

US policy: Domestic Priorities, Rebalancing towards Asia

Domestic Priorities of traditional European powers/ Repercussions of the financial crisis: UK/ F

Conclusion

- Moderate increase in defence spending: 2015: **33 bn Euro**; 2016: **34,2 bn Euro**; 2019 **35 bn Euro**
- Rediscovery of NATO's collective defence; but no appetite for large scale international crisis management
- Greater pressure to contribute to UN Peacekeeping (currently 135 soldiers as of August 30, 2015)
- Open question: Germany's role in integrated military structures (Redefinition of Sovereignty; Modification of the „Parlamentsvorbehalt“)