Inside Syria: After War, Before Peace?

On July 8th and 9th 2024, around 50 participants including regional and international experts, scholars, policy makers, politicians and government representatives working on Syria commenced in Jordan’s capital to discuss the current situation inside Syria. Thirteen years after the war's onset, the crisis in Syria remains profoundly complex and resists simplistic categorization. Whereas international peace efforts have come to a halt, Syria has neither transitioned into a postwar stage nor can the ongoing crisis accurately be labeled as a “frozen conflict”. Large-scale offensives have decreased, though the core drivers of conflict persist, manifesting in localized clashes and altering the social fabric of Syria's diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal communities. For concerned policymakers and practitioners the way forward is far from obvious. Comprehensive programs that aim to achieve stability, reconciliation and participatory political systems in post-civil war contexts are doomed to fail in Syria where international actors face a “fierce” state, whose institutions are geared solely towards regime survival. As efforts have been made to find alternative entry points and approaches for peacebuilding, the necessity arises to better understand the how, what, when and who of the complex sociopolitical landscape and dynamics in Syria, as well as how such knowledge can be utilized to shape viable paths going forward. Shedding light on the above questions, this conference report provides a summary of the main points and findings from the event.

The conference was held under the Chatham House Rules.

July 8th

Welcome dinner and keynote speech

During the welcome dinner, a keynote speech was delivered by a Jordanian politician, highlighting the challenges Jordan is facing due to the Syrian crisis including the hosting of Syrian refugees, drug and weapon smuggling as well we violent clashes with criminal gangs and militias at its borders. The speakers emphasized neutrality towards the Syrian government (GoS) while expressing support for the Syrian people and calling for continuous dialogue and keeping channels open.

July 9th

PANEL I: Syrian communal groups’ and substate actors’ potential for peace formation

The first panel discussion examined how the war has shaped the dynamics of Syria’s diverse communities and explored the constraints and opportunities for peace formation within these groups. The case of Syria’s Christians was highlighted, illustrating that while their experiences vary significantly based on geographical location, the community as a whole faces a security dilemma. Sectarian fears have driven militarization and garnered support for the Assad government, positioning the Church as a gatekeeper. This support, however, compromised the community’s neutral stance and exposed it to the risk of Islamic retribution. Historical fears, influenced by events such as the Armenian genocide and the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, significantly played into the "fear factor" among Christians and reinforced the perception of Assad as their sole protector. The question was raised whether there could be a Christian uprising against Assad similar to the recent uprising in Suweida. However, the geographical dispersion of Christians makes such a development less likely. Insights were furthermore provided on track-II initiatives involving Syrian leaders from all denominations and areas, emphasizing the need to build trust and create a dialogue space beyond the usual regime-opposition dichotomy. It was pointed out that an eventual resolution to the Syrian conflict needs to involve all parties, including Russia and the GoS, however not as the main player but as one among many on the table.

Lastly, the impact of the war on the Alawite community was discussed, highlighting growing disillusionment with Assad’s government, given that the community keeps on paying a heavy economic and human price for the war. Despite this dissatisfaction, Alawites were said to lack avenues to express opposition, as the government does not tolerate dissent from its traditional loyalty base. While there have been signs of communal grassroots activism to form peace and overcome sectarian divides, such efforts are politically sensitive and might jeopardize those who engage in such activities, especially since it is often unclear where the GoS draws it’s red lines. Participants furthermore debated the extent of Iran’s soft power and cultural/religious influence on the Alawite community. While Alawites benefit from Iran’s presence, it was established that its members are fearful and strongly opposed to attempts by the IRGC’s cultural arm to convert them to Shiism.

Overall, it became evident that fear of the “Other” plays a decisive role in all communities’ calculations and has even led to shifts in identity. The discussion included differing views on whether international organizations should support unregistered, informal grassroots groups in Syria, which were described as having the most significant impact due to their responsiveness to real needs, or established, registered groups that have a proven track record of successfully implementing projects in a transparent way. Lastly, it was emphasized that Syria’s various ethnic, religious and tribal groups should not be essentialized (“Who are ‘the Sunnis’? Muslim Brotherhood, tribes, Damascene liberals?”) and that a simplistic Alawite versus Sunni narrative would not hold water. For instance, the Assad regime, while perceived as Alawite, has largely been financed by Sunni merchants and businessmen, revealing a far more complex socio-political landscape.

