The EU and its global partners in a new legislative period

A changed lineup in a reshaped global landscape

The main driving force for a gradual change of the EU’s approach are the significant changes in the EU’s geopolitical environment. The EU has been dealing with the impact of a war at its immediate doorstep that poses an existential short-, mid- and long-term threat for the EU itself, it is still struggling to develop a common stance on the conflict in the Middle East. At the same time, it is facing an increasingly assertive China. All this comes against the backdrop of an incoming Trump administration that will not only demand a higher European contribution to its own security, but also may test the resolve of the EU in the future. Overall, the general outlook has become more bleak, a stark contrast to the more ambitious and optimistic mood of 2019.

Secondly, there appears to be a growing recognition that the EU’s influence on countries outside of Europe is not as strong as it might have originally expected it to be. The EU struggled to finalise trade agreements with like-minded partners in the past legislative period. Its international partners are more determined both in multilateral fora and in bilateral talks and demand a more equal treatment. The global appeal of the EU remains strong, but the EU is by no means considered the only game in town. The so-called Brussels effect of EU legislation which presumes that EU regulations and laws will be emulated on a global level is very limited in some areas. Some of the legislation that the EU passed in the context of the Green Deal has caused irritations among many of its global partners, be it the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) or even more so the EU deforestation initiative[1]. When it comes to its development policy, several critical voices inside and outside the institutions have noted that the EU’s policies lacked prioritization, a comprehensive strategy and were not sufficiently considering the EU’s and the target country’s interests.

Thirdly, the European Parliament elections have led to a significant shift of the European Parliament to the right of the political spectrum – with some impact on its foreign policy stance: The right-wing ECR and the newly formed far-right Patriots group are among the winners of the elections, so is the traditionally pro-European centre-right group of the EPP. At the same time the (pro-European) centre of EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens still commands more than 60% of the seats. Both these tendencies translate into the foreign policy orientation of the new EP. It can be expected that most decisions on foreign policy will still be supported by a broad consensus of the pro-European groups, i.e. EPP, S&D, Renew often joined by the Greens and/or parts of the moderately Eurosceptic ECR group. However, the new setup of the EP has shown that different majorities may be an option on a case-by-case basis: In September 2024 a resolution that recognized Edmundo Gonzalez Urruita as the rightfully elected president of Venezuela passed with the votes of the EPP and the ECR but also the far-right Patriots for Europe group, while S&D and Greens as well as the far-left voted against. While this can be expected to be rather an exception than the rule, it was a first signal by the EPP that it may look for flexible majorities if absolutely necessary.

Given the political affiliations of national governments, the victory of the EPP and the slight move to the right of the EU in the EP has also shifted the new Commission politically towards the centre-right: 14 Commissioners are hailing from the EPP or can be considered close to it, 4-5 from Commissioners are each from the Socialist or the liberal Renew family while one each is ECR, close to the Patriots or Independent.

General trends: more pragmatism and realism in an age of geopolitical rivalries

The political guidelines that Commission President von der Leyen published in September set the tone for the general outlook for the EU in the coming years. They acknowledge that “we have entered an age of geostrategic rivalries”. The guidelines themselves are not (in tone or direction) a complete break with the EU’s foreign policy but they mark a more sober and unfiltered tone than in previous years..

In general, the EU is expected to pursue a somewhat more ‘pragmatic’ approach towards its global partners. Even before the EP elections, some Commission officials admitted that the approach to do “less preaching and more practicing” was gaining traction. One important sign for this: The Global Gateway initiative is set to become an increasingly important tool in the EU’s partnership policy, with EU delegations playing a key role in promoting it as the EU's flagship initiative globally.

Another indication are the EU’s plans to adjust its global presence based on its priorities, improve coordination, and transition from relatively standardized EU delegations. An internal paper of the EEAS argues that the EU should enhance its presence in accession and neighborhood countries, G20 partner countries, regional and multilateral centres, emerging political and economic powers in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America and the Gulf and countries where instability poses a threat to EU’s interests.[2] In turn, the EU will likely reduce its presence in other countries, particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa.

Thirdly, the EU recognizes that relations with global partners will have to be reflected in more equal partnerships: the political guidelines of von der Leyen state that the EU needs to “listen and respond better to the concerns of our partners impacted by European legislation, in particular those linked to the European Green Deal.[3]

The messages when it comes to trade relations are mixed: on one hand, the EU is likely to continue its efforts to finalize free trade agreements with key countries like India, the Philippines, and Thailand, while on the other hand, it will also take stronger actions to secure supply chains. The mere fact that the title of the Trade Commissioner also contains “economic security” is a nod towards a more cautious approach. Several commissioners highlighted the need to conclude or deepen (i.a. with the DR Congo) raw material partnerships.

