Armenia between geopolitical fault lines
While in many countries the ninth of May is regularly celebrated as "Europe Day", in Armenia this year the merry month begins with a complete "Europe Week". Top-tier politicians from 46 countries, most of them heads of state and government, plus representatives of the EU, OSCE, NATO and Council of Europe will travel to the eighth summit of the European Political Community (EPC). The format, which was launched in response to Russia's full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is the only platform that brings together not only all EU members and accession candidates, but all states on the continent, including Türkiye. Beyond the symbolism of European belonging and togetherness, which should not be underestimated, the EPC framework serves to exchange ideas on questions of cooperation in strategic areas such as (cyber) security, energy, infrastructure or migration. The very next day, a separate Armenia-EU summit will be held. This is setting a precedent in their bilateral relations, which have recently gained considerable momentum .
Both summits bear witness to the historic upheavals that Europe in general and the host country in particular are going through. After the Velvet Revolution of 2018, Armenia's government under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had initiated a change of course. This affected primarily domestic policy but extended to foreign policy as well, especially in the aftermath of Armenia’s defeat in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, observers speak of a reinvention of national identity. The agenda of reconciliation, peace and the opening of borders with former adversaries Azerbaijan and Türkiye plays a central role in this. Building on this, Armenia wants to position itself as a central building block in the "Middle Corridor" between Asia and Europe.[i]
Simultaneously, Armenia is reducing its traditional dependence on Russia for security and economic policy. For decades, this had meant a glass ceiling for the conceivable European political ambition of the Caucasus state. Although Armenia has been part of the EU's Eastern Partnership since 2009, the country had to make a U-turn in 2013 shortly before the planned signing of an already negotiated EU association agreement, joining the Eurasian Economic Union instead. The less ambitious CEPA agreement did not come into full force until 2021.[ii] But the experiences of recent years, especially the failure of Russian security guarantees around Nagorno-Karabakh, have set in motion a rethink in Yerevan and large parts of the population. However, in view of the continuing geopolitical fragility, limited resources and vulnerabilities, the new strategy does not rely on radical breaks, but on diversification. The country is setting new accents, for example, by intensifying relations with India and Japan, but in particular by involving the Americans and moving closer to Europe.[iii]
Peace orientation and international flanking
On the one hand, the involvement of these strong international partners is intended to help politically secure Armenia's rapprochement with its neighbours, which are superior in military and economic terms. Moreover, these relationships are fraught with asymmetries of power and distrust. In this context, the Washington Accords of August 2025 and the planned "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)" made it possible to break out of a diplomatic impasse and open the way forward. The visit of Trump's Vice President JD Vance in February, the highest-ranking US visit in history, also underlines the importance of American engagement. But the European presence also plays a key role, for example through the European Monitoring Mission EUMA.
On the other hand, European values in this case are recognizably more than a Sunday speech reference. In comparison to an increasingly authoritarian neighbourhood, Armenia seems like a pioneer of democratic standards, human rights and civil liberties. The country itself is under considerable pressure – not only, but in a special way, from Russia. The Kremlin and Russian propagandists are overtly and covertly threatening Armenia with the use of economic levers, if not military intervention, if the country pursues its pivot to Europe.[iv] In Brussels, the threat of illegitimate hybrid influence by means of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), cyber-attacks or covert money transfers is taken so seriously that the European Council, at Yerevan's request, decided at the end of April to send a separate EU partnership mission to advise and support the Armenian partners. Time is of the essence for further expansion of these capacities, as landmark elections are imminent.[v]
Elections and pressure of expectations
The two summits come in the middle of the hot phase of the election campaign for the parliamentary elections on June 7. Although a total of seventeen parties and two electoral blocs are competing for the favour of voters, polls point to a victory for the ruling Civil Contract (CC) party and a third term for Pashinyan.[vi] But despite good prospects and a stable core electorate, CC is also facing harsh criticism. Progress on the rule of law, anti-corruption and civil rights since the 2018 revolution has stagnated. Opposition politicians accuse the government of a confrontational-authoritarian style of politics, which sometimes resorts to conspiracy narratives, such as that of a "war party".[vii] Others see the rapprochement with Azerbaijan while abandoning former territorial claims as a betrayal. The Prime Minister's raging confrontation with the leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church also met with a divided response from the population.
Against this background, foreign policy has a central domestic policy function. A large majority of Armenians want peace and support the course of rapprochement with the EU. Progress in the peace process and visible international support, especially from Europe, can make an important contribution to strengthening the government's backing.
The summit week as a political signal
With the EPC Summit, Armenia is hosting a format that explicitly aims to define the European political space beyond the borders of the European Union. The hosting of the semi-annual format varies between EU members and non-member states. By hosting the format, both Yerevan and the participating guests underline the common view of Armenia as part of the enlarged Europe.
The EU-Armenia summit immediately following represents a further upgrade. Usually, such bilateral summit formats are reserved for larger partners or immediate neighbours of the EU, and so its implementation alone signals an increased strategic importance of Armenia from Brussels' point of view. The presence of several heads of state and government – including Emmanuel Macron, who is combining the trip with a bilateral programme of talks – also draws the attention of the European media and the public to the Caucasus state for a moment and provides an opportunity to draw attention to its situation and development.
