IAEA
After the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme at its Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre, the IAEA from whose inspectors it had been concealed, needed intrusive powers to carry out their work. On 15 May 1997 the Additional Protocol (AP), also known as INFCIRC/540, was introduced to strengthen existing safeguards agreements, expanding the requirements for information and access states adopting the additional protocol are required to provide.
Why It Matters
Under the protocol, a voluntary measure - although states with safeguards agreements are urged to adopt it - the IAEA is given more information and broader access to facilities to increase the possibility of detecting nuclear material and activities that have not been declared.
The AP enabled IAEA’s access to: to research and development; all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle - from mines to nuclear waste; all buildings at a site, and all locations where nuclear material intended for non-nuclear use is present. The protocol’s scope covers administrative arrangements - multi-entry visas for inspectors, simplified designations of inspectors, and use of direct communication means between the field and headquarters. Environmental sampling, used to detect nuclear material beyond a declared location is permitted, as well as added control to export and import locations, plus the use of more advanced technologies, such as satellite imagery.
Further materials:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540c.pdf
https://vcdnp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/201914-iaea-safeguards-staying-ahead-of-the-game.pdf
https://armscontrolcenter.org/factsheet-iran-and-the-additional-protocol/
