South Asia’s (Almost) Forgotten Climate Crisis and Europe’s Responsibility

The Great Collective Action Dilemma

The blatantly obvious facts underpinning the climate crisis, the rather simple science behind it and the horrific consequences are neither a secret nor particularly difficult to comprehend. And yet, the message has failed to hit home. Organisations and individuals with great authority, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), document, analyse and warn against anthropogenic damage to planetary health and portend the repercussions of anthropogenic climate change, such as heatwaves and wet-bulb temperatures, permanent loss of biodiversity, wildfires, tropical storms, the acidification of oceans and rising sea levels. Secondary consequences include the perpetuation of under-development in badly affected regions as well as unprecedented mass migration from tropical and dry (e.g. South Asia) towards temperate climate zones (e.g. Europe).

The list goes on – and so do anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are accelerating global warming. We can reasonably conclude that these anthropogenic emissions are not exclusively but predominantly the result of a still increasing burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) for both energy consumption and production of plastic, steel and more. This process releases carbon dioxide (CO₂) into the atmosphere, trapping heat and thereby increasing global land surface and oceanic temperatures at an alarming rate. At the same time, natural CO₂ sinks are reduced at similarly drastic rates through deforestation and acidification of maritime spaces.

As a result, 2023 was the hottest year on record and probably in over one hundred thousand years, with the global average near-surface temperature at 1.45 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial baseline. As the world registered its two hottest days on record in just two consecutive days in July 2024 (17.09 and 17.15 degrees Celsius), 2024 will trump 2023.

At the same time, the world – or rather the top 20 emitting economies – continue to emit ever-greater quantities of GHG. Current atmospheric CO₂ levels, the main heat-trapping GHG, are at approximately 423 parts per million (ppm) – 50 per cent higher than pre-industrial levels and the highest concentration of atmospheric CO₂ in about two million years. At the same time, the pressure on energy supply chains has shifted the balance between climate and energy security policies in favour of the latter, once again promoting the ostensible virtues of fossil energy sources, and coal in particular. Meanwhile, climate change continues relentlessly. The curve is, thus, not even bending yet.

While climate sensitivity – the relationship between GHG emissions and surface temperatures – is not entirely clear, albeit proven to be causal, the 1.5 degrees Celsius target often associated with the Paris Accord is far from reach. With current policies in place, 3 degrees Celsius is a likely scenario, and even if all states were to meet their climate pledges, which they are not even close to, 2.5 degrees Celsius would be a more realistic outcome. So-called one-hundred year floods are becoming 30-year floods, extreme heatwaves, droughts and wet-bulb temperatures increase in frequency, and crucial tipping points are already reached, including a loss of ice sheets in the Arctic during summer, rising sea levels and permanently uninhabitable spaces. Much faster progress on a much larger scale is needed in protecting our climate.

Yet, little attention is paid to this most fundamental crisis, and there is correspondingly little apparent urgency on the part of policy makers in industrialised economies to pursue mitigation efforts. Benefit-maximising behaviour trumps the urgency to pursue the just-about-tolerable path of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. After all, global warming is the ultimate free-rider problem. Cutting GHG emissions gives rise to economic and social costs for the state – at least in the near term – while the benefits of this cut would mostly be felt elsewhere. And vice versa, the consequences of emitting GHG in the atmosphere, the global commons, are felt globally, not nationally. Economists call this “negative externalities”: planetary costs are borne by society, not by the party causing them. In other words, while economic benefits are individualised, the planetary costs are socialised. Climate change is therefore the ultimate collective action problem.

The Consequences of Climate Change in South Asia

In Europe, climate change and the global warming that causes it are still relatively abstract threats. But for many countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the threat is as real as it is imminent. Arguably nowhere more so than in South Asia, which is one of the world’s most affected regions when it comes to weather and climate disasters. Here, the consequences of ever-increasing temperatures impact two billion people, one-fourth of the world’s population – the most densely populated region in the world. Experiences with climate change and its consequences are similar across South Asia; this predominantly entails increases in both occurrence and intensity of heavy rains and floods, heat waves, cyclones, droughts and devastated ecosystems, creating economic and indeed human losses, food insecurity, uninhabitable spaces and forced migration. At the same time, with its low GHG emissions and large CO₂ sinks, South Asia contributes only marginally to anthropogenic climate change.

