



Japan and the United States:
Past, Present, and Future

Tsuneo WATANABE

Introduction: Reasons for high assessments of the late Shinzo Abe in the United States

On July 20, 2022, the United States Senate adopted a unanimous resolution honoring the achievements of the late Shinzo Abe, former Prime Minister of Japan who was assassinated on July 8 at a political rally. The wording of the resolution praised Abe for his efforts in strengthening the US-Japan Alliance, as well as expanding the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” strategy. It likewise extolled him for “leadership that laid a lasting foundation for the United States and Japan to partner for decades in promoting freedom, prosperity, and security around the world, and opposing authoritarianism and tyranny.”

Compared to past administrations of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), his government earned notably high marks in America. The reason for this lies in the role Abe played in engineering the transition away from the national policy known as the “Yoshida Doctrine,” a liberal route for Japan’s national strategy distinguished by economic growth and light armament maintained in the past, to the pragmatically rooted “Proactive Contribution to Peace” for the purpose of realizing the FOIP. The Yoshida Doctrine, essentially maintained by all Japanese administrations previous to Abe, was a strategy adopted by Japan under Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (the prime

minister from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1954) following the nation’s defeat in 1945. It focused upon reconstructing Japan’s domestic economy while relying heavily on the security alliance with the United States. The basic policy was to contain investment in military strength to the minimum necessary level, while expanding the national budget for economic growth and social security in moving to stabilize the administration. The Yoshida Doctrine was a national strategy, which succeeded in paving the way to Japan’s high economic growth from the 1960s, while instilling a particularly stable political foundation for the LDP even among the ranks of democratic countries around the world.

However, LDP administrations prior to the Abe era chose to adopt only a moderate approach to the overseas dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and bolstering of Japan’s own military strength for the purpose of upholding the functions of the US-Japan Alliance and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The reason for that route lies in the fact that during the Cold War, an agreement was reached with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and other left-wing political parties to not recognize the exercising of the right of collective self-defense as stated in the Japanese constitution. This stance can be said to exist in stark contrast to European allies, which participated in the multilateral alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) upon the foundation of exercising the right of collective self-defense.

This changed with the first Abe Cabinet, which took control of Japan's government in 2006. Abe defined the state of Japanese politics under the aforementioned restrictions on Japan's defense and security as the "Postwar Regime," while clarifying his stance of moving away from those checks. These attempts prompted warnings not only from Japan's domestic left wing, but also from liberals in the United States. Before winning wide-based support for this stance, however, Abe's personal health issues forced him to step down as Prime Minister. As it turned out, however, the policies of the following two LDP cabinets, along with the three Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) cabinets after that, disappointed Japanese voters in terms of both the diplomatic security and economic fronts. In the general election of December 2012, an LDP administration headed by the now healthy Abe was returned to power.

It was also around this time that China shifted to a policy of regular intrusion by its coastguard vessels into the waters around the Senkaku Islands—a group of uninhabited isles in the East China Sea owned and administrated by Japan. In September 2012, the DPJ administration of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda arranged for government purchase of one portion of those islands from the existing Japanese owner. This action triggered major scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, which in turn aggravated anti-China sentiment among the Japanese people and fueled the hopes of the hawkish Prime Minister Abe.

The second Abe administration championed the economic policy known as "Abenomics"—a mix of quantitative easing and expansionary fiscal policy, which produced a certain degree of progress in stabilizing his government. In 2014, Abe's Cabinet promoted a decision that partially approved the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Peace and security legislation based on that new constitutional interpretation was enacted in 2015 on the strength of collaboration with LDP coalition partner party Komeito. Rooted in these foundations, at the very least Japan managed to define the legal foundation for the use of force, even in cases other than for purposes of protecting its own nation, within the scope of the US-Japan Alliance and multilateral security missions.

Moreover, in addition to unveiling the strategic concept of the FOIP, the Quad Leaders' Meeting, a concept targeting broad-based collaboration between the US, Japan, Australia, and India, including the quest for security in the Indo-Pacific region, was originally proposed by Prime Minister Abe in 2007. US President Joe Biden, in a telephone conference with current Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida following Abe's death, praised Abe for his foresight in suggesting the launch of the Quad. Biden referred to that concept as one of Abe's "enduring legacies," ranking alongside the FOIP strategy.