The EU will also attempt to strengthen its capacity as a security actor: the appointment of a separate Defense Commissioner (the former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius, EPP) is a clear signal in that regard. His appointment and the choice of the former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as High Representative and Vice-President are clear messages towards Russia that the second von der Leyen Commission will not soften its stance or conduct foreign and security policy without the involvement of smaller member states.

An issue where the positioning has shifted compared to five years ago, is the relation with China. While China has until recently been referred to as a partner, competitor and rival, the current document clearly emphasizes competition and rivalry – due inter alia to unfair practices, and China’s “no-limits” friendship with Russia The guidelines as well as various Commissioners advocate for a de-risking approach towards China, reducing Europe’s economic dependencies. In its relations with Africa, the new EU leadership emphasizes the importance of an "equal" partnership. Latin America is highlighted in the context of the Mercosur trade agreements and as a like-minded region on the global stage, while the Mediterranean is viewed as a central hub for renewable energy projects. Despite those significant shifts, there is still a lot of continuity in the EU’s approach: it remains a strong supporter of multilateral institutions (incl. a strong support for a reformed WTO). While the role of the EU as a force promoting democracy has not been highlighted as much in the guidelines, mission letters and hearings, several Commissioners have referred to the importance of the EU’s values, to fight disinformation and to contribute to democratic resilience. The ‘democracy’-portfolio explicitly features in the portfolio title of two Commissioners (Executive Vice-President Henna Virkkunen (EPP) and Michael McGrath (Renew)).

Priorities of the incoming Commissioners – ’Principled pragmatism 2.0’?

As in previous legislative periods, different European Commissioners will deal with different aspects of the relations with the EU’s global partners outside of Europe. Except for the Dutch Christian Democrat Wopke Hoekstra who will more or less retain a similar portfolio (climate), all of the candidates that occupy a foreign relations related portfolio will be either new on that post (Maroš Šefčovič, Dubravka Suica) or be complete newcomers in the European Commission as such (Hadja Lahbib, Kaja Kallas, Jozef Sikela).

While crises and global developments will guide and determine the agenda, it is still worthwhile examining both the mission letters and the EP hearings of the new Commissioners that took place in November 2024.

The most senior figure (aside from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen) in the new European Commission is High Representative (HR) of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy, the former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas. She distinguishes herself from her predecessors in various ways: she is the first HR who is not a Socialist (but a liberal) and the first one that hails from a country that only joined the EU in 2004. Not surprisingly, her hearing revealed a strong commitment to sustained military, economic and political support for Ukraine against the Russian aggression and a strong supporter for Ukraine’s EU accession. She clearly stated that Ukraine’s victory was her priority, calling for each member state to spend 0,25% of GDP for Ukraine and urging that frozen Russian assets should be used to rebuild Ukraine. She sees Russia as the principal actor undermining global stability and showed awareness of the mutual support of autocratic countries and forces. The fight against hybrid threats and disinformation will rank highly in her priorities. While very outspoken on Russia, Kallas was more cautious or general on other issues (e.g. Iran). Like other Commissioners she favors a de-risking approach towards China. Kallas also voiced support for modernization and trade agreements with countries like Mexico, Chile and Mercosur as a way to enhance economic cooperation and counterbalance Chinese influence, she equally emphasized the support for democratic resilience in nations like Venezuela or Cuba. Kallas described Latin America and the Caribbean as natural partners that share values and interests with the EU and made also a relatively strong plea to defend human rights, democracy and media freedom as core values of EU leadership, particularly in the fight against state-sponsored disinformation.  It now remains to be seen to what extent her house – the European External Action Service which has been coined to a certain extent by the Socialist or Social Democratic leadership – will see personnel changes. Her first two days in office and her very clear statements i.a. on the authoritarian crackdown in Georgia show already a different tone and imply that (as a former Prime Minister) she might interpret the role in a more decisive and assertive manner.

The new Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič (close to Smer which is currently excluded from the S&D) is a Brussels veteran and has been the Slovak Commissioner since 2009. The portfolio name already indicates that Šefčovič will have to find a balance between forging trade deals, enhancing rule-based trade, securing raw material deals on the one hand and strengthening supply chain resilience and mitigating economic risks by fortifying EU economic security on the other hand. In the hearing, he has championed the Critical Raw Materials deal and suggested Common Purchasing Mechanisms (!). He equally advocated for modernizing trade defence instruments, tighten investment screening and deploying export controls to counter economic coercion and unfair trade practices. With regard to China, Sefcovic emphasized de-risking and diversification, aiming to reduce dependencies by strengthening ties with India, Latin America, the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Sefcovic tried to assure the Parliament that he would resolutely defend European interests towards China; be it with regards to retaliatory measures taken against European farmers, be it regarding overcapacity. Some MEPs had voiced concern due to his closeness to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico who has pursued a complacent line on China. He seeks to position the EU as a global leader in sustainable development, transparent trade and economic security, thereby offering a credible alternative to China, particularly in regions where China’s presence has grown, focusing specifically on Latin America. In order to be more responsive to EU partners, Sefcovic stressed the importance of flexible agreements, i.e. at times rather sectoral than traditional full-scale agreements. When assessing ongoing discussions, Šefčovič was treading carefully: On the Mercosur-agreement he stressed that any final deal had to align with EU interests, particularly addressing environment and climate standards and concerns of European farmers. With regard to discussions with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines Šefčovič underlined the need to advance talks.