In 2022, Pakistan was hit by devastating floods and it was not the first time. This was a “climate-induced, humanitarian disaster of epic proportions” according to the government, caused by a severe heatwave that melted glaciers and excessively high monsoon rains that were fed by increasingly moist air. The floods badly affected 33 million Pakistanis – about the entire population of Poland – with over 2,000 deaths and eight million internally displaced people (IDP), 15 billion US dollars in economic loss and a recovery fund amounting to 16 billion US dollars. And more severe floods have occurred since then, most notably in 2023 and 2024 in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

The monsoon, which shapes South Asia’s weather, seasons and culture, is a complex system that is undergoing dramatic change over a short period of time. As the air is getting hotter and thus holds more humidity, monsoon patterns are changing, becoming more erratic, less dependable, and – as the example in Pakistan shows – more dangerous. While the monsoon itself brings devastating rains, the pre-monsoon season brings prolonged heatwaves across the region. The 2024 pre-monsoon brought record-breaking heatwaves, when parts of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan recorded temperatures above 45 degrees Celsius, some parts above 50 degrees Celsius. In South Asia’s climate, sweat cannot evaporate in moisture-saturated air, and therefore does not cool the body. The “wet-bulb temperature” effect means that temperatures in South Asia above roughly 40 degrees Celsius cause excess heat deaths among children and the elderly, prevent children from attending school and virtually halt all outdoor activity and agricultural productivity, threatening food and economic security in parts of South Asia that are already poor. These heat records are now being broken almost every year.

In Nepal, among the most vulnerable countries in the world, climate change brings severe winter droughts and excessive monsoon flooding. The important winter season is becoming warmer and drier, bringing forest fires, melting glaciers and changing flora and fauna. Dry winters have a detrimental effect on the already astonishingly poor air quality – a phenomenon that anyone who has experienced a recent winter in Kathmandu can attest to. Two decades ago, mosquitoes were unheard of in the foothills of the Himalayas, whereas the mosquito-borne dengue is now an increasingly common deadly disease in this region as it gets warmer and wetter. During training conducted by the Regional Programme Energy Security and Climate Change Asia-Pacific (RECAP) of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung with locals in remote villages in these areas, small-hold farmers reported recent changes to their environment that presented a perfect summary of the climate change phenomenon; even though none of the farmers were aware of the concept of climate change at all. Besides the new occurrence of mosquitoes, other examples include unknown pests and overall decreasing harvest yields for previously fertile plants. The extensive use of pesticides and fertilisers is now imperative.

Likewise, the Tibetan Plateau, located at the intersection of Central, South and East Asia, is becoming warmer and wetter. The area is the source of some of the region’s major rivers, including the Mekong, Yangtze and Yalu River as well as Indus and Ganges. Whereas melting glaciers will raise water levels of the Mekong, Yangtze and Yalu River, the southern outflow regions are expected to experience a decline, resulting in critical water shortages for India, threatening irrigation, drinking water, industry, navigation and hydropower.

A significant number of South Asians live in coastal cities, many of them along the Bay of Bengal – the world’s largest bay. Many of these coastal cities have populations well above ten million, and the four largest (Karachi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Dhaka) are home to the equivalent of the entire population of France. As sea levels rise and tropical cyclones increase in severity due to warming oceans (the Indian Ocean is already one degree Celsius warmer than during the pre-industrial period), the force of climate change will increasingly drive migration away from these densely populated centres.

This list is far from complete. But all these examples demonstrate the extent and urgency of the challenge. And RECAP’s numerous engagements with South Asian stakeholders clearly show that both the public and the political and security establishment in South Asia are acutely aware that the anthropogenic climate crisis is the greatest security, economic and social crisis of all. In fact, discussions with the security community in Pakistan and Sri Lanka confirm that climate-induced threats to national security are high on national security agendas. And yet, this South Asian “new normal” tests the limits of governments. Ongoing rampant poverty, political and economic instability, the absence of regional cooperation and often modest local governance capacity impede Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and adaptation measures, despite substantial national efforts. In particular, the immediate impacts of extreme weather-related events require proper national DRM and functioning regional mechanisms for emergency relief.