In this article, I present an overview of the current status and direction of Japan's alliance cooperation, while also

reflecting on the historical background of this stance.

The US-Japan Alliance: Historical transition and current status

Upon recovering its independence in 1951, Japan entered into the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the US. The current version of that treaty was signed in 1960, following revision into a more bilateral version. It was around this time, against the backdrop of the Cold War, that Japanese student movements sympathetic to the socialist camp launched fierce protests. On June 15, 1960, for example, a clash occurred between a student demonstration surrounding the National Diet and police forces, leading to an uproar that included the death of a student from the University of Tokyo. The Diet had no choice but to approve the revised treaty in the midst of that confusion. Taking this pandemonium and the resulting public backlash to heart, the Prime Minister at the time, Nobusuke Kishi, resigned from his post. The revised edition of what became known in Japan as the Japan-US Security Treaty contained clear mention of the duty of the United States to protect Japan (a concept not present in the previous version). Deleted, meanwhile, was mention of the so-called “Civil Disturbance Clause” linked to involvement in Japan’s domestic affairs, along with other changes leading to a more bilateral accord.

Kishi, however, having served in posts such as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the cabinet of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, which head the march to war against the US, projected a strong reactionary image. With that being a factor in stirring up a left-wing backlash, he was left with no alternative but to resign, and was likewise forced to relinquish his pet policy of constitutional reform. Shinzo Abe is the paternal grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, while it warrants mention here that Abe held his grandfather’s achievements in great respect.

Hayato Ikeda, who succeeded Kishi as the LDP leader and Prime Minister (1960–1964), clamped down on the route of constitutional revision seeking independence for the Japanese nation. Instead, he initiated the so-called “Income Doubling Plan” in the fall of 1960, laying the foundation for Japan’s accelerated economic growth policy that followed. Having originally worked his way up in the Ministry of Finance, Ikeda possessed outstanding financial expertise. He was appointed Minister of Finance in the cabinet of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who had originally been trained as a diplomat and did not specialize in financial affairs. As a politician, Ikeda made his mark for establishing favorable relations with the US government financial officers who headed up the drafting of Japan’s financial and economic policies during the American Occupation. While Ikeda’s key focus was on the US-Japan Alliance, rather than issues such as restoring

Japan's military might or advancing constitutional reform, he may be characterized as a leader who installed the "Yoshida Doctrine," which viewed economic growth as the priority, as Japan's prevailing long-term strategy. Current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is the present leader of the Kouchikai faction a leading faction within the LDP established by bureaucrat-turned-politician Ikeda in 1957. In that sense, Kishida is a politician integrally linked to the genealogy of this bloc.

During the Cold War, the US-Japan Alliance functioned as a bulwark in the global standoff between America's armed forces and US liberal leaning allies and the Soviet Army and Warsaw Pact forces. Within this setting, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability contributed to the US military's anti-Soviet policy and on other related fronts. In actual practice, however, in comparison to West Germany and other first-line allies standing in opposition to Warsaw Pact military strength, US expectations for Japan's military strength were limited. I believe it can be stated, rather, that the outlook was high that Japan's economic growth would serve as an effective development model for capitalist countries—notably for nations of Southeast Asia for which concerns existed about potential swings to Communist rule.

Accordingly, during the Cold War years, in comparison to West Germany and other US allies in Europe, South Korea

(distinguished by its confrontation with North Korea at the Demilitarized Zone at the 38th parallel north) or other nations, US prospects for Japanese military might were not high. As such, Japan lost the opportunity for rearmament as a "normal nation." Among Japanese opposition parties, strong influences were wielded by the JSP and the Japanese Communist Party, two parties which championed Marxism. As a result, Japan experienced no rejection of class warfare akin to the Godesberg Program ratified by the Social Democratic Party of (West) Germany in 1959, which was accompanied by a shift to social democracy. This also can be said of the type of transition to a more realistic defense policy subsequently engineered by Willy Brandt of the German Social Democratic Party (Chancellor of West Germany from 1969 to 1974). Such changes failed to occur in Japan until the 1994 formation of a coalition government comprised of the LDP, the JSP, and the New Party Sakigake, a cabinet headed up by Tomiichi Murayama of the JSP as Prime Minister.

