Issue: 3/2024
International Reports (IR): If you read texts about the political situation in France, you often come across the term polarisation. Strong fringes, weak centre – is this how France can be described, also in comparison to Germany?
Anja Czymmeck: Firstly, it has to be said that a certain degree of polarisation is a central component of the French political system. The Fifth Republic, with its majority voting system, is simply structured that way. For a long time, there were two large blocs, the right and the left, which decided the elections between them. That has changed. There are now three similarly strong blocs in the National Assembly, none of which has an absolute majority. The recent government formation has shown that this makes things rather complicated, notably because France, as compared to Germany, does not have a culture of coalition and compromise. Traditionally, there is a strong focus on political poles.
Basically, it can be said that the division in France has increased in recent years. There is great dissatisfaction with politics, which increases the willingness to vote for extreme forces. The traditional parties, such as the Parti Socialiste and the Républicains, are increasingly being pushed aside, and the fringes are growing.
IR: You mentioned the recent formation of the government. The backdrop to this was the result of the parliamentary election, which President Emmanuel Macron surprisingly called following the European election victory of Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement National (RN). None of the electoral alliances were able to achieve an absolute majority, and the discussions regarding government formation proved correspondingly complex. Macron finally appointed former EU Commissioner Michel Barnier as Prime Minister, a politician from the centre-right party Les Républicains, which had achieved a result of around five per cent in the elections. Is this solution suitable for bridging political rifts?
Czymmeck: Barnier is a renowned politician who represents a conservative course. Macron’s decision in his favour was a pragmatic one. He wanted to avoid appointing someone to form a government who would immediately have been ousted by a vote of no confidence in parliament. This is why he rejected the left-wing alliance’s proposal to appoint Lucie Castets, a top civil servant from the Paris administration.
However, this decision will not bridge the rifts. The left-wing bloc feels ignored, although its protagonists have shown no flexibility with regard to a possible compromise candidate. Even though they did not have a sufficient majority, they still insisted on their candidate.
The budget will now be the central issue for Barnier. He must submit a budget that receives a majority in parliament. To do this, he will probably need the Rassemblement National, which will gain a new position of power as a result. The question is how long this constellation will last. If Barnier does a good job, he may become too popular for the RN at some point.
IR: Talking about the left-wing forces: in the summer elections, they ran together in the ‘New Popular Front’ alliance, which was narrowly ahead in the end. This result was greeted with great relief by parts of the German public, despite the fact that the alliance also includes figures such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon and his La France Insoumise party, who are often categorised as belonging to the far left. How do you view that alliance?
Czymmeck: First of all, it must be said that it was quite a surprise that this alliance came about before the parliamentary elections. Previously, the formation of such an alliance had failed because the moderate forces did not agree with the left-wing populists around Mélenchon, who were very radical in the National Assembly. It is a very unusual partnership. The Socialists, for instance, are pro-European and have traditionally proved to be a constructive force. They are now in an alliance with left-wing populists who give you the feeling that they are simply against everything. They are attacking the pension reform, which was only achieved with great difficulty. As far as the budget is concerned, they have some mad ideas about where they want to spend money. It rather makes one wonder how all this is to be financed.
The differences of opinion between the individual alliance partners in the field of foreign policy are particularly serious. The left-wing populists, for instance, hold difficult positions with regard to the Russian attack on Ukraine, the European Union, Israel and the war in the Middle East. In the context of the Russian war of aggression, La France Insoumise has positioned itself against decisive support for Ukraine, and presents itself as a ‘peace party’. The party is deliberately promoting the image of the EU as a bureaucratic, undemocratic entity. In terms of economic policy, the party is calling for the abolition of the EU Stability Pact, while free trade agreements are also one of their red lines. The party is highly critical of Israel in the Middle East conflict, and MPs have repeatedly made anti-Semitic remarks. As far as the European Union or the war in Ukraine are concerned, there are definitely overlaps with the far right. The right-wing populists are also highly sceptical of the EU and NATO. What both extremes also have in common is a sceptical view of Germany. Both parties are very difficult for Franco-German relations, as they deliberately portray Germany as an enemy.
IR: The left-wing alliance was ultimately able to win at least a relative majority in the parliamentary elections because in many constituencies, the other parties joined forces after the first round of voting against RN candidates who had reached the second round: an agreement often referred to as ‘Republican Front’. How was this process discussed in the centre-right, given that in some cases it would have meant supporting far-left candidates? And is this procedure a sustainable response to the rise of the far right?
Czymmeck: The Republican Front has prevented right-wing populists from coming to power since the RN, formerly the Front National, experienced a major upswing in France. However, this front is now clearly crumbling. While the left-wing populists claim to be part of this firewall, it is difficult for the centre-right camp to make election recommendations for a party like La France Insoumise in a second round of voting. For French voters, there are sometimes very complex situations when they want to vote against the right-wing populists, but the candidate of the New Popular Front is a representative of the Mélenchon party. The elections this summer have clearly shown that some reform of the electoral system is likely to be indispensable in France if voters are not to be completely alienated. President Emmanuel Macron announced the introduction of elements of proportional representation back in 2017. However, there has been no reform to date, precisely because there is a fear that the right-wing populists will then be even more strongly represented in parliament.