The long-term impact, for example on migration or overall economic development, will be even harder to tackle: a changing climate and the increasingly extreme weather events have devastating effects on both the economy and, even worse, on the socio-economic well-being of a large and already struggling population. Economic fallouts for South Asia due to climate change are difficult to estimate in precise figures, but most approximations lie at around one trillion US dollars. The World Bank estimates that the repercussions of climate change in South Asia will well exceed the global average of 7 per cent GDP loss, with potential losses of 10 to 18 per cent.

The agricultural sector, a major source of employment and a main guarantor of local food security, is particularly affected. Extreme weather severely curtails labour productivity, making South Asia’s slow developing economies increasingly less competitive. This not only hinders growth and development, but also exacer­bates socio-economic gaps in these already unequal societies. The relatively poor, often day labourers, who are predominantly employed in outdoor sectors, such as construction and agriculture, lose their income and thus the ability to sustain their families. The disproportionate impact of climate change in less developed countries in South Asia (and Africa) will further widen the development gap vis-à-vis the industrialised economies in Europe and elsewhere, which will encourage migration flows at the very least. In sum, in addition to demographic shifts as well as violence and conflict, this makes climate change one of the three crucial drivers of human migration in the 21st century. Sudden impacts like floods or seasonal draughts and slow-onset impacts like water shortages or rises in sea level make large-scale migration necessary. This has already happened in Pakistan where millions of displaced people are looking for new opportunities.

RECAP witnessed first-hand how all South Asian states are investing in mitigation and adaption and are implementing climate solutions, including reforestation, shoreline resilience, building renewable energy infrastructure and electrifying their developing economies. Bhutan has become “net-negative”, as its economy offsets more CO₂ than it emits via sequestration by means of vast protected forests and exports of renewable electricity. Bhutan is indeed a small country, but so is Luxembourg, one of the highest per capita emitting economies. Rather than dismissing Bhutanese success due to its size, we should instead analyse its environmental accomplishments. These successes are mainly due to committed environmental policy making, including constitutionally anchored forest protection, prioritising renewables over fossil fuels and a ban on logging for export.

Yet, regardless of domestic policy challenges, the greatest obstacle is the absence of regional cooperation; safeguarding national sovereignty as well as mutual distrust impede the sharing of best practice. A lot could be gained from a united South Asian approach towards climate change adaptation and disaster prevention. Some years ago, Pakistani and Indian climate activists managed to meet regularly and exchange notes on heat mitigation plans and reforestation strategies. The respective governments are making this exchange among civil society increasingly difficult, and India-Pakistan relations would certainly benefit from a de-securitisation of all bilateral contact. Furthermore, upstream states should share real-time data on river flows with neighbours downstream, while Himalayan states can jointly monitor glaciers and coastal states can report on weather patterns. RECAP staff witnessed first-hand the poor resources that Sri Lanka’s only meteorological station has to draw on. India’s far more sophisticated installations could share advanced storm warnings. This would severely limit damage from floods and cyclones and also build a basis for trust in regional cooperation. The Mekong River Commission represents an example from Southeast Asia where this joint river management works reasonably well. What is more, China has helped India and Bangladesh to enhance their flood preparedness and response strategies on the Brahmaputra River during the monsoon season, saving thousands of lives. Equally important is that regional states must do more to support each other’s disaster management.

Unfortunately, that part of the world is arguably the most dysfunctional sub-region in terms of mutual trust and inter-governmental regionalism. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is de facto dysfunctional due to persistent rivalries and conflicts among its member countries, India and Pakistan in particular. Alternative mechanisms have failed to compensate for this lack of regionalism, hindering effective cooperation and decision-making across South Asia.

European Responsibility and Ecological Realism

Scaling up efforts across the region is imperative for regional resilience, and Europe has a unique responsibility to support it. This is both a matter of climate fairness as well as a realistic assessment of national interests. For one, miti­gation is the primary responsibility of both historical and current emitters. The United States is the greatest accumulated polluter, and while China, India and Russia are heavy emitters, European economies as a whole are historically the second largest polluters after the US. Conversely, India aside, South Asia’s emissions are negligible and must be balanced with their need for growth in order to escape still widespread poverty. And even India, the world’s most populous nation, contributes “only” seven per cent to global emissions nominally and only marginally per capita.