In 1968, Japan's GDP surpassed that of West Germany to become the world's second largest economy. Among the byproducts emerging in the wake of this success from the 1970s, however, was trade friction with the US surrounding textiles, steel, and other industries. In the midst of rising fears within the US of the weakened state of the nation's industrial competitiveness, the period from the 1980s through the 1990s witnessed

the rise of theories describing potential threats posed by Japan. America's chronic trade deficit with Japan came to be viewed as a critical theme in US-Japan relations, with trade friction escalating into a serious political issue between the two nations.

In both Japan and the US, officials involved in cultivating ties of security between the countries came to view these developments with a sense of crisis, and focused on that matter in issuing proposals to both countries. A key example of such efforts consisted of the Armitage-Nye Reports authored by Richard Armitage (former Deputy Secretary of State under the administration of President George W. Bush) and Joseph Nye (Harvard University professor). Five of these reports were issued during the years of 2000 through 2020.

In the initial Armitage-Nye Report of 2000, it was noted how the majority of US policymakers had lost interest in Japan during the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. Despite this indifference, however, the authors insisted that Japan was in fact moving into its first major period of transition in the post-World War II era, a situation necessitating reconsideration of the role to be played by Japan in the international community. The aim was to appeal to US policymakers about the importance of the US-Japan Alliance.

The second Abe Cabinet, formed in 2012, shared awareness of the issues

raised in the Armitage-Nye reports up to that point concerning the US-Japan Alliance. Abe's government adopted a positive approach in cabinet approval of partial exercising of the right of collective self-defense, establishing Japan's own National Security Council, passing legislation for peace and security and addressing other issues. In the fifth and final Armitage-Nye report of 2020, it was noted to the effect that, "For the first time in its history, Japan is taking an equal if not leading role in the alliance with the United States." A positive evaluation was given to the "establishing a regional policy agenda, furnishing guidance in free trade agreements and multilateral cooperation, and the new strategy of the role of the United States in forming regional order in the midst of unstable conditions." This report cites the progress, advanced under Japan's initiative, leading to the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) from which the Trump administration later withdrew against the backdrop of the rise of protectionism in the US. Likewise mentioned was the signing of the accord between the European Union (EU) and Japan for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and other moves to maintain the minimum rules for free trade, as well as the previously mentioned expression of the FOIP by the Abe administration.

Within these reports, advance proposals were made with regard to the US-Japan

Alliance, now considered to be equal and indispensable for the region. They include expansion of the relations of cooperation between the nations of Asia and Europe, confronting the challenges to regional stability mounted by China and North Korea, expansion of cooperative ties in economics and technology, and other issues on which consensus has been reached by the current governments of the US and Japan.

Deepening of the US-Japan Alliance to avoid halting progress

The alliance between the United States and Japan has lost none of its value over the long road of the past 70 years. A key reason for this includes the support stemming from the aforementioned efforts by persons from both nations. Above all else, however, is the fact that the changes in the international environment surrounding the US and Japan in recent years have heightened the value of such a coalition for both sides. In a world characterized by the advance of economic globalization, there are signs of decline in the US-focused international order upon which the world developed following World War II, with new challengers appearing on the scene. A shift has occurred from the sources of the threats sensed by the US away from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations, as well as international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, to China which continues to expand

its presence on the strength of global economic influence. As this comes to pass, the role of Japan as an ally on the frontlines of confronting China, as well as a nation wielding economic influence in the region as the world's No. 3 economic power after the US and China, will grow increasingly crucial for the US. Along with this, the US and Japan are also aligned in terms of their awareness of today's hazards.

In Washington, there has been no change in the threats perceived to be posed by China even in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine from February 24, 2022. The national defense strategy conveyed by the Biden administration to the US Congress on March 28 of that year underscored China as the priority issue—rather than dealing with Russia even as it continued to advance into Ukrainian territory. China was also defined as the most important competitive rival for the US, and an intensifying challenge for the Department of Defense. It was noted that actions will be taken to uphold and strengthen the nation's deterrence capacity against China, while stressing moves to defend the US mainland against Chinese threats in the cyber domain, outer space, and other arenas.