IR: How do you explain the popularity of the political forces on the far left and far right?
Czymmeck: I had already hinted at it: my impression is that a pessimistic mood currently prevails in France. Many French people have economic worries; they fear for their livelihoods. Purchasing power was a major issue in the election campaign. The issue of migration is also significant, although France is not as affected by irregular immigration as Germany. These are issues that drive the French into the arms of the extreme parties. In addition, many people in rural areas in particular feel left behind and not understood. Politicians are perceived as arrogant and aloof. The right-wing populists, in particular, are capitalising on these sentiments. For instance, they turned the European elections into a plebiscite on the seven years of the Macron government – a place to vent discontent.
Nele Wissmann: Macron is well aware of this discontent among the French. There were already riots and the yellow vest movement a few years ago. Macron tried to counteract this with new grassroots democratic instruments such as citizens’ councils or consultations on topics such as climate change. However, one doesn’t get the feeling that this was really effective, partly because Macron simply cancelled many of the citizens’ proposals.
I have the impression that many voters see the political fringes as something like the last chance for change. Macron has also played a part in the situation. He disrupted the political landscape with his movement in such a way that there are currently hardly any moderate counter-offers. He also deliberately created the image of a duel between him and Le Pen. In other words: either my movement or the right wing populists. That is why the other parties have very little space, and the citizens have the feeling that this is the only offer available.
IR: Let’s look away from the political fringes. In Germany, the so-called political centre is a popular place that parties like to claim for themselves. What is it like in France? What role does the term “centre” play in political discourse?
Wissmann: In France, the Socialists and the Républicains, or the latter’s predecessor party UMP, represented the centre-left and centre-right as governing parties for a long time. The centre as a place of political practice therefore existed and still exists, although it is less common to refer to it openly. It is perhaps possible to name one party that explicitly links its identity with the political centre, and that sees itself as a centre party. This is the MoDem party, although it does not have many voters. A party like Les Républicains sees itself more on the right, the Socialist Party more on the left.
Czymmeck: In 2017, when Macron was so successful with his movement and became president, quite a few people thought that he would create a kind of new centre party. After all, his movement saw itself as neither left nor right. However, it has to be said that Macron has now moved significantly to the right, if one wants to use these categories. That surprised many people.
IR: Indeed, as you’ve noted, for many years, it was the centre-right Républicains, formerly under other names, and the centre-left Socialists who dominated France, and also catered to demand in the centre. That seems to be over. In the 2022 presidential election, the candidates of the two parties received just under five, and less than two per cent of the vote, respectively. Similarly, in the last parliamentary elections, they were far below their previous heights. Why is the situation so difficult for these once so influential parties?
Wissmann: Many voters are disappointed and are looking for polarising parties. In addition, the right-wing populists around Le Pen have succeeded in almost completely dominating the discourse on topics such as migration and security. This is a huge problem for the Républicains in particular. The Socialists, in turn, are coming under pressure from populism on the left.
As a general rule, however, one should not forget that the French party system is much more volatile than that of Germany, for instance. The Républicains have not existed in their current form for that long either, and the predecessor party also covered a broad spectrum of conservative, Christian democratic and liberal tendencies. There is currently a lot of movement in the centre-right camp, from which completely new alliances could emerge.
IR: Can the traditional parties do anything to improve their situation?
Wissmann: Firstly, it is of course true that a party like the Républicains has indeed suffered major losses at the national level. However, it is interesting to note that the situation differs at both municipal and regional levels, where the Républicains are actually quite successful. This shows that regional roots are still important and are recognised by voters. Many would prefer to have established local structures as opposed to parties that operate more like start-ups. A party like the Républicains must focus on this.
Czymmeck: Of course, the situation is difficult for the traditional parties. Le Pen’s RN is now the strongest single party in parliament. But as we have already discussed, there are reasons for this. If the new government led by Michel Barnier succeeds in implementing sensible policies and giving the country stability, something can come of it.
IR: These were foreseeably the last elections with Emmanuel Macron as president. It is hard to predict what will become of his political movement without him. Is it even possible today to make a serious assessment of where France will be politically in five years’ time?
Czymmeck: You would need a crystal ball for that. The party system is in a state of flux. Unlike in Germany, in France a politician’s affiliation to a party is much looser. Party changes are much more frequent. This makes predictions difficult. It will be interesting to see who will prevail at the head of Macron’s Renaissance party. Overall, it is startling to see how divided the political landscape is.
The interview was conducted by Sören Soika and Fabian Wagener – translated from German.
Anja Czymmeck is Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s France office.
Nele Wissmann is responsible for Analysis, Bilateral and European Affairs in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s France office.
