The long transition period in international politics following the end of the Cold War in 1989 came to an end when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Not only is the invasion likely to continue to impact international politics for years to come, it will also have an important influence on China’s strategy in Asia. Here I consider how developments in Russia and China in relation to the invasion will affect international politics and European and Asian security. I look particularly at the role of Japan and other advanced democracies exploring cooperation centered on their relationship with the United States, examining their position and role from the perspectives of middle-power democracy and middle-power cooperation.
The Russian invasion appears to be motivated by imperialist ambitions, with China pursuing a very similar impulse in Asia. And in both Europe and Asia, the United States is fronting the defense against the Russian and Chinese challenge. In other words, the invasion of Ukraine has again foregrounded the centrality of the three great powers—the United States, China, and Russia—in rivalry in international politics and security. Rather than encroaching on the relationship among the three superpowers, the advanced democracies are exploring cooperation within that
framework centering on their respective relationships with the United States—namely, middle-power cooperation. This perspective will be important particularly when considering Japanese diplomacy. Conservative discourses on diplomacy and security in Japan have traditionally underscored autonomy and self-help, often arguing as though Japan could have its own independent strategy. Since the invasion, there has been a lot of bold talk directly linking the Ukraine lesson to Japan’s safety and defense.
Such talk will not, of course, translate directly into Japanese foreign policy. For the current administration, however, it represents a domestic factor that cannot be ignored, potentially obscuring the reality of Japanese policy as a consequence. I have continued to argue that, while burdened with this structural complication, postwar Japanese diplomacy has effectively remained within the framework of middle-power diplomacy. This article is based on the conviction that the same analytical perspective remains valid in considering the actual state and future vision of Japanese diplomacy since the invasion. I begin by revisiting Japan’s middle-power diplomacy.
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