As suggested in that report, with the exception of the possibility of attacks on the US mainland using strategic nuclear arms, Russia lacks the capacity to strike the US with conventional forces. What's more, Moscow is also devoid of either the will or the economic power needed

to undertake such an assault. China, on the other hand, while maintaining fewer tactical nuclear arms than either the US or Russia, demands attention for its formidable economic might. In fact, that capacity qualifies China as the only nation with the potential to obtain the military capacity to attack the US mainland with conventional means. American and Japanese leaders are well aware that the geopolitical environment surrounding both nations does not necessarily reflect conditions enabling peace of mind. This understanding has contributed to a consensus to collaborate with the purpose of competing with China, as well as for the sake of sustaining stability in the Indo-Pacific region where China is strengthening its influence.

At the summit of Quad nations held in Tokyo in May 2022, President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida issued the “Japan-US Leaders Statement: Strengthening the Free and Open International Order.” That document opens with the declaration: “Today, Japan and the United States affirm a partnership that is stronger and deeper than at any time in their history.” The following passage reads: “Guided by our shared values; anchored by our common commitment to democracy and the rule of law; inspired by the innovation and technological dynamism of our economies; and rooted in the deep people-to-people ties between our countries, the Japan-US relationship is the cornerstone of a free and

open Indo-Pacific region.” Considering the long history of US-Japan relations touched upon above, it should certainly be clear that this statement represents far more than mere rhetoric.

Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden called upon China to stand with the international community and unequivocally condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The two leaders likewise expressed strong opposition to any unilateral attempts by China to change the status quo or make unlawful maritime claims in the East China Sea, while advocating the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraging the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. These pledges express the need for checks against China, while likewise confirming the US-Japan Alliance as “ways and means” and “assets” for the sake of realizing a strategic stance shared by both the US and Japan. In that way, this presents a vision of forging support for the existing international order in which regional nations will not be threatened by the tyrannical actions of superpowers.

Within this joint statement, the US-Japan agreement for the strengthening of Japan’s own military capacity reflects the new reality of the US-Japan Alliance positioned to confront the overwhelming improvements in China’s military capacity. While it is said that China currently maintains over 1,000 short-range missiles (ballistic and cruise types), it goes without saying that

Taiwan alone is not the target of such weapons. It makes far more sense to conclude that those missiles are aimed at the bases of the US military in Japan and Japan's own SDF. From the Chinese perspective, the reason for this stance lies in the reality that without disabling potential interventions from the US and Japan both politically and militarily, it would prove difficult for Beijing to unify Taiwan through armed force.

At the very least, in the event that the US were to opt for military intervention to cope with emergency situations in Taiwan, under the stipulations of the US-Japan Security Treaty Japan shoulders the responsibility to provide support for US military actions. For that matter, any crisis in Taiwan, a nation lying adjacent to Japanese territorial waters, would pose a grave situation directly linked to Japan's national security. Upon such developments, there is a high possibility that, in response to Japanese support for the US, China would issue threats implying the potential for launching of missile attacks on Japan's SDF bases or other targets. With no guarantees that counterattacks would be mounted by the US against China, Japanese leaders find themselves in a difficult situation. As things stand today, furthermore, under the spirit of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed between the US and Russia, which remained in effect until 2019, the US has not undertaken deployment of land-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Japan. Under the provisions of the

US-initiated Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) of 2021, meanwhile, the US military currently remains at the stage of conducting studies into deployment of such intermediate-range missiles.

Because any moves by Japan to host deployment of US missiles are projected to generate stiff political resistance in the targeted localities, the Japanese government has placed the priority on maintaining its own counterstrike capabilities. Within the three national security documents determined by the Kishida Cabinet and the National Security Council in December of 2022 (*National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and *Defense Buildup Program*), decisions included purchases of the US-made "Tomahawk" cruise missile, along with the conversion of Japanese-produced missiles to longer range strike capacity.

Also set forth as the targets of this national security overhaul is the raising of Japan's defense budget to 2% of the nation's GDP within a five-year time. Under Japan's trying fiscal conditions, which currently comprise the worst level among the world's developed nations, this goal will not be easy to achieve. There is no reason, however, for excessive pessimism. This upbeat interpretation may be traced to major shifts taking place in the views of national security among the Japanese public. In an opinion poll conducted by the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (the world's largest financial newspaper) from December

23 to 25, 2022, 84% of respondents expressed the view that the explanation provided by Prime Minister Kishida of a tax increase to cover defense spending was “inadequate.” Despite this dissatisfaction from a sweeping majority of the Japanese people, however, 55% said they “support” a plan to strengthen defense capabilities over the coming five years (vs. 36% expressing “non-support” of that stance).

