Like Germany, Japan was occupied by Allied Forces following its defeat in World War II. One of the objectives of the Allied Occupation was to demilitarize the country. The Imperial Army and Navy were duly disbanded, and Japan was disarmed. Under this policy, and under instructions from Occupation forces, a new constitution was drawn up. This was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and came into force on May 3, 1947. Article 9 of the Constitution contained the following provisions:
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
(Clause 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
In renouncing “war” as defined as wars of invasion, there is nothing particularly unusual about the first part of Article 9 in terms of international law. The distinctive aspect is the provisions in Clause 2, that is, the clear declaration that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential (senryoku), will never be maintained.” This clause led some people to make the extreme case that Japan was not allowed to exercise the right of self-defense and could not maintain defensive forces of any kind. But such extreme views were never realistic and by the middle of the 1950s—after some fierce debate—the position of the Japanese government was that even under Article 9, Japan was entitled to exercise the right of self-defense, and could also maintain defensive forces within certain limits. The present Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) were established on July 1, 1954.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on February 24, 2022, as well as growing concerns in recent years about the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, have had a major impact on Japanese people’s views of national security. In a poll of Japanese voters by the Asahi Shimbun in April 2022, more than 60% of respondents agreed for the first time that Japan should strengthen its defense capabilities. On December 16, 2022, the government carried out revisions to the “three national security documents” (the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program). The headline points have been the aim to increase the size of the defense budget to around 2% of GDP (from a previous level of around 1%), and the decision to develop a “counterstrike capability” that will allow Japan to hit belligerent missile bases overseas that might be used to launch missile attacks against Japan.
Meanwhile, the Constitution itself, including Article 9, has not been revised once since it was enacted shortly after World War II. The hurdles to constitutional amendment are high, requiring at least two-thirds approval of all the members of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors as well as majority support in a national referendum. Balancing a realistic response to Japan’s actual security environment with the restrictions of Article 9 will continue to be an unavoidable point of contention for anyone considering Japanese national security policy in the years to come.
Read the whole chapter here.
The views, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the view of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, or its employees.