Relations with the United States were of overwhelming importance in Japan’s foreign relations at the start of the postwar period. Consequently, the relative weight of relations with Europe declined significantly compared to the prewar period. Circumstances changed due to Japan’s rapid economic growth of the 1960s, its membership in the G7 beginning in 1975, and the full return and growing role of Japan in the international community as a major economic power and relations with Europe began to once again deepen and expand. However, the focus of attention during this period was the trade friction that characterized the relationship between Japan and Europe. As a result, the history of Japan-Europe
relations was frequently understood to be one of trade friction.
This situation also began to change in the mid-1990s. While economic ties continued to deepen, there was now a growing interest in political relations as dialogue and cooperation moved forward in the area of foreign policy and security. These developments led to the emergence of new forms of Japan-Europe relations. In terms of Japan’s relations with the European Union (EU), the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) both signed in July 2018 marked a critical turning point. In the meantime, Japan has been deepening its bilateral ties with such major European countries as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These newly developed relations go beyond economic ties and the security and defense dimensions have been gaining traction in recent years. This can be seen as the emergence of new Japan-Europe relations in the age of the Indo-Pacific.
This article reviews the extent to which Japan’s relations with the EU (and its predecessor, the European Communities: EC) and the United Kingdom, France, and Germany developed while also identifying the place of Europe in Japan’s foreign relations.
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