In reaction to Japan’s policy to expand its defense capacity, agreement was reached in January 2023 through a US-Japan summit meeting and the US-Japan “2+2” talks (of diplomatic and defense cabinet officials) for “modernization of the alliance.” In a joint statement issued following the summit, it was noted: “The leaders of the US and Japan have indicated to cabinet members to strengthen cooperation with regard to development and effective operation of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities and other capacities.” Furthermore, within the “Joint Statement of the US-Japan 2+2 Talks,” agreement was reached between the two nations on the specific measures of “intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) for the purpose of effective operation of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities and other US-Japan cooperation.”

US-Japan economic security policy targeting China

Yet another critical theme for the US-Japan Alliance concerns economic security policies. In the Biden-Kishida joint statement of May 2022 (examined above), for instance, confirmation was made of efforts to work through export controls and other means for the protection and cultivation of important technologies, along with cooperation in support of specific competitive advantages to maintain supply chain resilience. Furthermore, in keeping with the “Basic Principles on Semiconductor Cooperation” adopted by the Japan-US Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP), agreement was hammered out to establish a joint task force to study the development of next-generation semiconductors.

On July 29, 2022, the US-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the “Economic 2+2”) convened a meeting of the diplomatic and economic ministers from both nations. Following that exchange, the participants expressed recognition of the following effect: “In addition to the importance of strengthening supply side resilience, fostering and protecting critical emerging technologies, and ensuring stable energy supplies, it is also recognized that the existing international order is being challenged not only by unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, but also by attempts to realize personal strategic

interests through the unfair and opaque use of economic influence. Agreement has been reached to discuss diplomacy, security, and economy as one, and for Japan and the US to lead cooperation in the international community.”

The aim of these economic security policies is to target China, an object of concern on the security front specifically by placing controls on advanced technology for both military and civilian use which will serve as a military gamechanger, thereby raising the hurdle on the use of military force by China against Taiwan or other nations. The Economic 2+2 noted: “The Ministers also intend to collaborate in promoting and protecting critical and emerging technologies in a manner consistent with international rules and norms, including through research and development, as well as export controls, so as to support technological competitiveness and resilience and to address the challenges posed by the illicit diversion of technology critical for weapons development.” However, this issue presents an even greater challenge for effective coordination between the US and Japan than such collaboration for the purpose of Japan’s defense force development. This is because for both the US and Japan the ties of private sector companies with China run deep, thereby wielding a strong influence on the politics of the economic community. That makes it difficult to readily reflect agreements between governments in policies possessing real effectiveness.

Moreover, within the industrial communities of both the US and Japan, there is recognition that industrial competition lies on the foundation of competitive relationships. In addition, for the Japan side there is the recent bitter experience of the one-sided withdrawal from the TPP by the Trump administration. That created a situation in which, under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Japan was levied with punitive tariffs on steel, aluminum, and other products in the same way as those assessed on the EU. This changed with the transition to the Biden administration. On February 27, 2022, the governments of the US and Japan agreed to exempt imports of Japan-produced steel and aluminum to the US from application under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. However, it is difficult to anticipate that the Democratic Party administration of Joe Biden, which relies on labor unions as one of its key support bases, will return to the existing CPTPP. Within the Republican Party as well, the forces of protectionism have continued to swell since the Trump years. As such, regardless of which party assumes the reins of the government following the presidential election in the fall of 2024, the current conditions fail to suggest a return to the ranks of the CPTPP.

In this way, with economic security policies easily impacted by discord in US-Japan trade, there are elements that discourage expectations for the smooth implementation of such strategies by the two nations. In terms of security,

meanwhile, there is increasing importance for US-Japan cooperation in the face of concerns about the impact that China exerts on that domain in both the US and Japan, as well as moves by Beijing to achieve the political and security goals of economic statecraft. On this point, the Economic 2+2 statement reads: “The Ministers expressed grave concern about, and opposition to, harmful uses of economic influence, including economic coercion as well as unfair and opaque lending practices, in ways that threaten the legitimate interests of sovereign nations, as well as those of individuals and industries. The Ministers affirmed these practices undermine legitimate sovereign choices, challenge the free and open rules-based international order, and are best addressed through a collective response.”