Despite being among the great historical emitters, Europe is currently far less affected by climate change than South Asia. This costs-by-cause perspective engenders the inescapable responsibility to pursue energy transition in Europe with greater speed and vigour, but also to support developing economies in both their adaptation efforts as well as on their journey towards green development. Indeed, much of the local debate in South Asia is about loss and damages and climate justice. While it would be difficult for industrialised nations to ignore two billion people speaking as one, the absence of regional cooperation impedes this once again.

Add to this rather idealistic motivation a dose of realism: viewing the preservation of the biosphere – this extends beyond just global warming – as a core national interest, even a matter of national security. Such ecological realism recognises that humanity depends on ecological integrity as we know it and that our behaviour is critical to protecting it. Ecological realism views the preservation of planetary functions as imperative to any other national objective – not unreasonable in light of the empirical evidence of anthropogenic damage to planetary integrity.

In particular, the decreasing habitability of tropical and dry regions gives rise to immense push factors, especially in badly affected rural areas, with potential large-scale cross-border migration. Large parts of central Pakistan have already become virtually uninhabitable and mass internal migration is already taking place. Despite being mainly domestic and regional at first, large-scale migration will exert substantial pressure on the capacities of South Asian countries. From a European perspective, the effects of these kinds of structural distortions in South Asia are too far-reaching to be ignored and will eventually be felt in terms of political instability across South Asia and eventual migration to Europe.

Equally realist is the recognition that energy security and climate change are inextricably linked. Production and energy consumption are the major drivers behind global warming, accounting for three quarters of GHG emissions. Transforming global energy systems is essential in order to meet climate ambitions as well as to guarantee available and affordable energy, i.e. energy security. In all fairness, the European Union, through the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other channels, has significantly contributed towards renewable energy infrastructure in South Asia. However, Europe’s, and other large emitters’, main way of assuming climate responsibility and ecological realism is urgent mitigation at home and abroad – a speedy and comprehensive energy transition beyond political debates about combustion engines and wind turbines. And in theory, the path is simple: the electrification of the economy coupled with a rapid super-scale roll-out of low-emission energy technology.

The cause also requires some unconventional thinking. Energy transitions have an illogically narrow national focus, given the transnational nature of GHG emissions. India is the third largest emitter in absolute numbers. The climate effect of one tonne of CO₂ emitted in India is the same as one tonne of CO₂ emitted in Germany. However, the cost of preventing the emission of this tonne is highly unequal. More specifically, if Germany invested one million euros in national energy transition by building a solar photovoltaic park, it could avoid x tonnes of GHG emissions. If Germany invested the same million euros in India, it could guarantee an emissions reduction of x times 100 due to lower labour and land costs there. Given that Germany currently accounts for two per cent of global GHG emissions and India for seven, while the effect of reducing CO₂ is independent from where it is emitted, this would be a highly worthwhile mitigation strategy. That is, if combatting global warming were indeed the primary objective.

Mitigation should also become a primary pillar of developmental models, allowing South Asian (and African) countries to seek international assistance to devise locally appropriate measures. For example, countries with CO₂ sink potential or unexploited fossil resources need to be compensated with CO₂ credit systems for large-scale reforestation, conservation and leaving fossil reserves in the ground. Industrialisation pathways should be primarily low-emissions pathways from the outset.

That notwithstanding, climate action in low-emitting South Asia primarily means adaptation. This includes climate-resilient agriculture and urban infrastructure as well as nature-based solutions to cool cities and proper water resource management. It also entails increasing the national and regional DRM and emergency response capacities. Heat action plans for the construction of adequate buildings and rehabilitating water structures are becoming increasingly important in temperate climate zones, too. Intra-regional cooperation in this space can be highly beneficial. This does not absolve South Asia of its mitigation responsibility but is a call to prioritise more tailored climate action. It requires Europe to support both mitigation and adaptation in South Asia and other vulnerable regions.

Dr Frederick Kliem is the former Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Energy Security and Climate Change Asia-Pacific (RECAP).

Timm Anton is the former Programme Manager of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Regional Programme Energy Security and Climate Change Asia-Pacific (RECAP). Für eine vollständige Version dieses Beitrags inkl. Quellenverweisen wählen Sie bitte das PDF-Format.