The Croat Commissioner Dubravka Šuica (EPP) is returning to the Commission college as the Commissioner for the Mediterranean. Creating this new portfolio sends a clear message that despite the focus on Ukraine and the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood, the EU sees the Southern Mediterranean as a region of crucial importance. The flagship initiative will be a “New Pact for the Mediterranean”, which Šuica also labeled as a pact for European competitiveness. This strategy is supposed to integrate questions of economic stability, job creation, migration management and promoting economic, energetic and digital connectivity. One key initiative under this pact is the development of a Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation initiative to boost renewable energy and clean tech manufacturing. The EU will also attempt to strengthen coordinated action in security and the fight against organized crime and terrorism. Šuica will have to coordinate closely with other Commissioners as her portfolio contains issues where other colleagues are likely to be in the lead, be it migration or the Middle East conflict. Šuica outlined plans to expand partnerships with Jordan and Morocco. While the general narrative mirrored the EU’s focus on economy, energy and migration, Šuica also committed to uphold and promote human rights standards. She equally emphasized the strategic importance of strengthening partnerships with the GCC as part of the EU’s broader Middle East Strategy, particularly in the context of the trans-Mediterranean energy and clean technology initiative but also regarding their contribution to regional stability.

Given that the measures taken in the context of the Green Deal have been attentively followed by third countries and have at times sparked controversy. One important dimension of the work of the Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth, Wopke Hoekstra (EPP, Netherlands) will thus be to focus on the international dimension, working with partners in the world and strengthening climate diplomacy, particularly with major emitters such as the US, China and India. In this role, Hoekstra’s task will contribute to the EU’s global climate and energy vision for the next COP in Brazil. His portfolio will thus also include the new Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships to help secure supply of raw materials, clean energy and clean tech from across the world. During the hearing, Hoekstra has stressed the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) as a key tool to achieve climate targets. He considers the controversial Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as an important instrument to prevent carbon leakage (and not as a trade measure): in order to ensure fair competition and protect industries, he advocates for accelerating the CBAM review to 2025 rather than waiting until 2027.

The “International Partnerships” portfolio is one where observers in Brussels expect the most significant changes. While the previous Commissioner, the Finnish Social Democrat Jutta Urpilainen was still following a relatively classical interpretation of the EU’s development policy, the former Czech trade minister Jozef Síkela (nominated by STAN which is a member of the EPP Group in the EP) is expected to bring a more business-oriented perspective to Brussels. His main task will be to take the Global Gateway initiative ‘to the next level’ and ensure its key role to support global connectivity and investment. During his hearing, Síkela set out six priorities: mobilizing investment, enhancing the Global Gateway’s flexibility for fast-track projects, combating causes for irregular migration, conflict prevention and good governance; mutually beneficial partnerships and alignment with the sustainability objectives of the Green Deal. Overall, he stressed a stronger inclusion of the business sector in global gateway, enhancing public-private partnerships to de-risk investments and advocated regular monitoring as well as setting realistic targets. He also emphasized the importance of the “Team Europe approach”, i.e. a stronger involvement of EU member states and development banks. Síkela also raised concerns about procurement rules that let European funded projects to select Chinese suppliers instead of local or European providers. Despite the strong prioritization of Global Gateway as key tool of the EU’s future partnership policy, Síkela appeased fears by NGOs underlining that there was still room for “classic” development policy. He also stressed the importance of maintaining human rights and sustainability standards, including in the EU’s raw materials partnerships. Síkela also emphasized the importance of strengthening the partnership with the African continent in the backdrop of strong influence from Russia and China and showed openness to examine the possibilities of debt relief for partners of the EU.

The new Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management, the former Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib (Renew) emphasized the EU’s shift from reactive to proactive crisis preparedness. Thus, a new EU Preparedness Union Strategy will focus on anticipation, preventing and managing disasters. Climate resilience will equally be a key focus, along with strengthening readiness for public health emergencies and other threats based on lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic. Lahbib committed to the “triple nexus” approach integrating humanitarian, development and peace efforts. She committed to dedicating 15% of humanitarian aid to lesser-known conflicts. In relations to questions on the heavily criticized UN agency UNRWA, Lahbib referred to investigations that supported UNRWA’s “irreplaceable role”. When it comes to the growing gap between humanitarian needs and available funding, Lahbib emphasized the importance to broaden the donor base and enhance private sector involvement.