Viewed overall, there is the shared perception that when it comes to US-Japan economic security policy addressing China, the effectiveness of collaboration and joint responses will generate greater results than individual actions. This issue also overlaps with US-Japan cooperation on the military and defense front. While there is no need to become over-pessimistic, the journey to achieving consensus on effective joint policies promises to comprise a long and winding road.

Conclusion

Coming face to face with China’s expansionary policies in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, along with the enhancement of its military capacity in the background, the significance of the relations between the United States and Japan have been reconfirmed, with moves underfoot in both nations to raise their respective military might. The failure of Japan to possess a complete package of military power, including offensive capabilities, represents a weakness in the event that China attempts to use a crisis in Taiwan to drive a wedge between the US and Japan. Going forward, the most critical theme in the US-Japan Alliance lies in the bolstering of Japan’s own defense capabilities, with this comprising one key plank in Japan’s policies toward America.

For both the US and Japan, an urgent theme in the quest to avoid ceding overwhelming technological strength to China, as well as preventing China from rising to a dominant position in the military balance, is bilateral cooperation to limit exports and investment to China. On the other hand, the fact that both American and Japanese companies have deepened their respective ties with the Chinese economy comprises an element of uncertainty in achieving economic security policies, which can also emerge as an ingredient for China in advancing its US-Japan separation policy. For Japan, although Washington and Tokyo are in fundamental agreement on their

competitive stance toward China, factors such as the lack of continuity between the US Republican and Democratic administrations linked to partisan conflict between those political parties represent serious concerns. For the US, meanwhile, a source of anxiety lies in the question of whether the current Kishida administration, successor to the long-running government of Shinzo Abe, which generated such a major transformation in Japan's alliance policies, will be able to advance its policies with the same degree of momentum that the Abe administration achieved.

In the large-scale military exercises staged by the Chinese People's Liberation Army from August 4, 2022 near the Taiwan Strait, five missiles fired by China landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In an opinion survey conducted by Nippon Television Network and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* on August 10 and 11, 80% of the respondents reported that they "felt concern about the possible use of force against Taiwan by China." In addition to recognition of this threat, the Japanese people are also amply aware of value of the alliance between Japan and America, which has been passed the test of history over the years. Considering these and other factors, I foresee little likelihood of any changes in the direction of moves to beef up Japan's defense capacity or further tighten the alliance with the US going forward.

Reference material

National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (2000), "The United States and Japan: Advancing toward mature partnership," *INSS Special Report*, <https://armitage-international.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmNye-Oct-2000-Report.pdf>

The Governments of the United States of America and Japan (2022), "Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee: Strengthening Economic Security and the Rules-Based Order," <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100376270.pdf>

Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels (2018), "A New Military Strategy for Japan Active Denial Will Increase Security in Northeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs Website*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2018-07-16/new-military-strategy-japan>

Tsuneo Watanabe (2022), "Japan's Security Policy Evolution: The Interaction between Think Tank Proposals and Government Implementation," *Asia Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 3, <https://www.nbr.org/publication/japans-security-policy-evolution-the-interaction-between-think-tank-proposals-and-government-implementation/>

Tsuneo WATANABE



Tsuneo “Nabe” Watanabe is Senior Fellow of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, an independent policy research organization in Tokyo. In October 2016, he joined the Sasakawa Peace Foundation after serving as Senior Fellow and Director of Foreign & Security Policy Research at the Tokyo Foundation from 2009 to 2016. He served as Senior Fellow at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute in Tokyo from 2005 to 2009. In 1995, he joined Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He served as Visiting Research Scholar, Research Associate, Fellow, and Senior Fellow until 2005. He is currently Adjunct Fellow of the CSIS.

His publications include *The World Order after 2021: 20 Angles of the International Affairs* [in Japanese] (Shinchosha, 2020), *Asia Pacific Countries and the US Rebalancing Strategy* [co-authored with David W.F. Huang et.al.] (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016), *NATO and Asia Pacific* [co-authored with Alexander Moens and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor et.al.] (NATO Defense College, 2016), *Are the US and China Trading Places in 2025: History Tells the Truth of the US-China Relations* [in Japanese] (PHP Research Institute, 2011). He received his D.D.S. from Tohoku University in Japan and his M.A. in political science from the New School for Social Research in New York.