PANEL II:  Peace formation potential within and across Syria’s regions

The second panel examined how the war has impacted the communities in Syria's various geographical spheres and explored the constraints and opportunities for peace formation within these areas. The discussion began with an exploration of the Daraa region. It was noted that power dynamics have repeatedly shifted throughout the conflict. These changes intensified religious and factional fragmentations (even among those that once united under “the banner of revolution”), and increased insecurity and violence, further complicating peace efforts. In addition, the regime's failure to improve infrastructure has forced local communities to provide essential services themselves, leading to an increased role for various local actors. However, these efforts often focus merely on “putting out fires” rather than addressing root causes. Despite these limitations, local actors have sometimes successfully mediated conflicts even beyond their traditional areas of influence. Religious and tribal figures play key roles in conflict mediation, resolving financial and social disputes, and negotiating with regime actors. This complexity makes it difficult to identify a single dominant actor in Daraa.

Attention then turned to the region of Deir Ezzor. It was emphasized that grievances and marginalization felt by Arab tribes have been exacerbated by Kurdish dominance in decision-making. In Deir Ezzor, the regime has used identity politics to destabilize the community and support insurgency against the local administration, thereby increasing internal tensions. The fragmented tribal leadership complicates efforts to establish stable governance. The presented case study examined tribal peace initiatives aimed at non-violent efforts to combine the demands of Arab tribes with the Self-Administration, securing the release of Arab prisoners, improving public services, and countering terrorism. Policy recommendations from the Deir Ezzor file include establishing a government system that represents diverse ethnic and religious groups, ensuring transparent decision-making that involve local Arab tribes, and supporting public infrastructure and services to improve living standards, therewith reducing economic discontent. Additionally, improving the effectiveness of security operations and respecting human rights were emphasized. With regard to the governorate of Suwayda, it was noted that insurgent movements against the regime, traditionally seen as a protector of minorities, have been driven by economic and social discontent. The involvement of religious leaders and civil society has legitimized the protest movement. The shift in attitude among the Druze community, once passive, has been galvanized by these leaders. Recommendations for this region emphasized the need for Suwayda's inclusion in any national and international dialogue, supporting local civil society peace initiatives, enhancing social cohesion, and promoting cultural initiatives and peaceful resistance.

The final input focused on the Afrin region, where the war has led to significant displacement as well as housing, land and property (HLP) issues. These problems intensified after Turkey’s 2018 military campaign and the subsequent increased displacement of Kurdish locals by arriving Arab IDPs from other parts of the country, adding a significant demographic and identity-based dimension to the conflict. Such HLP rights violations, often committed by armed factions, have led to complex and contentious living arrangements. The blurred lines between armed forces and civilians due to family ties add to the complexity. Some local actors were said to have successfully mediated conflicts beyond their traditional areas of influence, indicating potential for broader peace formation efforts. Recommendations for Afrin emphasized the need for community-driven initiatives that offer sustainable solutions. Interventions should focus on social cohesion and peaceful coexistence, supporting informal initiatives for housing disputes, and integrating work on human rights and HLP violations.

In the discussion, it was highlighted that Syrian communities have agency and are not merely passive recipients governed by others. While the various governing actors’ actions often draw most of the attention, local players have significant potential as peace formation agents since they can tailor their responses to the specific needs and environments they exist in. These actors, ranging from individuals to civil society groups, often employ informal solutions that might not align with traditional (Western) practices but are effective in their contexts. Yet, it was also noted that these agents mostly operate covertly with minimal capacity and resources, and that offering them foreign support might endanger or delegitimize them or create communal tensions/competition by empowering one group over the other. Nevertheless, a combined approach that includes both local and international efforts was deemed essential, as local actors alone cannot resolve the Syrian crisis, but they are crucial for implementing agreements reached at higher levels. The need for inclusivity in designing interventions, especially considering historic and social dynamics unique to Syria’s various regions, was highlighted. The discussion also addressed the broader geopolitical context, examining the implications of newly emergent conflicts and the impact of international policies on local grievances. Emphasizing the importance of addressing these grievances was highlighted as crucial for fostering a sense of justice and mitigating feelings of marginalization.

PANEL III:  Localized solutions: Entry points for regional and international policy makers

The third panel focused on viable policy recommendations for localized solutions and peace formation in Syria, examining possible entry points for regional and international actors while considering the complex and intersecting nature of local dynamics. In this regard, panellists discussed how Germany’s Syria policy has evolved in recent years, highlighting the challenges and successes in finding alternative entry points and localized approaches to create stability. Emphasis was placed on maintaining humanitarian aid and Early Recovery efforts while avoiding strengthening non-legitimate actors. It was stressed that this can best be achieved by taking small-scale, calculated steps (“go local and go small”) within the red lines of Early Recovery activities. Improving monitoring mechanisms and transparency regarding the spending and flow of funds was deemed essential. Efforts should be increased quantitatively (funds) and qualitatively (sustainable projects/partners). While adhering to clear red lines was deemed important by some, others stressed that new challenges and dynamics on the ground in Syria require constant evaluation and possible adaptation of policies (“normalize with reality, not with the regime”). Moreover, the role of international coordination in tackling issues like the Captagon trade was emphasized, requiring collaboration and intelligence sharing with countries like Jordan, Iraq or Saudi Arabia.