The Yerevan Dialogue Conference, which was held synchronously with the EU-Armenia Summit, also provides a framework for discussing this on site under the eyes of the press and the expert public within the international expert community.
Between symbolism and substance
Despite all the political signal effect, it remains to be seen to what extent the summits will deliver concrete results. First drafts of the EU-Armenia Summit Declaration indicate that the European Union will reaffirm its support for Armenia's reforms, resilience and economic development. The strategic partnership agenda presented in December 2025 already offers a good framework of reference and a comprehensive specification of specific goals and steps, the implementation of which promises progress on many sides.[viii]
In addition, the summit is expected to underline the new security dimension of the EU's policy towards Armenia. The above-mentioned new EU mission to strengthen resilience to hybrid threats in the context of the upcoming elections, which will be politically accompanied by the summit, illustrates Brussels' claim to actively contribute to the stabilisation of the country. New financial commitments, on the other hand, are not yet foreseeable. Rather, the draft summit declaration refers to existing programmes, such as funds within the framework of an EU growth plan and investment commitments in the context of the Global Gateway Initiative.
The direct question of an EU accession perspective is also not on the agenda.[ix] The Armenian government has also not yet applied for membership in parliament, despite an EU accession law. Although Pashinyan declared membership to the population as a political goal, he openly communicates that full membership is a long way off under the current conditions of the accession process. The path of rapprochement itself, on the other hand, could already provide the country with valuable advantages, such as in the form of visa liberalization, which the government is actively working towards.
Europe as a partner – expectations and limits
For Armenia, rapprochement with Europe is both a strategic necessity and a political project. In addition to security policy considerations, economic prospects, infrastructure development and institutional reforms play a central role. The aim is to gradually reduce dependencies – especially on Russia – and replace them with broader international integration.
Nevertheless, there are persisting structural limits to rapprochement under the current conditions. On the one hand, this concerns the security sector. Although Armenia has de facto suspended its membership in the Russian-dominated CSTO defence alliance, Moscow continues to maintain a troop base in Gyumri in northern Armenia. On the other hand, while in the past the border with Türkiye was jointly secured by Armenian forces and Russian border troops (especially the FSB), Armenia has begun to increasingly take control itself in recent years. Moreover, the country is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, which significantly limits the possibilities of deeper economic integration into the EU single market from a technical point of view alone and pre-empts full EU membership.
However, the long road to EU rapprochement offers a lot of scope for a variety of confidence-building steps and intermediate successes and requires comprehensive political communication. Armenian society and large parts of the elites continue to have little understanding of the significance and conditions of European integration. And despite the increased commitment on the part of the EU and its member states, most EU citizens are likely to have a vague or exotic idea of Armenia, if any at all. Against this background, the country's visible involvement in formats such as the European Political Community is becoming increasingly important in order to strengthen the perception of Armenia as part of the European political space. At the same time, the implementation of the Partnership Agenda adopted in December 2025 offers ample opportunities to record ‘small successes’ and ensure that the direction of development is right.
Conclusion: Armenia as a test case for European politics
The summit week in Yerevan marks an important moment in relations between Armenia and Europe, and Yerevan and Brussels in particular. It emphasizes that the country is increasingly perceived as a relevant partner in the South Caucasus with regards to foreign, economic and security policy. Furthermore, with the decisive phase of the parliamentary election campaign rapidly approaching, the EPC offers symbolic support for Pashinyan’s government, which has taken up the cause of the regional peace process and rapprochement with the EU.
Still, it remains to be seen whether it will be possible to translate the visible political support into sustainable structural progress. Armenia faces the challenge of continuing its reform course, overcoming domestic political tensions and simultaneously retaining agency in a complex geopolitical environment. For the European Union, with its claim to be a value-based, normative geopolitical player, this is an opportunity to redefine its role in the strategically important region of the South Caucasus. Thus, the partnership with Armenia signifies a test case for the EU's ability to effectively support partner countries in strategically sensitive regions and stabilise them in the long term.
[i] Prime Minister's Office of Armenia (2023): Crossroads of Peace Brochure, Accessed 27.04.2026.
[ii] European Parliament: EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), accessed on 27.04.2026.
[iii] Armenia Life (2025): Japan Stresses Importance of Joint Initiatives with Armenia and Deepening Mutually Beneficial Cooperation, accessed on 27.04.2026.
[iv] OC Media (2026): Russia Claims EU Accession could cost Armenia 23 per cent of GDP OC Media (2026): Solovyovs suggestion of special military operation, accessed on 27.04.2026.
[vi] IRI (2026): Public Opinion of Residents in Armenia, accessed on 27.04.2026.
[vii] Armenpress (2026): https://armenpress.am/en/article/1245964, accessed on 27.04.2026.
[viii] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-union-and-armenia-adopt-new-strategic-agenda-deepen-partnership-2025-12-02_en Retrieved 27.04.2026.
[ix] Jozwiak Rikard (2026): Wider Europe Briefing EU-Armenia Summit. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved 27.04.2026.
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