Commentary – a challenging balance and the crucial role of EU member states

Some first impressions offer hope for the coming years: the more realistic and sober tone, the clear messaging of the new High Representative, the planned increased private sector-involvement in the EU’s partnership policy, the commitment to forge truly equal partnerships and the attempt to engage in “principled pragmatism” (again)[4]. Nonetheless, the EU will face very difficult balancing acts and challenges:

Firstly, an equilibrium will have to be found between the new emphasis on infrastructure with the enhanced Global Gateway, the (still needed) traditional development policies and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the EU will have to find a balance between interest-driven pragmatism and maintaining its role as one of the (few) global promoters of democracy. While the “how” of the EU’s democracy promotion efforts certainly deserves critical scrutiny, the EU is still considered by many as an important ally in the fight against increasingly assertive autocratic tendencies worldwide.

While prioritization, both thematically and geographically, is welcome, the EU must approach this carefully. It should avoid alienating global partners who may not meet the above-mentioned criteria outlined in the internal EEAS paper but remain reliable, like-minded allies when it comes to the EU's values, such as in the UN and other multilateral forums. In an era of increasingly assertive autocracies, it will remain important to not forget smaller or middle-sized like-minded countries.

The successful support for Ukraine will remain the ultimate litmus test for the EU’s global credibility; it is thus understandable that it is the key priority of the new HR. It will nonetheless remain crucial not to neglect countries in other regions – in this context the signal towards close allies in the Mediterranean region is important. Strengthening ties to partners in crucial regions like the Indo-Pacific will need more than the creation of regional fora which include extremely different countries with extremely different degrees of ambition and compatibility with the EU’s interests and values. Rather, the EU’s global credibility will be determined by its ability to deliver concrete results – which will be measured i.a. by the conclusion of trade agreements, meaningful global gateway projects and tangible forms of political support. Experts and diplomats from important global partner countries emphasized in the past months that there is little patience to attend ceremonial summit meetings that produce little more than joint statements. The EU-AU summit in 2025 will be a first test case for this. It will equally be crucial that the strategy towards China is not only based on strategies and intentions. Instead, concrete action will be required, for example by securing supply chains for rare earths.  As partners from friendly countries such as Canada or Australia regularly remind the EU these days: The time for naivety should be over. 

The EU has no choice but to prepare itself for more conflict, not less. Its credibility will thus also depend on increasing defence spending way beyond the 2% of GDP and the creation of a real single defence market. The strengthening of European production and industry are therefore not a choice but a necessity. Or, as the new Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius has put it,” If you want peace, prepare for war”.

The EU’s ability to forge stronger partnerships and to increase its global strength will require to make hurtful compromises and thinking beyond short-term national interests – a very challenging task as several governments are under strong pressure at home. The German vote against tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and the continued opposition of France and other EU member states against the Mercosur trade agreement demonstrate that even EU founding members have still a long way to go.

Another challenge will be to enhance its partnerships with key partners without having more means to do so – particularly while a significant amount of political and financial resources will (rightfully) continue to be directed towards Ukraine. The new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) which would allow a significant re-alignment of priorities, and a re-allocation of resources will only enter into force in 2028.

A stronger global role of the EU will depend on a harmonious cooperation between key players both in the Commission and the European Council; it will be crucial that the Commission President, the incoming President of the European Council (former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa) and the new High Representative find a better balance and division of tasks than their predecessors did in the past five years. At the same time, many aspects of the EU’s foreign policy remain intergovernmental and on key issues (Middle East, geographical prioritization and China) divisions remain despite some progress towards consensus. It would be crucial that member states leaders have the courage to think not only in categories of national but also in a term of long-term European interests. Even the best and most geo-strategic-minded Commission and European Parliament will not be able to make up for the current lack of European leadership at the European Council. Both France and Germany’s position’s ability to lead in that forum have taken a serious hit. For different reasons, neither Spain nor Italy can currently compensate this void. While Poland and its Prime Minister enjoy a high level of respect and are exercising a leadership role to some extent, it equally cannot make-up for the gap left by France and Germany. The next German chancellor will thus immediately face a strong demand to contribute significantly to the European Council and to exercise European leadership – in coordination with other key players.

Above all this looms the perspective of the second Trump administration: while appeals are legitimate that “the EU must finally get its act together” and “deliver” it remains to be seen whether the EU will actually be able to take the necessary steps.

[1] In May 2024, several WTO members have asked the EU to delay applying its rules on imported deforestation: AGENCE EUROPE - A number of WTO members ask EU to delay applying its rules o...

[2] https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/25/doc_1.pdf

[3] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf

[4] The notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ has been there for a decade (at least) which demonstrates that finding an equilibrium is not a new challenge.