A Front Line with Jihadism: The Struggle in Northern Benin and Togo
The insidious expansion of jihadist groups into northern Benin and Togo has largely gone unnoticed due to its slow and methodical nature. Initially confined to the borders with Burkina Faso and national parks such as Park W and Pendjari, instability has now spread further inland. Armed groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda employ infiltration, local recruitment, and violence against civilians to systematically erode state control in these regions.
Despite efforts by local governments to improve social services and economic opportunities – such as the Savanes Emergency Program in Togo and community development projects in Benin – living conditions continue to deteriorate. Unemployment, poverty, and ethnic tensions, particularly among Fulani communities, have fueled instability. The influx of refugees has further strained already limited resources, exacerbating social conflicts and land disputes.
This study is based on extensive field research, including 274 interviews in the affected regions. It highlights the repeated failures of international and national responses, often characterized by a lack of understanding of local dynamics. Lessons from counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel suggest that the same mistakes are now being repeated in the Gulf of Guinea states.
Militarily, Benin and Togo face a growing threat from two jihadist factions, Katibat Sékou Mouslimou and Katibat Abou Hanifa, operating from Burkina Faso. These groups, coordinated under the leadership of JNIM (Al-Qaeda’s Sahel branch), have established transnational networks that allow them to attack security forces while maintaining their operational bases outside Beninese and Togolese territories. Their strategic objective is not immediate territorial control but rather the creation of a buffer zone that weakens state authority and fosters long-term conditions for their influence.
Government responses vary between the two countries. Benin’s military has improved its counterterrorism tactics, preventing territorial losses, but remains vulnerable due to its lack of combat experience. Meanwhile, Togo has launched a preventive military operation, Koundjoaré, to secure its border, yet jihadist incursions persist. The situation is further complicated by rising crime, cattle theft, and local conflicts, blurring the lines between banditry and insurgency.
One of the study’s key findings is that jihadist expansion is not purely military but deeply tied to socio-economic grievances. Economic hardship, poor governance, and ethnic rivalries provide jihadist groups with recruitment opportunities. Without urgent measures to improve local governance, resolve land disputes, and integrate marginalized communities, the region risks following the path of the Sahel, where state authority has collapsed in many areas.
International involvement remains crucial, yet a lack of coordination and understanding of local realities hinders effective intervention. The lessons from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger illustrate the dangers of delayed action. If northern Benin and Togo are to resist the growing jihadist threat, a comprehensive strategy combining security operations with sustainable socio-economic investments is essential.
As the front line against jihadism in West Africa moves further south, the fate of northern Benin and Togo serves as a warning. Without decisive and informed intervention, these lines drawn in the sand may soon become permanent.
This article was written by Mathias Khalfaoui, an independent French consultant specializing in human security in West Africa, with a keen interest in coastal states. Through his extensive field missions, he has gained a deep understanding of local dynamics.
