The broader Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean has for long been a region tormented by conflict. This has taken many forms, from bilateral to multilateral disputes and from rooted, long-standing quarrels to new and emerging threats. Thus, effectively, we have a set of old conflicts (e.g. between Greece and Türkiye, the two sides in Cyprus, Israel and its neighbors) on which new issues are constantly superimposed, such as new territorial conflicts, terrorism and asymmetric threats, energy problems, migration, human security crises etc. Therefore, old troubles left unresolved and untreated form fertile ground for further deterioration. And time passing sees the addition and accumulation of new flashpoints, rendering the solution of the original underlying differences impossible to tackle, as these have now escalated to multi - level, actor, layer, and issue ones. Accordingly, on top of the established regional conflicts, new ones were added, like Syria Libya, confrontations over natural resources, etc. These have strained relations between the states in the area as well greater powers having a stake in the East Med and Middle East.
This politically, geopolitically, and socioeconomically complicated and vulnerable geography has lately been further challenged by climate change, that acts as a threat multiplier. According to the United Nations, the wider M. East/E. Med is experiencing unique climate exposure as it is a climate change hotspot – indeed, one of the top spots globally where climate change is happening the fastest. The region suffers from a lethal combination of factors that include low precipitation, droughts, floods, lack of groundwater storage, increased evaporation, temperature increases, freshwater issues, and agricultural problems. These are complemented by other problems, like growing populations, unemployment, migration, and food security (from shortages to disruptions to prices). The cumulative effect of all these is the sketching of an actual or potential explosive reality, posing major threats for the countries concerned and beyond.
The first conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the combined effect of the crises in Ukraine, Gaza, Syria, Nagorno Karabakh, and Yemen indicates there is no such thing as a frozen conflict, and nothing can be taken for granted. This means that there is an urgent need to deal with what can be dealt with, what can be managed, because challenges rising and augmented long-running ones sketch a bleak picture and can lead to eruptions at any given moment. The second inference is that the approach of the various issues and the different localities cannot be fragmented or disjointed with just symptoms-tackling and epidermic treatments. It is true that good efforts have been and are made regarding several concerns like energy, migration, hard security, or the environment. However, there is not much evidence that this is done in a holistic, cross-sectional manner between subjects and regions. Instead, there is a need to connect dots geographically and thematically, establishing threads. What happens in the Eastern Mediterranean very much affects, directly or indirectly, the Western Mediterranean and vice versa. The same is true for the Northern and Southern Med. Similarly, there is a direct causality between subject matters: for instance, climate change and its effects, energy shortages, and human security issues are migration drivers that in turn become hard security concerns. Hence, the root causes and not only the symptoms need to be dealt with, and holistic solutions must be sought with pragmatism and out-of-the-box thinking, understanding the sense of urgency. Indeed, it is necessary to go 30.000 feet up, examining and treating the region as a whole.
Unfortunately, the way the region often appears to be dealt with, in particular by the EU, is one that is perceived as less coherent, coordinated and consistent and more ad hoc. This offers few incentives for cooperation and fuels contestation instead, despite the nobility of motives behind it. For instance, the EU Commission’s seed funding of the East Med Gas Pipeline project at the same time as other institutions’, like the EIB and EBRD, total banning of fossil fuel projects funding has given mixed messages, undermining the EU’s credibility, impact, and clout in the region.
Dealing effectively with all these problems requires far sightedness, political will, realism, but most of all synergies, collaboration, and concerted action by the regional states and the international community supporting them. In the first instance, this could concentrate on fields that are more conducive to cooperation on account of key common challenges, major potential mutual benefits, and easier local acceptability. One such obvious area is energy, climate, and the nexus between them.
Building a pragmatic, sustainable vision for broader energy mix for the region could unlock joint opportunities and respond to common concerns and shared interests. On top of the environmental challenges mentioned above, climate awareness and compliance in the region is low. If this is combined with growing poverty, rule of law shortcomings, and inequalities, sustainability is rendered very problematic and further degradation nearly certain. There is a great need for facilitation, inspiration, enablement, and funding of energy transition to green energy in the East Med. The United Nations Secretary General and the European Union have already been pushing for green energy in the region. This will be a fresh way forward for the region in two important respects.
First, embedded ethnonationalist conflicts have been obstacles to the full realization of the regional energy potential. Maritime delimitation disputes, issue of state recognition, clashes over the ownership of hydrocarbon resources, and animosity regarding their exploration and exploitation led in some cases to critical delays and in others resulted ultimately in resources staying in the ground. Beyond their importance in other respects, part of the value of renewable energy sources, like wind power, lies in their ownership with the various states and their usage in common, if and when the countries involved wish to do so. This would allow neighbors to overcome, or bypass, established conflicts.
Second, this would address key energy needs of the region. East Med energy, even before the pandemic, was not able to be competitive either internationally or in a European context. However, this does not mean that E. Med energy sources are not useful or important locally, contributing majorly to the energy requirements of the littoral states. It would also promote cooperation in the field between countries that might be experiencing difficulties otherwise in their bilateral relations, facilitating broader cooperation in other fields or of a multilateral nature. The European Union should have a great interest in supporting and indeed funding such initiatives: it wouldn’t make sense if the core EU uses clean energy, if its neighbors aren’t; the EU has a principled position on climate concerns and green energy; and, through funding, it would offer the EU such much needed leverage and would be an important pillar of a nascent geopolitical EU. After all, it is sustainability that provides security and stability.
The future of the region lies in electrification and interconnectedness. If this is not realized and acted upon swiftly, countries run the risk of staying behind and letting developments overtake them. Access to resources and energy security are key to overall/hard security. Conflicts and tension between several Mediterranean countries in various combinations undermine the general stability of the region and lead to a lack of Mediterranean security architecture and consequently European security architecture. Existing rivalries extended to the energy field hinder broader cooperation on issues of wider critical concern (climate, migration); prevent progress in other areas (e.g. EU-Türkiye dialogue); themselves feed into wider confrontations (for instance great power rivalries); and eventually contribute to the lack of progress and underdevelopment of the region and beyond. Reversely, interconnectivity can lead to interdependence and cooperation to peace. When there is a will, there is a way.