Taking a regional angle, speakers examined the consequences of a possible rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, which would be most pronounced in Northern Syria. The fact that Turkey is perceived as an occupying power in this area was said to complicate the situation. Addressing root causes and making substantial investments in Northern Syria to reduce refugee flows to Turkey and further to Europe was highlighted. It was stressed that the Syrian crisis imposes a heavy burden on neighbouring countries, necessitating cooperative efforts and fair burden-sharing, particularly from the EU and the USA. Additionally, Jordan's position one year after Syria’s readmission into the Arab League and the developed step-for-step initiative was explored. It was noted that despite Jordan's consistent support for a political solution and the Syrian people, its efforts lacked the necessary leverage because regional Arab states did not show expected level of commitment. Consequently, the initiative has been unsuccessful and Jordan continues to face significant concerns, including drug and weapon smuggling, Iranian influence, and a reemergent threat from Daesh along its border with Syria. To alleviate these concerns, Jordan needs a reliable partner for state-to-state relations in Syria (“if goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will”) and hence does not see itself able to support or work with any other actor except the GoS. Reinvesting in other groups would jeopardize Jordan’s standing, especially without the backing of the international community, whose focus is currently diverted elsewhere.  A key question revolved around defining the “end game” for Jordan and other foreign players in Syria. Is the goal to reform the Assad's government, a political transition or regime change through another revolution? The need for a clear objective was emphasized, with foreign players urged to support only those Syrian actors whose end goals align with their own. The absence of a clear objective and path forward was underscored by the inability of the international community to agree on a peace track (Astana versus Geneva).

Lastly, lessons from Afghanistan were shared, noting the structural problems of international interventions, such as the lack of local ownership and accountability. This led to a dependency on foreign aid, causing the collapse of security services when funding was withdrawn. Additionally, there was a lack of understanding of local contexts and stakeholders, exemplified by the failure to early on engage with the Taliban meaningfully, resulting in unsuccessful peace processes. Another issue raised was the imposition of foreign concepts of human rights and justice, ignoring existing local systems as well as the failure to balance peace, stability, and transitional justice. The impartial documentation of war crimes provided a foundation for truth-seeking and societal healing but integrating this with peace efforts proved difficult. For future interventions such as the one in Syria, maintaining political dialogue and understanding local-level realities were deemed crucial lessons learned from the Afghanistan case.

During the discussion, some participants cautioned against placing too much emphasis on identity issues, though others welcomed the opportunity to address often avoided sensitive topics like sectarianism within the scope of the conference. It was highlighted that the conference’s rationale was rooted in the urgent need to address Syria's dire internal situation, the significant burden on neighbouring countries, and the lack of progress in state-level normalization processes. The conference thus aimed to explore alternative entry points and viable options beyond the unsuccessful attempts to engage Assad.

Concluding remarks

The concluding remarks emphasized the importance of understanding local dynamics but also questioned how this understanding would translate into better policies and a shared future vision for Syria. A cautious note was made regarding the potential risks associated with a localized approach, particularly the danger of further fragmenting the Syrian state and exacerbating sectarian divisions. The remarks also highlighted the inherent contradictions in working with unregistered local groups, which automatically become formalized once they collaborate with international organizations. Additionally, the need for burden-sharing among international actors was recognized as essential but difficult, given shrinking resources and the emergence of new conflicts. Nevertheless, openly addressing these issues was deemed crucial for making progress.

Questions and topics for further discussion

• Should international efforts prioritize localized initiatives even if they risk deepening existing divides, or should maintaining Syria’s unity be the highest priority?

• How can informal Syrian grassroots initiatives be supported given that collaboration would necessarily formalize and potentially internationalize them?
• How can a conflict-sensitive “do no harm” approach be implemented when working with informal organizations that avoids putting them at risk or delegitimizes them through foreign support?
• What are potential advantages and disadvantages of working with formal, registered Syrian groups versus informal ones, considering aspects such as efficiency, legitimacy, transparency or impact?
• Is focusing efforts and funds on micro-contexts merely "putting plasters" while leaving root causes untouched and possibly diverting focus from the overarching goal of finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis?
• How should controversial local actors, who hold significant legitimacy and can create meaningful impact in their sphere of influence, but engage in illiberal practices to resolve conflicts (e.g. executions) be dealt with?
• How can policy makers balance the adherence to clear red lines while creating actions that adapt to the changing local dynamics and context-specific needs on the ground in Syria?
• How can policies be adapted to the specific micro-level context without compromising overall strategic consistency and a coherent future vision for Syria?